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AN HISTORICAL RETROSPECT¹

THREE hundred years ago—almost within the month—the Pilgrims sailed into Provincetown Harbor. As the *Mayflower* approached the point of Cape Cod, the men, or most of them, set their names to the ever memorable Mayflower Compact. By this they acknowledged allegiance to the English king and agreed for the immediate future to obey any orders that should be adopted by the majority of those who signed this compact. Five weeks later, lacking one day, the Pilgrim ship anchored in Plymouth Harbor. The months that followed were among the most heart-rending in the history of colonization. For days and weeks, the Pilgrim survivors forebore all work and devoted themselves to nursing the sick and the dying on the ship and in the rude hut that they had built upon the land. Sometimes but six or seven of them had strength to care for the rest and to bury those whom death had claimed within the last hours. When the *Mayflower* sailed for home in April, 1621, forty-eight of her passengers—nearly one-half of the whole number—were dead. Of the eighteen married women, who looked out on the sandy shores of Cape Cod as the ship turned into her first mooring-place, but four were living. The fourteen dead had spent themselves that their husbands and children might live. It is the heroism of this pathetic tragedy that gives the Pilgrim story its place in our annals, for the *Mayflower* brought to our shores the spirit of homely duty—even more important, perhaps, than the principle of majority rule.

Two hundred years passed away and in 1820, just a century ago, came one of those crises in our history that yielded to the common sense of the American people. For some reason, not now apparent, the question of slavery and freedom suddenly interjected itself into

¹ Presidential address to the American Historical Association, delivered at Washington on the evening of December 27, 1920.

politics. Slavery had existed in the Missouri settlements since the early days; but, somehow, the Northern abolitionists regarded the continued existence of slavery there as an extension of the malign institution. And in a sense they were right, for, in the conditions then prevailing, the continuance of slavery in Missouri meant the extension of the slave system. The Missouri people felt that they were protected in their rights to their slaves by the terms of the Louisiana Purchase treaty which guaranteed rights of property to the people living in the ceded country. Slaves were their property and, therefore, the institution of slavery being guaranteed by a treaty was under the protection of the supreme law of the land. For a time, the disputation was violent in Congress and in the country. President Monroe predicted that the controversy would be "winked away" by a compromise. And so it was, for thirty years and more. But John Quincy Adams, Monroe's secretary of state, jotting down the President's remarks in his ever memorable "Diary", expressed his own opinion that the slavery contest would outlast both Monroe and himself—and so it did. The Missouri Compromise, as Jefferson said, sounded like a "bell in the night". It was the first utterance of the North on the Southern labor problem and was the first protest of Southern employers against interference with labor conditions that had come down to them from their fathers. At that time and thereafter they were developing the cultivation of cotton with slave labor and with every probability of enormous profit. The Southerners looked upon themselves as the best people in the United States. The abolitionists asked them to change their whole social condition. They refused. They preferred separate existence out of the Union to social revolution within. In 1850, secession came near and was only averted by the Compromise. At the time, most people in the North looked upon it as a Southern victory. One man in the South, William Lowndes Yancey, saw that it was a Southern defeat and strove against its acceptance, but in vain. Of the Northerners, Daniel Webster saw clearly that it was a victory for the North, notwithstanding the new Fugitive Slave Law. He strove to tell this to his fellow-countrymen and was denounced as a traitor. Time was what the North needed, for it was growing stronger every day in comparison with the South. Time also was needed for the people of the North to make up their minds to risk themselves and their fortunes for the cause of the Union. Had secession come in 1850, the South might well have succeeded. Had it been averted in 1860, another ten years would have so changed the economic and social relations of the inhabitants of the Ohio Valley that successful

Southern secession would have been out of the question. The Compromises of 1820 and 1850 were therefore among the most fortunate events in our history, for they postponed the War for Southern Independence until the forces of liberty had strengthened themselves for the encounter.

The hundred years between 1820 and our own time are without counterpart in the history of the world. The new era began in 1815 with the ratification of the Treaty of Ghent and with the battle of Waterloo. It began at the ending of the long series of wars extending with intervals of armed peace from 1756 to 1815. War in itself is the most dreadful scourge that afflicts humanity. It has another side, however, for it loosens the mind and leads men to take new views and to put into execution ideas that have long been dormant. In peaceful days, all our rules and regulations are directed to the preservation of life, liberty, and property. In war, our efforts are to destroy the enemy, his life and his property, or to enslave him and to convert his property to our own use. The whole bases of ordinary action break down and men emerge from such a condition of being, some of them filled with high ideals for the regeneration of humanity, others with the fiercest longings for material gain. The next half-century saw a rebuilding of society and a development of the world's resources that was without parallel up to that time.

The most significant fact in the development of the United States between 1815 and 1865 was the installation of new systems of transportation of men and goods and the transmission of intelligence and administrative orders. One succeeded another: the stone road, the steamboat, the canal, the steam locomotive, and finally, in the last half-century, the electrically propelled vehicle and the conveyance driven by the internal-combustion engine on the land and on the sea and under it and in the air. The new methods of transmission of intelligence likewise followed on the heels of one another by wire and by wireless over the land, under the sea, and through the air. No sooner had one of these methods of transportation and transmission approached perfection than a new one appeared and pushed its rival aside. In this century, the obstacles of distance, mountains, oceans, climates, and time have been overcome until the earth is now smaller than the United States was in 1789.

This ever increasing mobility of men, of commodities, and of intelligence has newly modelled government and society in peace and in war. By bringing about association of men and of women of similar ways of thinking, it has made possible the carrying out of great reformations, and the establishment of democracy on a great

scale—it has enabled democracy to expand from the town and city to the state and the nation, and possibly throughout the world. The ever widening area whence material for manufacturing can be drawn and from which labor can be summoned and the ever increasing distances to which goods can be sent and sold have changed the whole bases of production—of agriculture as well as of manufacturing. The successor of the household manufacturer, the small employer of labor, under these circumstances withdrew from contact with his half-dozen or score of working men with whom he himself had labored. He sat apart in a counting-room and there busied himself with affairs of money, with contracts for supplies, with the promotion of sales, and with the general oversight of the factory itself. From being the first of a limited number of working-men he became a capitalist. With the development of transportation and transmission, his activities and those of his successors constantly enlarged until, now one man controls production in many towns and sometimes in many countries and directs the movements of thousands of employees. Similarly the working-man from being the associate of the employer became one of a class apart. Furthermore, with the development of machinery, he has lost completely the joy of production—of seeing something grow under his hand to a complete and worthy whole—and is simply a superior cog in the machine whose movements he directs. New systems of transportation made it possible for the employer to draw labor from a distance. They also made it possible for the working people in trades to combine and by concerted action to put pressure upon their employers and to prevent the importation of working-men from outside. As transportation has developed, so the combination of working-men has grown until now class interests have leaped over political and racial limits and passed over oceans and mountains.

In agriculture the same process can be traced. In the good old colonial days, negro slavery was a patriarchal institution. By 1830, it was fast losing its old-time character and was entering upon the capitalistic stage. The master, from working in the field with his two or three sons and half-dozen slaves, or from personally overseeing the labors of twenty-five or thirty negroes, became the owner of hundreds of slaves, working them through an overseer whose best recommendation was the largest amount of production he could secure from a given number of field hands without a lessening of the physical powers of the slaves or arousing insurrection. The new slavery created new conditions for the master, for the slave, and for the free wage-earners of the North. Slavery had always

been opposed, but the opposition to it was academic until the development of transportation brought the two systems into contact. Then came a demand for immediate abolition without compensation that came near rending the country in twain.

In the North the development of agriculture proceeded on much less revolutionary lines for half a century. The development of transportation made possible the settlement of the Ohio Valley, the lands contiguous to the Great Lakes, and the region beyond the Mississippi, with a rapidity and a certainty that would otherwise have been impossible. The great movement to Transappalachia is without parallel. Its only analogy is the coming of the Germanic hordes into western and central Europe. The western movement in our own country differs from the latter, however, in that it was the conquering march of civilization and not the replacement of one civilization by another. Until 1850, this westward movement was the transference of old race-elements from the Atlantic seaboard to the regions over the mountains and on the shores of the Lakes. It put a tremendous strain upon the rural population of the Original Thirteen, especially because it was accompanied by a contemporaneous movement from the farms to the centres of commerce and manufacturing. In the early decades the westward migrants busied themselves in overcoming the forested areas; but by 1860 they were moving out onto the prairies and later to the Great Plains. Every decade since 1850 has seen the application of the capitalistic system more and more to the cultivation of corn and wheat lands. Now, it may fairly be said that staple agriculture is on all fours with capitalistic manufacturing. It depends upon the application of chemical and mechanical devices to the raising of staple crops. No longer do the farmer and his son and hired men work from morning till night with the animals of the farm and rely upon them for giving renewed fertility to the soil. Now, one man with a tractor does the work of ten men and a hundred animals and the renewal of the elements taken from the soil is made possible by the application of chemical fertilizer. Agriculture is now as much manufacturing, or nearly as much, as the directing of a machine within the four walls of a factory. And here again the laborer has lost that touch with nature that gave joy to work. And the farming owner, himself, has become a capitalist and is busied with the same problems of credit and finance, of buying and selling, that beset the head of a woollen factory or of a series of woollen factories. The farm hands no longer live on the farm from winter to summer and again to winter, in association with its fields and ponds and wooded lands.

They now serve for a short time in the growing months or travel in gangs, following the seasons from south to north. Moreover, agriculture is falling into the hands of corporations which either let out lands to tenants or themselves work them on an immense scale.

The development of transportation has made possible the congregation of masses of human beings within limited areas by bringing to them the necessities of life—heat, water, and food—with a regularity that has become so commonplace that we realize it only when it breaks down. At the beginning of the Wonderful Century, a working-man was obliged to live near his place of employment, for there was no attempt at public urban conveyance until well into the century, and even then it was confined to the few largest towns. New York was enabled to grow by reason of its accessibility to steamboat traffic connecting it with the farms and producing areas of New Jersey, the Hudson Valley, and the shores of Long Island Sound. Its growth has been so remarkable that nowadays as many people live within a thirty-mile radius of the New York custom-house as in the whole westernmost part of the United States from the 104th meridian—the western limit of the Dakotas and Nebraska—westward to the shores of the Pacific Ocean, and there are more people nowadays within that thirty-mile radius than there were in the whole United States in 1810. New York is the great example, but throughout the country, especially in the north-eastern portion, there are cities and towns almost without number. And, indeed, the last census enumeration for the first time gives the urban population as greater than the rural. This massing of human beings within limited spaces has brought about new problems of control and has given rise to new theories of living, to what is called the community spirit. The Jeffersonian idea of the dignity of the individual has disappeared. Now, men and women belong to society and not to themselves.

In these hundred years from 1820 to 1920, the human horizon has completely altered. The amelioration of humanity and not the coercion of the mentally or physically weaker members of society has become the guiding principle of legislation. In 1820 colonial ideas that had come to us from across the sea and had been somewhat changed by contact with the wilderness were still the basis of our modes of action. We had gone away for the most part from the pillory and the whipping-post, but we had placed nothing effective or humane in their stead. Now the mode of treatment of crime was revolutionized. New systems of punishment and of reformation were devised which were practically those in existence in 1900.

In the last twenty years they have been somewhat ameliorated and somewhat changed. In 1820, the poor debtor was still regarded as a criminal and was treated as such, with the result that one who looks into the statistics of those days can hardly believe what he reads. The insane were then also treated as if guilty of some crime, although what it was no one could tell. By 1850, they were no longer so regarded, but were treated as victims of disease. Let us hope that the reformation of the criminal and the curing of the insane are more successful than would seem to be from a study of the statistics.

The prosperity of the American people, their need for workers of all grades, and their liberality to newcomers have brought to our shores great masses of people from all parts of the world. From 1800 to 1840 there was very slight immigration from any part of the world. With the fifth decade began the great westward movement of Europeans, from Great Britain and Ireland, from Scandinavia, and from Germany. Some of these people had peculiar ideas and looked upon the United States as a fertile field upon which to try new experiments, especially in community living, and some of these newcomers from Europe felt themselves called upon to effect a reformation in the modes of thought and of action of the descendants of the old Revolutionary population. Their numbers and their ideas aroused the fears of some of our people and led to the formation of a party to regulate those already here and to hinder the coming of others. The War for Southern Independence and the tremendous demand for labor that followed it put an end for a time to these jealousies or to the manifestation of them. In more recent years a change has come over the character of the migration and a corresponding change in the attitude of the American people toward the immigrants. There is no longer room for them on the unoccupied acres of Transappalachia, for those lands are already taken up by occupants or by capitalists—and there is no room on those acres for the native Americans who are forced by the newcomers from their homes and their farms and from the factories of the mill towns. The new migration, also, has been made up largely from peoples whose ideas are unlike those of ourselves. For the most part this is not in any way due to racial peculiarities. It is the result of the circumstances under which they have lived in their old homes. But it has seemed to many persons to threaten the stability of our institutions which depend absolutely upon obedience to the will of the majority for the time being. If we do not like the doings of the majority, we possess our souls in patience and set to work by pen

and speech to create a majority for our own ideas. Some of these newcomers also are willing to work and to live in ways that are distasteful to native Americans. Under these circumstances, it has seemed desirable to prohibit their pressing in. We have restricted or prohibited the coming of the Chinese, the Japanese, and other members of the yellow races. In 1917 Congress by law authorized the national government to refuse admission to anarchists, to contract laborers, and to those that cannot read in some language. Moreover, it empowered the authorities to deport any alien who shall at any time be found teaching or advocating the destruction of property, the overthrow of the government, or the assassination of its officers. The student of history pondering these facts and thinking of the ideas of Thomas Jefferson, of the Alien and Sedition acts, and of the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, cannot help wondering as to the wisdom of curbing in any way the freedom of speech and of writing. Looking backward farther, those ancient Puritans of Massachusetts come to his mind. They bought their lands, they brought over their property, their families, and their friends, and instituted the government that they thought was the best in the world. They then proceeded to deny admission to those who thought differently from themselves and to deport those who sought by speech and by action the overthrow of their government and the destruction of their property. Possibly it was for some such historical reason that this immigration law had been vetoed by President Taft and President Wilson and was only passed over the disapproval of the latter.

Viewing the century from a somewhat different angle, one is impressed with the way that the soul has been absolutely freed from governmental control—so long as it does not concern itself with government—and at the same time with the ever increasing control of the physical body of every individual by the community. In 1820 there were still religious disabilities in several states. In Maryland he who denied the divinity of Christ or he who uttered any profane words concerning the Holy Trinity faced the old law of 1723 that prescribed the boring of the tongue, the branding of the forehead, and, for the third offence, death. In New England, in Massachusetts, and in New Hampshire, the Roman Catholics lived at a distinct disadvantage compared with their fellowmen; in New York, the Roman Catholic immigrant was debarred from all chance to exercise political rights. The preceding half-century had been a time of reaction against state ecclesiasticism and, indeed, the Revolution had been partly fought as a protest against the close con-

nection of Church and State in England and in the empire. The reaction brought to the surface men and women of most radical ideas in religion. Some of them found relief in new sects; others helped in the up-building of Methodism, Presbyterianism, and other faiths; some of them followed religious leaders into Adventism, Mormonism, and other sects that combined their religious activities with some form of community living, as the Perfectionists, the Shakers, and the Rappists. Many good men and women found relief in no settled religion. The result was two-fold: great religious activity throughout the country among all classes of people, and the repealing of nearly every one of the religious laws on the statute books of the several states.

Contemporaneous with the growth of religious freedom was the propaganda against intemperance. After heavily discounting the assertions of the prohibition advocates of the third and fourth decades of the nineteenth century, it must be said that the consumption of alcohol was appalling and the effects of intemperance startling to the reader of letters and to the student of account-books of that day. It was seriously held by the great mass of our people then that alcoholic stimulation was necessary to severe exertion. The readjustment progressed until in the fifties in one-half of the states of the Union the sale of alcoholic beverages was either forbidden or was hedged about with restrictions that amounted almost to the same thing. The War wrought a distinct change and by 1870 only three states remained faithful to prohibition. Since then a new movement has resulted in the passage of an amendment to the federal Constitution. Simultaneously with the struggle for the elimination of alcoholic beverages, the states have constantly more and more taken under their control the physical well-being of their citizens. Now, men and women are limited in their working hours, and, indeed, are often forbidden to work at all. They cannot live in houses of their own choosing, but are strictly regulated. They cannot cross a street at will and must submit their bodies to precautions against disease that some members of the community view with abhorrence. Many of these restrictions are based on the ideas of men of science which change with every passing year. There has been a complete breaking away from the individualistic ideals that had their highest expression in the writings of Thomas Paine, and now men and women cheerfully yield their physical well-being to community control. As the historian looks back upon it, he cannot help questioning, possibly because he is necessarily of the departing generation. But is it not worth while remarking the eagerness

with which our people have given up all community control of the salvation of the soul eternal and have hedged about the doings of the ephemeral body of every man, woman, and child every hour of the day and night, and have denied the rights of speech and print to every alien, quite forgetful of the story of Thomas Cooper, J. Thomson Callender, and the other martyrs of "The Terror" of the close of the eighteenth century?

The year 1820 was at the end of the old education and the beginning of the new. The public schools of the country and the colleges were apparently at the lowest point in our history. In Massachusetts a blow had been dealt at the public grammar school by raising the limit of compulsion to establish such an institution from a town of one hundred families to two hundred. In Virginia, every attempt to found a system of public schools had been unsuccessful and the existing colleges were seemingly in the last throes of life. The University of Virginia was on the point of opening its doors, but the struggle of the founders of that institution to gain the necessary funds from the Virginia Assembly is one of the most interesting bits of pedagogical history. The next forty years saw a tremendous change in the importation of a modified Prussian system of governmental control of public education. The laboring men demanded facilities for their children without any stigma of charity, and got them. The sects were restricting the higher education of their children to colleges of their own faith. The result was a tremendous expansion of educational facilities. Everywhere, also, there was a demand for the diminution of classical requirements and the establishment of something resembling vocational training. To all of which it was replied that the mental discipline acquired from the study of the ancient languages could be used with great advantage in the pursuit of any business or profession. Unquestionably, the system of state-controlled as distinguished from town-controlled education has greatly improved the local educational institutions in every part of the country, and the establishment of normal schools and of innumerable small colleges has produced a procession of more or less well-trained teachers. After the close of the Civil War, with the revolutionary changes at Harvard and with the re-founding of the University of Michigan, the modern American university came into being. We are all conscious of what is going on around us to-day in the educational establishments and, in fact, most of us are taking part in the training of our fellow men and women. But may we not ask ourselves as to how superior our educational system is to that which produced Ralph Waldo Emerson, Edgar Allan Poe, Washington Irving, and William Gilmore Simms?

For half a century after the adoption of the Twelfth Amendment, although numberless attempts were made to further change the Constitution, nothing was accomplished. Within the last half-century we have been more successful in altering the fundamental law, and seven amendments have been adopted. One of these aimed to confer the franchise on the negroes and led to scenes of lawlessness that are still in the memory of a few of us here. Now the negro vote is largely non-existent in portions of the South. Yet the Southern states receive full representation and are better off politically than they were before 1860. The amendment carried with it the power of enforcement, but Congress has declined to act. Another of these amendments marked the development of nationalism. When the Constitution was adopted, each state, no matter what its population, was given two senators. The states were regarded as political entities and were given equal representation in one house of the federal legislature to safeguard their rights. The senators then were chosen by the state legislatures as representing the states in their corporate capacity. The march of nationalism and democracy demanding a change, the election of senators has been given to the voters of each state, thus doing away with their corporate character. But in making this change, we did not alter the basis of representation accordingly, with the result that one state to-day possessing as many inhabitants as a small, unknown city in Massachusetts has two votes in the Senate of the United States and, in the Electoral College, is distinctly over-represented.

Three of these later amendments, instead of being proposed by "two thirds of both houses" of the Congress were proposed by two-thirds of quorums of the two houses, and our Supreme Court has ruled that two-thirds of both houses are the same thing as two-thirds of quorums of both houses. And the people of the United States, apparently, have acquiesced in this ruling. One of the last two amendments was designed to prohibit the manufacture and sale of intoxicating beverages. Regardless of the experience of the earlier prohibition era, no adequate means have been taken to enforce this change in the social habits of the American people. Finally the electorate has been doubled by the extension of the ballot to women; but how far has the disfranchisement of negro men in the South been extended to negro women? In saying these things I am not at all to be understood as taking sides one way or the other as to the subject matter. In the changing march of political and social institutions, due in great measure to the ever increasing mobility of men and ideas, the change from federal republican institutions to those

of a more or less unified democracy has been inevitable and the change is not yet complete. It may well be asked, however, whether this piecemeal fitting of our fundamental law to new ideas is the best way of going about it. We began by being a federated republic. By the time of Jackson, democratic ideas had become firmly rooted in the minds of large portions of our people. Since then the march of social life in the North has been more and more toward direct government. Under these circumstances our fundamental law and the interpretation of it must more or less closely synchronize with the changing political ideals.

In these hundred years we have built up a marvellous industrial society, we have extended our limits to the Pacific, to the Gulf of Mexico, and even beyond to the islands of the sea. We have grown as a people from just under ten millions in 1820 to over one hundred millions to-day, not counting the inhabitants of the insular possessions and of Alaska. The public debt of 1830 that Andrew Jackson was so anxious to see paid off would be hardly visible on the treasury books of this year. Then, they talked in hundred of thousands and in millions of dollars; to-day we estimate our income and our payments in billions. We have established in this city a Federal Reserve Board composed of persons appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, and as students we ourselves study the papers of Andrew Jackson and Nicholas Biddle in the Library of Congress for evidences of evil resulting from the connection of the political government with the financial concerns of the country! In all this, in the evolution of the greatest industrial society that the world has ever seen, have we gained or have we lost? Are men and women to-day happier and better off, politically, spiritually, mentally, morally, and physically, than our ancestors were in the days of James Monroe, John Quincy Adams, John C. Calhoun, Henry Clay, Daniel Webster, and Andrew Jackson?

EDWARD CHANNING.

SOUTH RUSSIA IN THE PREHISTORIC AND CLASSICAL PERIOD

THOSE historians, both Russian and foreign, who endeavored to trace the outlines of the history of Russia, used to begin with the formation of a Scandinavian-Slavonic state at Kiev on the Dnieper in the ninth century A. D. This starting-point was determined by our historical tradition. The first Slavonic annals, compiled by monks of the Kiev monasteries, began to chronicle at this epoch the transactions of what was destined to become Russia, and modern historians were only too willing to follow the same path.¹

But by this method many vital questions of early Russian history remained unanswered and obscure. How could such an entirely uncivilized nation, as the Slavonic tribes were agreed to be, have had power to convert in a very short time the foreign conquerors—the Scandinavian ruling class—into pure Slavs in speech and customs? How could the state of Kiev develop such a brilliant civilization as that which has been made evident by recent excavations there?² How is one to explain the relations between the late Roman, that is, the Byzantine state and this new Slavonic kingdom on the Dnieper? How are we to understand the possibility of such a speedy development of the Christian faith in this new state? What were the reasons for the spread of the Kiev civilization throughout the different Slavonic and Finnish tribes in southern and central Russia?

It is clear that our Slavonic annals could not give an answer to these questions, though they are of the first importance. On the other side the Byzantine historians paid almost no attention to their northern neighbors and foes and were satisfied to record the various conflicts between the different northern tribes and the armed forces of Byzantium. The late Romans of this dark period had many

¹ See the last general treatments of Russian history, V. O. Kluchevski, *A History of Russia* (trans. by C. J. Hogarth), vol. I. (London and New York, 1911); S. Platonov, *Lectures on Russian History* (last edition, Petrograd, 1917; in Russian).

² Count T. Tolstoi and N. Kondakov, *Russian Antiquities*, vol. V. (St. Petersburg, 1897); N. Kondakov, *The Russian Treasures* (St. Petersburg, 1896); J. Grabar, *History of Russian Art*, vol. I., *Architecture* (Moscow, 1909). Reports of the new excavations in Kiev carried out by D. Mileev are printed in the *Reports of the Archaeological Commission for 1908–1915*; cf. *Bulletin de la Comm. Arch.* for the same years.

misfortunes to record, and the various important processes which developed behind the curtain of different Germanic, Iranian, and Mongolian tribes, who carried with them other tribes and peoples, remained unknown and uninteresting to them.

It is evident that the answer to the questions which I have sketched above *exempli causa* can be given only by investigating the successive stages of cultural development in South Russia at the time of the great migrations, at the time of the Roman Empire, and backward to the times of the first relations between South Russia and the classical peoples of the East and West. For this period our written documents are scanty and one-sided. The only full and impartial evidence is that which has resulted from the archaeological investigations in South Russia. But although the archaeological material gathered by generations of investigators is very abundant and very important, the scientific exploration of it has lagged far behind the accumulation of these unwritten documents.

Classical scholars endeavored to explain the scanty mentions of South Russia in the classical historical tradition (chiefly in Herodotus), and classical archaeologists dealt with the products of classical art found in the remains of towns and the cemeteries of Greek cities on the shores of the Black Sea, merely with the desire to elucidate the evolution of Greek life, art, and religion in these remote corners of the Greek world. The remains which were found in the graves of the native population of South Russia were studied mostly by students of prehistoric times, and no links, except Herodotus's description of the burial customs of the Scythians, were discovered between the native population and the Greek cities. Orientalists paid but little attention to the various Oriental tribes, who formed the main population of South Russia for centuries, because there were such scanty remains of their language. It is a recognized fact that most Orientalists were and still are pure philologists.

Thus no successful attempt was made to combine all these different sources and to trace a history of South Russia as a whole. And I must emphasize the statement that only an attempt of this comprehensive kind could, if not elucidate (which requires many special studies and a vast knowledge of comparative materials), at least endeavor to bring the different questions to a possibility of solution, by pointing out the tasks which are the most important and clearing the path which is to be followed.

The ground for undertaking such an investigation has been well prepared by generations of scholars. The classical evidence has been collected, as regards both the literary sources and the inscrip-

tions, by B. Latyshev, who also prepared from the writers of the Byzantine epoch a full collection of quotations dealing with South Russia. The history of the Greek colonies on the shores of the Black Sea has been made clear by many scholars, both Russian and foreign. Numismatic evidence has been and is being carefully registered and classified by eminent numismatists such as Berthier de Lagarde, Oreshnikov, and others. The Bolshevik revolution, stopping the whole civilized life of the country, prevented the publication of a corpus of Greek coins of the Black Sea colonies by Retovski and myself.

Enormous progress has been made in the archaeological investigation of South Russia. First French, and afterwards Russian, scholars began a systematic archaeological exploration of the sites of the Greek cities on the Black Sea, an exploration both of the remains of the towns and of the cemeteries, and it went on without interruption till the beginning of the Bolshevik revolution. Splendid work has been done for the Dorian colony Chersonesos (near Sevastopol), for the Ionian colony Olbia, at the mouth of the Bug and Dnieper, and for the vast cemeteries of the centre of the Bosphoran state, Panticapaeum (the modern Kertch).

Still more important perhaps have been the results of the excavations of the thousands and thousands of barrows found all over the steppes of South Russia. Interest in these excavations was awakened by the remarkable results achieved in the middle of the past century by Zabielin and Tiesenhausen on the lower Dnieper, and in the delta of the river Kuban, the so-called Taman peninsula. They succeeded in discovering a set of graves which were, without doubt, those of native kings or princes, and which yielded an enormous harvest of golden and silver vases, jewelry of the finest kinds, richly adorned horse-trappings, etc. After this brilliant beginning discoveries followed one another almost without interruption. The most important of them were made by the indefatigable energy and great skill of the late Professor N. Vesselovski, who year after year opened barrow after barrow and filled the Museum of the Hermitage in Petrograd with many thousand of objects, all of the greatest scientific and artistic value. His fields of activity were the steppes on the lower course of the Dnieper and the valley of the Kuban. At the same time the shores of the middle Dnieper and its eastern affluents were explored systematically by many Russian scholars, among whom the leaders were the president of the Archaeological Commission, Count A. Bobrinski, and the keeper of the Archaeological Museum at Kiev, V. Hvoika. I cannot deal more at

length with the history of the archaeological discoveries made during the last fifty years in South Russia. A full account may be found in the recent book of Ellis H. Minns, *Scythians and Greeks*.³ I will only point out that all these discoveries were followed by careful reports and by many attempts to give a general account of the whole mass of archaeological evidence collected during half a century of systematic investigation. Books such as the famous *Antiquités du Bosphore Cimmérien*, the well-known *Russian Antiquities* of Count Tolstoi and Kondakov, the three big volumes of Count Bobrinski on his excavations near Smela, and the volume of Minns cited above, are and will be for generations so many sources of trustworthy information.

And yet no real attempt has been made hitherto to trace the history of the country as a whole and to combine this history with the historical evolution of the ancient world in general. The task in itself is a very difficult and complicated one. South Russia, from its geographical position, is a land of different influences, coming from the north, the east, the south, and the west, and fusing into one in the vast open steppes on the shores of the great Russian rivers. Through the Caucasus South Russia was in uninterrupted communication with the great Eastern monarchies. One of the monarchies—that around the lake of Van⁴—was almost the immediate neighbor of the tribes who occupied the valley of the Kuban. We are just beginning, thanks to the recent discoveries of Russian scholars, to understand how great was the importance of this mighty monarchy in eastern history during the last millennium B. C. and how intimate was its connection with South Russia and the Caucasian tribes. Through the steppes on the shores of the Caspian Sea Russia was largely open to the influences and migrations, first of Iranian and then of Mongolian tribes. The great Russian rivers formed an unbroken link between the steppes of South Russia on one side, and the Ural mountains, and also the forests, swamps, and

³ (Cambridge, 1913; see *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, XIX. 843-848.) He gives also a detailed bibliography of Russian and foreign works published on the subject during the last century. Cf. my two articles, "L'Exploration Archéologique de la Russie Méridionale de 1912 à 1917", in the *Journal des Savants*, n. s., XVIII. 49-61, 109-122 (March-April, May-June, 1920).

⁴ On the history of the Vannic kingdom, Hall, *The Ancient History of the Near East* (1913), p. 516; B. Turaiev, *History of the Ancient Orient*, II. (1912), 26 (in Russian). Excavations during the war brought to light new and very important inscriptions indicating relations between Van and Javan (N. Marr, *Bull. de l'Acad. des Sciences de Petrograd*, 1918) and artistic monuments of great value; see Pharmakovski, *Materials for the Archaeology of Russia*, XXXIV. (1914), 45 ff.

lakes of Central and Northern Russia, on the other. In the west, no natural obstacles hindered a free intercourse between South Russia and the valley of the Danube, as well as Central Europe in general, and in the south the vast and navigable Black Sea attracted the keen daring sailors of the Mediterranean from time immemorial.

And yet we have no right to affirm that South Russia was a land of continuous migrations, an open corridor for newcomers from the east and the west. The steppes of South Russia are so rich both as pastures and as arable land, the rivers are so rich in fish, and the forests on the northern edge of the steppes so full of game, that every newcomer to South Russia did his best to stay as long as possible in this Eldorado both for nomads and for settled dwellers.

Therefore the history of South Russia is very complicated and the aspects of its cultural life are very varied. But the task of the investigator is at least not hopeless, for most of the peoples who settled in South Russia stayed for long centuries and left behind them various traces of their life.

I will now endeavor to give a short account of the different stages of the political, social, and artistic development of South Russia during the prehistoric and so-called classical period, *i. e.*, till the epoch of the great migrations. My aim, in this short article, is not to depict historical life as it developed on the shores of the Black Sea, but to point out, in the light of evidence furnished by the archaeological excavations, classical authors, and epigraphical and numismatic monuments, the most important problems which arise from the study of these documents. An attempt to answer these questions more fully, from the point of view of universal history, will be shortly given by me in my forthcoming book *The Iranians and the Greeks in South Russia* (Oxford, Clarendon Press).

The first problem of general significance is presented to the historian by the recent discoveries, in the valley of the middle Dnieper and of the lower Bug, of very important remains of neolithic and eneolithic (first copper period) villages and burial-places with peculiar and artistic painted ceramics. The painted pottery and the clay statuettes (human beings, animals, models of houses, and sacred vessels), found mostly in ruined buildings of a peculiar nature—half burial-places, half funerary shrines—which were surrounded by reed and clay walls and covered by a roof, belongs to a large class of similar pottery called by the students of prehistoric life “the pottery of spirals and meander”.⁵ This pottery is found over a

⁵ The last treatise on the problem, Hörnes, *Urgeschichte der Bildenden Kunst in Europa* (second ed., 1915), pp. 284 ff. and 604 ff.

large area in the southern part of Central Europe. Similar painted vases, but different in both technique and ornaments, have been found in Thessaly and in Crete. Asia Minor is also full of remains of similar pottery which seem to be connected with the artistic painted pottery of Elam, Babylonia, and Turkestan of the same epoch rather than with the European pottery of the "spirals and meander". It is worthy of note that the Elamitic and Mesopotamian remains are in close connection with sherds of similar vases found by Sir Aurel Stein in heaps all over Seistan and Baluchistan. The question of the relations between the European pottery and that of Asia is hotly debated, no agreement having been reached on the problem. Polygenists (*e.g.*, Pottier⁶) affirm a simultaneous appearance of similar phenomena in different places, monogenists (*e. g.*, Wilke⁷) speak of migrations or commercial intercourse. South Russian discoveries have complicated the question instead of clearing it up. The South-Russian, Galician, and Rumanian group of this pottery appears to be the most richly developed European group, more similar to the Asiatic than to either of the other European series. The problem of this island of Asiatic pottery in Europe still awaits its solution and is made the more difficult by the fact that no pottery of this kind has been found either in the eastern part of South Russia or in the Caucasus. It is necessary to conjecture the existence of some links with Central Asia through Asia Minor. The resemblance between Elam and South Russia is too close to be accidental.

An important fact which may be deduced from the existence of this early centre of advanced civilization in South Russia is that already at this epoch the valley of the middle Dnieper was a land of settled dwellers, in no case nomads, who had reached a high standard of civilized life.

Still more important is the observation that the middle-Dnieper centre of civilization was gradually absorbed by a much lower civilization of nomadic type which is characterized by burials in the form of barrows. These barrows cover graves of different forms, with red-colored skeletons in the contracted position. But before being absorbed the middle-Dnieper civilization strongly influenced the nomads, brought them partly to settled life, and created for them a peculiar pottery with incised and painted decoration, highly developed. We observe this phenomenon chiefly in the steppes between

⁶ *Mémoires de la Délégation en Perse*, XIII. (1912).

⁷ "Spiral-mäander Keramik und Gefässmalerei", in *Mannus-Bibliothek*, vol. III. (1910).

the Dnieper and the Don, but it may have had a much wider development.

This fusion of the two types of civilization cited above had already taken place at the time when metals began to be in common use, first copper, afterwards bronze. The first knowledge of metals came to the steppes on the northern shores of the Black Sea not from the west, but from the east. It was in the valley of the river Kuban that a metallic civilization of a high standard was first developed in South Russia, at the same epoch when a similar civilization was brought about in Mesopotamia and Egypt. Many finds in large barrows on the river Kuban, especially one in a grave excavated by Vesselovski in Maïkop, have furnished us with many artistic golden and silver objects made with the greatest skill and a highly developed technique, in no way inferior to those which were found in Babylonia and Egypt belonging to the same age. I have devoted to these finds a special article.⁸ The main questions which we have to decide after having studied the monuments I have mentioned are: are they contemporary with the finds in Egypt and Babylonia, and if so how are we to explain their similarity to those of these regions, and also their points of difference? My own opinion is that the two series are contemporary, that no intercourse can be proved, and that therefore we have to suppose an independent beginning of civilized life in a place whose geographical conditions are not unlike those of Babylonia and Egypt.

The exploration of South Russia and especially of the Kuban valley has not been systematic enough to make it certain that the lack of finds belonging to the pure bronze period is not accidental, whereas the central and southern Caucasus on the one hand and the Hungarian plain on the other are full of remains of this period, a fact which would lead us to expect some finds of the same date in the northern Caucasus and also on the Dnieper. It must be taken into consideration that the bronze age in the Caucasus shows very similar features to those which characterize the copper age in the Kuban valley.

But as matters are, we have no traces of a highly developed bronze age in South Russia. From the copper age we come almost directly to the early iron age, *i. e.*, to the first millennium B. C. Of that epoch two facts of primary importance must be recorded: the appearance both in the southern Caucasus and in South Russia in general of two waves of invaders—first of Cimmerians, and after-

⁸ M. Rostovtsev, "L'Age de Cuivre dans le Caucase Septentrional et les Civilisations de Soumer et de l'Égypte Protodynastique", in *Revue Archéologique*, XII. 1-37 (July-October, 1920).

wards of Scythians. The question, who were and whence came the Cimmerians, is a crucial one. Cimmerians are a people well known both to the Oriental and to the Greek historical tradition. The former records their prolonged fight against the Vannic kingdom first and the Assyrian kings afterwards, beginning at the end of the eighth century B. C., and their triumphal march through Asia Minor, which brought them into collision with Lydia and the earliest Greek towns in Asia Minor. The second knows of their conquest of the Greek towns in Asia Minor on the one hand, and, on the other, of their long stay on the shores of the Black Sea, in the Crimea and the Taman peninsula. The Bosphorus was, according to this tradition, the starting-point of the Cimmerians for their invasion of Asia Minor. Both are fully acquainted with their rivalry with the Scythians and with the final victory of the latter both in South Russia and in Asia Minor. The facts are well known and I need not insist on them.⁹

Now we may ask: who were the Cimmerians, how long did they stay on the shores of the Black Sea, what was the influence which they exerted on South Russia, and have we any remains of their sojourn on the Black Sea? I cannot deal with all these questions at length, but I must mention a few facts of primary moment. The best-informed and earliest Greek traditions unanimously affirm that the Cimmerians were of Thracian origin. Modern historians partly prefer to urge the occurrence of some Iranian names among the Cimmerian rulers and to make them near relatives of the Scythians, their bitterest enemies. I may notice a third hypothesis, that of Posidonius. False and imaginary etymologies and the desire to explain some verses of Homer caused him to identify the Cimmerians with the Cimbri and to advocate their northern origin. But nobody took into consideration, first of all, that the historical tradition of the future kingdom of the Bosphorus implied a prolonged stay of the Cimmerians on the shores of the Black Sea, pointing out that many places on the straits of Kertch preserved the name of the Cimmerians, especially the straits themselves which were called Cimmerian Bosphorus. Secondly, nobody has explained the fact that the population of the future kingdom of Bosphorus, and in particular the ruling classes, bore partly Thracian names, and that the first rulers of Panticapaeum—a Milesian colony—were all Thracians. The

⁹ The best summary of our Oriental evidence is given by M. Streck, *Assurbanipal*, etc. (Leipzig, 1916, *Vorderasiatische Bibliothek*), p. cccxxi; cf. Olmstead in *Cornell Studies in Hist. and Pol.*, II., and in *Amer. Hist. Assoc., Ann. Rep.*, 1909 (Washington, 1911); and E. Meyer, *Geschichte des Altertums*, I¹, §§ 452 ff. I. 23, § 529.

usual suggestion, that these rulers were Thracian soldiers invited by the Greek population to defend them against the Scythians, is historically impossible and explains nothing. In the third place I would insist on the evidence of some early remains in the future kingdom of Bosphorus which are similar to those in Hungary and in Asia Minor, especially at Troy. All these facts seem to corroborate the earliest Greek traditions and to establish the probability that the Cimmerians were of Thracian origin. This fact does not involve their having come from the Balkan Peninsula. We do not know how old is the Thracian population in the Balkans, and we may doubt that it was autochthonous. The solution of this problem may be found when we are better acquainted with the Thracian language, which is practically unknown, and with the early ethnography of Central Asia. As far as our present knowledge goes, we cannot eliminate the hypothesis that many tribes of Central Asia may claim a close affinity with the Thracians, in the first place the Massagetae. Less probable is the supposition that the Thracians came from Central and Northern Russia or through those countries from the shores of the Baltic and the North Sea.

However, the Cimmerians were obliged to yield their place in South Russia to Iranian new-comers, the Scythians, who probably dragged with them some Mongolian tribes. Though the Scythians were always treated by the historians of the ancient world as a kind of negligible quantity, as a barbarous nomadic tribe which belongs entirely to the domain of prehistoric studies, the results of the excavations in South Russia show the Scythians to have been a factor of some importance in the political development of the ancient world and to have had a comparatively wide influence on the growth of civilized life in Eastern Europe in general.

Let us bring some facts to support my statement. The Scythians formed in South Russia a stable and strong state which lasted for almost four centuries, from the seventh to the third century B. C. The existence of this established state was the chief cause of the splendid development of the Greek colonies on the shores of the Black Sea, who rivalled in wealth and their high standard of material civilization the Greek cities of Asia Minor—vassals of the Persian kingdom.

Although organized as a nomadic and military state, the Scythians were in no way hostile to the settled life of tribes conquered by them and to the material development of the Greek cities, their tributaries. The former supplied them with corn, fish, metals, and furs, the latter purchased these goods from the Scythians, paid for

them in manufactured products partly imported from their mother-country, partly made by themselves, and thus gave Greece an opportunity of providing herself with food-stuffs for her population and raw materials for her industry. We must not forget that for centuries South Russia fed a large part of the Greek countries, and that Athens was able to develop her high standard of civilized life because of regular importations of food-stuffs and raw materials from South Russia which allowed her to devote her energy to arts, sciences, and industry, and to build up her power.

On the other hand, under the influence of Greece, Scythia raised her own civilization to a comparatively high level. Having brought with them their peculiar tastes and habits, their original style in decorative art—the so-called animal style—the Scythians did not drop their peculiarities under Greek influence.¹⁰ They not only made the Greeks work for them, adapting themselves to Scythian requirements and thus developing new abilities, but learned from the Greeks their skill and employed this fresh knowledge to build up their own art on new lines. Through Scythia civilized habits penetrated into Central Russia and acted as a stimulus to creative independent work among the South and Central Russian peoples. We do not know whether there were Slavs already among them. But even if the Slavs came to Russia comparatively late, they certainly absorbed the cultivation of their predecessors.¹¹ It is a matter of further study to follow closely this process of the spread of the Greek and Graeco-Oriental civilization through the medium of Scythians in Russia and in the Balkans, cradles of the future Slavonic states,¹² but even now the results of archaeological excavations show us how widely the Scythian influence extended and how flourishing was life on the banks of all the Russian rivers during the centuries of Scythian domination.¹³ In itself the Scythian state

¹⁰ On the Scythian animal style see the recent work of C. Schuchhardt, *Alteuropa in seiner Kultur und Stilentwicklung* (Strassburg and Berlin, 1919).

¹¹ See on these questions the valuable series of works published by the Finnish scholar A. M. Tallgren, enumerated in his last two volumes: *Collection Tovostine* (Helsingfors, 1917), and *L'Age de Bronze en Russie: la Civilisation d'Anan-jino* (Helsingfors, 1919).

¹² Recent excavations in Bulgaria have brought to light some graves of the fourth century B. C. with objects imitated from Scythian originals; see B. Filow, *Römische Mittheilungen*, XXXII. (1917), 1 ff.; G. Kazarow, *Beiträge zur Kulturgeschichte der Thraker* (Sarajevo, 1916).

¹³ Large towns with large cemeteries are found all over the region of the middle Dnieper and its eastern tributaries; see the above quoted work of Count A. Bobrinski, and *Drevnosti Pridneprovja* (*Les Antiquités de la Région du Dniéper*) by B. and V. Khanenko. On the lower Dnieper scores of small towns and villages, half-Scythian, half-Greek, developed along the river. See Goszkie-

presents many interesting features. We already know that the Scythians were Iranians. Iranians in general are but little known to us. And yet how far-reaching has been their influence on the classical world! What an opening for study, along with the greatest Iranian power—Persia, another Iranian state of entirely different mould, a state strong enough to challenge the Persian world-domination and to induce Darius to undertake a dangerous expedition into the steppes of South Russia! This opportunity of study is given to us by the ever increasing archaeological material, through which we can form an idea of the religious, social, economic, and political life of the Scythians. Finally, the Scythian state was a model on which later Asiatic states in South Russia were organized, and a thorough knowledge of it enables us better to understand the later nomadic states—dangerous rivals and foes of Slavonic Russia who again succeeded at the epoch of Tartar invasion in ruling an important part of the Russian land.

I have already pointed out that the existence of a stable Scythian kingdom in South Russia gave the Greek settlers the opportunity of founding many important centres of civilized life on the northern shore of the Black Sea. The most interesting of these is the Bosporan state on the straits of Kertch—a waterway uniting the Black and the Azov seas. The growth of this state is a phenomenon which calls for serious attention.¹⁴

From time immemorial traces of civilized life have been found on both shores of the straits. Different highways of international trade converged here and this convergence caused the inhabitants to take an active part in the exchange of goods coming to their doors from the north, east, and south. Gold, copper, iron, furs, slaves, fish, and leather were carried by caravans across the steppes of West Siberia and South Russia, by small boats on the Don and the Sea of Azov, and by ships on the Black Sea to this natural meeting-place—the Bosporan straits. No wonder that here was the centre of the Cimmerian kingdom and that after the fall of that kingdom the Scythians struggled hard for possession of it, nor that they encountered a strong resistance in the native population, a resistance reinforced by Greek colonists attracted by the great opportunities of the district. No wonder, again, that the old inhabitants welcomed the coming of Greek settlers who helped them to defend their independence against Scythian attacks. In this way were

vicz, *Bull. de la Comm. Arch. de Russie*, XLVII. 117, and M. Ebert, *Prähistorische Zeitschrift*, V. (1913).

¹⁴ See the valuable study of E. von Stern in *Hermes*, L. (1915).

founded the scores of Greek colonies which soon covered both shores of the straits. The most important were Panticapaeum on the Crimean shore and Phanagoria on the Caucasian. Common interest soon united these two groups with each other and with the native tribes. The scattered Greek towns and the indigenous population little by little sought and found a *modus vivendi* which allowed them to form a strong community, able to uphold its independence. Thus arose the Bosporan state, a compromise between the tribal monarchical organization of the aborigines and the Greek self-governing bodies.

It is a matter of great interest to trace the development of the new community. A loosely knit confederation of cities and tribes in its beginnings, it became gradually a political body of dual nature. The ruler of this body was for the Greeks an elected magistrate, for the natives a king ruling by divine right. Notwithstanding this apparent dualism, however, the constitution of the new state became gradually a purely monarchical one. The Greeks in the mother-country were fully aware of the fact and called the Bosporan archons and kings—tyrants. It was hard for the Greek colonists to give their support to these tyrants, especially as the tyrants were not Greeks but Hellenized natives. But the constant threat of Scythian supremacy overcame their repulsion to monarchical rule, and thus tyranny, which in Greek surroundings never lasted longer than one or two generations, stood firm in Bosporus for hundreds of years. This tyranny entered into diplomatic and commercial relations with the Greek world and was treated by the Greek states as a desirable friend. We must not forget that the tyrants of Bosporus disposed of all the corn produced in the country watered by the rivers Kuban and Don and in the Crimea and also of all the fish of these rivers and of the Sea of Azov, the Scythians having no commercial fleet and no ports of their own. Thus the kingdom of Bosporus became rich and mighty, with a peculiar social and economic organization akin to that of different Hellenistic states which gradually arose out of the monarchy of Alexander in the Orient.

The growth of the Bosporan kingdom out of a combination of two different types of state-life—the tribal monarchy and the Greek free city—led to a peculiar dualism not only in the state; both its social and economic organization and its material civilization were also deeply affected. Rulers who were also extensive landowners, surrounded by a ruling aristocracy of feudal type and a city-population of retail traders, ship-owners, and craftsmen, present a social picture of great historical interest. Although pure Greek by

origin, the inhabitants of the Greek cities in the Bosporan kingdom, governed as they were by a half-native dynasty, could not long remain purely Greek in life, habits, and religion.¹⁵ Everywhere, in all branches of civilized life, they were strongly influenced by their surroundings, especially as regards art and industry. Working for tribes of non-Greek race, the Greek settlers naturally adapted themselves to the tastes of their clients, and thus built up gradually a new style both in architecture and in decorative art. Take, for instance, the monumental graves of the Bosporan aristocracy, with their mighty step-vaults, which remind one of the famous grave of the Atreidae. Look at the beautiful gold coins with their masterly heads of the local rural divinities transformed into Sileni and Satyrs, and again at the remains of their painted tombs and at the peculiar jewels and vases which they made to satisfy the requirements of their neighbors. Everywhere you will find new features which cannot be explained by purely Greek analogies. But still all these products remain Greek both in workmanship and in style.

Students of art ought surely to pay more attention to this branch of Greek art than they have hitherto done. They will learn by this study how infinitely varied Greek art could be and how ready were the Greek artists to grapple with new tasks and to comply with new requirements. They eagerly studied Scythian and Maeotian life, the dresses, the arms, the social and religious habits of these tribes, the forms of their sacred vessels, etc., and used this fresh knowledge to create splendid works of Greek art. They ennobled primitive forms of vases, arms, and horse-equipment, and adorned them with lively scenes of a slightly idealized life of the Scythian and Maeotian tribes, in the spirit of the Stoic school and Ephorus. The ground for the best achievements of Hellenistic and Roman art in artistic ethnography was first prepared by Bosporan artists and craftsmen working for Iranians, whom they had themselves educated in the appreciation of Greek art and thus enabled to understand the best creations of Greek genius.

A new factor came into the life of South Russia through the appearance in the steppes of fresh tribes of conquering invaders—the Sarmatians.¹⁶ They moved slowly from the east, crossed the

¹⁵ See my paper, "The Idea of the Kingly Power in Scythia and in the Bosporus", in *Bull. de la Comm. Arch.*, XLIX.; cf. *Revue des Études Grecques*, 1921.

¹⁶ No good general work on the Sarmatians exists. See E. Täubler, *Klio*, IX. (1909), 14; J. Kulakovski, *The Alans according to the Testimonies of Classical and Byzantine Writers* (Kiev, 1899); M. Rostovtsev, *Ancient Decorative Painting in South Russia* (St. Petersburg, 1913), pp. 326 ff. and 340 ff.

rivers Ural and Volga, and already in the fourth century B. C. were approaching the Don. The Scythians were forced to yield before them, to evacuate the region on the Kuban, and to fall back on the right bank of the Don. At the same period political conditions in the west enabled the Scythians to resume their offensive against the Thracian tribes, checked at the end of the sixth century by Darius and afterwards by the buffer-state of the Odrysae—a creation, like the Bosphorus, of Athens during the period of her greatest expansion. In this way arose the mighty western empire of the Scythians of the fourth and third centuries B. C., with a military and political centre on the Dnieper, instead of the former eastern centre which must be conjectured to have been situated on the western shore of the Sea of Azov. The Scythian power spread widely westwards and northwards and firmly held the lands along the middle Dnieper and its affluents and the whole tract of flat land between the Dnieper and the Danube, including the delta of the Danube—the Dobrudja.

However, this last period in the history of the great Scythian kingdom in South Russia was but of short duration. The Sarmatians soon resumed their victorious advance and already by the middle of the third century B. C. a variety of new political factors put an end to the expansion of the Scythians westwards and northwards. The most important of these new factors was the conquest of the Balkan Peninsula by the Celts.¹⁷ Weak Scythian vassals in Thracia, with no support from outside, could naturally by themselves organize no effective resistance to the Celtic advance. On the other hand the Scythian kingdom, weakened by Sarmatian attacks in the east and by a long struggle with the powerful Macedonian kingdoms in the west—especially under the strong rule of Philip and Alexander—was obliged to leave its Thracian vassals to their own fate. Thus the Celtic advance from the north found hardly any resistance and was followed by chaos, not only in the Balkan Peninsula but also in South Russia. We must not forget that after the death of Lysimachus the political balance of the Greek world shifted definitely from Macedonia to the eastern Hellenistic monarchies, and that Macedonia, the chief promoter of Hellenism in the Balkans, was in constant political convulsion and thus unable to fulfill its chief task—the defense of Greek civilization from northern invaders.

Some inscriptions found in the Greek colony Olbia—the most

¹⁷ The last comprehensive work on the Celts in the Balkan Peninsula was published by G. Kazarow, "The Celts in Thracia and Macedonia", in *Transactions of the Bulgarian Academy*, XVIII. (1919).

important harbor for the export of the produce of the valleys of the Dnieper and the Bug and therefore in constant relations with the Scythian kingdom—supply us with decisive evidence of the conditions in the western part of the Scythian kingdom in the beginning of the third century B. C. I refer especially to the long decree in honor of Protogenes, a rich merchant of Olbia and member of one of the few families who preserved and increased their wealth during this troubled period. It appears from this decree that the great king of Scythia, Saitapharnes, concentrated his forces on the Dnieper, that he lost his hold on his different vassal-kings between the Dnieper and the Bug, and that the whole swarm of these petty princes fled hastily eastwards and southwards before the coming storm of Celtic and German invaders. I am convinced that such a state of things could only have been brought about by some serious blows inflicted by the Celts on the great Scythian kings somewhere between the Dneister and the Bug.

The Celts of course did not remain in South Russia. They were attracted by the enormous wealth of Greece and Asia Minor and concentrated their efforts on the task of penetrating into these districts. But the Scythian power could not recover after the heavy blows which it had suffered from the Celts, and was unable to hold its own against the different Illyrian, Thracian, and Germanic tribes who invaded South Russia. Moreover the conditions in the east became worse and worse. The Sarmatians, as I have already mentioned, crossed the Don early in the third century; in the second they reached the Dnieper and in the first the whole of South Russia was full of Sarmatian tribes moving westwards.

The consequences of these events were exceeding important for the history of the ancient world. The Scythians retired to the Crimea and began to press hard on the Greek towns trying to find an outlet for their commerce. The kingdom of Bosphorus and the Chersonesos were unable to defend themselves from the Scythian pressure. The Bosphorus especially suffered severely, both from the Sarmatians who settled on the Don and the Kuban and occupied the peninsula of Taman and from the Scythians in the Crimea. Anarchy, which reigned in the steppes, almost entirely checked the profitable trade of the Greeks and exhausted the accumulated wealth of the Greek cities with contributions extorted by the Scythians and Sarmatians and with payments to hired soldiers. The wave of oriental invaders seemed to doom Hellenism in South Russia to a final fall.

Nevertheless this fall did not come; it was delayed for some cen-

turies. Instead, civilized life began to flourish anew in the Greek cities and once more advanced deeply into the steppes of South Russia. The reasons for this development were, on the one side, the character of the new conquerors of South Russia—the Sarmatians, and on the other the political development of the Orient in general which brought South Russia under the sway of the nascent and developing Roman Empire. Let me deal first with the Sarmatians.

Like the Scythians, the Sarmatians were of Iranian descent. For centuries they remained probably in Turkestan, where they were in close relations first with the Persians and afterwards with the different half-Greek states created in the East by Alexander. These links were not broken after the beginning of the westward movement of the Sarmatians. We have every reason to suppose that they remained in touch both with the Parthian kingdom and with Central Asia. From Turkestan the Sarmatians, who were by no means wild barbarians, brought a powerful military organization, excellent weapons, civilized habits, and a strong taste for artistic objects both of Persian and of Central-Asiatic manufacture, from which sprang germs of artistic development among the Sarmatians themselves.

Thus the Sarmatians went to South Russia thoroughly prepared to take the place of the Scythians both in their political and in their commercial relations. They were nevertheless unable to succeed in creating in the steppes of South Russia a centralized state like that of the Scythians. They remained divided into different independent tribes, sometimes fighting one against another, but usually separated by intervening heterogeneous tribes.

Though unable to regenerate the Scythian state, the Sarmatians inherited all the traditions of Scythian commercial and political intercourse, especially with the Greek cities. Like the Scythians in their best epoch they did not seriously contemplate the eventual conquest of the Greek cities. They made no single attempt of this sort, though the occupation of Olbia and Tyras would have been in no way difficult. They preferred to enter into close commercial relations with the Greek cities, to impose on them their tastes and habits, to make Greeks work for them and to pay for the Greek goods with the products of their agriculture and commerce. We must take into account that the Sarmatians, like the Scythians, did not break up the agricultural exploitation of some parts of South Russia by the native population, and endeavored to maintain commercial relations with Persia, Central Asia, India, and China. The results of this policy

were: the possibility of existence and development for the Greek cities, the gradual infiltration of Sarmatian elements into them, and the birth of a new artistic style out of the collaboration of Greek artists and Sarmatian employers. We will deal with the first two points later; let us say now a few words about the third.

The Sarmatians brought with them from their native country two things which they required from the artists who worked for them. Besides asking for the weapons and jewels which they were accustomed to use, they insisted upon having these ornamented in a fashion always characteristic of the Iranian East: I mean the ornamentation by means of inset colored stones and enamels, and the use for this ornamentation chiefly of geometric designs and figures of animals.¹⁸ These requirements were willingly accepted by the Greek artists and thus there arose in the Greek towns an entirely new artistic style in jewelry and toreutics, the so-called polychrome style, often combined with the animal style. The history of the gradual development of this style in South Russia is of first importance for the history of art in medieval Europe. I cannot deal with this problem at length, but I must emphasize that I can prove that the so-called Merovingian or Gothic style in jewelry and toreutics developed gradually out of the elements brought by the Sarmatians and handed over first to the Greeks on the Black Sea and afterwards to the Goths who invaded South Russia from the north. All the successive steps of this development can be traced in South Russia, and scores of monuments, sometimes of the greatest artistic value, enable us to study this development in all its phases. I will mention only some important finds, such as the recent finds near Orenburg (third to second century B. C.), those of the Kuban region and the Taman peninsula (second century B. C. to second or third century A. D.), of the Don (especially the treasure of Novocherkassk, first century B. C. to first century A. D.), of Western Siberia (rich gold jewels and horse-trappings of the same epoch), of Rumania (the treasure of Petroasa), all of the more ancient period, and some of the later epoch, such as the finds of Kertch (beginning with the second century A. D.), of the South Russian steppes (first to third century A. D.), of Rumania, Hungary, Austria, Germany, France, Britain, Spain, North Africa, which all form an uninterrupted chain whose rings are linked together by identical style, similar technique, and the shape of the objects. It is the same track which the Sarmatians themselves followed in their gradual advance towards the west.

¹⁸ A detailed treatment of the evolution of the polychrome style will be given in my forthcoming book, *The Iranians and the Greeks in South Russia*.

On the other hand, the Sarmatian animal style, after having adopted many peculiarities from the Scythian animal style, perceptibly influenced central and eastern Russia and, through their medium, northern Europe, thus originating both in Russia and in Scandinavia a peculiar animal style which held its own in these countries for centuries and the influence of which can be traced in the Romanesque and so-called Gothic style in central and southern Europe.

Though not hostile to Greek civilization, the Sarmatians were a great danger to the Greek colonies on the Black Sea.¹⁹ Nobody in these colonies knew that the Sarmatians had no intention of destroying or conquering. On the other hand, as I have already pointed out, the Scythians under the pressure of the Sarmatians became more and more insolent and threatened the Greek cities with destruction. The Greek colonies, unable to defend themselves, naturally looked in every direction for protection. But the second century B. C., when the Sarmatians expanded with exceptional energy and the Scythians succeeded in forming once more a strong state in the Crimea under the sceptre of Skilurus, was a troubled epoch in the history of the ancient world. Of mighty protectors there were none in the East, all the more or less Hellenized kings in the Orient being either vassals or clients of Rome, and Rome itself, involved as she was in an internal, ever-growing struggle, was in no way anxious to support the Pontic Greeks against their enemies. This is the explanation of the fact that the Pontic Greeks sought and found help from the most dangerous foe Rome had in the second century B. C., King Mithridates of Pontus, a half-Iranian dynast of high ambition. Everyone knows the history of the struggle between Rome and Mithridates. Everyone remembers that Mithridates made his last stand in the Bosporan kingdom, and that he was betrayed here first by the Pontic Greeks and afterwards by his own son.

The consequences of the temporary rule of Mithridates over the whole of the Crimea were momentous in the history of South Russia. Mithridates endeavored to organize the whole eastern Iranian world, including Scythians, Sarmatians, and Thracians, against Rome. After his death Rome was thus faced with the possibility of a renewal of the Mithridatic attempt, and understood clearly that a consistent policy towards the Parthians could not be carried out without

¹⁹ On the history of South Russia in the Roman epoch, see E von Stern, in *Hermes*, L. (1915), 211, and my own papers, "Pontus, Bithynia, Bosphorus", in *Annals of the British School at Athens*, XXII.; "Caesar and the South of Russia", in *Journal of Roman Studies*, 1917, pp. 27 ff.; "Queen Dynamis of Bosphorus" in *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, XXXIX. (1917) 88.

first settling conditions not only on the southern shore of the Black Sea but also on the eastern and northern. The former indifference of the Romans towards the Black Sea was now transformed into a lively interest. Caesar, Augustus, and their followers all watched attentively over the Greek colonies on the Black Sea and did their best to consolidate their influence over them and to help them in the constant struggle against the Scythians and Sarmatians. Greek settlers on the Black Sea, threatened by the Iranian danger, were reliable vassals of the Romans, strong advanced posts of Greek civilization standing like islands, amidst the Iranian sea, and excellent spies who, in their own interest, kept the Romans informed of all the new events in the Iranian world. We must take into consideration that already in the first century A. D. Sarmatian vanguards had come into conflict with the Roman troops on the Danube. Hence the policy of Rome to transform the kingdom of Bosphorus into a vassal state, the Greek free cities into Roman "allies".

After some vicissitudes and waverings during the first century B. C. and the first century A. D., Rome achieved her aim and the Bosporan kingdom became for centuries her vassal. But this Bosporan kingdom was no more the old state of the Spartocides. The neighborhood of the Sarmatians and Scythians and the rule of Mithridates had borne fruit. Bosphorus and the other Greek cities were no longer purely Greek.

I have already pointed out that Mithridates relied chiefly upon his Iranian allies and his half-Iranian subjects in the Pontus. He filled up the Greek towns with them and assigned to them influential posts and large holdings of land. Seeing that the Greeks did not welcome his rule, he tried to bring into the Greek cities more trustworthy elements. It is probable that he was the first who transferred a large body of Jewish settlers to the Bosporan kingdom. No wonder that he left Bosphorus with a large admixture of foreign intruders. His successors had to reckon with this state of things. They were themselves not Greek. The dynasty reigning over Bosphorus during the first three centuries A. D. were descended from the union of Dynamis (daughter of Pharnaces, son of Mithridates, by one of his foreign wives) and a Sarmatian or Maecotian prince, Aspurgus, son of Asandrochos. Aspurgus himself married as his second wife a Thracian princess, Gepaepyris. Thus the Bosporan dynasty evidently was not Greek at all, but half-Iranian, half-Thracian. And we must not forget that this dynasty ruled over a combination of a few Greek towns and many native tribes, and depended in its wars partly on city levies, but chiefly on hired or

conscript native soldiers. Under these conditions the Bosphoran kingdom inevitably became more and more barbarian, *i. e.*, Iranian, as the native civilization was chiefly Iranian, although the native tribes were of varied origin—Iranians, Thracians, Caucasians. We wonder, not at the fact of this Iranization, but rather at the amazing phenomenon of the pertinacity of Greek language, Greek habits, and Greek thought among a population in whom Greek blood flowed more and more scantily and among whom even Greek personal names became exceptional. It is remarkable that these barbarian citizens of the Bosphoran towns boasted of their Hellenism and tried to convince everyone, against all evidence, by keeping alive Greek traditions, Greek education, Greek language, and by maintaining a kind of cult for Homer and Plato, that they were really descended from the Milesian and other Greek settlers on the shores of the Black Sea.

This Hellenism, however, was but a pious camouflage. The citizens of the Bosphoran towns in the second and third centuries A. D. were not in any respect different, except as regards the official language, from the Hellenized Scythians and Sarmatians, their neighbors. Students of social and economic life should pay more attention than they have hitherto, to the economic and social conditions of the Bosphoran kingdom at this period. These conditions did not change very much as compared with those of the Spartocid period. But they became more like the feudal organization of the Scythian kingdom and the several Sarmatian tribal states. The study both of the sculptured funereal stelae, found by the hundred in Kertch and recently published by Kieseritski and Watzinger,²⁰ and of the painted funereal chambers and vaults of Panticapaeum, collected and investigated by myself,²¹ as well as the study of the furniture of thousands of graves which have been opened in the Bosphoran necropolis, shows that the Bosphoran kingdom was, like the Scythian and Sarmatian state, a kind of highly organized military community of landowners and traders, who ruled over a native population of serfs. Some of the neighboring tribes recognized the supremacy of the Bosphoran kings and were their vassals, as they themselves were vassals of Rome; some were their allies or their enemies. The great wealth of the ruling Bosphoran aristocracy depended entirely on their exploitation of the rich soil of a part of the Crimea and the Taman peninsula and on their trade with the Greek and Roman

²⁰ G. von Kieseritski and C. Watzinger, *Griechische Grabreliefs aus Südrussland* (Berlin, 1909).

²¹ M. Rostovtsev, *Ancient Decorative Painting in South Russia* (St. Petersburg, 1913); cf. *Jour. of Hell. Studies*, XXXIX. (1919) 144 ff.

world, *i. e.*, on their command of the sea routes. This command, which was upheld at all costs by the suzerains of the Bosphorus—the Romans—was the chief reason why the Sarmatians never thought of destroying or capturing the Greek cities. They perfectly understood that such destruction would mean a complete cessation of the importation of all manufactured goods, to which they had become more and more accustomed.

I cannot deal at length in this short article with all the curious peculiarities of the social, religious, political, artistic, and intellectual life in the Bosphorus during the first three centuries A. D. Broadly speaking, we meet everywhere the same phenomenon: a thin Greek shell and a hard native kernel. The coexistence of these is characteristic of the whole epoch and of many provinces within the Roman empire. But in no other case have we to deal with so enduring an organization, with such a fulness of historical evidence, and with such a combination of Greek and Iranian elements. I must emphasize that if we want to know anything about the social, political, and cultural structure of the greatest enemy of Rome—the Parthians—we must begin by a careful study of the Bosphorus, and if we would understand the Sassanid renaissance of the Iranian creative genius we must attentively watch the signs of a similar renaissance—in art, religion, and political ideas—in the Bosphorus in the second and third centuries A. D.

This renaissance was diverted into a different channel by a strong advance towards the Black Sea on the part of German tribes from the north—the Goths. But it was precisely this advance and the mixture of Gothic and Irano-Greek elements in South Russia which made this Iranian renaissance in South Russia of not merely local but universal importance. The germs of Iranian culture—the strongest and most creative of the civilizations then existing in the ancient world, as the Graeco-Roman was dying out—were not confined, as in the case of Sassanid Persia, within the boundaries of one state. These germs were not brought to Europe by weak and intermittent currents of trade, but they were conveyed by conquering tribes into the whole of Europe. They there formed the civilization of Western Europe in general, for they were the foundation of the civilization of the ruling classes in Europe, of those Goths, Vandals, Sueves, and afterwards Huns, who were so closely connected with Sarmatians and who had no civilization of their own.

For the development of Slavonic states in Russia and the Balkan Peninsula the history of the Bosporan kingdom, interwoven as it is with the history of the Scythians, Sarmatians, Goths, Scytho-Goths,

and Sarmato-Goths, has still greater significance. The Scandinavians who organized the political life of the first Slavonic states known to history, in South Russia, followed a path already well defined by the Basternae, the Goths, and their followers. And in Russia they met with the same fate. Like the Goths, they adopted *en bloc* the higher civilization which they found firmly established on the banks of the Dnieper, and they inherited all the relations between the Dnieper basin and the South and the West which had been formed during centuries and centuries of friendly intercourse. We have only to study more closely than has been done the antiquities of South Russia during the period of migration, *i. e.*, from the fourth to the eighth century, to become aware of the uninterrupted evolution of Iranian culture in South Russia through these centuries. If the Byzantine empire at this epoch appears more and more Iranized, that comes not only from its relations with Sassanid Persia, but chiefly from the Iranization of its immediate neighbors in the Balkan Peninsula, from the type of civilization which was brought to Constantinople by the so-called barbarian troops, and from the characteristics of the ruling aristocracy which consisted chiefly of the elements furnished by these barbarian troops. The Slavonic state of Kiev presents the same features, not because the Slavonic princes imitated the Byzantine emperors and adopted their art and habits, but because the same cultural tradition—I mean the Graeco-Iranian—was the only tradition which was known to South Russia for centuries and which no German or Mongolian invaders were able to destroy.

M. ROSTOVTSSEV.

NEW LIGHT ON THE ORIGINS OF THE WAR, III. RUSSIA AND THE OTHER POWERS

A GOOD many new sources of information in regard to Russia's part in the tragic days of July, 1914, have appeared since the publication of the original Russian Orange Book soon after the outbreak of the war.¹ This suppressed a considerable part of the diplomatic correspondence of the days preceding that event. The Bolsheviki have not seen fit to follow the example of the Central Powers and give a complete publication of all the diplomatic correspondence which passed through the Russian Foreign Office, as Kautsky and Gooss have done respectively for Germany and Austria.² Nevertheless, a few of these suppressed documents, particularly those which passed between Sazonov and the Russian ambassadors in Paris and London, Izvolski and Benckendorff, were published in a series of articles in the Russian *Pravda*, in 1919, by M. Pokrovski. They are interpreted by him and by the Germans to prove Sazonov's aggressive intentions against Constantinople and the Straits and his scheming efforts to get England's support in case of a Russian attack on Germany.³ The Kautsky and Gooss documents contain also a great many despatches from Petrograd, giving many hitherto unknown details about what was happening in the Russian capital.

More important are the secret mobilization-telegrams and other military documents which the Germans captured in the Warsaw district during the course of the war, published by Hoeniger.⁴

¹ *Dipl. Corresp.*, pp. 266-298.

² See above, vol. XXV., pp. 616 ff.

³ *Pravda*, nos. 5-7, Feb. 23-Mar. 9, 1919; translated in *Deutschland Schuldig*, pp. 188-208. For other indications of Sazonov's aggressive aims, and particularly his memorandum of March, 1914, for a sudden naval attack to secure control of the Straits, see the documents published by the Bolsheviks in seven fascicules, between December, 1917, and February, 1918, conveniently translated and arranged by E. Laloy, *Les Documents Secrets des Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères de Russie publiés par les Bolcheviks* (Paris, 1919). Cf. also Bogitshevich, *Causes of the War* (Amsterdam, 1919); Nekludoff, *Diplomatic Reminiscences* (London, 1920). Possibly even if the Bolsheviki wished to make a full publication of the diplomatic correspondence it would be difficult for them to do so in view of the possible destruction or dispersion which may have resulted from the haste and confusion with which the archives are said to have been packed up when the German armies seemed to threaten Petrograd in 1917.

⁴ R. Hoeniger, *Russlands Vorbereitung zum Weltkrieg* (Berlin, 1919); also his "Untersuchungen zum Suchomlinowprozess", in *Deutsche Rundschau*, CLXXV.

Most interesting and dramatic of all, though not so trustworthy historically, are the revelations which were made at the Sukhomlinov trial in August and September, 1917. The Sukhomlinov trial will remain one of the *causes célèbres* of the twentieth century. In 1917, when the war was going very badly for Russia, Russian public opinion demanded a scapegoat. Sukhomlinov, the former minister of war, was popularly held to be one of the persons chiefly responsible for the Russian disasters. He was arrested and brought to trial. At the hearings, which lasted nearly two months, a great amount of Russian dirty linen was washed in public. There was given in great detail the history of Sukhomlinov's relations with his pretty but extravagant young wife, who had been divorced by doubtful means from a rich old man in order that she might marry the Russian Minister of War. All Sukhomlinov's shady or indiscreet relations with the spies, such as Miasoiedov and Altschiller, who were executed for espionage in 1915, were set forth at length. The lack of co-ordination in the government departments and the pitiful shortage of ammunition and equipment of all sorts were mercilessly laid bare. And, finally, Sukhomlinov's measures toward mobilization during the days immediately preceding the declaration of war were discussed at some length. Highly sensational testimony was given, but it is very difficult for the historian to draw conclusions from it. No official stenographic report of it was ever published. One has to rely on the reports given in the Russian newspapers. But the newspaper reporters, or the editors, have so garbled the accounts of the trial that in many instances different newspapers give flatly contradictory reports of what was evidently the same piece of testimony. But even after comparing the fullest reports in several of the most important newspapers of different political complexion, and thereby establishing a probable approximation to the testimony which was actually given in court, this testimony is so contradictory with itself, with the secret mobilization-telegrams printed by Hoeniger, and with much of the diplomatic correspondence, that it must be used with the greatest caution. Generals who in 1917 were defending themselves against the charge of having been duped by Germany, and of having made insufficient military preparations, would be inclined, after three years of war, to exaggerate on the one hand the German "threats" as the cause and jus-

15-80 (April, 1918); and "Fürst Tundutow über die Russische Mobilmachung", *ibid* CLXXVI, 150-165 (August, 1918). These telegrams are particularly important because they are contemporary evidence which enables one to check the contradictory statements made from memory three years later at the Sukhomlinov trial.

tification of Russia's general mobilization, and on the other hand their own perspicacity in foreseeing the "inevitability" of war and consequently in disobeying their peace-loving master, Nicholas II., who forbade them to proceed with their military measures. Professor Oman emphasizes the German "threats" to prove that Germany was the party really responsible for the fatal succession of mobilizations. The Germans emphasize the disobedience and deception of the Russian militarists to prove just the contrary. Within the brief limits of this article it is not possible to analyze all the misrepresentations of fact which were made at the trial, nor to state, in detail, the reasons for rejecting many of the views of both Oman and the Germans. Only a brief narrative and a statement of conclusions may be given, the analysis on which they are based being left to a larger work.⁵

⁵ The Russian newspapers which I have read are the *Izvestiia*, *Novoe Vremia*, *Russkiiia Vedomosti*, *Riech*, *Novaia Zhizn*. An excellent account of the scandalous personal affairs of Sukhomlinov, his wife, his friends of dubious reputation, and the spies, is given by E. H. Wilcox, *Russia's Ruin* (New York, 1919), pp. 35-117; but Wilcox says practically nothing about the all-important question of Russian mobilization. Robert Wilton, *Russia's Agony* (New York, 1919), devotes two chapters to the outbreak of hostilities and the deficiencies of Russian equipment; he quotes at length the testimony of Ianushkevich, apparently using the report in the *Russkoe Slovo*; but as he makes no critical comments on Ianushkevich's testimony, nearly every sentence of which is inaccurate, Wilton's account is of little value. Professor Oman, in his admirable book on *The Outbreak of the War, 1914-1918* (London, 1919), ch. VII., gives by far the best account of the Russian mobilization which has appeared in English; it is based on the *Novoe Vremia* report of the Sukhomlinov trial, on some other unnamed paper (apparently the *Russkoe Slovo*), and on the accounts of the trial in the German newspapers. The question is touched upon in the *New Republic*, XVIII. 127-128, 348-351 (Mar. 1, Apr. 12, 1919), and by H. N. Brailsford in the *London Nation* of Sept. 15, 1917. For further light on Russian military preparations and mobilizations, see: B. Gourko, *Russia, 1914-1917* (New York, 1919), pp. 1-24; V. D. Doumbadze, *Russia's War Minister* (London, 1915), a grotesquely laudatory work by one of Sukhomlinov's disreputable friends who was later exiled to Siberia on the charge of giving military information to the enemy—it was one of the charges against Sukhomlinov that he had allowed Doumbadze to have a secret synopsis of Russia's military reforms; B. von Eggeling, *Die Russische Mobilmachung und der Kriegausbruch* (Berlin, 1919), by the German military attaché in Russia; H. von Kuhl, *Der Deutsche Generalstab in Vorbereitung und Durchführung des Weltkrieges* (Berlin, 1920), valuable because the author held a high position for a quarter of a century in the German General Staff and indicates what the Germans supposed the Russians were doing; *Russlands Mobilmachung für den Weltkrieg: Neue Urkunden zur Geschichte des Weltkrieges, herausg. auf Befehl des Chefs des Generalstabes des Feldheeres* (Berlin, 1919); Georg Steinhausen, *Die Grundfehler des Krieges und der Generalstab*; Immanuel, *Siege und Niederlagen im Weltkriege* (Berlin, 1919); Frantz, "Der Russische Aufmarsch gegen Deutschland im August 1914", in *Wissen und Wehr* (Jahrgang 1920, heft 2); E. Sauerbeck, *Der Kriegausbruch* (Basel, 1918).

The first news of the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand made a painful impression in Russia as everywhere else in the civilized world. But this was soon overshadowed by the fear that Austria might now attempt to take a dangerous revenge on Serbia. In an interview with Pourtalès, the German ambassador, Sazonov, the Russian minister of foreign affairs, bitterly but shrewdly criticized the conduct of the Austrian officials: they had not only permitted excesses against the Serbs but he was convinced had purposely given a free rein to the popular fury. He denied Austria's assertion that the assassination was the result of a Great Serbian plot; at least, he said, there was not the slightest proof of this so far, and it was exceedingly unjust to hold the Serbian government responsible, as the Austro-Hungarian newspapers were doing. This was no more justifiable than it would have been for Russia to call the French government to account for the crimes which were plotted on French soil and committed in Russia. The Serbian government, he said, was taking a completely correct attitude. The Serajevo crime was only the isolated act of immature young persons and there was no proof of their connection with any deep-laid political plot. When Pourtalès sounded the old note of the solidarity of monarchical interests against such dangerous anarchistic murderers, he found that Sazonov responded to this ancient theme with less warmth than usual.⁶

In the middle of July, Sazonov spent several days at his country estate near Grodno. He wanted a rest before the exacting demands on his strength, which would be made by the approaching visit of the French president and prime minister. Such an absence from Petrograd seemed, at that time, quite safe. The political horizon, in spite of Serajevo, seemed still unclouded. He had no thought of war,⁷ for Berchtold had deceitfully given an appearance of calm at Vienna and the Austrian chief of staff had left the capital in order further to lull to sleep the suspicions of Europe. He had returned to Petrograd by July 18, and was beginning to grow nervous at the ominous silence of the Vienna authorities. To the Austrian and German ambassadors he reiterated his views that it was unjust to make a whole people responsible for the crime of a single individual, as the Austrian newspapers were doing. "Russia," he said, "would not be indifferent to any effort to humiliate

⁶ Pourtalès to Bethmann, July 13, 1914. *Kautsky Docs.*, no. 53.

⁷ This, at any rate, was the conviction of the Russian ambassador in London; cf. Benckendorff's views as reported by Lichnowsky on July 16 and 20. *Kautsky Docs.*, nos. 62 and 85.

Serbia. Russia could not permit Austria to use menacing language or military measures against Serbia. In short, 'La politique de la Russie est pacifique, mais pas passive.'⁸ In this attitude he was undoubtedly strengthened by Poincaré's visit, though we do not know precisely what took place in the secret conversations between the highest officials of the two allied countries, as well as with Buchanan, the English ambassador in Petrograd. The following telegram, which Viviani sent to Paris as he was leaving Russia, probably sums up accurately their provisional understanding:

REVAL, July 24, 1914, 1 A. M.

In the course of my conversation with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs we had to take into consideration the dangers which might result from any step taken by Austria-Hungary in relation to Serbia in connection with the crime of which the Hereditary Archduke has been a victim. We found ourselves in agreement in thinking that we should not leave anything undone to prevent a request for an explanation or some *mise en demeure* which would be equivalent to intervention in the internal affairs of Serbia, of such a kind that Serbia might consider it as an attack on her sovereignty and independence.

We have in consequence come to the opinion that we might, by means of a friendly conversation with Count Berchtold, give him counsels of moderation, of such a kind as to make him understand how undesirable would be any intervention at Belgrade which would appear to be a threat on the part of the Cabinet at Vienna.

The British ambassador, who was kept informed by M. Sazonov, expressed the idea that his government would doubtless associate itself with a *démarche* for removing any danger which might threaten general peace, and he has telegraphed to his government to this effect.⁹

Evidently the Triple Entente was planning to offer some such identical counsels of moderation when it was suddenly confronted, on Friday morning, July 24, with the text of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia.

Everywhere the extreme demands and the intransigent tone of the ultimatum caused the most painful astonishment and the most serious misgivings. Sir Edward Grey "had never before seen one state address to another independent state a document of so formidable a character". Sazonov at once became highly excited.¹⁰

⁸ Szápáry to Berchtold, July 18, *Red Book*, I., no. 25; Pourtalès to Bethmann, July 21, *Kautsky Docs.*, no. 120.

⁹ *Dipl. Corresp.*, p. 154.

¹⁰ The interview in which Szápáry informed Sazonov of the Austrian ultimatum has hitherto been chiefly derived from Szápáry's account as printed in the *Austrian Red Book* of 1915, no. 14; *Dipl. Corresp.*, pp. 457-458—but this combines two telegrams into one and omits seven passages; cf. Szápáry to Berchtold, July 24, *Red Book*, II., nos. 17, 18; cf. also I., nos. 29, 30. For Berchtold's simultaneous interview with Kudachev, the Russian chargé in Vienna, see *Red Book*, II., no. 23.

Of a naturally mercurial temperament, he was now particularly indignant at Berchtold's methods. The short time-limit, the withholding of the *dossier*, and the excessive and humiliating demands on Serbia, all seemed to indicate that Austria was determined on war at once with Serbia. It was particularly deceitful on Austria's part to have pretended for three weeks that the demands would be mild, and such as Serbia could surely accept, and then to face the little kingdom with an ultimatum which seemed to indicate that Austria wanted war and would soon cross the frontier into Serbian territory. Moreover, Poincaré and the French prime minister had only left Russia a few hours before. They were now on the high seas, where it was difficult, if not impossible, for Sazonov to get into touch with them. Furthermore, he shrewdly suspected that much that Szápáry had asserted was not true. But he did not know for certain, as we do now, how perfidiously Berchtold had acted in carefully suppressing the Wiesner report, which wholly exculpated the Serbian government, in deliberately framing the ultimatum so that Serbia could not accept it, and in holding back the *dossier*, because an impartial examination of it by Europe would not have borne out Austria's charges. Therefore, Sazonov concluded that his own wisest course was to seek to have the Austro-Serbian question treated as a question in which Europe was interested. He must not allow the "localization", which meant the inevitable humiliation or defeat of a small power by a great one.

Accordingly, after his interview with Szápáry on Friday morning, Sazonov hurried at once to the French embassy, after telephoning to the British ambassador to join him there. Sazonov, Paléologue, and Buchanan went over the situation carefully. Sazonov said that he regarded "Austria's conduct as both provocative and immoral; that Austria would never have taken such action unless Germany had first been consulted and he hoped that England would not fail to proclaim her solidarity with Russia and France. . . . [Paléologue let it be understood that] France would fulfil all the obligations entailed upon her by her alliance with Russia, if necessity arose, besides supporting Russia strongly in any diplomatic negotiations". Buchanan very cautiously and correctly represented Grey's precise views. He "saw no reason to expect any declaration of solidarity from England that would entail an unconditional engagement to support Russia and France by force of arms. Direct British interests in Serbia were nil and a war on behalf of that country would never be sanctioned by British public opinion". In reply, Sazonov still insisted it must not be forgotten that the gen-

eral European question was involved, the Serbian question being but a part of the former, and that Great Britain could not afford to efface herself from the problems now at issue. As Sazonov was unable to persuade Buchanan into making a statement of solidarity, which could be used as an effective bluff at Vienna, he declared that he thought that at any rate Russian mobilization would have to be carried out.¹¹

This discussion between the three representatives of the Triple Entente reveals the situation which became clearer as the crisis became more serious: France and Russia pressed England to join them in a statement of solidarity, which could be used as an effective counter-bluff, or even as a threat, to prevent Austria and Germany from acting against Serbia. But to this Buchanan and Grey would not, at first, agree. They did not encourage Russia's strong action by holding out the hope of British armed support, as so many Germans have asserted. On the contrary, Sir Edward Grey was very reserved and cautious as to saying or doing anything which might encourage Russia to mobilize and so precipitate a crisis. All his thoughts and efforts were directed toward finding some peaceful solution for the crisis and avoiding anything which might aggravate it. They are too well known to need repeating here. It was only very gradually, as Germany and Austria deliberately blocked all his earlier peace proposals, that Grey became finally convinced of the *mala fides* of the Central Powers and consequently began to give Lichnowsky the "friendly warnings".

On leaving the conference with Buchanan and Paléologue at the French embassy, Sazonov became still more nervous and excited because he was uncertain of English support. In a somewhat stormy interview with Pourtalès on Friday evening, July 24, Sazonov argued quite logically that the promises which Serbia had made in 1909, as Austria had incautiously admitted in her note to Serbia, were given not to Austria, but to the Powers; consequently the affair was a European one and not one to be "localized"; it was for Europe to examine the *dossier* and investigate whether Serbia had lived up to her promises or not. Austria could not be both prosecutor and judge. These arguments Pourtalès promised to report to

¹¹ Buchanan to Grey, July 24, *Dipl. Corresp.*, pp. 14-15. This account by Buchanan of the meeting of the three representatives of the Triple Entente is full and frank in contrast with the brief report of Paléologue, *ibid.*, p. 163. That Buchanan correctly represented Grey is clear from the latter's reply next day: "You spoke quite rightly in very difficult circumstances as to the attitude of His Majesty's Government. I entirely approve what you said." (Grey to Buchanan, July 25, *ibid.*, p. 25.)

Berlin, but "he doubted whether Germany would expect her ally to lay the results of her investigation before a European Areopagus". Austria would object, as any Great Power would do, to subject to arbitration a question in which her vital interests were at stake. Finally Sazonov exclaimed, "If Austria gobbles up Serbia, we shall make war on her".¹²

On the afternoon of Saturday, July 25, the wave of midsummer heat which had been hanging over Petrograd for a month seemed to reach its climax. The trains were crowded with peace-loving people pouring out for the summer holidays. Out on the sun-baked plain at Krasnoe Selo, the Tsar and all the diplomatic and military world gathered to witness the usual summer review of the Russian troops. But the review was postponed for an hour on account of an important Crown Council at which the Tsar presided. Even when the review finally took place, it was cut short, and an unusual military excitement pervaded all the officers. The military attachés got the impression that the Crown Council had considered, perhaps even ordered, the mobilization of the Russian army. After the review had taken place, in an abbreviated form, it was announced that the manoeuvres here and in the whole empire were to be broken off, and that the troops were to return to their standing quarters. The feeling that mobilization and war were imminent was increased by the premature promotion of the cadets from the Petrograd Military Academy as officers. At the banquet following the review, young officers openly expressed their joy that now at last something was starting against Austria. Following the banquet there was a theatrical performance, which, under the leadership of the Grand Duke Nicholas, was made the occasion of a great demonstration for war. That evening, Petrograd was startled out of its stillness by the unexpected sound of the Imperial Guards galloping back to the capital, although they were to have been quartered out at Krasnoe Selo for another month.¹³

What were the decisions taken at this important Crown Council at Krasnoe Selo in the presence of the Tsar? We have no precise record, but we may surmise that a conflict of opinion took place be-

¹² Telegram of Pourtalès to Bethmann, July 25, 1:08 A.M. *Kautsky Docs.*, no. 160; the German *White Book* (*Dipl. Corresp.*, p. 427, exhibit 4) suppresses nearly all of this interesting telegram. For many other details of this interview, see Pourtalès's long letter to Bethmann of July 25, in *Kautsky Docs.*, no. 204; and Pourtalès's account of it to the Austrian ambassador, Szápáry to Berchtold, July 25, 2:30 A.M., *Red Book*, II., no. 19.

¹³ *Kautsky Docs.*, nos. 194, 291; Eggeling, pp. 22-27; *Red Book*, II., nos. 41, 60; Meriel Buchanan, *The City of Trouble* (New York, 1918), pp. 10-12.

tween the civilians and the militarists. There are good reasons for believing that, on the one side, the Tsar, Count Fredericks, Sazonov, and Krivosheín sincerely wished to avoid war and hoped that it could be avoided, perhaps through England's efforts. The civilians wanted no more military measures than were necessary to bluff Austria out of her intended attack upon Serbia. On the other hand the militarists, led by the Grand Duke Nicholas, by Sukhomlinov, minister of war, and by Ianushkevich, chief of the General Staff, urged more complete military measures. They felt that a war between Austria and Serbia was necessarily a war between Austria and Russia, and they had no doubt that Austria was about to begin an invasion of Serbia as soon as the time-limit expired. In fact, later in the day, a Russian officer, looking at his watch at six o'clock, remarked to the German officer attached to the Tsar's suite, "The cannon on the Danube will have begun to fire by now, for one doesn't send such an ultimatum except when the cannon are loaded".¹⁴ They were probably convinced that war was "inevitable", and that here was Russia's heaven-sent opportunity to have her final reckoning with Germany and to acquire Constantinople and the Straits. Therefore the sooner full mobilization was declared the better.

It is quite possible that one of their arguments in favor of mobilization was the dangerous domestic situation. Petrograd and all the larger cities were in the throes of an extensive working-men's strike. By a strange irony of fate, at the same moment when the Russian military bands, in the camp at Krasnoe Selo, had been welcoming Poincaré with the Marseillaise, the Cossacks in the suburbs of Petrograd had been striking down working-men for singing this same Marseillaise.¹⁵

At any rate, whatever the arguments used at this council, at least two definite decisions were taken. First, it was agreed that the troops throughout the empire should at once be recalled from their summer training camps to their standing quarters. It was in their standing quarters that the full equipments were kept which were necessary for war, and which they must have before they could start for the front. Ianushkevich, chief of staff, lost no time in putting the decision into execution.¹⁶ This breaking off of manoeuvres

¹⁴ Chelius to the Kaiser, July 26. *Kautsky Docs.*, no. 291.

¹⁵ For indications of conflict between militarists and civilians, see *Kautsky Docs.*, nos. 130, 194, 203, 204, 338; *Red Book*, II., nos. 60, 61, 73; III., nos. 19, 71; Nekludov, pp. 284-285.

¹⁶ He must have telephoned an order from Krasnoe Selo to Petrograd, for at 4:10 P.M. there were sent out from the General Staff to the chief of staff of the Warsaw military district the secret cipher telegrams, nos. 1547 and 1557:

and return of the troops to their standing quarters was not, however, in any way equivalent to mobilization. It must, to be sure, precede mobilization, but it was not in any way a menacing or hostile act. France and Germany both ordered similar measures a little later. The return of the Imperial Guards to Petrograd on Saturday night, July 25, is to be explained as a part of this general preparation for possible action.

The second decision taken by the Crown Council was one desired by Sazonov and is probably accurately indicated by the account of it which he gave to the French:

At the council of ministers of the twenty-fifth, which was held in the presence of the Tsar, the mobilization of thirteen army corps intended eventually to operate against Austria was considered; this mobilization, however, would only be made effective if Austria were to bring armed Prussia to bear upon Serbia and not until after notice had been given by the Minister of Foreign Affairs upon whom falls the duty of fixing the day, liberty being left to him to go on with negotiations, even if Belgrade should be occupied. Russian opinion makes clear that it is both politically and morally impossible for Russia to allow Serbia to be crushed.¹⁷

This is confirmed by the testimony of Ianushkevich at the Sukhomlinov trial in 1917: "At first it had been decided only to proclaim a partial mobilization—the four districts—to frighten off Austria-Hungary."¹⁸

In other words, for the Tsar, Sazonov, and all the diplomats, this Crown Council meant that Russia intended to threaten Austria with a "partial mobilization" in case Austria crossed the Serbian frontier. But even this partial mobilization was to take place only if and when Sazonov should decide it should be done. And even if Belgrade were occupied, he might still continue to negotiate for peace. He did not need to break off diplomatic relations with Austria nor yield to the militarists in his own country. Sazonov was highly delighted with this solution and during the next two days was exceedingly optimistic and conciliatory, so much so that it was

"Prepare quickly transport plans and summaries for the return of all troops to their standing quarters. Time for the completion of the work: twenty-four hours. 1547. [Signed] General DOBROVOLSKI." Later the same day, at 11:59 P.M., perhaps after Ianushkevich had returned to Petrograd, telegram no. 1557: "His Majesty commands that upon the arrival of this telegram the troops are to return from their camps to their standing quarters. . . . 1557. [Signed] BJÖLJEV." Hoeniger, *Russlands Vorbereitung*, p. 80.

¹⁷ Bienvenu-Martin's summary, July 26, *Dipl. Corresp.*, p. 174. In the third line, it would have been more correct to translate *eventuellement* "contingently" or "in case of need" than "eventually".

¹⁸ *Novoe Vremia*, no. 14,852, Aug. 13 [26], 1917.

specially remarked by a number of persons.¹⁹ He believed that he had the trump cards in his hand. He could continue to negotiate, but he had the threat of force with which to strengthen his hand. Also the militarists in Russia could not get control, because the decision for partial mobilization lay only in his power.

The militarists, however, were not satisfied with these two decisions. They proceeded to take a further and far more wide-reaching action, though whether they did this in accordance with the decision of the Council or without the knowledge of the Tsar or Sazonov, merely on their own authority, is not certain. At any rate, after the Crown Council at Krasnoe Selo they lost no time in beginning to put into operation secret "measures preparatory to war". In the frontier districts toward the Central Powers, these measures were almost equivalent to mobilization, although they did not require a public announcement of mobilization. This seems to be the meaning of two secret cipher telegrams, numbers 1566 and 1575, which Ianushkevich sent out from the General Staff before dawn on Sunday morning, July 26, to the commanders of the troops in the Warsaw military district:

PETROGRAD, July 13[26], 1 A. M.

His Majesty commands all the fortresses of the district to be placed on a war footing. It is ordered to begin with the works which are indicated in "surveys 1 and 2" attached to the Instruction Concerning the Period Preparatory to War, confirmed by His Majesty on February 17 [Mar. 2], 1913. 1556. [Signed] Lieut.-Gen. IANUSHKEVICH.²⁰

PETROGRAD, July 13 [26], 3:26 A. M.

His Majesty commands that July 26 is to be reckoned as the beginning of the Period Preparatory to War in the whole territory of European Russia. You are to take, according to surveys 1 and 2 of the Instruction Concerning this Period, all the measures which are to be carried out . . . 1575. [Signed] Lieut.-Gen. IANUSHKEVICH.²¹

¹⁹ By Pourtalès (*Kautsky Docs.*, no. 217); by Szápáry (*Red Book*, II., nos. 73, 93); by Buchanan, "I saw Sazonov this afternoon and found him very conciliatory and more optimistic" (July 27, *Dipl. Corresp.*, p. 49); and by Paléologue, "Sazonov has used conciliatory language to all my colleagues" (July 27, *ibid.*, p. 186).

²⁰ Captured Russian telegram, quoted by Hoeniger, p. 81; cf. also pp. 11-12 and 17-20. That the order was speedily obeyed is indicated by General Rennenkampf's order no. 13,482 of July 26: "In accordance with an order from the Tsar, Kovno is on this day placed upon a war footing", quoted from the White Russian newspaper, *Homan*, for May, 1916, by Mueller-Meiningen, p. 348, note 1; and Bülow, who was consul at Kovno, was able to telegraph from Eydtkuhnen in East Prussia on July 27, at 5:35 P.M., presumably having learned the news many hours earlier: "Kovno has been placed in a state of war." *Kautsky Docs.*, no. 264.

²¹ Hoeniger, p. 80.

According to this Instruction of 1913, which was one of Sukhomlinov's reform measures to improve mobilization, "'Period Preparatory to War' means the period of diplomatic complications preceding the opening of hostilities, in the course of which all boards must take the necessary measures of preparation for security and success at the mobilization of the army, the fleet, and the fortresses as well as for the march of the army to the threatened frontier."²² According to "survey 1", in the districts on Russia's western frontier,

it is decreed that upon the order of the Minister of War [not upon that of the Tsar] the reservists and the militia of the corps on the frontier are to be called up for military training. Out of the militia will be formed in accordance with the mobilization plan troops for securing the frontiers, the lines of communication, the telegraphs, and the other objects of military importance. The cost of this calling up of men for training is to be labelled in the accounts under the head of funds granted for military training and for practice mobilization.

This is supplemented by "survey 2", by which, upon the order of the Minister of War, the "calling up of the reservists and militia for training takes place to an extent which exceeds the funds of the current year fixed for such training and practice mobilization".²³ Thus, under cover of "preparatory measures" and "practice mobilization", military measures could be taken upon the order of the Minister of War which did not require the approval of the Tsar nor a public announcement of mobilization, but which nevertheless were almost equivalent to mobilization in those frontier districts. Such a "practice mobilization" had been undertaken in the fall of 1912 and had called forth a strong protest from the German chief of staff, Moltke—a protest which Sazonov, at that time, appeared to admit was well founded.²⁴ It was by these measures that Sukhomlinov and Ianushkevich really began secret mobilization measures against Germany on July 26 and when war actually came surprised Germany and the world by the rapidity with which the Russian troops poured into East Prussia.

On Sunday morning, July 26, after the break-up of the manoeuvres at Krasnoe Selo, Sazonov and Pourtalès met on the platform of the station and travelled up to Petrograd together. Pourtalès, finding Sazonov much calmer and more conciliatory than the day before, took advantage of this informal opportunity to point out to

²² Quoted by Hoeniger, p. 17.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

²⁴ *Deutschland Schuldig*, pp. 141-142; Bogitshevich, p. 39, note; Hoeniger, p. 35.

him that Austria had no hostile intentions toward Russia. He urgently advised him to have a frank and friendly talk with the Austrian ambassador, with whom he had had no words since the excited interview two days before, when he had first been confronted with the Austrian ultimatum.²⁵ On arriving at Petrograd, Pourtalès saw Szápáry, told him of Sazonov's calm and conciliatory state of mind, and gave him the same good advice, to seek a good long talk with the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs. Accordingly, Szápáry went to see Sazonov:

Sazonov received me very amiably in contrast to his decidedly piqued attitude on Friday. . . . Friday he had been taken somewhat by surprise, he said, and had not controlled himself so much as he had wished; and at that time, too, our interview was a wholly official one. . . . He could not deny, he said, that people in Russia had old grievances against Austria. He admitted that he had had them, too, but these belonged to the past and ought not to play any rôle in the policies of the present; and as far as the Slavs were concerned, though indeed he ought not to say this to an Austro-Hungarian ambassador, he had, he said, no sympathy at all for the Balkan Slavs. In fact, these were, he said, a heavy burden for Russia, and we could hardly imagine what one had had to suffer from them already. Our goal, he said, as I had described it to him, was an entirely legitimate one, but he considered the path which we were pursuing to attain it was not the surest. He said that the note which we had delivered was not happy in its form. He had since been studying it, and, if I had time, he would like to look it through once more with me. [They then went over in detail the whole Austrian ultimatum, point by point.] By way of summary the Minister declared that he found that in the matter of the note it was really merely a question of phraseology and that perhaps a more acceptable way for us could be found by which these difficulties could be gotten over. . . .

At the close of the conversation, Sazonov again expressed, in the warmest words, his pleasure at the explanations which I had given and which had materially calmed him. . . .

Long is the path which has been traversed by Russian Policy in the two days from the first harsh refusal to accept our procedure . . . to a recognition of the legitimacy of our claims and to a request for mediators. Nevertheless, it must not be overlooked that along with this backing-water policy of the diplomatists, there is setting in a lively activity on the part of the militarists as a result of which Russia's military, and therefore also her diplomatic, situation threatens daily to become less favorable to us.

Incidentally, in our conversation, Sazonov asked whether I could give him a look into our Dossier. Upon my replying that I was not yet in possession of it, he asked whether it could not be made accessible to Shebeko [Russian ambassador] in Vienna.²⁶

²⁵ Pourtalès's diary, *Kautsky Docs.*, vol. IV., p. 161. Szápáry to Berchtold, July 26, 2:15 P.M., *Red Book*, II., no. 73; this despatch is incorrectly dated July 27 instead of July 26.

²⁶ *Red Book*, II., no. 73; cf. also *Kautsky Docs.*, nos. 217, 238; and *Dipl. Corresp.* for reports of this same interview, by Buchanan (p. 39), by Paléologue (p. 177), and by Sazonov (p. 275); also, p. 427, exhibit 5, and p. 505.

Pourtalès's advice to the two principals thus bore good results. He was warmly thanked by both. It led to the opening of "direct conversations" between Petrograd and Vienna. It seemed to pave the way for finding some compromise, which would both satisfy Austria's demands and also make their acceptance by Serbia possible.

On Sunday afternoon or evening, after this friendly talk with Szápáry, Sazonov had another interview with Pourtalès. Sazonov, again, expressed the hope that an agreement might be reached through a change in the form of Austria's note, as it was merely a question of phraseology. In the course of the conversation Pourtalès expressed his personal suggestion, not in any way binding his government, that the following way might be found practicable:

In case the Vienna Cabinet should consent to modify somewhat the form of its demands, as the statements of Szápáry seem to indicate is not wholly out of the question, perhaps an attempt should be made with this in view to come into direct touch with Austria-Hungary. Should an agreement result from this then Serbia could be advised by Russia to accept the demands of Austria on the basis agreed upon by Russia and Austria; and Austria could be notified of this through the mediation of a third Power. Sazonov, upon whom I again strongly impressed the fact that I did not speak in the name of my government, declared that he would at once telegraph to the Russian ambassador in Vienna along the lines of my proposal.²⁷

The suggestion of "direct conversations" between Petrograd and Vienna, as the most hopeful way out of the crisis, was a sincere and well-meant effort of the German ambassador. But, as we now know from Berchtold's intentions, there was not the slightest possibility of Austria's being willing to modify even the phraseology of her demands. As it turned out, his refusal of the "direct conversations" tended to the embitterment, rather than to the amelioration, of the relations between Russia and Austria.

While thus attempting to secure a basis for a compromise between Austria and Russia, however, Pourtalès had not failed to warn Sazonov that mobilization measures by Russia would be an exceedingly dangerous means of exerting diplomatic pressure. If Russia should attempt a bluff of this kind, the militarists everywhere would gain an increased influence and soon take the question beyond the control of the diplomatists by the purely military arguments which they knew so well how to urge. He informed Sazonov of the following statement of Germany's position, which he had received

²⁷ Pourtalès to Bethmann, July 26, 10:10 P.M. *Kautsky Docs.*, no. 238.

from Bethmann:

After Count Berchtold's declaration to Russia that Austria does not intend any territorial gains at Serbia's expense, but only wishes to secure repose, the maintenance of the peace of Europe depends on Russia alone. We trust in Russia's love of peace and in our traditional friendly relations with her that she will take no step which will seriously endanger the peace of Europe.²⁸

He also called attention to the news current among the foreign military attachés, according to which it was supposed that mobilization orders had been issued to several Russian army corps, on the western frontier. In reply Sazonov guaranteed to him that

no mobilization orders of the sort have been issued; on the contrary, in the Ministerial Council it has been decided to delay with any such order until Austria-Hungary should take up a hostile attitude toward Russia. Sazonov admitted, however, that there had already been taken certain military préparations in order that Russia might not be caught by surprise.²⁹

Sazonov does not appear to have regarded this communication as a threat on the part of Germany, for his optimism continued during the following day and with the approval of Buchanan and Paléologue he telegraphed to Vienna, proposing the "direct negotiations". He realized that they could be successful only in case Austria and Germany were convinced that Russia was not taking steps toward mobilization. He therefore telephoned to Sukhomlinov, asking him to make it plain to the German military attaché, as one military man speaking to another, that nothing but measures preparatory to a possible mobilization in certain districts against Austria was contemplated. Accordingly very late on Sunday evening, Eggeling was invited to an interview with Sukhomlinov, which Eggeling thus reports:

Sazonov requested him [Sukhomlinov] to enlighten me on the military situation. The Minister of War gave me his word of honor that no sort of mobilization order had as yet been issued. For the present merely "preparatory measures" were being taken. Not a horse had been recruited, not a reservist called in. If Austria crosses the Serbian frontier, such military districts as are directed against Austria, *viz.* Kiev, Odessa, Moscow, Kazan, will be mobilized. Under no circumstances those on the German front, Warsaw, Vilna, Petrograd. Peace with Germany, he said, was urgently desired. Upon my inquiry as to the object of the mobilization against Austria, he shrugged his shoulders and indicated the diplomats. . . . I got the impression of great nervousness and anxiety. I consider the wish for peace genuine; military statements in so far correct that complete mobilization has probably not been

²⁸ Bethmann to Pourtalès, July 26, 1:35 P.M. *Kautsky Docs.*, no. 198; vol. IV., p. 161; cf. *Dipl. Corresp.*, p. 428, exhibit 10b.

²⁹ Pourtalès to Bethmann, July 26, 9:30 P.M. *Kautsky Docs.*, no. 230; cf. also *Red Book*, II., no. 61.

ordered, but preparatory measures are very far-reaching. They are evidently striving to gain time for new negotiations and for a continuance of their armaments. Also the internal situation is unmistakably causing serious anxiety. The general feeling is: hope from Germany and from the mediation of His Majesty [the Kaiser].³⁰

During Monday, July 27, the diplomatic situation at Petrograd remained without substantial change. Sazonov was even more conciliatory and optimistic than the day before. He still hoped that Austria's bark was worse than her bite, for he still had no news that Austria had opened hostilities against Serbia, as he had feared would be the case. He was waiting hopefully for a reply to his proposal for "direct conversations".

On Tuesday, July 28, Sazonov's optimism received several rude shocks. He was disappointed and indignant that his proposal made two days previously for "direct conversations" had met with no response from Berchtold. He was also unfavorably impressed by the fact that Szápáry could not give him the *dossier* which Austria had promised.³¹ Therefore, he turned to Pourtalès and urged that Grey's plan for a conference of the Four Powers be taken up again; but he met with no encouragement from the German ambassador. On the contrary, Pourtalès complained of the hostile tone of the Russian press and of the fact that reliable reports made it clear to Germany that Russia's military preparations exceeded what Sukhomlinov had stated to Eggeling on the night of July 26. Pourtalès diplomatically expressed the suspicion that the Russian militarists were acting behind Sazonov's back and going further than the Minister of Foreign Affairs intended. He warned Sazonov again of the very serious danger which would arise from wide-reaching Russian military preparations.³² When Sazonov went out to Peterhof for his usual Tuesday audience with the Tsar, he found in fact that the militarists had been seeing the Tsar and had been exerting great pressure upon him.³³ Later in the day, when the news arrived that Austria had declared war on Serbia at midday, Sazonov's optimism evaporated completely. He agreed that the time had come to ap-

³⁰ Pourtalès to Bethmann, July 27, 1 A.M., *Kautsky Docs.*, no. 242; cf. no. 216, and *Dipl. Corresp.*, pp. 427-429, exhibits 7, 11.

³¹ Szápáry to Berchtold, July 29, 10 A.M., *Red Book*, III., no. 16; though dated July 29, the first part of this telegram refers to his conversation with Sazonov on July 28.

³² Pourtalès to Bethmann, July 28, 8:12 P.M., *Kautsky Docs.*, no. 338; Szápáry to Berchtold, July 28 (despatched July 29, 1:15 A.M.), *Red Book*, II., no. 94.

³³ Cf. Tsar to King George, Aug 1, *Dipl. Corresp.*, p. 537; Tsar to Kaiser, July 29, *ibid.*, p. 431; Szápáry to Berchtold, July 29, 11 P.M., *Red Book*, III., no. 19.

prove Russia's "partial mobilization" against Austria, as had been agreed upon at the Crown Council at Krasnoe Selo on July 25. He must have come to this decision on the afternoon or evening of July 28, for on that same evening he telegraphed to the Russian ambassador in Berlin:

In consequence of the declaration of war by Austria against Serbia the Imperial Government will announce tomorrow (29th) the mobilization in the military conscriptions of Odessa, Kiev, Moscow, and Kazan. Please inform German Government confirming the absence in Russia of any aggressive intention against Germany. The Russian ambassador at Vienna has not been recalled from his post.³⁴

As Austria's declaration of war put an end to the possible success of any "direct conversations" between Petrograd and Vienna, Sazonov now urgently appealed to Grey again to set on foot mediation with a view to the suspension of military operations against Serbia^{34a}—an appeal which Grey at once adopted by strongly supporting the plan that Austria cease her military advance after occupying Belgrade, and accept mediation.

Meanwhile what did the Tsar and the chief of the General Staff do after this decision in favor of partial mobilization? The Tsar, characteristically, made a personal appeal to the Kaiser, practically admitting his own helplessness before the pressure of the Russian militarists.³⁵ At almost the same moment, curiously enough, the Kaiser was sending a telegram to the Tsar. Pourtalès had hinted more than once that it would be a good thing for him to send such a personal telegram, emphasizing the identity of their monarchical interests, and offering mediation between Austria and Russia.³⁶

These two imperial telegrams, which reopened the "Willy-Nicky" correspondence, crossed each other on the wires. They were both, on the whole, of a conciliatory character and expressed a genuine desire to avert war. The Kaiser's telegram was in accordance with the "pledge plan" which Bethmann was already urging at Vienna as the basis for the Kaiser's mediation and a satisfactory compromise. Perhaps the two monarchs might have suc-

³⁴ Sazonov to Sverbeiev, July 28, *Dipl. Corresp.*, p. 55. Sverbeiev did not inform Bethmann, nor did Sazonov inform Pourtalès of this decision until the next morning, July 29. *Kautsky Docs.*, nos. 342, 343, 359, 365, 370.

^{34a} *Ibid.*, p. 56.

³⁵ Tsar to Kaiser, July 29, 1 A.M., *Kautsky Docs.*, no. 332; in *Dipl. Corresp.*, p. 431, this telegram is incorrectly worded owing to double translation, and incorrectly dated 1 P.M. instead of 1 A.M.

³⁶ Kaiser to Tsar, written July 28, 10:45 P.M., despatched July 29, 1:45 A.M. *Kautsky Docs.*, no. 335; cf. *Dipl. Corresp.*, p. 431. For Pourtalès's hints, advising a telegram from the Kaiser, see nos. 229, 308, 337.

ceeded in their friendly intentions had not the militarists in both countries, and particularly in Russia, precipitated matters.

The chief of the Russian General Staff, Ianushkevich, was not content with "partial mobilization". Acting with the Minister of War, Sukhomlinov, he assumed the responsibility of taking steps toward a "general mobilization". In addition to notifying the commanders of the four southern districts that "partial mobilization" was about to be proclaimed, as he was authorized to do, he also, on his own responsibility, sent secret orders to Zhilinski, the commander of the Warsaw military district, and presumably to all the military districts, stating that "general mobilization" was imminent:

July 17 [30] will be announced as the first day of our general mobilization. The announcement will follow upon the agreed telegram. 1785. [*Signed*] Lieutenant-General IANUSHKEVICH.³⁷

One can imagine how the receipt of this telegram would lead the Russian commanders at Warsaw and at other posts along the German frontier to strain every nerve to take all possible secret steps toward preparing for war, short of a public announcement of mobilization.³⁸ Thus, on the early morning of July 29, under pretense of merely mobilizing in four districts to bluff Austria, Ianushkevich was really preparing a general mobilization of all European Russia, thus threatening Germany, in addition to the "measures preparatory to war" which had already been going on in the frontier districts since July 26. There was therefore a genuine ground for the fears which Pourtalès and Szápáry expressed that the militarists were acting behind the back of the Tsar, who ought to be clearly informed

³⁷ Telegram no. 1785, Ianushkevich to Zhilinski, July 29, ca. 7:20 A.M.; quoted by Hoeniger, pp. 100-101. Some hours earlier he had also asked the Warsaw commander about arrangements for disembarking troops which were being pushed forward toward the German frontier (telegram no. 1746, July 28, 11:58 P.M.; *ibid.*, p. 105). Aware that Russian troops, expecting at any moment the publication of "general mobilization", might commit some act of hostility against Germany on the frontier which would compromise his own illegal action, and also compromise Russia with her allies, by making Russia seem to be the aggressor, he was careful to order explicitly that the opening of hostilities was not to take place except upon a special telegram, and that the frontier troops were to be warned, "in order that no irremediable mistakes occur" (telegram no. 1754, July 29, 1:10 A.M.; *ibid.*, p. 105).

³⁸ That Ianushkevich on the early morning of July 29 was telegraphing that "general mobilization" was about to be announced is further indicated by Zhilinski's telegram of the following day: "The Chief of the General Staff telegraphed yesterday that July 30 would be announced as the first day of mobilization, but since this has not taken place I conclude that changes have taken place in the political situation. Would it not be possible to inform me of the changes which have occurred in this matter? 1954." (Zhilinski to Sukhomlinov, July 30, 2:25 P.M., quoted in Hoeniger, p. 110).

of the true situation and its dangers. Though the order for "partial mobilization" had been decided upon on July 28, it could not be legally proclaimed until the Tsar's signature had been signed to a formal ukaz. Accordingly, before noon on July 29, Ianushkevich went out to Peterhof to secure the Tsar's signature. He probably argued there strongly in favor of the "general mobilization" which he had already secretly notified the commanders was imminent, but without telling the Tsar what he had been doing secretly. But peace-loving Nicholas, counting on his own appeal to the Kaiser, and on the Kaiser's telegram which he had by that time received, was only willing to sign the ukaz for "partial mobilization". With this in his pocket Ianushkevich hurried back to Petrograd and after trying to mislead the German military attaché as to Russia's military measures and plans,³⁹ began to send out the telegrams as the Tsar's ukaz authorized him to do, ordering "partial mobilization" in the four districts "against Austria" and proclaiming that mobilization was to be considered as beginning at midnight between July 29 and 30.⁴⁰

Meanwhile on this fatal afternoon and evening of July 29 the Tsar and Sazonov were becoming more and more perturbed. About 1 P.M., Sazonov had complained to Pourtalès that he still had no answer from Vienna to his proposal of three days before for "direct conversations". "Shebeko, who received instructions in regard to this, still reports nothing from authoritative persons [in Vienna], and similarly Szápáry declares he has received no instructions and he must doubt therefore Austria's good will." He therefore notified

³⁹ Eggeling's report in *Kautsky Docs.*, no. 370; about half this report is omitted in the report as given in the German *White Book (Dipl. Corresp.*, p. 410). Eggeling's pamphlet, pp. 25-42; Russian newspapers reporting the third day of the Sukhomlinov trial.

⁴⁰ None of these original telegrams were captured by the Germans, but a copy of an order based on them was found: "Order for the troops of the Smolensk Garrison. On 16 [29] of this July His Majesty commands the troops of the Moscow military district to mobilize. The first mobilization day is to count from midnight between July 29 and 30. [Signed] Lient.-Gen. ALEXEIEV." (Quoted by Hoeniger, pp. 108-109.) As this bears a mark indicating that it was "received on July 30 at 4:50 A.M.", the General Staff telegram on which it was based must have been despatched from Petrograd several hours earlier. Cf. the similar secondary telegrams sent by Gen. Sievers to the 10th Army Corps at Kharkov in the Kiev military district (July 30, 10:30 A.M.) and by Gen. Nikitin to the 7th Army in the Odessa military district (July 30, exact hour not indicated). *Ibid.* At the Sukhomlinov trial, as will be indicated below, both Sukhomlinov and Ianushkevich testified that at the time of their three-cornered telephone conversation with the Tsar, *i.e.*, late in the evening of July 29, "mobilization was already in full swing"; "it was technically impossible to stop it"; Ianushkevich said he knew that "already 400,000 reservists has been called up".

Pourtalès, as Sverbeiev had already notified Bethmann in Berlin, that

as Austria has mobilized eight corps which in part must be regarded as directed against Russia, Russia sees herself compelled likewise to mobilize the military districts on the Austrian frontier. The order will be given today . . . But in Russia mobilization is far from meaning the same thing as in the West European countries; the Russian army could, according to circumstances, stand for weeks with arms grounded without crossing the frontier.

Pourtalès, knowing well the power of the militarists at Berlin, warned Sazonov of his fear that the General Staffs of the Central Powers would not surrender their advantage over Russia in the matter of rapidity of mobilization and would press for counter-measures.⁴¹ Later in the afternoon, Sazonov's indignation was greatly stirred by receiving at last Berchtold's "categorical refusal" to enter into the "direct conversations" he had suggested. He therefore pressed the English and German ambassadors for a return to Grey's proposal for mediation.⁴² Sazonov's indignation was further increased by the news that the Austrians had bombarded Belgrade. As Szápáry reported to Berchtold:

Since the German ambassador told me that Sazonov showed himself very much excited over Your Excellency's refusal to continue an exchange of views with Russia and over Austria's mobilization . . . I sought the Minister out to clear up some misunderstandings which seemed to me to exist and incidentally to get a closer look into Russia's plans. . . . He further informed me that a ukaz would be signed today which ordered a mobilization of a somewhat wide extent. He was able, however, to assure me in the most official manner that their troops were not intended to attack us. They would only stand ready with grounded arms in case Russian interests in the Balkans should be in danger. An explanatory note would make this clear, for it was a question only of a precautionary measure that Emperor Nicholas had found to be justified since we, who in any case have the advantage of quicker mobilization, have now also so great a start. . . . While we were thus engaged in a confidential exchange of views, the Minister heard through the telephone that we had bombarded Belgrade. He was like a changed man [war wie ausgewechselt]. . . . "You only wish to gain time by negotiation but you go ahead and bombard an unprotected city!" "What precisely will you further conquer, when you have taken possession of the capital," and more such childish remarks. . . . I left him in a most extremely excited state. . . .⁴³

⁴¹ Pourtalès to Bethmann, July 29, 1:58 P.M. *Kautsky Docs.*, no. 343. Chelius to Kaiser, an hour later, reported that the circle around the Tsar, after the Austrian declaration of war and refusal to accept Serbia's conciliatory answer, "now regards general war as almost inevitable". *Ibid.*, no. 344.

⁴² Pourtalès to Bethmann, July 29, 6:10 P.M. *Kautsky Docs.*, no. 365. Buchanan to Grey, July 29, *Dipl. Corresp.*, pp. 60-61.

⁴³ Szápáry to Berchtold, July 29, 11 P.M., *Red Book*, III., no. 19; cf. *Dipl. Corresp.*, pp. 522-524.

About 7 P.M. Pourtalès had still another interview with Sazonov. This was the reflex of Russia's expressed intention of declaring partial mobilization. Bethmann, on being informed by Sverbeiev about noon of Russia's intention, had at once telegraphed to Pourtalès "to explain very earnestly to Sazonov that a further advance of Russia's mobilization measures would compel us to mobilize, and that then a European war could hardly be averted".⁴⁴ In informing Sazonov of this instruction, Pourtalès says he emphasized that this was not a threat, but only a friendly expression of opinion. But Sazonov, who by now was "very excited", regarded it as an unfriendly threat; nevertheless he said he would report it to the Tsar.⁴⁵

In informing France of this interview Sazonov justified Russia's partial mobilization on the ground of Austria's actions, and represented Pourtalès's communication as a threat which made war probably inevitable:

As we cannot comply with the wishes of Germany, we have no alternative but to hasten on our own military preparations and assume that war is probably inevitable. Please inform the French government of this, and add that we are sincerely grateful to them for the declaration, which the French ambassador made to me on their behalf, to the effect that we could count fully upon the assistance of our ally, France. In the existing circumstances, that declaration is especially valuable for us.⁴⁶

To both Buchanan and Paléologue Sazonov was still careful to emphasize that Russia was only proceeding with partial mobilization. To neither did he indicate that he intended to extend "partial" into "general" mobilization. For he knew that to do so would be against the wishes of France⁴⁷ and would make it far less likely that Russia could secure the support of England. When he informed the Tsar of his interview with Pourtalès the Tsar also appears to have thought that Russia had gone far enough. Clinging to the hope that he and the Kaiser might avert the war which Bethmann's threat made the excited Sazonov regard as "probably

⁴⁴ *Kautsky Docs.* no. 342.

⁴⁵ Pourtalès to Bethmann, July 29, 8 P.M. *Kautsky Docs.*, no. 378.

⁴⁶ Sazonov to Russian ambassador in Paris, July 29. *Dipl. Corresp.*, p. 287. Cf. also Sazonov's reports of the interview to Buchanan and Paléologue, *ibid.*, pp. 60-61, 210.

⁴⁷ Viviani to Paléologue: "I think it would be well that, in taking any precautionary measures of defence which Russia thinks must go on, she should not immediately take any step which may offer to Germany a pretext for a total or partial mobilization of her forces" (evidently written on the evening of July 29 though dated July 30, *Dipl. Corresp.*, p. 210).

inevitable", the Tsar sent a second telegram to the Kaiser:

Thanks for your telegram conciliatory and friendly. Whereas official message presented today by your ambassador to my minister was conveyed in a very different tone. Beg you to explain this divergency. It would be right to give the Austro-Servian problem to the Hague Conference. Trust in your wisdom and friendship. Your loving NICKY.⁴⁸

This telegram does not intimate that the Tsar had changed his mind in adhering to partial mobilization as a sufficient measure, even after Sazonov had informed him of Pourtalès's "threat" at 7 P.M.

A little later in the evening the Tsar in turn received a second telegram from the Kaiser. William II. insisted that "Serbian promises on paper are wholly unreliable", and, in the dominating tone which he had so often found successful in the past with the Tsar, told him warningly:

It would be quite possible for Russia to remain a spectator of the Austro-Serbian conflict without involving Europe in the most horrible war she ever witnessed. I think a direct understanding between your government and Vienna possible and desirable and as I already telegraphed you, my government is continuing its exertions to promote it. Of course, military measures on the part of Russia which would be looked upon by Austria as threatening would precipitate a calamity we both wish to avoid and jeopardize my position as mediator which I readily accepted on your appeal to my friendship and my help. WILLY.⁴⁹

The Kaiser apparently judged correctly the effect of this tone on the weak and changeable "Nicky", for the Tsar, ruminating on the situation, began to think he had made a mistake in signing the ukaz for mobilization. He thought he had better countermand it and therefore called up Sukhomlinov on the telephone. The three-cornered telephone conversation which followed—one of the most curious, sinister, and obscure of the militarist doings of those dark days—was discussed at length on the third day of the Sukhomlinov trial. Ianushkevich was the first witness. He had evidently come into court with a carefully concocted story and impressed all the newspaper reporters by his glibness. "He speaks smoothly and very calmly and is not at all agitated. He appears in every respect the former professor of the War Academy."⁵⁰ "His testimony is distinguished for its great fluency. He is evidently a practised orator who knows how to talk on every occasion."⁵¹ In a speech

⁴⁸ Tsar to Kaiser, July 29, 8:20 P.M., *Kautsky Docs.*, no. 366; cf. *Dipl. Corresp.*, p. 542. I assume that the Tsar here refers to the Kaiser's first telegram, which he had not yet answered, and not to a second telegram, to be mentioned in a moment, which though written at 6:30 P.M. had probably not yet reached the Tsar.

⁴⁹ Kaiser to Tsar, July 29, 6:30 P.M. *Kautsky Docs.*, no. 359; cf. *Dipl. Corresp.*, p. 431.

⁵⁰ *Izvestiia*, no. 145, Aug. 16 [29], 1917.

⁵¹ *Novoe Vremia*, no. 14,852, 13 [26] Aug., 1917.

which can be proven to be full of misstatements he testified among other things:

When Austria launched her provocation against Serbia, we naturally had to come forward in the rôle of a final protector. It was plain to everyone that Germany was standing behind the back of Austria, and that is why I insisted on a declaration of complete mobilization, although this might appear to be a direct provocation in respect to Germany. And so this was decided upon. On July 14 [27] I received the command to proclaim complete mobilization,⁵² and in the evening after making all the arrangements, I set off for the Council of Ministers where I also secured the signature of three ministers, which is necessary for the proclamation of the order.⁵³ When I returned they rang me up on the telephone from Tsarskoe Selo⁵⁴ and informed me that Emperor William had sent a telegram to the Tsar, in which he assured him on the word of honor of a monarch that Germany would not proceed against Russia if she were not forced to this by following Russia.⁵⁵

When I received the information about Wilhelm's telegram, I knew that Germany had already mobilized.⁵⁶ I had information that by that time 400,000 [Russian] men were already mobilized. I insisted that it was impossible to put any trust in the telegram, even though it was supported by Wilhelm's word of honor and I begged that the general mobilization should not be revoked. But the word of honor of the Kaiser triumphed and I received the order to proclaim only "partial mobilization".

Then I set off for the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sazonov; I told him everything; I explained the plan of our mobilization; and I begged him to take the measures which depended on him.

On July 17 [30] Sazonov went with a report to Tsarskoe Selo and returned from there with orders to reconsider the question of mobilization. We arranged a conference in which the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of War, and I took part. Thanks to our unan-

⁵² From whom did he receive this command? The Tsar? Sukhomlinov? Sazonov? He does not say. Or did he act on his own responsibility? The date, July 27, is certainly a mistake for July 29; if he had really received orders to proclaim "general mobilization" on the 27th, he would have lost no time in sending out the telegrams. Some of the newspapers, trying to reconcile his statement with known facts, give July 29, others give July 30. His reference below to the Kaiser's telegram makes it clear that he must be talking about July 29.

⁵³ In another part of his evidence he declared that a ukaz signed by the Tsar was necessary for the proclamation of a mobilization order.

⁵⁴ The Tsar at this time was not at Tsarskoe Selo. He was at Peterhof, as is proven by the fact that his telegrams to the Kaiser on July 29 at 1 A.M. and at 8:20 P.M. are both dated from Peterhof. (*Kautsky Docs.*, nos. 332 and 366.) After returning from the military review at Krasnoe Selo on the 25th, the Tsar apparently remained at Peterhof during the following critical days until he came to Petrograd on July 31 (*ibid.*, no. 487).

⁵⁵ There is nothing in the Kaiser's telegram about his word of honor; see the telegram above, note 49.

⁵⁶ This was not true. Germany did not begin to mobilize under cover of the "Threatened State of War" until about 1 P.M., July 31, that is, not until two days later.

ymous opinion about mobilization, our conference lasted only five minutes. We all gave our opinion in favor of complete mobilization. I called His Majesty on the telephone and informed him of our decision. His Majesty heard me and directed me to hand over the telephone receiver to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and after a conversation with him, we reached the decision to put into effect the general mobilization of all the Russian armies.⁵⁷

These revelations produced a great sensation in the court room. Sukhomlinov asked to be heard. In contrast to Ianushkevich "he speaks very simply in language easy to understand, but is greatly agitated, gesticulating wildly with his hands and striking himself upon the chest".⁵⁸

On the night of July 16 to 17 [29 to 30] the Tsar rang me up on the telephone and said that he had received news which gave a possibility of escaping from war. Therefore, he ordered that the partial mobilization in the four districts should be suspended.⁵⁹ The question of mobilization was very acute at this time and I therefore reported my conviction that it was necessary that this mobilization should be completed in a shorter period of time than it had ever been completed before. On receiving the command to suspend mobilization in the four districts, I was completely dumbfounded. This was the limit. [I received a direct command, a precise command, which allowed of no kind of objections. . . . Mobilization had already been ordered, and if it were revoked a catastrophe threatened. What was I to do? I knew that it was impossible to revoke the mobilization; that technically it could not be carried through; what would then happen in Russia? God knows what a mess we should have been in. I felt I was being done for.] When the Tsar informed me that a telegram had been received from Wilhelm to the effect that Germany had no intention of making an attack, I, knowing Wilhelm, made up my mind that he was simply playing a trick and that he simply wished to delay our preparations so that he could demolish us after having overpowered France. Therefore, when the Tsar told me about this telegram and said that mobilization must be suspended, I said to him, "But Wilhelm does not guarantee us anything at all." To this the Tsar replied, "He is exerting himself to bring pressure to bear upon Austria."⁶⁰ And upon that he added, "Why do you not wish to cancel mobilization?" I replied categorically that if mobilization should be cancelled, it would be absurd, for it would not be possible to recommence it on account of technical difficulties. "If you do not be-

⁵⁷ *Izvestiia*, no. 145, Aug. 16 [29], 1917.

⁵⁸ *Novoe Vremia*, no. 14,852, Aug. 13 [26], 1919. The report which follows is from the *Russkii Vedomosti*, no. 185, Aug. 13 [26], 1917, except the parts in brackets, which are from the *Novoe Vremia*.

⁵⁹ Oman (p. 70), quoting from some newspaper which he does not name and which I have not been able to find, gives this statement: "The Tsar told me it was necessary to break off the mobilization in the *three* military districts," and explains in a note, "This undoubtedly means the Wilna, Warsaw, Petrograd districts on the front opposite Germany."

⁶⁰ That the Kaiser was really exerting this pressure is now clear from what has been said above, vol. XXVI., pp. 41-53.

lieve me," I added to the Tsar, "ask the chief of the General Staff." The Tsar replied, "Very well," and he called General Ianushkevich to the telephone. . . .

Half an hour later, Ianushkevich rang me up, and said that His Majesty had commanded him by telephone to suspend mobilization, but that General Ianushkevich replied that it was technically impossible to do this. His Majesty replied to him, "Nevertheless, suspend it!" General Ianushkevich asked what he was to do then. [I replied to him, "Do nothing at all."] "I knew," adds Sukhomlinov, "that the responsibility rested on me and I gave orders that mobilization should not be suspended, for which General Ianushkevich thanked me." . . . ["On the next morning, I lied to His Majesty, explaining that mobilization was proceeding only in the districts of the Southwest. On this day I nearly lost my reason. I knew that mobilization was in full swing, and that it was impossible to stop it. Fortunately, on the same day the Tsar was convinced afresh, and I was thanked for the good execution of mobilization; otherwise I should have been in jail long ago," said Sukhomlinov fervently].

About one P.M. of the next day, our ambassador in Germany, Sverbeiev, sent a telegram that general mobilization had been proclaimed there. Instantly a great stone rolled away from my heart. Everything was ending happily and I was thanked.

Though the testimony of the two generals agreed on many points, it differed absolutely on one important matter. Sukhomlinov said that the Tsar ordered the "partial mobilization" of the four districts to be suspended, that is, all mobilization. Ianushkevich said the Tsar spoke of substituting "partial" for "general" mobilization, implying that the Tsar already knew that "general mobilization" had already been ordered and was going on. To clear up this contradiction Ianushkevich was recalled to the witness stand. Under cross-examination, and when faced with extracts from Sukhomlinov's diary, he hesitated, became confused, and on several points admitted he could not remember or was mistaken. His carefully prepared story broke down, although he still insisted that the Tsar had spoken of substituting "partial" for "general" mobilization. Sukhomlinov's lawyers wished to call as witnesses two of the Tsar's servants, who were supposed to have heard the telephone conversations, but the court, unfortunately, for some reason which is not given, refused the request.

From these two narratives, the following points are tolerably clear: (1) About 11 P.M. on July 29, Russian "partial mobilization" was in full swing. This is confirmed by the captured telegrams quoted above. (2) This "partial mobilization" had been caused directly by Austria's refusal of "direct conversations" and by her declaration of war on Serbia. (3) The Tsar, influenced by the Kaiser's telegram, made a serious effort, though perhaps one

impracticable on technical considerations, to stop mobilization of some kind.⁶¹ (4) But the Tsar was flatly disobeyed and deceived by the Russian militarists, who thereby rendered futile the Kaiser's efforts to check Russian military measures until he could effect a settlement by his mediation at Vienna. (5) On July 30 the Tsar was persuaded to approve "general mobilization", thereby at last making legal and regular the secret military measures which his militarists had disobediently been carrying on behind his back. Naturally their minds were thereby greatly relieved, and in 1917 they could boast of their patriotic action. (6) An element in this final persuasion of the Tsar was quite probably the arrival of Sverbeiev's telegram from Berlin: "I learn that the order for the mobilization of the German army and navy has just been issued."⁶² (7) Shortly after five o'clock, secret telegrams began to be despatched to the frontier districts against Germany, ordering, at last, the long-awaited announcement of "general mobilization".⁶³ A little later telegrams were despatched to the regions where "partial mobilization" had already been in full regular progress for twenty-four hours, announcing "general mobilization" and ordering that mobilization was to be reckoned as beginning at midnight between July 30-31, instead of at midnight of July 29-30.⁶⁴ It was almost at the same time that Austria had decided to announce "general mobilization". Thus the announcement of "general mobilization" in both Austria and Russia took place practically simultaneously before the news could go from one country to the other. Neither was the cause of the other, though the contrary has been often asserted by both parties.

Germany's mobilization, on the other hand, was directly caused

⁶¹ Professor Oman (pp. 63 ff.) thinks that it was "general" mobilization which the Tsar had sanctioned a few hours earlier as a result of the "formal threat" which Pourtalès made to Sazonov about 7 P.M. This would be in accordance with Ianushkevich's testimony, but there are many objections to this view. It is more probable that the statement of Sukhomlinov is correct that the Tsar spoke and knew only of "partial mobilization"; and that no authorized order for "general mobilization" was despatched on the night of July 29. What Sukhomlinov and Ianushkevich were boasting of in 1917 were the secret "measures preparatory to war" which had been ordered before dawn on July 26, and which were stimulated by their secret telegram of the morning of July 29 to the effect that "general mobilization" was imminent.

⁶² Russian *Orange Book*, no. 61. This was due to the well-known *Lokal-anzeiger* episode.

⁶³ Telegrams nos. 1945 (received at Warsaw, July 30, 8:15 P.M.) and 1946 (despatched to Kovno Fortress at 7:15 P.M.). Hoeniger, pp. 114-118.

⁶⁴ Telegram no. 1965, General Staff to the Moscow military district, July 30, c. 11:20 P.M. Hoeniger, pp. 117-118.

by that of Russia. In fact it came rather surprisingly late. Neither Pourtalès nor Eggeling had been told anything of the decision which Russia had made for "general mobilization" on July 30. They knew nothing of it until the next morning after the news had already been printed in the Russian newspapers and been posted up in the streets. As soon as Eggeling learned of it, he hastened to Pourtalès, who sent off a despatch at 10:20 A.M.: "General mobilization of the army and navy ordered. First mobilization day, July 31."⁶⁵ This reached Berlin at 11:40 A.M. Bethmann telephoned it to the Kaiser at Potsdam. The Kaiser motored at once to Berlin and in a meeting with Bethmann and the militarists decided about 1:00 P.M. to order the "Threatened State of War". Until the arrival of this official despatch from Pourtalès, confirming the German suspicions that Russia had been secretly mobilizing, Bethmann had been able to restrain the Kaiser and the militarists from taking any irremediable military steps; but with "Threatened State of War", the whole German military machine was set in swiftest possible motion, though formal mobilization was not declared until the following day. The militarists were now in complete control. In Berlin, as well as in Petrograd, war was now inevitable.⁶⁶ Neither the "Russian formula" which Sazonov had proposed to Pourtalès, nor the personal appeal which Pourtalès made on his own initiative to the Tsar at Peterhof, nor the Kaiser's efforts at Vienna, nor Sir Edward Grey's efforts, could have any possible chance of success. 7

4 If the German government, on July 31, had really desired peace, it would have been possible for it simply to answer Russian mobilization by German mobilization, and stand on the defensive. But the German militarists insisted that mobilization meant war and therefore Bethmann despatched the ultimata to Russia and to France, to which but one answer was possible on their part.

In conclusion one may say that Bethmann, by his *carte blanche* to Austria, and by his apparent endorsement at first of her policy toward Serbia, gave Russia reasonable grounds for thinking that Serbia was about to be treated intolerably. Russia, on account of her rôle as protector of Serbia, and because of her political interests in the Balkans, could not permit Serbia to be crushed or become a vassal of Austria. Bethmann was thus responsible for Russia's provisional decision of July 25 for "partial mobilization", which was justifiable; but Bethmann played directly into the hands of the Russian militarists. Sazonov's optimism about "direct conversa-

⁶⁵ Kautsky Docs., no. 473.

⁶⁶ Kautsky Docs., nos. 456, 473, 477, 479, 480, 488, 490.

tions", like Bethmann's optimism about "localization", was rendered futile by the uncompromising and reckless procedure of Berchtold at Vienna, and by the pressure of their own militarists in Petrograd and Berlin. Bethmann's belated efforts to restrain Austria and impose the "pledge plan" came so late that the Russian militarists, in spite of, rather than because of, German threats, were able to proceed to "complete mobilization". This action in turn played directly into the hands of the German militarists and made the war inevitable.

Relatively little material has appeared since the war which throws new light on the part played by France and England in the crisis which followed the assassination of Franz Ferdinand. Neither government unfortunately has seen fit to make that fuller publication of documents which would clear up many obscure points, particularly as to their relations with one another in view of their common danger from Germany. Such a publication would increase that feeling of mutual frankness among nations upon which the peace of the world in the future might rest more securely. In view of this lack of new material, only a word, therefore, will be said as to these two countries and in regard to Belgium.

Belgium had done nothing in any way to justify the demand which Germany made upon her. With commendable prudence, at the very first news of the ominous Austrian ultimatum, she had foreseen the danger to which she might be exposed. She had accordingly instructed her representatives abroad as to the statements which they were to make in case Belgium should decide very suddenly to mobilize to protect her neutrality.⁶⁷ On July 29, she placed her army upon "a strengthened war footing", but did not order complete mobilization until two days later, when Austria, Russia, and Germany had already done so, and war appeared inevitable. Even after being confronted with the terrible German ultimatum, at 7 P.M. on August 2, she did not at once invite the assistance of English and French troops to aid her in the defense of her soil and her neutrality against a certain German assault; it was not until German troops had actually violated her territory, on August 4, that she appealed for the assistance of the Powers which had guaranteed her neutrality.⁶⁸ Belgium was the innocent victim of the German militarists.

As to France, however much she may have encouraged the Russian militarists, in the months preceding the crisis, by her adoption

⁶⁷ Davignon's circular, July 24, *Belgian Gray Book*, no. 2.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, nos. 8, 10, 15, 20, 23, 24, 30, 38, 40.

of the three-year term of military service, by her exchange of military and diplomatic visits (Joffre, Grand Duke Nicholas, Poincaré), by her naval convention, by her jingo press, and by her close relations with England, and however much by these same measures she may have aroused the suspicions of Germany,⁶⁹ there can be no doubt that when the crisis came, she sincerely did her best to avert it. While Poincaré was out of touch on the high seas, returning from Russia, the French acting minister of foreign affairs, Bienvenu-Martin, was too distraught to exercise much influence anywhere, though he did endeavor to persuade Grey to adopt the French solution of a strong English warning to Germany. When Poincaré and Viviani returned to Paris, they were careful to take particular pains, such as withdrawing the French troops ten kilometres from the frontiers, to avoid the slightest possibility of any frontier friction, which Germany might regard as a grievance. It is not clear how far these genuinely pacific measures toward the end of the diplomatic crisis mark a change from a previous more vigorous and aggressive policy. Nor is it clear whether this change, if change there was, was due to the bad impression made on Poincaré by the strikes in Russia, or to the French Socialists and French domestic political troubles, or to the fact that England seemed to be on the threshold of a civil war in Ireland, or simply to the terribleness of a European war, the main blow of which was certain to fall upon France.

In regard to England's responsibility, the most important recent book is that of Lord Loreburn, *How the War Came* (London, 1919). One may certainly agree with him in censuring Grey for involving England in secret understandings with France into which other members of the Cabinet, to say nothing of Parliament, were not initiated. This was not in accord with what was understood to be the constitutional practice in England, and it resulted, in 1914, in England's being unable either to find a successful means of averting war, or to wage war immediately with adequate means. One may even agree with Lord Loreburn that Grey's hands were not so free in July, 1914, as he sought to make it appear. But on the other hand, they were not so completely tied as Lord Loreburn represents. One may say that Grey was under a moral obligation to use the British navy to protect the north coast of France, and he fulfilled this obligation by his declaration on August 2 that "if the German fleet comes into the Channel, or through the North Sea, to undertake hostile operations against French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power". But this is not the

⁶⁹ Cf. Kuhl, pp. 81-83.

same thing as saying, as Lord Loreburn does, that England was bound to support France in war on land. The distinction, perhaps, is an impracticable one, but it is sufficient, essentially to justify Grey's attitude that England's hands were free and that it was still for Parliament and public opinion to dictate whether England should stand aside or not. England went into the war from three mixed motives: to fulfill her obligations to France, to preserve her honor in upholding her guarantee of Belgian neutrality, and to protect her own safety and material interests against German aggression. That Grey, in his speech in Parliament, very skillfully put forward very prominently the second of these motives, there is no doubt; and if he believed, as of course he did, that England ought under the circumstances to fight, he did so wisely; for this was the motive which would most clearly and powerfully appeal to Parliament and the British public. On the other hand, it is doubtful if one can agree with Lord Loreburn's further criticism of Grey for not making a plain, timely statement to Germany that, if she attacked France, England would be on the side of France and Russia. It is very doubtful, in view of the strong anti-British feeling in Germany, the blind Pan-Germanism, the power of the militarists, and the Kaiser's sensitiveness to a second rebuff after Agadir, whether such a threat would not have had exactly the opposite effect in Germany. It would have been regarded as the proof and culmination of British "encirclement". Even granting that it might have postponed the war over the Austro-Serbian crisis for some months, it would have so increased the Anglo-German embitterment that some other occasion would probably have soon set Europe on fire after Germany had made further frantic naval and military preparations. As Buchanan wisely told Sazonov, on July 27,⁷⁰ "Germany's attitude would merely be stiffened by such a menace. England could only induce her to use her influence at Vienna to avert war by approaching her in the capacity of a friend, who was anxious to preserve peace." Moreover, such a threat by England might have served as a dangerous encouragement to the Russian militarists in their aggressive aspirations toward Constantinople and the Straits. Grey had to choose a policy; because he chose one which did not turn out successfully, it is not necessarily true to say that he chose the wrong one. If a criticism of Grey is to be made, it is that he, like Bethmann and Sazonov, was too optimistic—too little aware of the monstrous influence which the militarists would acquire in Vienna, Berlin, and Petrograd.

SIDNEY B. FAY.

⁷⁰ *Dipl. Corresp.*, pp. 39-40.

A CONFEDERATE DIPLOMAT AT THE COURT OF NAPOLEON III.

IN John Slidell of Louisiana the Confederacy possessed its ablest diplomatic agent. Born in New York in 1793 of a family on marriage terms with some of the most distinguished of Northern leaders, including Commodore Perry of Lake Erie fame, Slidell had linked his entire personal and political fortunes with the Lower South. Here indeed was the land of promise for men of the Slidell type. The cotton-gin and a broadening European cotton market had transferred economic and political leadership from the Upper South to the Lower, and called forth a new type of American, the planter-businessman-politician.¹ Slidell was the incarnation of its requirements, and success had been his reward. In professional life, a lucrative law practice had rendered him well-to-do; in finance, a penchant for railway promotion had made him the rival in that domain of Stephen A. Douglas and Jefferson Davis; and in politics, the increasing recognition of his varied powers had brought him forward as a national figure long before Secession called him into its service.

To this training in practical affairs, growing out of a varied and active career, Slidell added a special experience in diplomacy. For he had already served in 1845 and 1846 as the unofficial agent of President Polk for extending the boundaries of the Cotton Kingdom by peaceful purchase from Mexico.² Moreover, as senator from Louisiana, from December, 1853, to February, 1861, he was once more, in some sense, a diplomat, the representative of his state and section at Washington, then the firing line of Southern interests—rare training indeed in the ways of men and governments.

When, therefore, in 1861, the Southern States needed to be represented abroad by persons not only of convictions, but of experience, Slidell's record made him the logical man for the most difficult and at the same time the most hopeful post in Europe.

With his friend, Senator James M. Mason of Virginia, he accordingly set out; Slidell for Paris, Mason for London. The adven-

¹ For the best summary description of life in this great section, see William E. Dodd's *The Cotton Kingdom* (1919).

² For an account of this mission, see the author's "Slidell's Mission to Mexico", in the *South Atlantic Quarterly*, January, 1913.

tures of the two, their arrival at Cuba, departure on the *Trent*, seizure by Wilkes, detention near Boston, and release on British intercession, are not a part of the present story, which concerns rather the vicissitudes of hope and despair which marked their mission abroad. These oscillations of emotion are revealed in the correspondence of the two commissioners more clearly than in any other source now available. Unfortunately, the Slidell papers have been destroyed, but Mason preserved copies of his own letters, as well as something like a hundred letters from his colleague, constituting altogether as valuable a record as the war has left of the thoughts of two of the most active and intelligent men who ever threatened the permanence of the American system. It is with Slidell's share in this correspondence that the present paper is primarily concerned. Its object is, without pretending to relate the whole history of Confederate diplomacy in Europe, to show what contribution toward the making of that history may be derived from this one source, recently made available to the student.³

In the first letter of the series, written from Paris on February 5, 1862, Slidell admits to Mason that "recognition [of the Confederacy] may long be delayed but I am very sanguine as to the speedy breaking up of the blockade".⁴ He counted much on the friendly disposition of the French authorities, and was proportionately disappointed at the coldness of his first reception by M. Thouvenel, the minister of foreign affairs. Thouvenel denied that his government had been in correspondence with Great Britain concerning the blockade, and "his denial . . . was so categorical and unqualified", says Slidell, "that I was obliged to believe it, but conversations with other officials have since led me to doubt it".⁵ The Minister of the Interior, Persigny, a close friend of the Emperor, was more cordial than Thouvenel,⁶ and Slidell set store upon his good offices and those of the President of the Council of State, M. Baroche,⁷ whose son had previously been placed under obligations to the Slidells for hospitality extended during a visit to New Orleans.⁸ The Minister of Finance, M. Fould,⁹ also was among those who gave Slidell an early

³ Mason Papers, Library of Congress, acquired in 1912. Many despatches of Slidell to the Confederate Secretaries of State are printed in vol. II. of Richardson's *Messages and Papers of the Confederacy*, though the lack of a table of contents makes them hard to pursue.

⁴ Feb. 5, 1862.

⁵ Feb. 12, 1862.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ See letter of Feb. 5, 1862.

⁹ Feb. 12, 1862.

audience. His conclusion from conversations with these men and others was, February 12, that "the Emperor's sympathies are with us—that he would immediately raise the blockade and very soon recognize us, if England would only make the first step, however small, in that direction, but for the present at least he is decided that she shall take the initiative".¹⁰ His French friends told Slidell that they had no wish to be the cat in the fable and to draw out chestnuts for British benefit.

Slidell had a faculty for facing facts, and his first estimate of Napoleon's intentions proved to be final. Napoleon's friendly advances were always forestalled of fruition by British reluctance to co-operate, and ultimately by Confederate reverses which intensified the risks of interference by outsiders. The first of these disappointments came to Slidell in March, 1862. Notwithstanding the autocracy of the emperor, the Corps Législatif was in some measure a barometer of opinion, at least to the extent that many of the speakers drew their inspiration from the imperial fountain, and Slidell watched its debates upon the American blockade with a passionate interest. In a speech delivered March 13, 1862, by M. Billault, a government spokesman in the Chamber, he heard the knell of French intervention. The cause he correctly traced to Confederate defeats. "If instead of the defeats at Roanoke and Donelson, we could have had some decisive victory to announce to the world, I believe that a very different view would have been taken by Mr. Billault. As it is I can only look forward with hope not unmingled with anxiety, to the news which we must soon have of an important battle at or near Nashville."¹¹

The entire month was a period of the most anxious suspense. It confirmed Slidell's impression that Napoleon would do nothing without England, being "determined to hold on to her alliance on any terms which she might dictate".¹² He asked Mason for a frank statement of the London situation, for if nothing was to be hoped from Palmerston and Russell, "the sooner our people know that we have nothing to expect from this side of the water and that we must rely exclusively on our own resources, the better".¹³

Before another two weeks renewed negotiations between Napoleon and England lifted Slidell out of the slough of despond, and he wrote Mason in a totally different vein:

¹⁰ Feb. 12, 1862.

¹¹ Mar. 14, 1862.

¹² Mar. 28, 1862.

¹³ *Ibid.*

I have at last some good news to give you. Mr. Lindsay has had a long interview with the Emperor, who is prepared to act at once decidedly in our favor. he has always been ready to do so and has twice made representations to England, but has received evasive responses. He has now for the third time given them but in a more decided tone. Mr. Lindsay will give you all the particulars. This is entirely confidential, but you can say to Lord Campbell, Mr. Gregory etc. that I now have positive and *authentic* evidence that France only waits the assent of England for recognition and other more cogent measures.¹⁴

But these approaches of Napoleon were unofficial. With characteristic subterfuge, he acted through the Englishman, Lindsay, rather than through his own ambassador at London. Earl Russell refused to negotiate outside of regular channels, and Napoleon's third move shared the fate of his former efforts. Lindsay told his story, however, to Disraeli, and from him gained what promised to be a new light on the situation. Disraeli declared that Lord Russell was bound by a secret agreement with Mr. Seward not to break the blockade, and not to recognize the Confederacy. But Disraeli hinted that this agreement was irksome to Russell, and that if Napoleon himself would only take the lead, British opinion would support him so strongly that Lord Russell would be obliged, with only pretended reluctance, to give way in order to avoid a change of ministry.¹⁵

Napoleon was not too well pleased with Lindsay's report of the reception of his overtures.¹⁶ He recollected his former grievance at Lord Russell's conduct in forwarding copies of French official representations on American affairs to Lord Lyons, who in turn communicated them to Mr. Seward. But he seized upon the explanation of the Russell-Seward agreement, and was half inclined to act upon Disraeli's advice, on the principle that "he could not consent that his people should continue to suffer from the action of the Federal government".¹⁷ A friendly appeal might suffice, especially if accompanied by a naval demonstration on the American coast. But action had better await the naval decision at New Orleans, whose capture Napoleon did not anticipate, but must take into possible account. All this in confidence.

Characteristically Machiavellian was the scheme which Napoleon at this time evolved to make his future course toward the American question appear like a response to public demand. "Measures have

¹⁴ Apr. 12, 1862.

¹⁵ Summary of despatch no. 6, J. Slidell to Hon. J. P. Benjamin, secretary of state, Apr. 18, 1862.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

been taken," says Slidell in his report to the Department of State at Richmond, "to procure petitions from the Chambers of Commerce of the principal cities, asking the intervention of the Emperor to restore commercial relations with the Southern States."¹⁸

Editorial comment in the semi-official journals *Constitution*, *Patrie*, and *Pays*¹⁹ coincided with reports that, with the exception of M. Thouvenel, the entire cabinet favored a vigorous American policy. And even more reassuring was a burst of activity in the Mediterranean fleet, which was ordered to lay in stores for three months. All in all, in the closing days of April, 1862, Slidell had reason for contentment. "I am not without hope," he wrote Mason, "that the Emperor may act alone."²⁰

Even the fall of New Orleans failed to dispel the illusion of cheer. On May 2, Persigny gave Slidell definite assurance that the Confederacy would soon be recognized,"—this between ourselves—as he talks to me very unreservedly and relies on my discretion."²¹ Even Thouvenel relaxed under the new geniality, and confided to Slidell that Mercier, who had gone on Napoleon's behalf to investigate conditions in the Confederacy, had made a favorable report as to Southern resources and determination. To Thouvenel's query upon the significance of the loss of New Orleans, Slidell was obliged to own that "it would be most disastrous, as it would give the enemy the control of the Mississippi and all its tributaries, but that it would not in any way modify the fixed purpose of our people to carry on the war even to our own extermination."²² Slidell on his side pressed an inquiry into Thouvenel's views as to Lord Palmerston's assertion that British and French policies were identical. Thouvenel evaded the answer by saying that French action had been purely verbal.²³ The interview was, on the whole, satisfactory to Slidell, though a warning that only great Confederate victories at Corinth or in Virginia would warrant European recognition should have impressed him as ominous.

On the sixteenth of May, Slidell received fresh intimations of the emperor's good intentions—these from M. Billault, whose March speech had caused him such anxiety. "He assures me," writes Slidell, "that the Emperor and all the ministers are favorable to our

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ Apr. 28, 1862.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ May 3, 1862.

²² May 14, 1862.

²³ *Ibid.* A part of this letter is printed in Richardson, *Messages and Papers of the Confederacy*, II. 251.

cause, have been so for the last year and are now quite as warmly so as they have been. Mr. Thouvenel is of course excepted, but even he has no hostility."²⁴ The darker side of the picture was that Billault, in contradiction to Thouvenel, declared that the emperor was far from satisfied with Mercier's visit to Richmond.²⁵

Meanwhile McClellan's Peninsular Campaign was in full progress, and Slidell looked for the capture of Richmond. "Things look gloomy," he admitted to Mason, "but if we can repulse the enemy before Richmond and hold it (of which I feel by no means confident) and Beauregard defeat Halleck, I think that we will have a good prospect of early recognition. Even if we abandon Richmond retiring in good order beyond James River and we achieve a decided victory in the neighborhood of Corinth, I shall entertain hopes of being recognised."²⁶ He suggested to Mason that it would be well for both, in the event of a military success in either quarter, to act in concert in a demand for immediate recognition.

But such a plan involved a number of objections. The governments of Great Britain and France were not equally friendly to the Southern cause. Joint action might be premature. On the other hand, too early a demand upon Paris might isolate London completely. The difficulties a battling confederation would have in forcing recognition from unwilling powers were really insuperable, and Slidell fell back into the pessimism from which the promises of Napoleon had temporarily lifted him. "I am heartily tired and disgusted," he complains, "with my position here and so far as I am personally concerned, if our recognition is to be indefinitely postponed, I would very much prefer to bring my mission to an immediate close, but of course I must remain at my post however disagreeable, until authorised by the President to withdraw."²⁷ In these views of Slidell upon the desirability of action or a prompt withdrawal from Europe, Mason concurred.²⁸

But new issues arose to make a permanent residence desirable, even in default of recognition. Of these, one was Mexico. Slidell's first reference to Mexican developments was in an outline to Mason of a projected letter to Thouvenel. "I am inclined . . . to touch upon the Mexican question, saying that while foreign occupation of that country would excite the most violent opposition at the North, we, far from sharing such a feeling, would be pleased to see

²⁴ May 16, 1862.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ May 27, 1862.

²⁷ June 1, 1862.

²⁸ See Slidell, June 6, 1862.

a steady, respectable, responsible government established there soon."²⁹

Distance did not blind Slidell to the vast significance of the military decisions pending East and West, and in the middle of June he again sounded Mason on the proper course for each to pursue when the victory should be heralded. To Slidell, London looked like the most promising field for an aggressive demand.³⁰ He regarded Russell as the chief obstacle in the Confederate path, but felt that a formal demand, backed by a victorious army, might induce even him to yield to the policy of Palmerston and the other members of the cabinet. If, however, Great Britain showed a disposition to mediate between North and South, "it would perhaps be better to postpone the demand for formal recognition as such an offer would be virtually to recognize us".³¹

To Billault Slidell expressed himself as favoring recognition far rather than mediation,³² saying "that it was impossible to overestimate the importance of such a step, that if it had been taken last summer the war would long since have terminated. That the same effect would now follow in a few months, it would give courage to the peace party at the North to speak out in time to operate upon the approaching Congressional elections".³³ Billault, however, gave Slidell no encouragement to think that recognition would soon be forthcoming, and reiterated that French determination to act only in concurrence with England was unchanged. He recommended him to consult Thouvenel once more,³⁴ and admitted that the Southern attitude toward French intervention in Mexico might have an influence upon the question of recognition, the more so as Slidell took occasion to renew his assurances "that all we desired there was the establishment of a respectable and responsible government and were quite indifferent as to its form, and that he was well aware that such were not the sentiments of the Washington government".³⁵

Hope deferred was making the heart sick, and on June 21 Slidell unburdened himself in a very correct analysis of events. He put no confidence in Lord Palmerston. Disraeli and Walpole were well intentioned but futile. There was no use in applying to Thouvenel.

²⁹ June 6, 1862.

³⁰ June 14, 1862.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² June 17, 1862.

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ *Ibid.*

I have seen enough since I have been here to be convinced that nothing that I can say or do will advance for a single day the action of this government, and I am very much inclined to tender my resignation: The position of our representatives in Europe is painful and almost humiliating. it might be tolerated if they could be consoled by the reflection that their presence was in any way advantageous to their cause, but I am rather disposed to believe that we would have done better to withdraw after our first interviews with Russell and Thouvenel.³⁶

More patiently, but no more optimistically, he wrote a few days later, "I think that it is now more evident than ever that England will do nothing that may offend the Lincoln government, and I shall await, as patiently as I can, the course of events."³⁷ Five months of his mission had expired, and Slidell had made little progress. In the social world, he was obtaining a recognition that was soon to result in an acquaintance and even a friendship with the emperor. In the political, he was pitted against forces too mighty for even the most adroit of diplomats to overcome.

These forces, nevertheless, seemed for the moment to favor Slidell when McClellan's withdrawal from Richmond admitted the failure of the Peninsular Campaign. He wrote Mason to reassure him of Napoleon's good-will. "I hear that the attempt is renewed to excite the impression in England that the Emperor is not disposed to recognise us and that the hitch is here, not at London. You can run no risk in giving any such report a most emphatic contradiction."³⁸ Persigny gave him once more to understand that intervention was imminent. But he realized the difficulty of Mason's position because of Palmerston's recent display of strength in Parliament. "Indeed that august body seems to be as much afraid of him, as the urchins of a village school of the birch of their pedagogue."³⁹

At last, in July, 1862, came an interview with the emperor. Slidell had won the confidence of the emperor's friends. It remained for him to bring Napoleon himself into the circle of his influence. The improved military position of the Confederacy doubtless had its share in bringing about a meeting. It took place at Vichy.⁴⁰ Napoleon was apparently somewhat noncommittal in respect to Slidell's demand for immediate action, but gave Slidell to understand that his heart was in the right place. The interview lasted seventy min-

³⁶ June 21, 1862.

³⁷ June 29, 1862.

³⁸ July 11, 1862.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ July 16, 1862.

utes and was marked by extreme graciousness on the emperor's part.

He talked freely, frankly and unreservedly, spoke in the most decided terms of his sympathy and his regret that England had not shared his views. He said that he had made a great mistake in respecting a blockade which had for six months at least not been effective, that we ought to have been recognised last summer while our ports were still in our own possession. He spoke freely of the Mexican question and of the probability of its soon bringing him into collision with the U. S. That the treaty with Mexico if ratified by the Senate would place them virtually in a hostile position towards him. He asked if he offered mediation how the question of boundaries could be settled? What we would insist on? I said that we would insist on all the States where a majority of the people had already determined by their votes to join our Confederacy, leaving the people of Kentucky, Missouri, and Maryland to decide for themselves whether they would or would not unite their fortunes with ours. He expressed his regret that he had not been able sooner to see me and on parting said that he hoped for the future I should have less difficulty in seeing him.

On the whole he left on my mind the impression that if England long persisted in her inaction, he would be disposed to act without her, although of course he did not commit himself to do so. He said that he had reason not to be well satisfied with England, she had not appreciated as she should have done his support in the Trent affair. There is an important part of our conversation that I will give you through Mr. Mann. On the whole my interview was highly satisfactory. I have as yet made no mention of my having seen the Emperor but to his very confidential friends. I prefer that it should be known through other channels and as yet I have seen no notice of it in the papers.⁴¹

Armed with fresh confidence after these expressions of imperial favor, Slidell soon sought a fresh interview with Thouvenel, who had been kept in ignorance of the meeting at Vichy. Thouvenel discouraged any immediate demand for recognition, but indicated the right procedure if Slidell was determined to act, giving him to understand that no reply could be expected until some time after he himself had returned from Germany, where he was going for a ten days' absence.⁴²

Mason meanwhile was pressing similar demands upon Lord Russell, and Slidell felt the most anxious solicitude as to their reception. "If the present moment be not opportune (to use his favorite phrase), I can imagine no possible contingency short of recognition by Lincoln that will satisfy his Lordship."⁴³ He wished each negotiation, however, to stand upon its own merits, and urged Mason to secrecy regarding the manoeuvres at Paris, which were apparently going well, for "I received yesterday a letter from Mr. Persigny

⁴¹ July 20, 1862.

⁴² July 23, 1862.

⁴³ July 30, 1862.

who had been to Vichy since I saw the Emperor. He writes most encouragingly."⁴⁴ Contact with the emperor led to overconfidence. And Slidell wrote on August 3, when suspense over Russell's decision was growing unbearable, "It seems to me impossible that Russell can be acting in concert with this government, and if he has undertaken to solve the question for England without full consultation and understanding with France, I should be *very much* surprised and disappointed if the Emperor do not take the matter in hand on 'his own hook'".⁴⁵

Again Lord Russell refused to sanction these unofficial moves of Napoleon, giving as his reason the existence of a strong Union party at the South. Slidell's indignation at this matched the seriousness of the decision. He suggested to Mason that England's failure to move was due to the fact "that they desire to see the North entirely exhausted and broken down and that they are willing in order to attain that object to suffer their own people to starve, and play the poltroon in the face of Europe".⁴⁶ There was still room for hope that Russell had acted without consultation, that Napoleon would resent the rebuff, and that action by France alone might be the result. If so, "Russell's prompt reply ought not to be regretted. France will for us be a safer ally than England."⁴⁷ That this would prove to be the case seemed undeniable to Persigny, but Slidell had begun to discount the latter's over-sanguine temperament. "He is very enthusiastic," Slidell wrote to Mason, "and I am not as confident as he appears to be."⁴⁸ Action at this juncture was in any event made more doubtful, in Slidell's judgment, by the movements of Garibaldi.⁴⁹ Events in Italy would require the full attention of Europe, and would militate against Confederate hopes. Very curious testimony this to the influence of one liberal movement in aiding another oceans away!

Concern at the indifference of England, the timidity of France, and the tumult of Italy did not, however, move Slidell to hold out the olive branch to the Federal government. He tells Mason of a chance which the Duc de Morny, intimate of the emperor, afforded him to talk to Seward through the medium of a Frenchman known to be in communication with Washington upon the subject of a peace by reconciliation and reconstruction. "You may be assured, in no

⁴⁴ July 30, 1862.

⁴⁵ Aug. 3, 1862.

⁴⁶ Aug. 6, 1862.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

measured terms," he writes, "of the scorn with which such a proposition would be received."⁵⁰

But if in America the bridge was already burned, in France it was desirable to keep open all avenues of communication. Chief of these was a confidential intercourse with the Foreign Office. Thus it was a real service which a friend at the Foreign Office did Slidell in giving him a chance to signify his wish for a delayed reply concerning his demand upon Thouvenel for recognition of the Confederacy. "If made it would be merely dilatory, probably more amicable in its tone than Russell's but arriving at the same conclusion."⁵¹ Only the actual withdrawal of McClellan from the Peninsula would warrant Slidell in pressing Thouvenel for an immediate reply. And in any event such a reply must await the emperor's return from Chalons or Biarritz.⁵² This in the event of good news. If the news proved bad, an immediate withdrawal from Paris might be advisable. Meanwhile "the affairs of Italy are giving great uneasiness and with all the Emperor's desire to get rid of his English commitments, he can do nothing until Garibaldi is disposed of".⁵³

Two weeks later affairs were in much the same state. Slidell felt that the iron was hot to strike and that failure to gain recognition in 1862 would leave "no reason to hope for any favorable action here until we shall have ceased to desire it".⁵⁴ But the usual alteration of mood soon came to his relief. Lee's first invasion of Maryland was raising high hopes, and Slidell allowed himself some rosy dreams of victories to come. McClellan was to attack Lee and be defeated. Philadelphia was scheduled for capture, and Washington would lie at the Confederate mercy. But in Slidell's opinion it would be unwise to enter the capital, for "if we do we ought to destroy the public buildings and that might produce a bad impression in Europe".⁵⁵

At the same time with Lee's advance, came the first overtures for the Confederate cotton loan. "I have been quite surprised," Slidell declares, "at an uninvited suggestion on the part of a respectable banking house of a disposition to open a credit to our government of a considerable amount. No distinct proposition as to the terms or amount, but the basis to be cotton to be delivered to the parties making the advance at certain ports in the interior."⁵⁶

⁵⁰ Aug. 20, 1862.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴ Sept. 12, 1862.

⁵⁵ Sept. 26, 1862.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

Slidell felt disposed, in default of specific instructions, to assume responsibility for carrying through the projected loan on the basis of his general powers, subject to concurrence by Mason in the terms arranged. "Pray let me hear from you at once on the subject as I intend to see them again on Monday."⁵⁷ The cup of joy was pretty full. A much-needed loan was broached, and better still (September 30), it seemed once more as if recognition would not be long deferred. This from Thouvenel, the quondam skeptic. But once again a string was tied. Nothing could be done before the emperor's return.⁵⁸

On October 14, 1862, Slidell was at *qui vive*. A ministerial council at St. Cloud would decide next day the course of French policy, and recognition ought to be officially agreed upon in time for communication to England before the twenty-third.⁵⁹ On the seventeenth he knew the worst. The Roman question had produced a cabinet rupture. Thouvenel resigned; Drouyn de Lhuys took his portfolio; "and for the time our question has been lost sight of".⁶⁰ A complete reorganization of the cabinet was averted only by the personal intervention of the emperor. All eyes were upon Italy. The Confederacy might wait.

The political deadlock did not interfere, however, with the negotiations over the cotton loan. On October 29 Slidell took Mason more completely into his confidence on this head. He named the Erlangers as the principals, representing them as "one of the richest and most enterprising banking houses of Europe, having extensive business relations throughout France and free access to some very important men about the Court. They will in anticipation of the acceptance of their propositions actively exert themselves in our favor and enlist in the scheme persons who will be politically useful."⁶¹ Slidell advised acceptance of their terms, subject to possible modifications, and completed his budget of good news with information that Napoleon was exerting himself to bring Russia as well as England into a proposal for a six months' armistice, North and South, "with our ports open to all the world",⁶² a project the more likely of success because of the support of King Leopold, who was believed to have much influence with his niece, Queen Victoria. "The Emperor thinks that his counsels will have great influence and

⁵⁷ Sept. 26, 1862.

⁵⁸ Oct. 2, 1862.

⁵⁹ Oct. 14, 1862.

⁶⁰ Oct. 17, 1862.

⁶¹ Oct. 29, 1862.

⁶² *Ibid.*

perhaps Lord Palmⁿ, when he finds the Queen with us, may be willing to act."⁶³

Reverting to the loan, Slidell evidently feared that Mason might balk at the terms it contemplated, for he urged repeatedly that the final decision would rest not with them, but at Richmond, "while in the meanwhile the mere anticipation or hope rather of their acceptance will be useful here".⁶⁴

In politics, Slidell so far misread the Russian temper as to believe that Napoleon's advances would meet a favorable response, "perhaps with some reservation".⁶⁵ It was unfortunate, to be sure, that Captain Maury, who had been selected for St. Petersburg, had not been appointed earlier. "We should have had an agent there long since."⁶⁶

Slidell's correspondence for the year 1862 comes to an end with these reflections upon Russia,⁶⁷ with a belief that France was on the point of demanding a cessation of the war in the interest "of humanity not only in America but in Europe",⁶⁸ and with a suggestion that army contractors and armament makers would prove useful if properly approached.⁶⁹

The year had been one of immense activity, anxiety, and, in view of a cause predoomed to failure, of achievement. Many wires had been pulled, many friends recruited, and much pressure brought to bear toward recognition, the great object of the mission. In a sense, Slidell's achievements in Paris were the counterpart of the military situation at home. It too was foreordained to failure, but the year 1862 closed with what appeared to many minds as an even chance for victory.

Appeals for recognition and details of the cotton loan occupied Slidell in the opening days of 1863. It was reassuring to be told by Persigny that

Mr. Drouyn de L'Huys wrote to Mr. Mercier last week instructing him to make an earnest appeal for a cessation of hostilities and to suggest at all events a conference between the parties belligerent even without an armistice. Mr. Dayton was informed of the instructions and did not remonstrate against them. Mr. Drouyn is now heartily engaged in the matter and Mr. Persigny is confident that if Lincoln refuses to act on the suggestion made by him, recognition will immediately follow.⁷⁰

⁶³ *Ibid.*

⁶⁴ Oct. 1 (erroneous date for Nov. 1), 1862.

⁶⁵ Nov. 14, 1862.

⁶⁶ Nov. 28, 1862.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸ Oct. 1 (*i. e.*, Nov. 1), 1862.

⁶⁹ Dec. 6, 1862.

⁷⁰ Jan. 21, 1863.

Again the exuberance of Persigny required to be discounted, for Slidell's next account of the instructions to Mercier admits that they were conciliatory to a degree, carefully avoiding "anything calculated to excite Yankee susceptibility".⁷¹ But it was something to have enlisted the active co-operation of Drouyn de Lhuys.

The affair of the loan came, meanwhile, to a head, and on February 3, 1863, Slidell was able to announce its consummation, but not the particulars. Not so the arrangement for a peace conference: Slidell learned through his friend at the Foreign Office on February 10 that while Seward favored an armistice, Lincoln was "determined to carry on the war at all hazards",⁷² and Dayton, who had been passive when a conference between the belligerents was first proposed, now exerted himself in protest against French intervention.⁷³ But Slidell was hopeful that French policy would adhere to its new programme, and trusted to the emperor's forthcoming speech to the Chambers to "say something significant about our affairs".⁷⁴ French assistance was then the chief hope, because it had soon become apparent that nothing was to be anticipated from King Leopold's influence at the British court.⁷⁵

By the fifteenth, Slidell was in a position to announce the terms of the cotton loan. It called for £3,000,000 seven per cent. bonds at 77 per cent., "convertible into cotton at 6 *d.* deliverable within six months after peace at a port".⁷⁶ This was highly satisfactory to Erlanger, though it might seem a hard bargain to the Confederacy.

In default of recognition, which continued to be the rainbow of illusion, Slidell reverted to the blockade issue.

I shall not make it matter of formal communication [he wrote Mason], but will endeavor to induce this government to reconsider the whole question of blockade. All here admit that a gross error has been committed in recognising the efficiency of the blockade and only desire to find some plausible pretext for retracing the false steps. The evidence of the repeated intermissions of the blockade at many points and for several days which I presented was conclusive, the voluntary relaxation of the blockade offered in my opinion much stronger grounds for declaring it inefficient than its temporary suspension from 'force majeure'.⁷⁷

On this point, nevertheless, as on almost all others, Slidell's hopes were doomed to disappointment, for Drouyn de Lhuys informed him

⁷¹ Jan. 25, 1863.

⁷² Feb. 11, 1863.

⁷³ *Ibid.*

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

⁷⁶ Feb. 15, 1863.

⁷⁷ Feb. 19, 1863. See also Mar. 1, 1863.

that France was already too far committed in recognition of the blockade for her to withdraw without the co-operation of England. "He asked me however to write him an informal note on the subject, when he would carefully examine it."⁷⁸ Here of course was the trouble. Such examination only demonstrated the folly of action. And of the blockade, as well as of the war, France continued but a passive spectator.

The only avenue for really constructive developments lay in semi-official and private negotiations with ship contractors. And 1863, in France as in England, was a year of activity in this direction. The cotton loan made ship-building possible. And Slidell soon turned his attention to this auxiliary development of his mission. "We can not only build ships here but arm and equip them. I am only waiting to know with tolerable certainty the success of the loan to suggest to Captn. Maury the expediency of coming over here, where I have no doubt he can build on as good terms as in England, but will have no difficulty in carrying his ship to sea."⁷⁹

In the more diplomatic sphere of Slidell's mission, one excuse after another arose for French delay. In 1862 it was Garibaldi and Italy. In 1863 the troubles in Poland occupied the stage, and Slidell, in a refrain grown almost habitual, observes that "Until the Polish imbroglio is settled I do not hope that anything will be done here in our affairs".⁸⁰

The world of European politics thus complicated a task already diversified enough. Recognition, intervention, recall of the blockade, ship-building, and the cotton loan made in themselves a fairly formidable programme for an agent not officially recognized. And already in April, 1863, the problem of Confederate credit had arisen. The bonds, now on the market, had declined three or four points;⁸¹ Spence, the English agent, feared a drop of fifteen; and stock-exchange operations to bolster the bonds were already a subject of discussion. Slidell displayed on this economic subject, as well as upon the more strictly diplomatic questions in his purview, a strong acumen.

I do not see at present [he declares] any sufficient motive for buying on acct. of our government, but the time may arrive before the settling day when it may be good policy to do so. In the meanwhile, I think it would be well to agree that the amount of the loan should be reduced to two millions with the privilege however of taking the other million

⁷⁸ Feb. 23, 1863.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

⁸⁰ Mar. 15, 1863.

⁸¹ Apr. 5, 1863.

within some fixed delay. This would leave very little floating scrip for the operators for a fall to work on.⁸²

Along with these sound ideas on conservative policy, are revealed some details of the loan which betray their writer's familiarity with high finance. He mentions that if the sales go badly the Erlangers have the option of withdrawing from the entire transaction, by a payment to the Confederacy of £300,000, but says, "I have no idea that under any circumstances they will take this ground, for they would be very heavy losers, having as they inform me expended large sums in conciliating certain interests and influences."⁸³

Mason's arrangements for price-bolstering were successful for the time being, and on the thirteenth, Slidell anticipated an early premium of five or six per cent.⁸⁴ His own affair of the ship-building also gave favorable prospect of success, involving as it did direct permission of the emperor, who alone can be alluded to in the following: "B[ulloch] is about making contract to be binding only when I shall have recd. assurance from the *highest* source that he can use the articles when ready."⁸⁵

Slidell in turn made himself useful to Napoleon by providing him with evidence of Yankee shipments of arms to the Mexican government. This, he told Mason, he had secured through "the recklessness or stupidity of Mr. Charles Francis Adams".⁸⁶ The influence of these disclosures was not confined to Napoleon, for Slidell noted with satisfaction a new truculence in John Bull.⁸⁷ The time was nevertheless ill chosen, in Slidell's opinion, to press Great Britain for direct permission to export arms. He preferred to work through a neutral agency, and on April 27 made the following report to Mason: "I am now in treaty with the agent of a foreign government for an arrangement that will enable our ships to leave England armed and equipped without any danger of interruption. Capt'n. Bullock goes over to-morrow and he will give you full details. I am sure that you will consider the proposed arrangement as in every way desirable."⁸⁸

Quite impossible achievements were anticipated of this new British-Confederate navy. Slidell even predicted that if the ships

⁸² Apr. 5, 1863.

⁸³ *Ibid.*

⁸⁴ April 13, 1863.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

⁸⁶ Apr. 22, 1863.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸⁸ Apr. 27, 1863.

once got to sea, "we can open the Mississippi and retake New Orleans".⁸⁹

In May, 1863, interest shifted from blockade-runners and Confederate cruisers back to the loan. Spence, the British agent for its flotation, was pessimistic, and rumors, which Slidell believed to be without foundation, concerning negotiations for a second loan, were injuring the confidence of "the City" in the first loan. On his own responsibility, Slidell denied that such a loan was in contemplation, but he had an uneasy suspicion that after all it might be. His anxiety was increased by an entire lack of confidence in Spence. "I am obliged to confess that I have no faith in Mr. S.'s judgment or business qualities, and am almost equally sceptical about his fair dealing or disinterestedness."⁹⁰

From Spence himself, who claimed to have specific authorization from the Confederate Treasury for the negotiation of this new loan. Slidell demanded to see the instructions.⁹¹ The reply was evasive. Spence spoke of rumor only, mentioned Oppenheim and Co. as the probable bankers, indicated \$100,000,000 in six per cent. bonds as the proposed sum, recounted his own efforts in the *Times* to bolster confidence in the cotton loan, admitted that this would be fatally jeopardized by such an issue as they were discussing, and concluded evasively without any reference to the supposed instructions, that "it is now better to wrap this matter entirely in oblivion for the present", taking especial care to keep it a secret from Erlanger and Co., who might, in an effort to extricate themselves from the cotton loan, only embarrass it further.⁹²

This reply was far from satisfactory to Slidell. He not only noted its spirit of evasion, but objected to its assumption of authority in the expenditure as well as in the flotation of the loan. To Mason he wrote that "Spence appears to consider that the powers of Secy. of Navy as well as of Treasury are vested in him. I am getting heartily tired of his meddling."⁹³

The consolation of Slidell's mission was that, although something or other was going wrong nearly all the time, not everything did so at once. In the same month of his anxiety over Spence and the loans, developments in Mexico freed Napoleon's hands, and augured well for a policy of intervention. "I am to have an audience with the Emperor on Friday," wrote Slidell, "from which I hope good

⁸⁹ May 6, 1863.

⁹⁰ May 8, 1863.

⁹¹ May 10, 1863.

⁹² Spence to Slidell, May 11, 1863.

⁹³ May 15, 1863.

results, as the recent successes in Mexico leave him freer to act than he was before. In the meanwhile [and here Slidell shows an attention to preparation and detail which marks the conscientious diplomat] pray endeavor to ascertain what will be the probable result of Mr. Roebuck's motion on the thirtieth and let me know. The motion will in all probability be alluded to by the Emperor."⁹⁴ But the interview came and passed, with intervention still a dream of the future, and Slidell thought it best to await the outcome of the French elections before making his next move.⁹⁵

In June, 1863, while Lee was gathering his army for the mighty push towards Gettysburg, Slidell was quietly working on the shipping problem. He favored selling a certain vessel to Russia, in order to be in funds for the building of two others of a more suitable type, and he declared mysteriously that "Another advantage would result from the sale to Russia. it would give increased facilities to another operation you wot of."⁹⁶

In the more conventional field of his negotiations he faced the old issue of procrastination. Napoleon's attitude of friendliness toward the Confederacy remained unchanged, but so did his disposition not to act without England. With a view to securing this co-operation, however, he had once more, June 22, sounded Palmerston, the emperor himself writing a note to his minister at London, Baron Gros, in which he used the words, "je me demande s'il ne serait bien d'arrestar Lord Palmerston que je suis décidé à reconnaître le Sud".⁹⁷ Slidell learned this through his confidential friend at the Foreign Office, and he allowed himself an exultation keener than any he had known since first he learned of Napoleon's friendly sentiments, keener, it may be added, than his previous disappointments should have countenanced. In his exuberance he wrote to Mason that

This is by far the most significant thing that the Emperor has said either to me or to others—it renders me comparatively indifferent what England may do or omit doing.

At all events, let Mr. Roebuck press his motion and make his statement of the Emperor's declarations. Lord Palmerston will not dare to dispute [and] the responsibility of the continuance of the war will rest entirely with him.⁹⁸

Again everything led only to disappointment. Mr. Roebuck presented a motion which indicated no cognizance of the emperor's

⁹⁴ Another letter of the same date.

⁹⁵ May 23, 1863.

⁹⁶ June 26, 1863.

⁹⁷ June 29, 1863.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

intentions. But Slidell was disposed to acquit the emperor of any blame. "I am satisfied," he wrote Mason, "that he has kept his promise with good faith. Either the Minister of Foreign Affairs or Baron Gros or both have failed to carry out his instructions or Messrs. Russell and Layard have asserted what was false. *Perhaps* Lord Palmerston may have recd. the communication and failed to inform their [*sic*] colleagues of the fact. I hope that this may prove to be the fact."⁹⁹

Gettysburg and the prospect of French intervention failed together. The high-water mark, both on the battlefield and in the field of diplomacy, had been reached. From that time on, the history of the Confederacy was that of a decline and fall. Nor was it otherwise with the Slidell mission. Occasional gleams of hope illumined the monotony of disappointment. But the realist could see only final despair. The true barometer of foreign aspirations lay in England. By September, Slidell was as gloomy over the lukewarm aid of friends as over the avowed antagonism of enemies. "Sir James Ferguson and Mr. Gregory in the debate on Roebuck's motion seemed to be as indisposed to recognize us as Russell and Bright. They give us fair words it is true, but beyond these we have nothing to expect of them."¹⁰⁰

For such satisfaction as was to be gleaned, one was obliged to turn to social rather than to diplomatic life. In the *beau monde*, the Slidells were conspicuous. Slidell pictures their life at Paris with a justifiable pride at the position of his wife and family.

My family and I have been twice to the receptions of the Empress. She received Mrs. S. and the girls most graciously. At these parties men are not presented to her but at her request. On both occasions she sent for me. on the first she talked with me for more than 20 minutes. She is perfectly well posted about our affairs, and understands the question in all its bearings thoroughly. At my second visit she conversed probably 10 or 12 minutes and was very particular in inquiring about the siege of Charleston.

She sympathises most warmly with our cause and so expresses herself without any reserve. I mention these facts because the Empress is supposed, I believe with truth, to exercise considerable influence in public affairs. . . . I forgot to mention that the Emperor at the second reception of the Empress was present—he came to me and shook hands and conversed very cordially for several minutes.¹⁰¹

The correspondence with Mason apparently ceased in September, 1863, for the remainder of the year, so that Slidell's views upon the course of affairs in the autumn and winter are not available from

⁹⁹ July 9, 1863.

¹⁰⁰ Sept. 16, 1863.

¹⁰¹ Biarritz, Sept. 16, 1863.

this source. It is not difficult to imagine, however, that the round of diplomatic calls continued to be engrossing, nerve-destroying, and fruitless, while in the world of society, the fascination of Paris brought the Slidells more and more under its spell. Certainly the busy record of the first two years leads one to believe that Slidell continued at his task, indefatigable and urbane, ready for every opportunity to advance the cause nearest his heart.

Communication, at any rate as far as the files are now preserved, was renewed in March, 1864. Slidell discusses with Mason some details of the naval war,¹⁰² puts him on his guard against Fortunatus Crosby, formerly a consul at Geneva, now posing as a friend of the South, but more probably an emissary in the pay of Seward,¹⁰³ and denies the rumor that French intervention is imminent. He reports a very friendly interview with M. Drouyn de Lhuys in which the latter expressed his Southern sympathies with more than usual warmth, and intimated that Lord Palmerston also was full of admiration for the Confederacy and confident of its ability to maintain itself, information to this effect having come to the Foreign Office through a Frenchman high in the confidence of the emperor, who had been honored with a recent interview with the British premier.¹⁰⁴ Drouyn apparently did not feel entire confidence in the correctness of these statements, inasmuch as he urged Slidell himself to ascertain Lord Palmerston's intentions, a not very easy task, to be sure, but one which Slidell attempted to carry out through the assistance of Colonel Mann, in the supposed absence of Mr. Mason from London.¹⁰⁵

Judging, however, from the course which the government actually pursued, the real views of M. Drouyn de Lhuys were far removed from those which he expressed to Slidell. To one of his colleagues he declared that the supposed renewal of negotiations between France and England tending toward a recognition of the Confederacy was "absolutely without foundation".¹⁰⁶ It was true that France and possibly Lord Palmerston also took a friendly attitude toward the Confederacy, but the time to manifest this was by no means opportune, more especially as Napoleon was as determined as ever not to act alone.¹⁰⁷

Contradictions like these of Drouyn de Lhuys were becoming

¹⁰² Mar. 6, 1864.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁴ Mar. 9, 1864.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁶ Mar. 13, 1864.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

familiar to Slidell, but in the present instance there was the added chagrin of the failure to secure a promised interview with the Archduke Maximilian, who was on the point of leaving for Mexico. Slidell's comment on this is bitter.

I have reason to believe that in declining to see me, he followed the advice of the Emperor influenced by Mercier saying that Lincoln had assured him that the Imperial government in Mexico would be recognised at Washington provided no negotiations were entered into with the Confederacy.

All this is very disgusting and I find it very difficult to keep my temper amidst all this double dealing. . . . This is a rascally world and it is most hard to say who can be trusted.¹⁰⁸

Pious lamentations upon the world's duplicity did not prevent Slidell from contributing his mite toward the sum total thereof. Unable to see Maximilian directly, he worked upon the sympathies of General Wold, his aide-de-camp, and the only Frenchman in his suite, therefore the most likely of all to present the Confederate cause in a favorable light to the emperor. "I have talked to him very freely," writes Slidell, "as to the consequences that will result from a refusal to be on good terms with the Confederacy. He agrees with me fully and will have ample opportunity of impressing his views on the Archduke during the passage to Vera Cruz."¹⁰⁹

These subterranean methods made the £500 received in June, 1864, for secret-service account a welcome addition to the \$1500 allowance for a contingent fund.¹¹⁰ Perhaps it oiled an occasional cog at the Foreign Office and procured for him such gossip as "that the British Government has made definite overtures of energetic measures to curb the German governments and that they are favorably listened to here—my informant would not be surprised at a general European war this summer. he is very reliable. I give you this for what it is worth."¹¹¹

The war had now dragged on into mid-1864. Its outcome was more and more dubious. The advantages which an early recognition by Europe might have won for the Confederacy were already forfeited. In Slidell's words,

the time has now arrived when it is comparatively of very little importance what Queen or Emperor may say or think about us. A plague I say on both your houses. I have an autograph letter of the Emperor to a friend, saying that he *had* given an *order* to let the *Rappahannock* go

¹⁰⁸ Mar. 13, 1864.

¹⁰⁹ Mar. 22, 1864.

¹¹⁰ June 9, 1864.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*

to sea. the letter is dated 7 inst. and yet the permission is still withheld by the Minister of Foreign Affairs.¹¹²

In default of material aid from France and Great Britain, Slidell was skeptical of the advantages to be derived from the moral aid of the Papacy. Thus, in December, 1864, when Sherman was well on his way to the sea, Slidell opposed the publication of a letter from Cardinal Antonelli, the papal secretary of state,

as it was much less decided in its tone than the Pope's letter to the President of Decr. 63. . . . Mr. Mann does not agree with me in opinion. he thinks the publication of Antonelli's note desirable. I am never very tenacious of my opinions unless in matters of very grave importance and this is not of that category.

Pray let me know what you think. if you agree with me I will write to Mann that I do not object to publishing the letter in Belgium but that I would rather that it should not appear in the London or the Paris papers.¹¹³

Mason sided with Mann, and Slidell yielded to their judgment.

In Slidell's mission, as in the affairs of the Confederacy at home, 1864 was a year of reverses. Less is heard of even the possibility of intervention. A possible break-up of the blockade is not once mentioned. Comments upon naval construction and the interpretation of the law of prizes¹¹⁴ are pessimistic. Even in Mexico, where a ray of hope might be said to gleam, failure to establish a direct contact with Maximilian was disappointing. Such a weight of despair the polite nothings of Drouyn de Lhuys, the imaginary favor of Palmerston, and the conventional benedictions of Antonelli were by no means adequate to counterbalance. The hopes of the Confederacy were sinking.

Early in the new year came rumors of peace which to Slidell at first appeared incredible.

I am completely bewildered about the peace rumors¹¹⁵ [he wrote]. I attached no importance to them until the news of Blair's return to Richmond. This indeed looks as if some serious negotiation were on foot, and yet I cannot conceive on what it can be based. From what point of departure can it commence? Our affairs have never appeared to be in a worse condition and it is difficult to imagine that Lincoln would now entertain the idea of separation which he has so long and so studiously rejected.

On the other hand, I cannot permit myself for a moment to suppose that President Davis would listen to any terms of which independence was not the indispensable preliminary condition. I have endeavored to get some information here but without success. are you better posted

¹¹² July 17, 1864.

¹¹³ Dec. 16, 1864.

¹¹⁴ See a letter of Dec. 18, 1864.

¹¹⁵ Feb. 3, 1865.

than I? I have not written you for a long while, but I have had nothing to communicate and there has been little in the news from home to invite comment.¹¹⁶

But until peace became an actuality, Slidell's mission went on in its accustomed rut. Lord Russell continued to be the *bête noir*;¹¹⁷ Mason continued to receive advice on the proper approaches to Lord Palmerston in the light of developments at Paris;¹¹⁸ and agreeable but fruitless sessions with the emperor, his cabinet, and intimate friends, continued to absorb the time of Slidell.¹¹⁹ An interview with Napoleon on March 5, 1865, brought him no nearer the goal than their first colloquy at Vichy in 1862. "My interview with the Emperor resulted as I supposed it would. He is willing and anxious to act with England but will not move without her."¹²⁰ And England had rejected his overtures too often to warrant the expectation that she would ever heed them. In fact, in the judgment of Napoleon, it was useless for Mason himself to press the issue further, until Beauregard should prove his ability to stop the northward progress of Sherman's army. This notwithstanding the fact that in other matters England was manifesting a disposition increasingly conciliatory toward Napoleon.¹²¹

Mason, it appears, had doubted the fact of the overtures to which Napoleon had alluded, for Slidell took occasion to remind him of Lord Palmerston's "implicit admission" to that effect.¹²² It was in their last interchange of letters before Appomattox. A curious blindness to events and their significance obscured from Mason even the finality involved in Lee's surrender. He continued to hope against hope. The more practical mind of Slidell grasped the issue in its fullest bearings. His letter to Mason of April 26, 1865, is the swan-song of their mission.¹²³

My dear Sir.

I cannot share your hopefulness. we have seen the beginning of the end. I for my part am prepared for the worst. With Lee's surrender there will soon be an end of our regularly organised armies and I can see no possible good to come from a protracted guerilla warfare. We are crushed and must submit to the yoke. our children must bide their time for vengeance, but you and I will never revisit our homes under

¹¹⁶ Feb. 3, 1865.

¹¹⁷ Feb. 14, 1865.

¹¹⁸ Mar. 5, 1865.

¹¹⁹ Mar. 5, 6, 1865.

¹²⁰ Mar. 6, 1865.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*

¹²² Mar. 22, 1865.

¹²³ Apr. 26, 1865.

our glorious flag. For myself I shall never put my foot on a soil over which flaunts the hated stars and stripes.

I went yesterday to the Foreign Affairs but Mr. C. had already left his office. I have sent Eustis [his secretary of legation] to make the inquiries you desired and shall keep my letter open to give you the result—but before you receive this you will probably have another steamers news with Lincoln's program of pacification and reconstruction. I am sick, sick at heart.

Yours faithfully

JOHN SLIDELL.

Slidell's comments upon the assassination of Lincoln are not preserved in the files of his correspondence with Mason. But in the accession of Andrew Johnson he foresaw mischief. To Mason's suggestion that there were elements in the situation promising a new lease of life for the Confederacy, Slidell replied without enthusiasm. "I confess I can see no grounds for the hopes you entertain unless some drunken outbreak of Andy Johnson should induce Grant to take possession of the government and thus produce a civil war in the North. A few months, however, perhaps a few weeks, will decide which of us is right."¹²⁴

The personal fortunes of Slidell declined with the cause for which he labored. The capture of New Orleans, followed by the confiscation of his property by the Union authorities, cut off his chief source of private income. He was obliged at that time to discontinue an annuity of \$600, previously paid to a maiden sister, and for his own wants to depend upon his salary as a commissioner. With the war at an end, this also terminated, though all arrears in salary were made good to him and Mason from a small unexpended balance of Confederate funds still in the hands of Fraser, Trenholm and Co., fiscal agents for the defunct government. Slidell accordingly gave up his expensive apartment and economized in various other ways. "I little thought," he wrote Mason, "when we left the Confederacy that the time could arrive when I should be compelled to make these calculations, but so it is and I trust that I bear the change with a considerable degree of philosophy."¹²⁵ That he was in some straits is clear enough from his decision to sell his library.¹²⁶ Yet his desire to realize upon all available assets proceeded not so much from immediate want as from a conviction that no more funds would ever be forthcoming from America. "We [Mr. Mason and I] are peculiarly situated," he reminded an English correspondent, "as we can have no expectation of ever returning

¹²⁴ May 1, 1865.

¹²⁵ May 29, 1865.

¹²⁶ July 26, 1865.

to our homes or recovering any of our property (our children may some day or other save something from the general wreck), for even if we were disposed to apply for grace, I cannot stomach the word pardon, no amnesty would be extended to us, certainly neither to Mr. Mason nor to me. Mr. Mann might possibly have some chance of being forgiven, but I have no idea he will make the experiment."¹²⁷

There can be no doubt of Slidell's sincerity in desiring never again to set foot on American soil, but the interests of his children in the confiscated estates which he had meanwhile deeded to them caused him to humble his pride to the extent of applying to President Johnson in August, 1866, for permission to visit New Orleans. The communication was forwarded through the courtesy of John Bigelow, who had been Union chargé d'affaires at Paris throughout the war. Slidell is mindful of the dignity of the cause which he had represented, but with his usual perception of facts he does not disguise that he must now be the suppliant. The letter is notable.¹²⁸

Mr. President.

I have for the last year been desirous to return, at least for a limited period, to the State of Louisiana, but have deferred asking permission to do so, believing that the policy which you intended to pursue towards persons situated as I am, had not yet been decided on by you, or if decided, that the time had not arrived for promulgating it. The condition of the world would now seem to authorise the hope that the day is not distant when that reserve will no longer be considered necessary.

My antecedents are known to you, and it would be worse than useless [to] trespass on your valuable time to recur more particularly to them. It may not however be improper for me to say, that since the month of May '65, I have without intruding my counsels on any one, invariably advised such *ci-devant* Confederates returning to their former homes as have thought fit to ask my opinion, to accept frankly the issue of the past struggle with all its legitimate consequences, the first of which I consider to be an unreserved submission to the authority of the government of the United States. With this brief explanation, I solicit permission to visit the State of Louisiana and respectfully ask to be informed on what conditions, if on any, I may be allowed to do so.

I have the honor to be with great respect

Your Mt. Obedt. Sr.

JOHN SLIDELL.

To the President of the United States,
Washington.

I have thought it proper to send this letter unsealed through the Legation of the United States at Paris.

Four months having passed without reply, Slidell concluded that

¹²⁷ July 26, 1865.

¹²⁸ Aug. 6, 1866. Quoted in a letter to Mason, Oct. 7, 1866.

none was intended. He wrote an account of the whole episode to Mason, emphasizing that the proposed visit was solely in his children's interest, and reiterating his determination not to apply for a special pardon, though admitting his willingness to take advantage of any general pardon which might cover his case without the imposition of humiliating conditions.

For instance [he declared], I would not object to pledge myself to do no act hostile to the government of the U. S. for without any such pledge, I should discourage any attempt for a renewed movement, satisfied that our people have been too dreadfully crippled to make one successfully for many years. Nothing would induce me ever to become a citizen of the U. S. nor will any of my children, I trust, ever establish themselves there. Indeed could I return tomorrow to Louisiana, be elected by acclamation to the Senate and received without contradiction at Washington, I would shrink with disgust from any association with those who now pollute the Capitol.

One word of explanation—my declaration about advice given to Confederates returning to their homes is strictly correct, but I have never advised any so to return, who were not absolutely without means to reside abroad or the necessary qualities and connections to enable them to support themselves decently elsewhere, nor had leave been given to me to visit Louisiana would I have accepted it coupled with any other condition than a parole of honor to do nothing hostile to the government.¹²⁹

Nevertheless when Mason found in 1869 that he was one of those who would be better off at home in Virginia, Slidell approved the move, and admitted that in similar circumstances he would have done the same.¹³⁰

But having one daughter married in France and Mrs. Slidell with the two others having become not only accustomed to but satisfied with Parisian life—having no interest which could be advanced by my presence in America—feeling that I could not possibly render any service to any one or any cause at home, I have made up my mind to let the remainder of my days, in the course of nature it cannot be a long one, glide away quietly in Paris. There is no great hardship in this, for there is no spot on earth where the “*dolce far niente*” can be more fully enjoyed.¹³¹

He goes on to say that his son Alfred is leaving next day for New York to enter the bond business, and to acquire residence and citizenship as a step toward the prolonged litigation which would be involved in a recovery of the confiscated property in Louisiana. Thus reconstruction was weaving even so torn and shattered a thread as the Slidells into the woof of a new nation, and the mission

¹²⁹ Oct. 7, 1866.

¹³⁰ Nov. 3, 1869.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*

of the emissary of Confederacy and disunion had come to its philosophical as well as its technical end.

In the fullness of reconstruction, scarcely begun in 1869, but a reality in 1920, it is fair to include Slidell in the calendar of distinguished American diplomats. Destiny called him to serve a section rather than a nation, at a time when the whole had lost all meaning to some of its parts. Yet Time with its healing touch has removed most of the agony of the period, leaving the outstanding figures of an heroic age to claim the homage of their countrymen, North and South. Among these, Slidell, always at his post of duty, moving heaven and earth to win friends for his cause, resolute to the end, and undaunted by its consequences, merits a place as one of the great Americans who, like Franklin, have pleaded an American issue before the bar of world opinion.

LOUIS MARTIN SEARS.

NOTES AND SUGGESTIONS

A CAUTION REGARDING MILITARY DOCUMENTS

IN view of the interest in the study of military history evidenced by floods of divisional or regimental histories and more pretentious accounts of American military operations it may be timely to suggest to the historical student certain characteristics of military documents that necessitate the application to them of the most careful critique. Indeed, when the official character of a military document is established, the task of the student is only begun. He has further to learn the circumstances under which the document was produced; he has to estimate the character and reliability of the information on which it was based, the possible motives of its framers for concealment or modification of the truth as they knew it. He has further to consider whether the application of a critique in the framing of his document may not have made a secondary account of what purports to be a source. All these inquiries, it is true, have normally to be made with respect to any documents; for military documents, they must be most searching.

An illustration will make this apparent. The documents from which we would seek to learn the position of the front line held by a unit on a given day would be a body of reports, probably those from corps or division to higher authority. These reports would be based on reports from brigades, the brigade reports on regimental reports, regimental reports on battalion reports, battalion reports on company reports, company reports on platoon reports. The platoon commander, as the original source of information, perhaps in fading daylight or early dawn, perhaps in a dense forest where no landmarks are available, possibly subject to a stinging fire if he climbs a knoll to look about him, must determine his position as best he may. This done, perhaps with a very hazy knowledge of map reading, he sends back what he guesses are the map coordinates of his position. If, as may easily happen, neither he nor his company commander has been able to look at a map for more than five minutes, he sends a rough position sketch only. His company commander, battalion commander, regimental commander, each corrects the data in the light of what seems to him more authentic information. Each may use reports of scout officers, reports from officers who have been

part way up to the front, reports more or less confused by officers and men who have come back wounded; possibly a calculus of probabilities based on the report of some neighboring unit that it occupies such and such map coordinates and is ahead of, or abreast of, his own. If runner or phone communication is uncertain he is most likely to use the supplementary information indicated rather than attempt to verify the original report. Accordingly a document that at first sight appears to be a source may well be a source plus a critique, the value of which depends on the skill or information of the officers who have applied it.

That such critiques may be extremely inaccurate in their results any officer can testify who knows the degree of exact information normally in possession of rear posts of command during an engagement. Despite all protests a unit is ordered to occupy a given trench, being assured it is vacant. It obeys orders and pays in casualties for the knowledge that the information on which the order was based was, to speak mildly, inaccurate. Information reaches a unit that men in a given position are Americans when the men commanding the unit are morally certain the men in question are enemies, as later experience proves. Within the writer's own experience is an order to an officer in charge of combat train based on the supposition that the American troops had taken Fismes, and Fismettes, its suburb north of the Vesle, and that he would find his commanding officer in Fismettes, the enemy supposedly being fast retiring on all sides. In fact, the officer was held up on the road some five miles from his objective by heavy enemy fire and on parking the train in safety and exploring for his unit found it not a quarter of a mile away from his train-park but very far from the position he had been assured it occupied.

Furthermore, the student of military operations must remember that a document is not always compiled under the circumstances in which it purports to be. Documents prescribed by army regulations to be compiled from day to day and supposedly a contemporary record of events may be, and often are, in reality, compiled months after the events, often by people who have had no part in them. A typical case is the war diary prescribed to be kept on campaigns by battalions and larger units and containing a brief account of operations, positions held, etc. At first sight, such a document might seem a contemporary record. In one case that came under the writer's observation, and in many of which he has heard, such diaries have been compiled months at a time by adjutants and sergeant-majors with no personal experience in the events and from miscellaneous

information, adjustments, and guess work. Here again, what seems to be a pure source is in reality one with much added critique.

To a less degree, the same applies to orders, to training orders, and to drill schedules especially. In many instances such documents are compiled for the benefit of higher authority as much as for guides to performance. They are subject to interruption, to being practically disregarded by officers in command of troops with a tacit connivance of superiors, etc. Often they may represent in but a small degree the actual training that a unit receives.

Understanding of the degree of reliability attaching to military documents is common property among the more intelligent officers and men. Even in popular regimental and divisional histories that have recently appeared, the authors, though not trained historians, often instinctively control documentary information by information received from participants while the events were still fresh in mind. The trained historian likewise must bear in mind that the military document is often a meaningless formulary, or, worse still, has an interpretation written into it. To comprehend the formula, or to separate source and interpretation, he has no better recourse than to the narrative of the eye-witness whether in diary or letter written while the facts were fresh in mind and when hasty first impressions had been corrected in the light of fuller information. In such narratives personal bias is more easily detected than in impersonally couched official reports; and where the use of several such narratives is possible the personal element may be in great measure eliminated. Such material of course cannot supersede the document; at best it can but assist in the divesting of the source from the interpretation or give warning that the document is so corrupted or so remote from the actual occurrences it purports to describe that it should be altogether rejected.

THEODORE CALVIN PEASE.

DOCUMENTS

General M. C. Meigs on the Conduct of the Civil War

WHEN President Lincoln was inaugurated, Montgomery C. Meigs (1816-1892), who had been graduated from West Point in 1836, was a captain in the corps of engineers in the United States army. For several years he had been occupied with the construction of public works in and near Washington—chiefly the Potomac aqueduct and the enlargement of the Capitol. On May 14, 1861, he was commissioned as a colonel. On May 15 he was commissioned as a brigadier-general and appointed quartermaster-general of the army, which position he occupied throughout the Civil War and until his retirement from the army in 1882. In 1887 or 1888 he was invited by the editor of the *Century's* war book, *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, to write an account of the relations of Lincoln and Seward to the military commanders, the argument being that Meigs was in a position to make an authoritative reply to the charges made on that subject by General McClellan in the posthumous book, *McClellan's Own Story*, then recently published. The general "was not a literary person and had no taste for writing except of official reports of work done", but he wrote the article and sent it in (1888). It was never printed. Col. J. R. M. Taylor, U. S. A., a grandson of its author, has kindly placed a copy of it at the disposal of this journal. The original is in the possession of the general's younger brother, S. Emlen Meigs, of Philadelphia.

Though the *Century* editor doubtless had his reasons for not printing the contribution, which in truth lacks form, it has in 1920 a distinct value for the student of civil war history, as presenting the opinions of a capable observer whose position had given him special opportunities for knowledge. General Meigs also contributes interesting testimony as to several particular transactions. The two episodes having most interest, of those which he mentions, are, first, the expedition which he and Secretary Seward, in the anxious closing days of March, 1861, devised for the reinforcement of Fort Pickens, Pensacola, and, secondly, the councils held at the White House in January, 1862, in the endeavor to obtain some action from McClellan.

It so happened that, soon after this manuscript was presented to

the *Review*, descendants of General Meigs gave to the Library of Congress a large number of volumes of diaries and other records from his hand, and it was natural to seek in them for further light, from his point of view, on the two transactions named. What was found is presented as sections II. and III. of the ensuing documents. The material respecting the Fort Pickens episode appears in shorthand in a thick quarto volume containing journal-matter, newspaper clippings, and photographs, of 1860 and 1861. Most of the shorthand matter relating to the origin of that expedition has already been transliterated, and used by Nicolay and Hay in their life of Lincoln, in which (III. 430-441, IV. 1-7) is the best account of the affair. The secretary of the Department of Historical Research in the Carnegie Institution of Washington has kindly revised the transliteration and completed it to the end of Meigs's stay at Fort Pickens, but only the earlier part is used here.

The planning and execution of the Fort Pickens expedition still remain an astonishing transaction—an expedition planned and carried out by the President and the Secretary of State (amateur strategists in March, 1861, if ever there were such), with the aid of a captain of engineers and a lieutenant in the navy, all in such secrecy that neither the Secretary of War nor the Secretary of the Navy knew anything of the preparations, and important plans of the latter, which had received the President's approval, were wrecked by conflicting secret orders of the President himself! We already have accounts of the affair by two of the chief participants, one by Gen. Erasmus D. Keyes, in his *Fifty Years' Observation of Men and Events*, pp. 379-393, and a jaunty one by Admiral Porter in his *Incidents and Anecdotes of the Civil War*, pp. 13-25. Crawford's account, in his *Genesis of the Civil War*, pp. 407-416, is based on information supplied by both Porter and Meigs and on Navy Department papers obtained by him in Secretary Robeson's time, and since published in the *Official Records, Navies*. The view which Welles not unnaturally took of the matter is set forth in his *Lincoln and Seward* (*Galaxy* articles), pp. 55-62. He gives further information in a narrative written some years after the events, prefixed to his *Diary* (I. 16-26, 38-39). The account in Soley's *Admiral Porter*, pp. 100-114, has advantages from the special knowledge of an assistant secretary of the navy. His predecessor Fox tells what he knew in letters written shortly after and recently published, *Confidential Correspondence*, I. 31-35, 40-45, and in a later narrative printed in *Contributions of the Old Residents' Historical Association, Lowell, Mass.*, II. 52-54. Moreover, Meigs himself gave a

guarded account of the matter in the *National Intelligencer* of September 16, 1865, called out by a *Tribune* editorial of September 12. But it is an advantage to have in full the contemporary private record of a principal participant in this extraordinary transaction.

On the momentous councils of January 10-13, 1862, respecting and with McClellan, we already have the statements of three of the principal participants. The fullest and most authoritative is that of McDowell, confirmed by Lincoln, in Raymond, *Life of Lincoln*, appendix, pp. 772-777. McClellan's account is in *McClellan's Own Story*, pp. 156-159. Secretary Chase's diary for January 12 is printed in Maunsell B. Field, *Memories of Many Men and of Some Women* (London, 1874), pp. 267-269. Meigs's account in the manuscript intended for the *Century* (I., *post*, pp. 292-293) adds a number of particulars and is much fuller than the entries (III., *post*) drawn from a little pocket diary for 1862; but the latter have seemed to be worth preserving.

I. THE RELATIONS OF PRESIDENT LINCOLN AND SECRETARY STANTON TO THE MILITARY COMMANDERS IN THE CIVIL WAR.

When the actual war began in the firing on Fort Sumter, probably the only expeditions determined on were those to reinforce Fort Pickins and to supply Fort Sumter.

The first originated with Mr. Seward and the President himself.¹ It was kept secret, its object and its composition communicated to the smallest number of persons consistent with its due preparation and dispatch; no member even of the Cabinet, except the Secretary of State, was made acquainted with the intention to send off such an expedition. Captain Meigs of the Corps of Engineers, and Lieut. Col. Keyes, Military Secretary to Gen'l Scott, were ordered by the President to prepare a scheme for this movement, to submit it with an unwritten message from Mr. Lincoln to Gen. Scott; and, after his approval, they were charged with the preparation of the necessary orders to be signed by the President.

Lieut. David Porter, U.S.N., at a later, but early period, was associated with them in preparing the instructions for the co-operation of a naval vessel to the command of which he was assigned by executive order signed by the President, but not made known to the Navy Department.

This careful secrecy was successful in so far that the destination of the Expedition remained unknown to friend or foe until the steamer Atlantic appeared off Fort Pickins.

The Sumter Expedition originated, I believe, in the mind of Gustavus Fox, an ex-officer of the Navy engaged in Civil pursuits, very highly esteemed by his former comrades, and, later, Assistant Secretary of the Navy to the end of the War.

I never knew, directly, with whom the other and later Coast expedi-

¹ See section II., *post*.

tions originated, but it is to be presumed that, in their long preparation, most officers of high position concerned in their dispatch and preparation, were more or less consulted or heard. General McClellan, no doubt, had his say in regard to them. They were the result of many men's thoughts,—they began in the attempt to organize a coast force for operations in the bays of Virginia and Maryland.

The propriety, as soon as the national forces grew strong enough, of shutting up the ports through which the adventurers of Europe hastened to introduce military supplies to the South was evident to all, and these expeditions followed the creation of a military power.

The President's approval and sanction was necessary to the raising of troops for them; to the engagement of transports; to the appointment by State Governors of the officers of the Volunteer regiments; and no secrecy was possible except perhaps as to the exact date of sailing and the exact period of landing.

Undoubtedly the Cabinet fully discussed all points of importance, and General McClellan must have been in the executive councils of the time. It is to be supposed that he had the military orders or instructions drawn up for final approval of the Executive,—the Commander-in-Chief.

Neither the President nor the Secretary of War had then the military experience,—probably neither of them knew the official routine or manner of framing and recording military orders and instructions at that early day of their official experience. Such matters would naturally be intrusted to the Commanding General.

Mr. Lincoln, as an officer of volunteers, had commanded a company of infantry in a short campaign during the Black-Hawk War. This could not have given him much military knowledge, but even that must have proved useful to him in the end.

General Scott, the senior and Commanding General of the Army, was in Washington at the inauguration of President Lincoln. He collected there a few troops to protect that inauguration. His military capacity had been proven on many fields and he had conducted great and successful campaigns in Mexico. He was held by the people of the United States to be the highest American authority on all military questions. Undoubtedly his advice was sought, obtained and relied upon by the President, Cabinet and advisors.

The circumstances, political and geographical, forced certain preliminary operations on the Government. We had seen how the importance of holding two forts on the Southern Coast induced earliest action by Mr. Lincoln, who dispatched military and naval expeditions in less than a month after his inauguration. The enemy collected forces in front of the Capital, and their sentries walked post at the Virginia ends of the three bridges which cross the Potomac. Their hostile sentries were daily in sight of the citizens of the Capital and of the legislators who remained true to their duties.

The loyal citizens of the southern border states,—Western Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee and Missouri, demanded protection. This compelled the gathering of troops along the Ohio, and at the confluence of that river with the Mississippi.

St. Louis, torn by hostile parties, called for troops to protect the loyal, and to prevent the resources of that rich and powerful city being seized by the disaffected of the city and state. Ohio hastened to the

assistance of the loyal of West Virginia; and, as early as April 31st 1861,² the Governor appointed McClellan Major General of Volunteers. On the 14th of May the President commissioned him Major General U. S. Army, with orders to disperse the rebel forces then over-running West Virginia.

General Scott gathered a strong force at Washington and in the Shenandoah Valley; and, early in July,³ a council was called in the East Room of the Executive Mansion at which were gathered the Members of the Government and the principle officers of the forces at hand. At this council General Scott opened the proceedings by stating that "Our forces had at length become considerable, and were now strong enough to justify some expeditions."

The composition of a corps to attempt to drive the enemy from his position at Manassas was then discussed; its proper proportion of infantry, cavalry and artillery settled. After some remarks by the General, apparently drawn out by the evident hesitation of officers so much his juniors in years and service, to utter opinions in the presence of one whom all looked up to as the great master of the art of war, he said he "desired their advice; that he felt the burden of many years, and it was not right to leave upon him, at his age, the whole weight of such a responsibility,—that younger men must soon take it up".

In the end, the question was freely considered,—the important details of the force settled; the action of Patterson's army near Winchester discussed, and General Scott distinctly assumed the responsibility of giving such instructions to Patterson as would occupy Johnson's⁴ troops, and prevent their coming to the battlefield in time to interfere with McDowell who was to command the advance on Manassas. He said,—“I assume the responsibility for having Johnson kept off McDowell's flank.”

I think that so far as campaign plans go, this first campaign originated in Generals Scott and McDowell. Some such movement everybody looked for,—they prepared and executed it.

With new troops not in training for marching, the movement was slower than anticipated and Johnson escaped from Patterson who occupied his attention as he believed, during the time prescribed to him, and then fell back. The result was that Johnson fell fresh on McDowell's tired and exhausted troops and turned their victory, in the moment of triumph, into a severe defeat.

I understood that General Scott's general plan was to send a strong column down the Mississippi, with which the people of the Northwest,—even then powerful and growing rapidly, though none foresaw then the immense and wonderful increase in population, in production and in wealth, which we have lived to see in the twenty-seven years which have passed since the McDowell Campaign was ordered,—should break the barrier audaciously and impudently drawn across the Nation's path to the Sea.

This column was spoken of in Press and conversation as "Scott's Anaconda", which should crush the rebellion in its coils.

The expulsion of the enemy from West Virginia, as has been already

² Apr. 23. *McClellan's Own Story*, p. 41.

³ June 29. Nicolay and Hay, *Lincoln*, IV. 322. Cf. McDowell's testimony as to this council, *Report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War*, II. 35-37.

⁴ Johnston's.

said, fell to General McClellan with whom served General Rosserans.⁵ Both had been Engineer officers of high character. McClellan had gone through the Mexican War with Scott's column, but, while he acquired great reputation, he had command only of a company of Engineers with which he did good service in the siege of Vera Cruz, and in the battles attending the successful march to the City of Mexico. His further military experience was limited to a visit to the trenches at Sebastopol besieged by the French and British armies, and their auxiliaries. This was military experience, but in inferior command, and not such as developed great and successful generals; but the American of that generation surviving with age not too great, had no other; and on McDowell's defeat McClellan was, at the instance of Scott, fresh from his successes in West Virginia called to the command of all the Armies of the United States; Scott retiring in favor of the younger man.

I have always believed that Scott impressed upon the war its first general direction and scheme of operations; but the air was full of military opinions and plans of campaigns. The Press gave voice to their authors. Everybody's attention was turned to military affairs, and upon the retirement of General Scott, burdened with years, and infirmities which made it impossible for him to take the field, there were left no officers of the War of 1812, and few of the veterans of the Mexican War whose history recorded such services as to give much authority to their opinions. The nature of the country indicated the general lines of operations defensive and offensive, on both sides of the contest.

Troops collected at Charleston attracted the patriot naval and military forces to Port Royal and to Charleston Harbor. Savannah's Fort Pulaski was besieged and fell in due course. The troops of the Northwest collected at the junction of the Ohio and Mississippi, and there fell under the command of General Grant, whose active military experience had been acquired in command of a company in Mexico; not greater, therefore, than that of McClellan before described.

To command the Mississippi column, Halleck, also a former officer of Engineers, was made Major General and stationed at St. Louis. Grant at Cairo soon showed ability and initiative. He seized Paducah, an enterprise which had important results both military and political. He attacked Belmont with raw troops in inferior force; and, inflicting much damage on the enemy, withdrew successfully with prisoners and captured guns, and taught the Southwest not to rely upon the belief that one Southerner was the equal of five Yankees. He took Fort Henry after urgent request to Halleck to allow him to attempt it, and he took Fort Donaldson⁶ without permission, and captured 15,000 prisoners, and all this he did by the 16th of February 1862; when McClellan's first known plan of campaign for the Army of the Potomac was only two weeks old.

In these events is seen the gradual hardening into form of a plan of campaign extending over the whole country; its general features suggested themselves, doubtless, to many intelligent minds in civil as in military life, whose tastes inclined to such studies and speculations.

Schalk wrote in 1861, and printed in 1862, a summary of the Art of War in which a chapter on the war in America anticipated with great

⁵ Rosecrans.

⁶ Donelson.

success the operations of the armies, not in particular and exact detail, but in general terms such as justified his later work on the campaigns of 1862 and 1863.⁷

I do not believe therefore that any man has a just right to claim to be the author of all the plans of campaign finally executed,—neither Mr. Lincoln, nor Stanton, nor McClellan.

The initiation is due to Scott. He soon learned that he could not sit in a chair in Washington and personally command an army engaged in battle thirty miles distant, with safety to that army or to his own great and well won reputation; and soon after the Battle of Bull Run he voluntarily retired from public life, and left to McClellan, whom, upon his success in West Virginia, he had invited to Washington, the further conduct of the war.

General McClellan showed great ability in the organization and drilling of the Army of the Potomac. He fancied that in every night's telegraphic conversation with Halleck and other commanders he really devised and governed their movements; he grew to believe that he had great military capacity; he said one day, there were very few men who could command and manoeuvre 100,000 men but that he believed he could do this.

For want of better, the President yielded his own judgment, and allowed the line of the Chickahominy to become the line of operations of the Army of the Potomac. His letters, heretofore published, show that he did not approve it, and only consented to allow it.

The General was an Engineer, and sat down to another siege of Vera Cruz or of Sabastopol before Yorktown. He called upon the Navy to do his work for him. It seemed to become a habit with him to call upon others to undertake the hard end of the military campaigns. He wished the squadron of wooden ships to do what Sabastopol gave every reason to believe was impossible,—what he then learned, able, and aged chief of his old corps of Engineers, General Totten, had, in official public reports on the relations of ships and forts, repeatedly pronounced impossible; what the most powerful British squadron at Sabastopol had tried in vain. This call was not obeyed, and the Army was left to its own efforts.

The country was impatient. The President felt the pressure, and finally against his protest, he sent Burnside to relieve McClellan; but at Burnside's earnest plea, left with him discretion, after acquainting McClellan with the contents of the order in his pocket, not to deliver it, if any assurance of progress could, under this pressure, be obtained from him.

Burnside obtained such assurances as he thought justified him in not taking command of the Army on the Peninsula, and returned to the President and reported, leaving McClellan in command.

McClellan showed capacity to move an army of 100,000 men in the ordinary operations of a campaign, but not to guide them to victory except at Antietam, and that was a victory from which the beaten army escaped with the loss only of what it suffered on the battlefield. It was not such a victory as Napoleon had accustomed the world to demand

⁷ Emil Schalk, *Summary of the Art of War, written expressly for and dedicated to the U. S. Volunteer Army* (Philadelphia, 1862); *id. Campaigns of 1862 and 1863, illustrating the Principles of Strategy* (Philadelphia, 1863).

from its Generals, but it was an important one, and it put an end to the invasion of Pennsylvania, though it left the hostile army in condition to renew that invasion on the next opportunity.

McClellan seemed to have no sufficient appreciation of the fact that an American soldier costs his country \$1,000 a year, whether merely drilling, or engaged with the enemy. He seemed satisfied, with 200,000 men in his army, to rest quiet and drill and review them; to ride the picket line occasionally; but, when urged to move his troops to accomplish something, it was always some distant corps whose movements he suggested.

He seemed to show the disposition of which Marshall Marmont accuses most generals: "They", he says, "prepare for battle with intelligence and skill; but then hesitation commences." "A battle is such a chance medley, success depends on so many chances, that the General doubts and hesitates till the favorable moment is lost before he makes up his mind to give the word."

On Friday, January 10th, 1862, the President, in great distress, entered my office.⁸ He took a chair in front of the open fire and said, "General, what shall I do? The people are impatient; Chase has no money and he tells me he can raise no more; the General of the Army has typhoid fever. The bottom is out of the tub. What shall I do?"

I said, "If General McClellan has typhoid fever, that is an affair of six weeks at least; he will not be able sooner to command. In the meantime, if the enemy in our front is as strong as he believes, they may attack on any day, and I think you should see some of those upon whom in such case, or in case any forward movement becomes necessary, the control must fall. Send for them to meet you soon and consult with them; perhaps you may select the responsible commander for such an event."

The council was called.⁹ On Sunday, January 12th, McDowell and Franklin called on me with a summons to the White House for one P.M. These officers, and Messrs. Seward, Chase and Blair of the Cabinet attended. The President announced that he had called this meeting in consequence of the sickness of General McClellan, but he had that morning heard from him that he was better, and would be able to be present the next day; and that, on this promise, he adjourned the discussion for twenty four hours.

The next day, Jan. 13th, the same persons and General McClellan appeared at the rendezvous. The President opened the proceedings by making a statement of the cause of his calling the Council. Mr. Chase, and Mr. Blair, if memory is accurate, both spoke. All looked to McClellan, who sat still with his head hanging down, and mute. The situation grew awkward. The President spoke again a few words. One of the Generals said something; McClellan said something which evidently did not please the speaker, and again was mute.

I moved my chair to the side of McClellan's and urged him, saying, "The President evidently expects you to speak; can you not promise

⁸ The office of the quartermaster-general, moved that day to the Winder Building, still standing, at the corner of Seventeenth and F Streets in Washington. See the diary of this date, *post*, III.

⁹ There was such a meeting on Jan. 10, at which Meigs was not present. McDowell's statement in appendix to Raymond's *Lincoln*, pp. 772-774.

some movement towards Manassas? You are strong." He replied, "I cannot move on them with as great a force as they have." "Why, you have near 200,000 men, how many have they?" "Not less than 175,000 according to my advices." I said, "Do you think so?" and "the President expects something from you." He replied, "If I tell him my plans they will be in the New York Herald tomorrow morning. He can't keep a secret, he will tell them to Tadd." I said: "That is a pity, but he is the President,—the Commander-in-Chief; he has a right to know; it is not respectful to sit mute when he so clearly requires you to speak. He is superior to all."

After some further urging, McClellan moved, and seemed to prepare to speak. He declined to give his plans in detail, but thought it best to press the movement of Buell's troops in the central line of operation. After a few words that brought out nothing more, Mr. Lincoln said, "Well, on this assurance of the General that he will press the advance in Kentucky, I will be satisfied, and will adjourn this Council."

I did not discuss the affair with others, but it left on me the impression that McClellan would prefer to send forward any other troops than those under his present command. After the evacuation of Yorktown, he sent his army in pursuit, and remained at Yorktown to embark Franklin's corps.

Though the immediate results of this council was so meagre and unsatisfactory, it perhaps had a useful effect, for, on Feby. 3d, 1862, about two weeks later, McClellan wrote a letter proposing a plan of campaign for the active portion of the Army of the Potomac, which he wished to land at Urbana on the lower Rappahanock, and march in one day to West Point, where, crossing the Fork, he expected to reach Richmond in two marches and apparently to surprise that City and capture it before the Army at Manassas could interpose. But, though at this Council Mr. Lincoln yielded in despair to his wilful General, he, in "McClellan's Last Words",¹⁰ gives an account of the meeting with the assertion that it grew out of some intrigue of officers desirous of replacing him in the enjoyment of the honors of command.

It originated in his own typhoid fever and the President's distress at the lamentable condition in which that put all the affairs of defence and finance. The President may have consulted others than myself, but, if so, I never knew it. This history has given it exact.

Thus grew up the details of campaign operations. Four important letters have been made public. In the written and earnest declarations of their authors, Lincoln and Stanton, are positive proof that both the President and his great War Minister dealt faithfully, honorably, and patriotically with their subordinates.

The first is a letter of May 9th '62, dated at Fortress Monroe (See Appendix folio A) to General McClellan,¹¹ in which, with patience, with kindness, and with sincerity, he deals with objections to the establishing of Army Corps in the Army of the Potomac, then over 150,000 strong. He also gives him some good advice showing a knowledge of human nature in which the General seemed to be deficient.

The reference to the reports of threats of a dictatorship in the letter to Hooker (see Appendix, folio B)¹² are illustrated by a scene at Har-

¹⁰ Meaning, *McClellan's Own Story*; see pp. 157-158.

¹¹ Lincoln, *Works*, ed. Nicolay and Hay, II. 149.

¹² Lincoln to Hooker, Jan. 26, 1863. *Ibid.*, II. 306.

rison's Landing. I sat by a camp-fire near the tent in which Halleck consulted with McClellan, and a circle of officers of rank gathered around the fire in the twilight. Mutterings of a march on Washington to "clear out those fellows" were uttered, when Burnside moved into the circle opposite me and said aloud: "I don't know what you fellows call this talk, but I call it flat Treason, By God!"

"Come fellows, let's go," some one said, and the circle melted away without another word.

I spoke to Halleck of it as important as indicating a bad spirit in the Army, but he made light of it as only Camp-talk, which meant nothing. Probably this occurred also in other camps, and evidently it reached Mr. Lincoln's ears. The letter to Hooker accompanied a commission to command the Army of the Potomac after Burnside's defeat at Fredericksburg.

The third is Mr. Lincoln's letter to General Grant (see Appendix, folio C)¹³ on taking command of the whole of the army before entering on the Wilderness Campaign.

The fourth is the letter of Mr. Stanton to the Rev. Mr. Dyer (see Appendix, folio D)¹⁴ not made public till after the death of the writer, who preferred to suffer the obloquy cast upon him by McClellan's friends and partisans, to risking the least injury to the cause to which he as truly gave his life as did any soldier, who died in battle.

These are true letters, written from the heart. They express the true and honest feelings and policy of their authors and will, wherever read with impartial mind, satisfy the reader that no just accusation of treachery or bad faith can lie against their authors. My constant intercourse with both never left me a doubt or suspicion as to their intentions or their loyalty, to those intrusted by them with command. They asked for action, for progress, for victory; they sometimes were urgent, when patience failed under costly inaction,—when it became difficult to raise men and money, and to procure the supplies loudly demanded by those who failed to make effective use of them, but who well knew that without such costly and continuous supplies, the Armies they commanded must speedily dissolve and disperse. Commanders in such cases, were sometimes displaced, but never capriciously or without absolute necessity. Amongst other obvious reasons such changes were limited by the difficulty of finding better qualified successors. There were many brave officers available,—none with experience in war proving their ability to command such large bodies of troops. These had to be painfully sifted out from the mass of men of all ranks coming forward to serve their country.

Mr. Lincoln's letter to Hooker is a monument of patriotic self-abnegation, and that to Grant, perhaps too much sacrificing the just right and authority, and even the duty, of the Head of the Nation to have knowledge, and influence, in the course of the application and use of the enormous supplies of men and money entrusted by the Constitution and laws and by the devotion of the people, to the Commander-in-Chief. He could never free himself from his great responsibility.

These things and their direction were entrusted by the Nation to the Executive Head, and not to any of the Generals who were his creatures,

¹³ Lincoln to Grant, Apr. 30, 1864. *Works*, II. 517.

¹⁴ Stanton to Rev. Heman Dyer, May 18, 1862. Gorham, *Stanton*, I. 426-432.

made and unmade by his breath, and for whose capacity and conduct he bore the whole responsibility. They sometimes, in the intoxication of suddenly attained power, forgot their dependence upon the Executive. He was refused admittance to the bedside of one General when he knocked at the door, tormented with the cares and anxieties of his position. He, it was believed, was spoken of, as unable to keep the important secrets held in the breast of his creatures and their subordinate creations. A spectacle to make gods and men ashamed!

Had there been comrades or rivals of McClellan equally esteemed by the people, he had been earlier replaced. But his early and successful campaign in West Virginia had given him prestige and had borne him into command of the defeated Army of the Potomac, and later, of the whole Army of the People.

Why Mr. Lincoln endeavored to force McClellan to cross the Potomac after the Army had driven Lee across and into Virginia, and why he at the last sent Burnside to relieve him at Warrenton, perhaps no one fully knows. Letters of Mr. Lincoln on this movement, which appear to show that he had at that time pretty clear ideas of military principles, are in print. They urge greater rapidity of movement.

At length patience seems to have been exhausted and Burnside replaced him, and moved quietly to Fredericksburg. In due time he delivered his attack and failed. He behaved honorably about it, and stood ready to obey orders without murmuring or to give up the command, as might be thought best.

He was followed by Hooker, who with wonderful skill, reorganized a defeated and discouraged army, and infused into it a new and hopeful spirit; but who, after planning and conducting to apparent certain success, in the very hour of greatest hope and triumph, broke down disastrously and was the cause of dreadful defeat and loss. Lee moved round his right flank and he followed vigorously. Some differences arose during the march about the disposition of the garrison at Harpers Ferry and he asked to be relieved, if not permitted to carry out his wishes and views. The President took him at his word, and in the very crisis of a great movement, placed Meade in command. He had shown daring and initiative in the disastrous battle of Fredericksburg, where his division penetrated the hostile line of battle and, failing of expected support, was successfully and skillfully withdrawn. It was known that Hooker's habits before he reached such high command had been bad; his breakdown at Chancellorsville was ascribed by many to a relapse; by others to the shock of a ball which struck a post near him. It has never been settled what was the true cause, though he himself is alleged by an old friend to have, when questioned, replied that he was not drunk, but at the moment he had "lost confidence in Hooker."

Whatever the cause, no one can blame the President for accepting in such an extreme crisis, the opportunity afforded by the demand for relief from command of one who had shown that he could not be relied upon in a supreme moment to exercise in the highest degree the military talent he undoubtedly possessed when entirely in command of his faculties. The risk was too great, and the result of the battle impending, justified the choice of General Meade, who won a brilliant victory.

He was blamed for not risking more by following and attacking the defeated army. It is not here in order to discuss this question. No

great pursuit has followed any battle of this war. The country does not afford the paved roads and open fields over which European armies have fled; and, in a former age of short-range fire arms, Napoleon followed and dispersed defeated armies, and Bluecher followed Napoleon himself, when his army melted away at Waterloo. The nearest approach to such pursuit was that, I believe, of Early by Sheridan's mounted infantry and cavalry, which drove him without an army out of the Shenandoah Valley.

Much complaint has been made by McClellan and his friends about the retention of McDowell's troops when the former, against the judgement of the Executive, attempted to take Richmond by surprise. Published documents prove that he disobeyed the express command of the President, founded on the opinions of the officers commanding his corps d'armee, and on that of those left to be responsible for the safety of the Capital. The President did not then detach McDowell from his command, but required him to be moved direct towards Richmond, being kept in position, on any movement threatening the Capital, to defend it. McClellan protested loudly, asserted that McDowell coming upon his right would be useless to him,—while, if sent by water to his left, *i.e.* between him and the deep sea, he would be of the greatest value—that it was impossible for Lee to detach troops to threaten Washington while he was on the Peninsula. While he thus protested and showed that he was not competent to alter his plans to suit his orders, the country was shocked by telegrams announcing that detachments of Lee's army had attacked the Shenandoah troops under Banks, and, driving them in confusion across the Potomac, spread terror in Maryland, and doubt in Washington. Then, and not till then, did the President order McDowell to march to the Shenandoah and striking hands with Fremont west of Jackson, intercept him if possible and destroy his power for mischief. The movement failed of success, and Jackson, after doing infinite damage, escaped to do still more injury by joining Lee at Richmond, and, fresh from this double march through a country held by McClellan to be impracticable, striking, and doubling up his right flank and driving him to the James River. This movement was designated not a defeat, but a change of base. A euphonious amendment of title.

The Battle of Malvern Hills, a well fought defensive battle, showed that the troops kept up a better heart than their commander shows in his hysterical despatches, railing against those whose advice he had rejected, whose orders for the safety of the Capital he had disobeyed, and yet, who were the creators of his rank, command, and power for good or evil.

The argument of the withdrawal from the Peninsula has been repeatedly published. Both sides have debated it ad-nauseam. I, after reading the despatches of dreadful discouragement first received from Harrison's Landing, made up my mind that it would be necessary. Mr. Lincoln found out that this was the opinion at Washington and expressed great regret that such was the opinion. He waited, sent Halleck to McClellan who was demanding 100,000 reinforcements and great supplies and promising nothing definite, only a hope that he could do something from the new refuge under the naval guns which he denominated the "new base", as though it had been from the beginning his objective point. It is not worth while to renew this exhausted discus-

sion. The campaigns of the greatest soldier of the war with carte-blanche from the Executive, occupied from the 4th of May to the middle of June in a bloody march to Richmond. After inflicting great damage upon his adversary and suffering a loss of 60,000 to himself, he reached the vicinity of Harrison's Landing in the middle of June, and, crossing the James, on April — '65,¹⁵ after 10 months from McClellan's refuge of a defeated army, Grant captured Richmond. It seems clear that McClellan, with a defeated army, could not have done better.

In his account of the council of Jan'y. 1862, he distinctly states that he declined, at the call of the President, to declare his plans then. His posthumous work of his "Own Story" contains his project under date Feby. 3d 1862, in reply to a letter of the President of same date, and in his account of the council held on Jan'y. 12th, he says that he had some weeks before, of his own volition, to comfort the Secretary of the Treasury troubled with financial operations by the uncertainty as to military operations, communicated to him his plans with which he was highly delighted.¹⁶ From another page,¹⁷ it appears that this was early in December, 1861, when his plans were sufficiently matured to make this possible. This, evidently from his letter of Feby. 3d, was the movement to Urbana, which, in execution, became the movement to Fortress Monroe.

It is not worth while to discuss the question whether he formulated, or had ever made known, plans for the campaigns of other armies. The Peninsula Campaign occupied so much of his military career, with its eventuality,—the operations arising in Lee's escape from the Army of McClellan, to the defeat at Antietam, that he had no opportunity to carry on other military operations. It may be proper here to say that so far as relates to the suspicion of the General that McDowell originated the council of January, it is improbable that he had any connection with the suggestion; and that of the secret examination into the condition of the Army which McClellan says had been entrusted to McDowell and Franklin by the President at that time, I never heard till I read with surprise his "Own Story". He speaks certainly of the part in it of McDowell and Franklin and thinks that Meigs was one of those thus entrusted. If so, I never knew it. I think it a delusion of a brain under typhoid fever, remembered in after years.

General McClellan's "Own Story", a posthumous publication but mostly from his own pen, reveals to the world his inner feelings and thoughts. It adds nothing to his glory. It shows that his mind made himself too much the centre of his plans and thoughts. It has been wittily described as a case of "posthumous *felo de se*".

Discontent with the President, with the Secretary of War, with Mr. Chase, suspicion of them, ingratitude to General Scott, suspicion of General McDowell, always a thoroughly patriotic officer, loyal and true,—appear throughout its pages. It is a pity for his fame that his weaknesses have thus by his friends been published to an unsympathising world.

General Pope had been active in the affairs of Island No. 10, in

¹⁵ Apr. 3. The meaning is that Richmond was occupied on that day, ten months after the crossing of the James.

¹⁶ *McClellan's Own Story*, pp. 229-236.

¹⁷ P. 203.

which Mr. Lincoln had taken great interest, requiring frequent telegraphic reports of progress in the casting and boring of the 13 inch sea coast mortars, the casting of their shells, the building of the huge solid timber rafts or floats, to carry them to their destination and to bear the shock of the discharge of their mortars. By the way, he afterwards said he had telegraphed for weeks several times a day and when all was over, he had never been able to learn that the bombardment had killed one hostile soldier.

After the evacuation of Corinth, Pope was active in pursuit. His reports as the press printed them, described great devastation and loss inflicted on the enemy as gathered from the waste and destruction seen on the routes by which they retired. The thousands of prisoners claimed in the printed accounts never reported at Halleck's headquarters, and later, Pope denied the authority of the despatches.¹⁸ But, he was then prominent, and was called to Washington and commissioned to command the scattered bodies of troops assembled for defense of Northern Virginia, and the Capital behind the Potomac; and to co-operate with the Army before Richmond. He was unable to prevent the march North of Lee, after McClellan was shut up at Harrison's Landing on the James, and, while McClellan was protesting that Lee could not move to threaten Washington so long as he was near Richmond, Pope was driven back, and it became necessary to hasten the slow transfer of the Army of the Potomac to save the Capital and Pope's army threatened, and defeated with great loss; while the daring enemy crossed the Potomac and invaded Pennsylvania.

I know nothing of the conception of Halleck's Corinth Campaign. I think the collection of a strong force at this point attracted Halleck's troops to the attempt to disperse them. An enemy has much to do with the determination of military movements. I once heard Halleck say to the President, "Mr. President you will remember that you directed me to take Corinth; early, if practicable, but in any case not to fail to take Corinth, and I did take it, Mr. President."

I do not think that Mr. Lincoln interfered in any important degree with General Halleck. They were in momentary telegraphic communication, and no doubt conferred frequently, even constantly.

When the Army of the Potomac carried on its rolls 200,000 men they cost the people, whether idle or employed, \$200,000,000 a year. This was not the only army. This was the ordinary rate of expenditure or cost per man of the American Army. And this without the enormous cost of steam transports waiting on them. The annual revenue and expenditure of the United States for all purposes in the year 1860, did not exceed \$60,000,000. The Executive looked of course with apprehension at such expenditures with no positive results which could be used to encourage the people to provide the money,—unorganized as was business, manufactures, and finances, for such burdens, with a cost of \$600,000 a day he was anxious that McClellan's army should show progress. This consideration did not seem to affect McClellan.

I doubt that in any other state or country could the Chief of the State and his Ministers of War have submitted to what Mr. Lincoln and Mr. Stanton bore. Stanton hoped great things from McClellan and received him cordially. The "Own Story" accuses him of treachery, it makes

¹⁸ See Force, *From Fort Henry to Corinth*, pp. 190-191.

the same vile accusation against General Scott, and it attempts to argue that the Administration did not wish the Army of the Potomac to succeed. Its pages, however, bear witness to the gradual and slow destruction of the hope and confidence at first given.

Many military names from this War will live in History but Lincoln's and Stanton's will outlast all but Grant's. These three are the great men of the War. I knew them all during its course. They differed in talents and in temperament, and in manner. Lincoln was easily first; Grant and Stanton occupied the second place. I will not attempt to say which should be the first of those two. But, all won my regard and such reverence as I have felt called on to give to no other men in the course of a long life in which I have shaken hands with every President since Adams,¹⁹ that is, with 16 of the 21 men who have held that high office.

Between Lincoln, Stanton and Grant, I believe there was never a dispute.

II. FROM GENERAL MEIGS'S LARGE DIARY, MARCH 29--APRIL 8, 1861.

[*March*] 29. To Great Falls. When we came home I found a request from the Secretary of State to come to see him. I went with him to the President who wished to see me. He said that they were in a difficulty and he wished to have the President talk with some man who would speak of what he knew—not of politics in military affairs and one who could get on a horse in the field too. He said they had had Gen. Scott and Gen. Totten but no one would think of putting either of these old men on horseback.

The President talked freely with me. I told him that men enough could be found to volunteer to endeavor to relieve Fort Sumter, but that persons of higher position and rank than myself thought it not to be attempted, that this was not the place to make the war, etc. He asked me whether Fort Pickens could be held.²⁰ I told him certainly, if the Navy had done its duty and not lost it already. The President asked whether I could not go down there again and take a general command of these three great fortresses²¹ and keep them safe. I told him I was only a captain and could not command majors who were there. He must take an officer of higher rank. Mr. Seward broke out with "I can understand too how that is, Captain Meigs, you have got to be promoted". I said, "That cannot be done; I am a captain and there is no vacancy". But Mr. Seward told the President that if he wished to have this thing done the proper way was to put it into my charge and it would be done, that I would give him an estimate of the means by 4 P. M. of the next day. He complimented me much. Said that when Pitt wished to take Quebec he did not send for any old general but he sent for a young man whom he had noticed in the society of London, named Wolfe, and told him that he had selected him to take Quebec, to ask for the necessary means and do it and it was done. Would the President do this now?

¹⁹ Meaning, John Quincy Adams.

²⁰ Captain Meigs, sent down from Washington in the preceding winter to strengthen the defences of Fort Jefferson, at the Dry Tortugas, was familiar with the circumstances of Fort Pickens.

²¹ Fort Taylor, at Key West, Fort Jefferson, at the Dry Tortugas, and Fort Pickens.

He replied that he would consider on it and would let me know in a day or two.

I walked home with Mr. Seward, who said he was much gratified at the result of this interview. That they²² had been in a strait. Gen. Scott objected to relieving Fort Sumter or Pickens, thought it best to give them up and thus put a stop to all cry of coercion. For his own part, his policy had been all along to give up Sumter as too near Washington and leaving a temptation to Davis to relieve it by an [attack] upon Washington. That he wished to hold Pickens, making the fight there and in Texas, and thus make the burden of the war, which all men of sense saw must come, fall upon those who by rebellion provoked it. That I must wait for a day or two and I should hear again from him.

30. Drew my pay for the month, \$168.20. Club at our house, quite a large meeting and a pleasant one.

31. As I was about to start for church this morning Col. Keyes,²³ Gen. Scott's military secretary, called and said that Mr. Seward had sent for me. We went to his house and he requested us to put down upon paper an estimate and project for relieving and holding Fort Pickens in consultation with Gen. Scott and to bring it to the President before 4 P. M.

I learned from the President himself the other day that he had verbally directed Gen. Scott to hold all these forts and make arrangements to reinforce them on the 5th of March. That about the 10th, finding nothing done, he had thought it best to put himself on record and had repeated the order in writing.²⁴ That he learned that the *Brooklyn* had gone to Key West and as she had the troops for Pickens on board he supposed that his orders had fizzled out.²⁵

That Gen. Scott had told him he did not think that Pickens ought to be held and this had given him a cold shock. He had not slept the night before he saw me, that is Thursday night. Felt much relieved at my assurance that the place could be held against all opposition by proper arrangements. Keyes and myself went to the engineer office, wrote out, after looking over the plan for Pickens, our views; compared notes, agreed, and were at the President's at 2½ P. M. Told him that we found we had not time to see Gen. Scott and be back with the result before 4 and had called to report. He with some effort [?] directed us to read our papers and then ordered us to see Gen. Scott, tell him instructions of the President and that he wished this thing done and not to let it fail unless he can show why the refusing him something he asked is necessary. "I depend upon you gentlemen to push this thing through."

We went to the house of Gen. Scott, showed him our papers which he approved saying there was nothing in them not necessary and little to be added as necessary. Mr. Seward came in and the matter was talked over and resolved upon.

April 1. At Gen. Scott's office laying out plans. To the President's.

²² Meaning, the Cabinet, at the meeting held that day; it is fully reported in Nicolay and Hay, *Lincoln*, III. 429-433.

²³ Lieut.-Col. Erasmus D. Keyes. See his *Fifty Years' Observation*, p. 380.

²⁴ Scott to Vogdes, Mar. 12. *Official Records, Navies*, IV. 90.

²⁵ Before sailing to Key West the *Brooklyn* had transferred her troops to the *Sabine*, but this was not known in Washington.

Got Lt. D. D. Porter ordered to go to N. Y.,²⁶ take any vessel ready and suitable, and proceed to sea and not draw rein until he was inside the Pensacola harbor, to capture [watch?] the place[?] strictly and to prevent any boat crossing the harbor with troops to attack Pensacola. I sent a despatch to commandant of the Brooklyn Navy Yard to get the *Powhatan* ready for sea with least possible delay. This was signed by the President.²⁷

Hard at work all day making orders for the signature of the President and for myself. We had much discussion as to who was to command this expedition. Secretary of State wished me to be promoted and take command, and when Gen. Scott showed him that this could not be done as the law would not allow it, he asked me to go. I told him I was ready for any duty in any place in any capacity at any pay, so long as it was in my country's service.

Gen. Scott said it was cruel to ask me to go away from these great works²⁸ and that in a rank so low as that which my captain's commission must give me. Seward said any arrangement which I could make for carrying on the works in my absence would be carried out, to this he pledged himself; and I got [my] pay anyhow; that fame would come from Pickens as well as from the Capitol; the Capitol might stop. There was no use in a capitol unless we had a country.

April 2. Having completed our plans Col. Brown²⁹ and Col. Keyes set out for New York to-day.³⁰ I follow. Have to transact other necessary business to-morrow.

3. Receive \$10,000 secret service money for hastening and helping the expedition.³¹ This is paid to me. I do not account for it. I gave to my wife of the money I have some \$300 and set out at 3:20 P. M. Took Thomas³² with me to N. Y.

4. Reached New York at 4 A. M. to-day. Set every thing going.

5. At work. Evening, telegram from Secretary of Navy to detain the *Powhatan*.³³ Porter in despair. Says he will do nothing more for this government. He will go to California and spend his time in surveying. He was under orders for California on the Coast survey, to sail on the 11th when I got him put upon this duty.³⁴

²⁶ Porter says that Meigs had already talked to him of his plan. *Incidents and Anecdotes*, pp. 13-14.

²⁷ Text in *Official Records, Navies*, IV. 109, and in G. V. Fox, *Confidential Correspondence*, I. 15.

²⁸ The Potomac aqueduct, the extension of the Capitol, and the constructing of its dome.

²⁹ Brevet-colonel Harvey Brown, U.S.A., who was to command the expedition.

³⁰ Keyes, p. 388, says that Meigs and Porter went by night train of Apr. 3, and that he went with them to Philadelphia and thence to New York the next morning. It is likely that Meigs wrote up his diary a few days later, at sea.

³¹ There being no military or naval secret-service funds, Seward went to his department, procured \$10,000 in coin from its secret-service fund, took it to his house, and there turned it over to Captain Meigs, who later returned \$6000 of it. Crawford, *Genesis of the Civil War*, pp. 411-412.

³² Thomas Allen, says a later annotation; a servant, presumably.

³³ Text in Soley's *Admiral Porter*, p. 110.

³⁴ Welles describes Lieutenant Porter at this time as being under Southern influence and anxious to go to California to avoid being put into action against the South. *Diary*, I. 19-20.

6. Everywhere. Had to go to the Navy Yard to endeavor to save the *Powhatan*. This did twice, and I succeeded in taking her though written orders from Secretary of Navy to send her to help reinforce Sumter on the 11th were in the yard.³⁵ I took the ground that Capt. Mercer had been relieved by orders signed by President,³⁶ that she was promised to our expedition, was a necessary and most important part of it, and that no man, secretary or other, had a right to take her, and that the secretary could not do it as I was by the President made responsible and told not to let even the Secretary of the Navy know that this expedition was going on. They gave her up to us and Porter sailed about noon. He was seen going down the harbor at 3 P. M.

7. We got to sea at 3 A. M. with order to set out [?] and pass the Light Ship about 7 A. M.

We are in the Collins steamship *Atlantic*, the first made Collins steamship and a noble vessel. We have on board 399 persons connected with our expedition, among them the engineer company of sappers and miners, a company of light artillery, with 73 sailors, 5 companies of troops altogether. I have in my pocket the commission of the marshal to be appointed at Key West. I have got the appointments of best men [for] district attorney and navy agent made. The district attorney will sail in the *Illinois*, which follows us tomorrow. A good set of officers and a good set of men. Our ship of 2846 tons is loaded with stores and people and sailors.

8. . . . Well, Keyes and I have done our duty and have set a ball in motion. Porter, the officer whom the whole Navy has by acclaim selected from the profession, is on his way into the harbor of Pensacola and into it he will go, God permitting, for man will not be able to prevent him.

III. FROM GENERAL MEIGS'S SMALL DIARY, JANUARY 10-13, 1862.

Friday, January 10, 1862:

Moving office of Q M Dept into Winders Building.

To Navy Dept to see the mode of making new gunboats.

President came to talk to me much depressed at inactivity of the army. M'Clellans sickness.³⁷

Sunday, January 12, 1862:

McDowell and Franklin called to discuss matters and invite me to a meeting with the President at 1 pm.

Met Presdt, Seward, Chase and Blair of Cabinet and these officers. McClellan had grown better and would meet us tomorrow.

³⁵ Welles to Capt. Samuel Mercer, commanding the *Powhatan*, Apr. 5. *Official Records, Navies*, IV. 235.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, IV. 109.

³⁷ Added note dated May 22, 1888: "I advised him that typhoid fever meant 6 weeks disability. He should see the officer next in rank, consult and determine who should command if the enemy, believed by McL. to be in great force should attack while he was ill or if any move become necessary. He sent for the Council 13th [meaning 12th]: Seward, Chase, Blair, Meigs, Franklin, and on 13th McClellan, Presidt Lincoln. See McL. Own Story Posthumous publication."

Monday, January 13, 1862:

At Prsdts.

Secy Chase, Seward, Blair. Gen. McClellan, McDowell and Franklin. Much discussion not much accomplished. McClellan declined giving his detailed plans. Indicated some thing of them generally.³⁸

³⁸ Added note, May 22, 1888: "See Gen. McLellans acct of this council in McL. Own Story, a Posthumous publication. He suspects all of intrigue against him. Thinks McDowell originated the whole." [*Remainder illegible.*]

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

GENERAL BOOKS AND BOOKS OF ANCIENT HISTORY

The Maintenance of Peace. By S. C. VESTAL, formerly Colonel, 339th Field Artillery, National Army. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1920. Pp. xiv, 584. \$5.00.)

THIS is a book neither lightly to be taken up nor lightly to be put aside. It is too long and too cumbrous in its arrangement. Its bulk consists of that terror of the historian, a history of the world constructed to point to a particular moral, sections of which rest thinly upon inadequate material, as the chapter on the Incas, which is described as a "*précis* of Book I. of Prescott's *Conquest of Peru*" (p. 56). It is frequently careless in details, as when Lubbock is described as writing of spiders and Fabre of ants (p. 5), or Washington as leading an army in the field to suppress a rebellion in Pennsylvania (p. 20). But it is founded on broad reading, on deep and earnest thought, and contains much common sense. Its theoretical portions are far inferior to its historical.

The central idea of the historical review is to trace the fate of the "balance of power". By this term, which he considers inadequate, Colonel Vestal means not equal balance, but the preponderant balance of smaller or maritime states against land powers seeking world control. Equipoise, or equal balance, the condition existing before the late war, he regards as the greatest menace of peace, but a true balance as the surest bulwark against war. In periods when such a balance has existed he finds conditions favoring the maintenance of peace. Attempts at world empire have proved unsuccessful, or if successful within the range of endeavor, as in the case of the Incas, stagnating. Attempts at confederation, such as the Holy Roman Empire, the Papacy, and the Holy Alliance, have proved abortive. Federation, which he defines as a supergovernment resting and operating directly upon the individual citizens of the several states which comprise the federation, he considers at present impossible, whether it be desirable or not. He believes then that the foundations of peace rest upon the existence in the world of strong nations, with strong boundaries, united, either in purpose, or by common declarations, or even by mutual treaties, to oppose the dominance of any one nation. He believes that democracy is the strongest basis for domestic peace, but he points out, in the best-constructed portion of the book, that domestic peace has nowhere long existed without the maintenance of armed forces.

The greatest weakness of his discussion is, as is true of all such discussions, not vulgar inaccuracy, but simplicity. He discards all

forces except that which he believes to be dominant, which may be described as that of nationality. He fails to mention such vital things as the force of example, of law, either domestic or international, of religion, and barely admits that of economics. His history, moreover, is static, and he feels no real movement in the world. He idealizes the particular force, that Balance which he selects as the world's peace-maker; saying for instance: "No victorious coalition formed for defence against a strong usurping power has ever dismembered the defeated state or wantonly abused its victory in any way" (p. 108). One seeks without result for an explanation of how the force of the majority, which in the case of nations is transmuted into power by organization, is, in the case of the world, to become power, without organization.

But how many of the reviews of history which have of late years been put forward to point the finger of the past directly toward a "Parliament of Man", have been without similar defects? Most of them were the work of men earnestly hoping that a world league would come, and reviewing the past to convince themselves and others that it was possible. This is a review by a man who believes such a league impossible, and who has sought in history some other solution for the problem of peace. It is not as historical works that such books are to be evaluated, but as contributions to thought, and the function of the historical reviewer is to pass his opinion on, so to speak, the historical grammar. Practically none of these books show authoritative powers of historical interpretation, though many are suggestively interpretive, and none more so than this. Colonel Vestal, as compared with the others, shows a medium degree of accuracy, but quite the widest scope and broadest background of any with which the reviewer is acquainted. His facts, moreover, are facts that most of the others disregard, and by combining his book with some on the other side, a chance for a comprehensive view and a real personal interpretation of the foundations of peace is afforded, which the average reader might not get by a first-hand reading of sounder general histories. Colonel Vestal, moreover, displays an intellectual activity in his comments which is refreshing, and six pages of quotations from Demosthenes would give distinction to any book (p. 146-150). Quite apart from its use of history, the book deserves consideration for its constructive ideas with regard to peace. Its destructive analysis of other proposals now current is almost too ill-natured to be useful.

CARL RUSSELL FISH.

The Writing of History: an Introduction to Historical Method. By FRED M. FLING, Ph.D., Professor of European History in the University of Nebraska. (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1920. Pp. 195. \$2.00.)

IN this little book Professor Fling offers an instructive guide to the student within or without college walls who desires to learn by experi-

ence the technique of historical research and exposition. Although the author believes that relatively few of his readers may be ambitious to contribute to the body of historical facts scientifically established, he is urgent that all serious teachers of history undertake at least one task of investigation, for otherwise they cannot understand the basis of historical knowledge or distinguish between the products of sound scholarship and the writings of popularizers and rhetoricians. He recommends that those who intend to teach or to write history should carry out a definite scheme of work from an early period of the undergraduate course. His estimate of what such an undergraduate should be able to accomplish is likely to provoke on the part of some college teachers the anxious query, Where shall beings of this sort be found? A part of the reading suggested for the study of literary criticism and of philosophy seems beyond the capacity of most undergraduates. Moreover, not every student who aspires to teach history is of exceptional endowment. These questions are discussed in the introduction. Here also is an excellent statement of the distinction between the methods of sociology and of history in dealing with facts.

Chapters II.-V. present the classification of sources, and the determination of genuineness, time, place, and authorship. Then follows an explanation of the exact process by which indications drawn from these sources become established facts. The last two chapters are given to the grouping of facts and their exposition in an historical account or narrative.

In explaining the application of the critical method to historical material Professor Fling deals chiefly with the different forms of testimony. His illustrations, which are mostly from the period of the French Revolution, are selected from the determination of those facts which make up a narrative of events. It is obvious that the problems of testimony are the most varied and difficult with which the young investigator has to deal. Nevertheless, it would have been helpful had the author included brief directions for the use of documents which are more in the nature of "remains" than of "tradition", that is, laws, administrative acts, etc. Professor Vincent's somewhat more extended work on *Historical Research* contains three suggestive chapters upon the use of such material. The student interested in the history of social and political institutions is likely to deal with such documents more than with memoirs or even pamphlets and newspapers.

It might have been well for Professor Fling to have warned the student that success in the establishment of facts depends upon ability to interpret the meaning of acts or words and that something more than correctness of method is required. He emphasizes this point of view later in what he says about the organization of facts. There he explains that unwearied industry and a sound method are not enough. An imagination capable of discerning the relationships of facts must be

added. He remarks, "This part of the historian's work must depend largely upon genius and genius cannot be taught."

Professor Fling believes that serious pieces of historical writing should be intended primarily for the perusal of scholars, and that the author should, therefore, quote liberally from the sources and should indicate in notes the documents upon which each detail depends. He has in mind apparently even such details as the particular hour at which an important session of an assembly opened. Is this not carrying fidelity to method too far? Must we not assume that trained historical investigators know how to find out such facts? The instance Professor Fling cites of an erroneous statement by so distinguished an historian as M. Flammermont proves simply that historians occasionally "fall asleep at the switch". Of course, if the detail is controversial, evidence for the conclusion should be cited. The author recognizes the fact that there must be histories for the general reader, and that they need not include critical apparatus, although they should be based upon scholarly investigation either by the authors or by those upon whose works they depend. He adds that "the ideal condition would be to have the scientific and the popular histories written by the same men".

This book should arouse college teachers to the need of early directing promising students toward systematic preparation for the later and more serious tasks of historical research. The severity with which Professor Fling condemns defective and superficial processes will have a stimulating effect also upon those who are face to face with the practical problems of research courses.

HENRY E. BOURNE.

Coal, Iron, and War: a Study in Industrialism Past and Future. By EDWIN C. ECKEL. (New York: Henry Holt and Company. 1920. Pp. 375. \$3.00.)

WE have become so familiar with the facts of impending depletion of our extractive resources that there would be little novelty in a study that concerned itself merely with the general danger of exhaustion of mineral resources. This study of coal and iron, however, is much more than a jeremiad on the subject of conservation. The dependence of our present industrial system upon extractive enterprise is frankly and fully explained; little encouragement is held out of significant substitutions of less predatory methods of obtaining power, so that there is no attempt at superficial evasion of the fundamental question, What is to be done? The answer is explicit: slower rates of growth in mass of population and in the basic industries; actual decline in production before many decades; greater diffusion of industry leading to notable economies in the use of power for transportation; serious changes in the balance of political power and forbidding antagonisms between different political ideals.

This study will not afford much encouragement to those idealists who were disposed to believe that modern civilization tends naturally towards world peace. Again and again strong emphasis is laid upon the inherent instability of industrial prestige and leadership.

In the end, then [says Mr. Eckel in his last paragraph], we come back to the fact that there are very serious material difficulties in the way of future peace. These difficulties are of natural origin, being ultimately dependent upon the unequal distribution of important natural resources. They may act directly, as in the case of the coal of Westphalia and China, the iron of Lorraine, the oil of the Caspian and Caribbean—all of which may serve as immediate causes of war or as the bases for that competition which is in the end more crushing and deadly than war. Or they may act through their effects upon political development, so as to create the possibility of international conflicts (p. 370).

The thesis is carefully developed and well maintained, although the historical chapters fail to present the antithesis between the machine civilization based on minerals and the earlier industrial order based upon agricultural resources. The contrast would have placed the conclusions of the book in still stronger relief, but such an undertaking would doubtless have seemed out of place to the average reader. Suffice it to say, a more sumptuous historical setting would merely confirm the thesis of the work.

This brief setting-forth of the essential idea might arouse a suspicion that we are dealing here with a crude instance of materialistic determinism, but there is no trace of such superficiality. The relation of physical resources to inventive effort is stated with unusual felicity, and the striking feature of the book is the openness of mind with which the future is examined. The underlying assumption of all discussion is that things will not remain as they are: technical processes will be different, rates of growth of population will be different, requirements will be different. The reader already familiar with the general tenor of these modes of analyzing industrial problems will find much that is stimulating, and any who may have failed to come in contact with such principles of interpretation will find in this book an especially fine presentation of a body of doctrine that is certain to captivate the imagination.

Although the historical portions of the book are sound in the main there are some statements with reference to the eighteenth century that can scarcely be accepted. The advances in the textile industries during the industrial revolution (p. 12) were not merely effects of the revolution. Iron was not a basic industry in the eighteenth century (pp. 21, 187). Consideration of the relative importance of the textile and metal industries would affect the implications of the statement (p. 20) that the colonies were producing as much iron as Great Britain about 1740. Elaborate treatment of these historical questions, however, would undoubtedly strengthen the conclusions of the text. These slips do not in any way affect the validity of the doctrines presented.

ABBOTT PAYSON USHER.

An Economic History of Rome to the End of the Republic. By TENNEY FRANK, Professor of Latin in the Johns Hopkins University. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press. 1920. Pp. xi, 310. \$2.50.)

IN contrast to the practices of certain contemporary historians who have analyzed Roman economic conditions, Professor Frank has wisely laid down the principle (p. 110) that "*a priori* methods of interpreting historical development by means of generally accepted economic and psychological maxims must be applied to Roman history only with great reserve". He therefore follows closely the evidence furnished by the inscriptions, by archaeology, and by literature. So far as literature goes, the favorable opinion which he expresses (p. 34 f.) of the trustworthiness of the leading ancient historians of the Republic meets the reviewer's hearty approval, and incidentally leads the author to take a conservative attitude toward certain controverted questions like the patricio-plebeian theory (p. 10), the date of the first treaty with Carthage (p. 30), and the authenticity of the Licinian-Sextian laws (p. 44). From the remains of the intricate draining system in early Latium (p. 6 f.) Frank draws the inference that this region was very fertile and densely populated, and this fact helps us to understand the conquests made by its people. Under Etruscan domination industry and commerce developed in Latium to some extent (p. 27 f.). An interesting side-light is now thrown on trade conditions in this period by the newly published fourth volume of Gsell's *Histoire Ancienne de l'Afrique du Nord*.

The treaties with Carthage and the history of Roman coinage show that trade declined after the expulsion of the Etruscans, and that the Romans turned again to their farms. The first Roman coins do not go back beyond the fourth century, and it is interesting to notice that their issuance acted as an over-issue of currency acts to-day (p. 49). Somewhat the same results followed Alexander's Eastern conquests, when large quantities of silver and gold were put in circulation in the Mediterranean world (p. 69 f.). The deforestation of the Volscian mountains and the gradual exhaustion of the soil made it impossible for the dense population of Latium to win a livelihood from their own land, and the pressure was relieved by territorial expansion. If relief had not come in this way manufacturing, commerce, and the arts might have gained a better foot in Rome (p. 63). The two chapters on Industry constitute one of the most valuable contributions which the author has made to our knowledge of Roman economic conditions. In them he has given us a study of certain industries, like the making of glass, bricks, metal ware, and earthen ware, and has investigated the factory system, so far as the facts concerning it are ascertainable. Of peculiar interest are the inferences which he has drawn from the examination of a typical *insula* in Pompeii (p. 191 ff.) in which there were forty shops and ten resi-

dences. We earnestly hope that he may have the time and opportunity to extend his survey to cover the whole city. All through the Republican period and under the Empire industry and trade suffered because of the Roman's contempt for them, because goods were transported slowly and with difficulty, because the needs of a household were supplied by its slaves, and because the plentiful supply of cheap labor prevented the development of labor-saving devices. The government was at fault, too, in failing to enact patent laws, or to supervise banking, and in not developing business law.

The chapter on Public Finance seems to the reviewer inadequate. While the sources of income and the expenditures of the state are described, nothing is said about financial administration, the appropriation of money by the Senate, and the Roman system of public accounting. The racial situation which Italy faced toward the end of the Republic and in the Early Empire reminds us forcibly of similar conditions which confront us to-day. From the large number of Oriental names in the cemeteries of Italy the author infers that the peninsula was swamped by immigration, mainly from the East (p. 162). Consequently the fact "that reform through orderly compromise gave way (under the Gracchi) to revolution through bloodshed is largely due to the displacement of real Italic peoples by men of Oriental, Punic, and Iberian stock" (p. 119).

It will be clear from this review that this book is not intended to present a survey of the economic life of the whole Roman world; but as a study of the economic development of the city of Rome, the governing centre of the civilized world, it stands alone in its completeness, in the thorough use which the author has made of available evidence, in the sound judgment which he has shown, and in the clear, convincing way in which he has set forth his conclusions.

FRANK FROST ABBOTT.

BOOKS OF MEDIEVAL AND MODERN EUROPEAN HISTORY

The Mennonites: a Brief History of their Origin and Later Development in both Europe and America. By C. HENRY SMITH, Ph.D. (Berne, Ind.: Mennonite Book Concern. 1920. Pp. 340. \$2.25.)

A TIME when a world war is hardly ended and when conscientious objectors are still persecuted and lingering in prisons, is not an auspicious time for a history of the Mennonites. It is most timely, however, for the Mennonites themselves, who have passed through a deep experience and have been compelled to search their souls anew for the basis of their faith. They will find strength in learning that their forbears for four centuries have suffered martyrdom for conscience' sake. It is for them that Dr. Smith's book, which is the fruition of two decades of hope, is written.

That the Mennonites are little known is to be expected from their small, widely scattered numbers—under 300,000 all told. The ordinary impressions of them are gained from such sources as Helen Martin's *Tillie, the Mennonite Maid*, Mrs. Fiske's *Erstwhile Susan*, Wildenbruch's *Der Mennonit*, or—equally misinforming—the superficial newspaper accounts of conscientious objectors during the war. These play up this or that characteristic of some branch of the Mennonites, their dress, their austerity, their non-resistant doctrine. None of them gives a picture that the Mennonites themselves would recognize.

Individual and literal interpretation of the Scriptures is the basic principle of Mennonitism, from which its major tenets emanate. These are: baptism on confession of faith, hence adult baptism, originally designated anabaptism; religious toleration; love of one's fellowmen, and a responsibility for them that in some instances developed into communism, and always into genuine charity; literal acceptance of the commandment "Thou shalt not kill" and of Christ's injunction "Swear not at all", hence, non-resistance, opposition to war, and refusal to take an oath; and the separation of Church and State. Simple or specified garb, refusal to hold office as being something "worldly", non-intercourse with those of other faiths, and the prohibition of membership in secret societies are principles advocated by some branches of Mennonites.

These represent the major common principles of Mennonitism. It should go without saying that since this sect is individualistic, the beliefs of the several branches or congregations vary infinitely, and that its adherents are to be found among the common people, and not among the so-called upper classes who accept the established order and the state church. To write the history of a numerically small sect, which, because of its fundamental principles of non-conformity, suffered much schism and was frequently disturbed or dispersed by the authorities, is not an easy task. Dr. Smith is to be complimented on the patience and skill which has enabled him to produce what is undoubtedly the most authoritative work on the Mennonites in our language. His impartiality in dealing with the present-day rival branches of the sect is also worthy of commendation. He goes but little into the theological aspects of Mennonite doctrine, rightly appreciating that the contribution of the sect lies rather in the political and sociological field than in the field of dogma.

The volume falls into two parts: the Mennonites in Europe, and in America. Beginning with the Anabaptists in Switzerland, and the indigenous movements of a similar character in Germany and the Netherlands, and their unjust and unwarranted identification by the authorities with the tragedy at Münster, the book leads to the systematizing of Anabaptist views by the Dutch ex-priest, Menno Simons, after whom the religion is named. The early scattered congregations in the Netherlands, Switzerland, Cleves-Julich, East and West Prussia, East Friesland, Hamburg, Holstein, Bavaria, Württemberg, Alsace-Lorraine and

France, Moravia and Galicia, and their leaders all find their place. The story is one of martyrdom, division, confiscation, dispersion, but of abounding willingness to die for faith. The source for much of this is Thielman von Bracht's *Martyr's Mirror*, one of the monuments of Mennonite literature. The contact of the Mennonites and the Quakers is not overlooked, and the interesting story of the migration of German Mennonites into South Russia under Catherine II., and the later chiliastic exodus to Tashkend and Bokhara is well told.

The section devoted to the Mennonites in America is a reworking of Dr. Smith's earlier treatise on the *Mennonites in America*. Noting the casual Dutch Mennonites who came to New Amsterdam and settled in "Manhate", on Long Island, and on the New Jersey coast, the book proceeds to detail the first substantial colonization by Mennonites under Penn at Germantown, which owes its name to their coming. Step by step their expansion into Western Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia is traced and their experiences with the frontier Indians and during the Revolutionary War are related.

The founding of the United States, the land of freedom, with the guaranties of religious liberty and the separation of Church from State, offered a haven which the Mennonites of the Old World, long oppressed and now experiencing the conscription of the Napoleonic Wars, were quick to recognize. Accordingly the nineteenth century saw a steady stream of Mennonite immigrants proceeding to the American frontiers and subjecting new lands to cultivation and prosperity. Settlements found root chiefly in Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Oklahoma, Nebraska, Dakota, Minnesota; and in Ontario and Manitoba. The most extensive migration occurred in the seventies, when the descendants of the Mennonites who settled in Russia under Catherine II. were deprived of military exemption and came in hundreds to America and settled in Kansas, Nebraska, Minnesota, and Manitoba. Their important contribution in introducing Turkey hard wheat into the United States, which is related in one of the publications of the Department of Agriculture, has escaped Dr. Smith.

The final chapters of Dr. Smith's study are given over to special topics, such as Mennonite doctrine on Church and State, including their fate as conscientious objectors in all countries in the Great War, Mennonite schools and missions, literature and hymnology, and statistics. He also devotes a chapter to the significant attempt of the last decades to overcome the inherent tendency of Mennonitism to split up, and the two resultant conference-groups which now loosely unite the major portion of the sect. In this connection he gives two useful, but very poorly drawn, charts. There is a good bibliography, but no index, a regrettable omission in a work that deals with minutiae so complex and scattered.

The author of a history of his people may be expected to dwell on their achievements. Dr. Smith shows much moderation, by no means

making all the claims he has heard in his daily contacts. Few in numbers, a rural people except in the Netherlands, where they have exercised great power in mercantile lines and even upon the government, often exceedingly conservative in such external matters as dress, travel, and education, exclusive usually to such a degree as to refuse to hold office or to resort to civil courts—though always adhering to the injunction to submit to the authorities when not contrary to conscience—the Mennonites have nevertheless exercised an influence in conformity with the trend of civilization. From the beginning they advocated religious toleration, the separation of Church and State, and the congregational church system. Their influence on the establishment of the Baptist, Congregational, United Brethren, and Adventist denominations is part of history. George Fox, William Penn, and Robert Barclay in 1677 visited the Mennonite body in the Netherlands, then at least a century old, and though Quakerism arose independently, Barclay wrote: "So closely do these views correspond with those of George Fox, that we are compelled to view him as the unconscious exponent of the doctrine, practice, and discipline of the ancient and strict party of the Dutch Mennonites". To the Germantown Mennonites, too, belongs the credit of issuing the first recorded public protest in America against slavery. And the League of Nations, to end wars, is so obvious an endorsement of Mennonite fundamentals as to require no comment.

EDWARD KREHBIEL.

A History of France: from the Earliest Times to the Treaty of Versailles. By WILLIAM S. DAVIS, Ph.D., Professor of History in the University of Minnesota. (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company. 1919. Pp. xv, 642. \$4.00.)

CERTAIN peculiarities of Professor Davis's *History of France* are explained when one learns from the preface that it is an expansion of a popular narrative originally intended for the American troops in France, and that portions are paraphrases and summaries of standard French histories for secondary schools and of manuals like Rambaud's *Histoire de la Civilisation Française*. The result is well adapted to its purpose of interesting American readers by a non-technical account of the outlines of French history. A French critic would perhaps be shocked by the shifting proportions of the volume and especially by the brief treatment of the Middle Ages as compared with that of modern times. Professor Davis knows better, however, the desires of his countrymen, to most of whom France since the Revolution is more interesting than France under feudalism or even under Louis XIV. In consequence the history of the country down to Napoleon takes up the first half of the volume, and the second half deals with the nineteenth century to the armistice of 1918. The work seems, therefore, better suited in its completed form to individual students or to reading circles

than to college courses, where a more harmonious combination of the parts might be advisable.

Professor Davis has the knack of vivid and fluent narrative. The tale reads well and is interesting. The author makes the great figures of French history appear living, and has wisely preferred to emphasize the connection of history with important aspects of social life, such as art, letters, and institutions, rather than to stress the details of warfare and of field strategy.

The necessity for quick results in the composition of the volume is accountable for evidences of haste and for certain slips in nomenclature, by way of accents, which slips betray the writer not thoroughly at home in French. "Eventuated" (p. 86) and "quite a few" (p. 170) are more journalistic than soberly historical. "The nature of the monarchy and power of Louis XIV. have been set forth" (p. 170) is not the best way to begin a chapter. "For Napoleon III. to have refused to answer the challenge would have cost" (p. 498) is but one instance of Professor Davis's over-fondness for double past tenses. We read of Marie de Medici on page 131 and of Marie de Médicis on page 132. "Boutéville" (p. 137), "Abbéville" (p. 162), "Jerôme" (p. 347), "Uzés" (p. 550), and "Jaurés" (p. 586), testify, among other instances, to uncertainty with accents, as do "tricouleur" (p. 275) and "pays légale" (p. 421) to uncertainty with French. "Luson" (p. 134), "Gustine" (p. 312), and "Lacomte" (p. 514) may be misprints, but Loménie de Brienne should not be designated as "Archbishop of Brienne" (p. 239), and it is misleading to call Marshal Ney "Prince of Moscow" (p. 369), which would be in French *Prince de Moscou*, instead of his real title *Prince de la Moskowa*. The present republic was not finally acknowledged by a "so-called Walloon amendment" (p. 532) but by an amendment proposed by M. Wallon, and Molière may be a Gallic Aristophanes, but scarcely a "Gallican Aristophanes" (p. 173) any more than an ultramontane one.

Professor Davis has wisely concentrated his attention in recent French history to certain great events like Boulangism, the Dreyfus case, and the disestablishment of the Church, but the Panama scandal caused too much turmoil and bitterness in politics and finance, and forms too convenient a transition between Boulangism and the Dreyfus case, to be neglected.

C. H. C. WRIGHT.

English Economic History: Select Documents. Compiled and edited by A. E. BLAND, P. A. BROWN, and R. H. TAWNEY. (New York: Macmillan Company. 1919. Pp. xx, 730. \$2.25.)

PUBLISHED first in 1914, the present issue is merely the third impression and in appearance much inferior to the original. The field covered is from about 1000 A.D. to the corn-law debate of 1846. These

eight centuries and a half are divided into three periods, the middle one being from 1485 to 1660. Probably every student of English economic history has his own conception of what the middle period is, but only those not yet emancipated from political history would follow the editors of this volume in their choice. Within each period, the arrangement is topical. It is curious to note that while public finance is dealt with in the first and last periods, it is omitted in the middle period.

The selection of documents seems on the whole to have been carefully made. It is a bit unfortunate, however, that the very first document should be one of the most difficult in the whole book to interpret. But such a collection as this is made neither for continuous reading nor for immature students. The teaching of history to undergraduates by reading original documents presumably belongs to the days when professional historians failed to distinguish between research and teaching, and between graduate and undergraduate instruction.

The editors were misguided in publishing the customs document of 1302. It is quite long and was superseded a few months later by the document of 1303, the very next one in the book. The latter, the well-known *Carta Mercatoria*, is given the incorrect heading, "The Custom on General Imports". It really includes export as well as import duties, and is not confined to customs. The editors have followed precedent in printing the *Carta Mercatoria* from a later confirmation, rather than from a more accurate record on the contemporary Fine Rolls.

About twenty pages are devoted to "The Feudal Structure". Similar records can be found in readily accessible collections. The space so used might have been more profitably given up to manorial accounts which are not included at all, to the Hanseatic League entirely ignored, or to the Revolt of 1381 which is inadequately dealt with. The demands of the peasants both at Mile End and at Smithfield constitute one of the best commentaries on economic conditions in fourteenth-century England, but they find no place in this collection. Much space is taken up by selections from the well-known and easily accessible *Commonweal of this Realm of England*, while the regulations of 1565 concerning piracy and the corn trade, and the bounty acts of 1673 and 1689 are omitted.

All documents are given in English, regardless of the language of the originals. The difficulties of interpretation which the originals present are mostly solved in the translation. If the editors had put in brackets the original word after the English term in all cases of difficulty, the student would not have to go back to the original quite so frequently. Translation is interpretation; and when we read the word "interest", we want to know whether it really means interest or usury; similarly whether "slave" is really a slave or a serf, and "prisage" really prisage or modulation.

The editors have produced a useful and scholarly book and we are all grateful. It is to be hoped that the success of this work will induce

others to do the same for French, German, Italian, Dutch, and Spanish economic history. Perhaps this is the logical step after the new series *Handbuch der Wirtschaftsgeschichte* has been published. All single-volume collections covering so wide a field, however, should be regarded as pioneer efforts. They should be followed by more special collections. Whether these special collections should be on shorter periods or on certain topics is a question for debate. While a well-rounded collection of records confined to a certain period will show interrelations between various forces, an ample source-book devoted to one institution or kind of production, such as commercial association or manufacture, would show development from beginning to end, the genesis of history. The latter plan is coming to be the more useful, but at present it is more difficult because historical training tends toward the compartment treatment—ancient, medieval, and modern—and of course for the very good reason that it is (or seems to be) more feasible.

The service that the editors have done for the reader in providing him with a useful list of readings and commentaries on the subject and the contents of the documents, and also with explanatory foot-notes, must not be forgotten.

N. S. B. GRAS.

Poland the Unknown. Translated from the French of K. WALISZEWSKI. (London: William Heinemann, 1919; New York: George H. Doran Company, 1920. Pp. xiii, 263. \$2.25.)

M. WALISZEWSKI, already well known to the Western public through his long series of studies on Russia from Ivan the Terrible to Catherine II., returns in the present volume to the history of his own country. This is, however, by no means a narrative of Polish history, and it can scarcely be read with much profit by those who are not already familiar with that subject. It is rather an essay on the causes of the decline and fall of the old Polish state.

The literature available in Western languages on that grave but fascinating theme is mainly the work of German and Russian scholars or of others who derived their information or their ideas almost solely from them. These writers commonly proceed by first drawing a veritable caricature of old Poland, and then concluding that the nation deserved all that it has suffered: "Die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht", and people who are struck down by assassins invariably die of internal organic trouble. The Polish side of the case has seldom been heard, for Polish historians have rarely had the good fortune to be translated.

M. Waliszewski's book is largely a vigorous and effective polemic against the misrepresentations of Polish history so long and systematically inspired by Berlin and St. Petersburg. Unfortunately, his own views as to the causes of Poland's downfall are nowhere very concisely

summed up. In general, he ascribes comparatively little importance to constitutional factors, but lays great emphasis—too great in the opinion of the reviewer—upon the economic changes that took place at the close of the Middle Ages: the deflection of the old routes of European trade with the East, which, in the author's opinion, struck a fatal blow at the prosperity of the Polish cities, and reduced Poland to the rank of a poor, exclusively agricultural country, in which one class, the *Szlachta*, henceforth was bound to assume a monopoly of both power and responsibilities. This situation gave the political and economic structure of Poland too narrow a basis, and made demands upon the ruling class which, in spite of heroic efforts to "carry on", it proved unable to meet.

Nevertheless the author is obviously of the opinion that the chief cause of the ensuing catastrophe—in so far as that cause lay within Poland—was neither political nor economic but psychological. "In every stage of its career", he says, "the Polish people has been the conscious possessor, for good or evil, of a quality which differentiates it from all its neighbors, which marks it as an exception among the nations." But what this *quicquid unicum* is, the author does not very clearly state. Apparently, he discovers it in "a substratum, deeper than is found elsewhere, and more intact, of the Christian element" in the Polish character: a kind of transcendent idealism, a love of liberty, justice, and truth, which made Poland incapable of competing in the rough game of international politics with the rapacious, unscrupulous, militarist absolutist monarchies by which she was surrounded. In the Europe of the eighteenth century Poland appears to him like a "bewildered dove among birds of prey", or "a lamb struggling with wolves".

Such explanations and many others that might be cited may appear to be one-sided and inadequate, as is almost inevitable in view of the complexity of the subject; and the circumstances of the case and of the hour (the book was written towards the close of 1918) may serve to excuse a certain amount of patriotic exaggeration. The author may be criticized for great carelessness in the matter of names and dates; *e.g.*, one is introduced on page 184 to a Roman patriot named "Scylla"! But such faults by no means obscure the merits of a volume packed with ideas and vivaciously and often brilliantly written; a volume which should help materially to produce a more just appreciation of the cardinal factors in Poland's history and of the many original and highly creditable features of the old Polish state. In particular it may help to refute the still-current legend that the Poles have proved themselves historically to be incapable of independent political existence.

R. H. L.

Mediæval Heresy and the Inquisition. By A. S. TURBERVILLE, M.C., M.A., B.Litt., Lecturer in Modern History in the University College of North Wales, Bangor. (London: Crosby Lockwood and Son. 1920. Pp. vi, 264. 10 sh. 6 d.)

"THE aim of this book", says the author, "is to provide, within a short space, and primarily for the general reader, an account of the heresies of the Middle Ages and of the attitude of the Church towards them." Half the book, accordingly, is given to the story of the heresies, half to that of the Inquisition. But "its main concern is with doctrine, and for that reason chapters on Averrhoism and on Wiclifitism and Husitism have been included". Within these limits it is a useful little volume, easily and companionably written, with insight and with an evident purpose to be fair. It rests mainly on "H. C. Lea's immense work", but with much use of later books, especially of Catholic ones, and by no means without first-hand dipping into the sources.

Its limitations are perhaps best suggested by the ten-page "note on authorities" added at the end. "All that is attempted here", we are told, "is to give a select list of a few of the most useful, important and most easily accessible works"; but the list, though it contains both things rare and things unimportant, has serious lacunæ. For both heresy and the Inquisition it is, however, ample as a basis for this book; but for sorcery and witchcraft, to which a chapter is devoted, it is sadly inadequate and out of date. So, too, our author's critical acumen has limits. In the field of the Inquisition his personal study and his native shrewdness stand him in good stead; but when he quotes from Caesarius of Heisterbach (he calls him "Caesarius Heisterbach") the story of the heretics at Béziers and abbot Arnaud's "Kill them all, for the Lord knows his own", he can write like this: "The chronicler does not relate a fact, but tells a story, which may or may not be fact." Of course he tells a story, and of course the story may be gossip (Caesarius himself gives it only as a report—"fertur dixisse"); but who that has read the honest old monk's preface can doubt that he believes it fact? And, whether it be fact or no, is it nothing to the historian of the attitude of the Church toward heresy that a contemporary cleric, a fellow Cistercian, could tell to the novices of Heisterbach, and with naught but admiration, this utterance of the great abbot of their order; or that, embalmed thus in the most widely known collection of edifying anecdotes, it passed for centuries unquestioned and unblamed? Again, speaking of the Inquisition's use of torture, he makes the astounding statement that "torture had been known to both Roman and barbarian law, being used even for such minor offences as theft"; and in support of it his footnote cites "Tanon, p. 362". But what Tanon says is only that "torture, bequeathed by the Roman law to our tribunals, perhaps never completely disappeared from the practice of secular courts". Not a word about barbarian law. Only this about barbarian practice; and even for bar-

barian practice Tanon admits the evidence slight. He is, indeed, able to cite instances of its use, and one was in a case of theft; but the thief had stolen the treasure of a church, and the bishop had turned him over to the lay judge to be tortured. And how, asks Tanon, could secular justice have ceased to use this means of conviction, when it had never ceased to be in use in ecclesiastical courts—though forbidden by the canon law? But of this use, though Tanon devotes pages to its demonstration, our author makes no mention.

GEORGE L. BURR.

Records of the Social and Economic History of England and Wales.

Volume IV. *A Terrier of Fleet, Lincolnshire*, edited by Miss N. NEILSON, Ph.D., Mt. Holyoke College; *An Eleventh-Century Inquisition of St. Augustine's, Canterbury*, by the late ADOLPHUS BALLARD. (London: Published for the British Academy by Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press. 1920. Pp. lxxxv, 214; xxvii, 33. \$9.45.)

THE terrier of Fleet displays with exceptional fullness the economic organization of a Lincolnshire manor in the early years of the fourteenth century. It contains a survey of the tenements classified according to the nature of the tenure; another survey of them as they were located geographically; a rental; summary statement of special rents, services, or customs, such as the fees due from the salt-works on the manor; a number of charters, including two papal letters not listed by Potthast; records of judicial proceedings; and miscellaneous memoranda of the kind apt to find its way into cartularies of the period. The record is supplemented by documents illustrative of the type of manorial economy found in Fleet. These come from such diverse sources as the plea rolls, the ministers' accounts of the Duchy of Lancaster, the chancery miscellany, and monastic cartularies.

The text has been edited with great care, so far as the reviewer can judge without reference to the original. The reader, however, might reasonably expect from the editor more critical apparatus. Dates are generally left without identification, and the dates of some documents cannot be established without reference to manuscript sources. Extracts from the Cottonian manuscript Claudius C. xi, for example, are printed without indication of the date (pp. 168-170), though it is clear in the original that they form part of an inquisition made in 1277.

The manor of Fleet was located in the fen country, where the physical characteristics of the land produced peculiarities in the manorial organization. Miss Neilson's introduction is in large part a study of these exceptional aspects of manorial life. In two chapters she describes the customs which governed the common use of the different fens by the adjacent vills, giving her attention mainly to rights of pasture and turbary and to duties of maintaining dikes and drains. Her evidence,

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which is drawn almost entirely from manuscript sources, displays the system when the lords of manors possessed the wastes in legal theory; but the men of the villis still had rights which point to a "non-seignorial origin of the custom of intercommoning". In the third chapter she deals with the economic arrangements in Fleet and neighboring villis, treating the topography of the manor, the status of the tenants, among whom were freemen, molemen, werkmen, and Mondaymen, the condition of the demesne, the salt-works, and the customs with regard to assarts. A map of the manor and a map displaying the villis of the fen district as they were grouped for the purpose of intercommoning are nearly indispensable adjuncts of the treatise, though the latter is rendered difficult of use by the failure to distinguish rivers graphically from roads and dikes.

The work is a valuable addition to our knowledge of manorial economy in general. For the study of local conditions in the fen country it is of fundamental importance.

The inquisition of St. Augustine's is found in the cartulary of the monastery now preserved in the Public Record Office. Mr. Ballard edited it in parallel columns with extracts from the Exchequer Domesday. It is entitled *Exce(r)pta de compoto solingorum comitatus cancie secundum cartam regis videlicet ea quae ad ecclesiam sancti Augustini pertinent et est in regis domesday* (p. iii), and evidently bears some relation to Domesday Book. Both give the same information on many particulars, but one is not a copy of the other, and each contains some material not to be found in the other. The excerpts give some information, lacking in Domesday, which, in the opinion of the editor, indicates a greater local familiarity with the whole of east Kent than any one person was likely to have possessed. He argued, therefore, that the compotus of the sulungs, from which the Excerpts were taken, was not the work of one man, but was the returns from the hundreds from which Domesday Book was compiled. In other words the Excerpts have the same relation to Domesday Book as the Cambridge and Ely inquests. Another document known as the Domesday Monachorum, which is among the muniments of the dean and chapter of Canterbury, is similar in character to the Excerpts, but relates in the main to other estates. In the small portions where the two documents cover the same ground, the statistics from the three sources are printed in parallel columns. The significance of the new material is thoroughly explained in the introduction. Its chief value is the additional aid given to the interpretation of the Exchequer Domesday by the additions to and the variations from that text.

W. E. LUNT.

L'Intendant Tourny (1695-1760). Par MICHEL LHÉRITIER, Agrégé d'Histoire et de Géographie, Docteur ès Lettres. In two volumes. (Paris: Félix Alcan. 1920. Pp. xvi, 453; 607.)

THIS is one of those "lives" the interest of which derives not from the hero's character, but from his rôle; a biography of the sort that finds its justification not so much in the intrinsic worth of its subject, his moral or intellectual greatness, as in what might be termed his extrinsic importance, his activities and relations. The Marquis de Tourny, intendant of the Limousin, and later of Guyenne, was, undoubtedly, a man of large affairs; his official career, extending over thirty years, was crowded with feverish activity; he projected much, and achieved—less than he undertook, it is true, but still much, so much as to have entitled him to a meed of gratitude from his own generation, and of praise from those who, coming after, entered into his labors. But the Marquis de Tourny was not a *great* man. Not even the conscientious effort of M. Lhéritier can quite succeed in expanding him to heroic dimensions. He even falls short of the stature of an "administrative genius". He possessed a daring imagination, and conceived magnificent projects; he possessed inexhaustible energy, and threw himself into his enterprises with a vehemence almost torrential. But, like many another self-sure, strenuous, and indefatigable public servant (and Tourny was sincerely devoted to the public interest, as he understood it), he found in his very virtues the chiefest obstacles to his success. His imagination led him on to plan more than he could have executed in double the term of his intendency; and his impetuosity (what Turgot called "l'humeur impétueuse de M. de Tourny", vol. I., p. 171, n.), his impatience of delay and restraint, more than once betrayed him into hasty decision and precipitate and ill-advised action. A striking exhibition of this characteristic weakness is afforded by his fiscal measures in the Limousin. For the arbitrary *taille* he proposed to substitute the *taille tarifée* (the theory of which had been elaborated by the Abbé St. Pierre), a measure sound enough in itself, rational and equitable. But so great was his haste to erect the structure of reform, that he neglected to secure the foundation; his census and surveys were inaccurate and incomplete, so faulty that Turgot, coming twenty years later, had to make entirely new estimates and assessments (I. 371 ff.).

Moreover, Tourny himself constantly balked his own undertakings. His jealousy for his own authority, his imperious temper and peremptory manner, antagonized the objects of his paternal care, provoked resistance, and rendered willing co-operation impossible. He would be everything, all powers in one, and all at once. He knew what his province needed, and was determined to "serve it in spite of itself" (II. 13). He quarrelled with everybody in turn—the bishops of Limoges and Angoulême, the *jurats* of the cities, the Academy of Bordeaux (over the trifling matter of the location of a building), the governor of

Guienne, the Parlement of Bordeaux; he even incurred the reprimand of his chief, Machault. He ended by bringing his *généralité* almost to the point of revolt, and thus necessitating a recall that was but thinly cloaked under a nominally voluntary retirement. An administrator who generates friction can hardly be rated as a "genius".

Embittered, but self-confident to the last, Tourny refused to admit failure. History would vindicate him! "Vous me maudissez", he said to the stiff-necked, ungrateful Bordelais, "mais vos enfants me béniront" (II. 11, n.). And curse him they did, as "overbearing toward his inferiors, obsequious toward his superiors, arrogant, harsh, contentious"—the "Satrap of Guienne" (II. 347-348 and n.). Their children may not exactly "bless" his memory; but they have so far fulfilled his prophecy as to raise his monument, in token of their appreciation of his services, and their pride in his achievements. For Tourny did do much to place Bordeaux in his debt. He fostered its industry and encouraged its commerce; he improved its communications with the interior by great highways; he embellished it with noble avenues and imposing buildings. "Administrateur clairvoyant et un peu rude, créateur au génie profond et impérieux", was the judgment pronounced upon his work by the orator at the dedication of his statue (II. 565); "Terrible homme, en vérité, et qui aurait pu devenir un tyran, s'il n'avait été un grand bienfaiteur", says his biographer (II. 12).

As a contribution to the administrative history of the Old Régime, the work of M. Lhéritier is of immense value and cannot be too highly praised; as a biography, however, the portrait of a man, its merit is impaired by excessive length, faulty proportions, and surfeit of details.

THEODORE COLLIER.

The Journal of the Rev. John Wesley, A. M., Sometime Fellow of Lincoln College, Oxford. Enlarged from Original MSS., with Notes from Unpublished Diaries, Annotations, Maps, and Illustrations. Edited by NEHEMIAH CURNOCK, assisted by Experts. Volumes VII. and VIII. (London: Robert Culley; New York and Cincinnati: Abingdon Press. 1916. Pp. 528; 476, iv. \$21.00 for the eight volumes.)

THESE two volumes now under review bring to completion the latest edition of the *Journal* of John Wesley, the first six volumes of which were reviewed in the *American Historical Review* in January, 1916 (XXI. 346-348). It is very probable that no further work will ever need to be undertaken to bring together material relating to the life and career of John Wesley, for the editor—who died before the last volume was through the press—searched the world for Wesleyana.

The seventh and eighth volumes cover the closing years of the life of the Wesleys, 1789-1791. In 1784 John Wesley was eighty-four years of age, but still as active as ever, and his ceaseless travelling, preaching,

and writing he continues without interruption to within a few days of his death. He has now become one of the most conspicuous figures in the British world and is everywhere respected. Persecution has ceased and he is crowded with invitations to preach in the churches of the establishment, while clergymen of the Church of England frequently come to hear him (VII. 365). The habits of his long life continue as rigid as ever; he rises at four, as his Diary, now for the first time published, invariably shows, and each moment of the day is filled with serious duties. Indeed the most remarkable thing about John Wesley was this ability to keep at his task through the stirring years of a long life.

Wesley's chief concern in 1784 was the organization of American Methodism. The authority of the English ecclesiastical law had ceased in America and Wesley was anxious to perpetuate the American societies. Meanwhile the Americans were demanding the sacraments, for none of their preachers were ordained men and they had been depending upon the Church of England for the ordinances. This situation led Wesley to ordain several preachers especially for America and to send them across the Atlantic to organize a separate American church. (See portraits of early Methodist oversea pioneers, VII. 301.) This was done without the knowledge or advice of Charles Wesley, who was always a staunch churchman. Later Wesley ordained preachers for Scotland, though he never ordained men for England. Soon there were accusations that he had separated from the Church of England, and Charles was greatly disturbed about his ordinations, but John Wesley steadfastly denied any intention of separation, though he did admit that he varied somewhat from the Church. (See Tyerman, *Life and Times of John Wesley*, III. 636.) One reading these last journals can readily see, however, that separation was bound to come just as soon as Wesley was removed from the direction of the societies.

It is interesting to note with how many reform movements Wesley was directly or indirectly connected. It was during these latter years of his life that the Sunday-school movement was begun in England, largely inaugurated by the Methodists, and always with the heartiest approval of Wesley. In the *Arminian Magazine* for 1784 Wesley writes "An Account of the Sunday Charity School, lately begun in various parts of England", and there is frequent mention in the *Journal* of the schools at Leeds, Manchester, and other places. Wesley gave encouragement and endorsement to the work of John Howard, whom he characterizes as "one of the greatest men in Europe" (*Journal*, VII. 295). Throughout all the latter years of his life he never lost an opportunity of striking at slavery. We find him announcing that he would preach on slavery, at Bristol in 1788 (VII. 359), when the "house from end to end was filled with high and low, rich and poor". It is a striking fact that Wesley's last letter was addressed to Wilberforce; in it occurs this sentence, "Go on in the name of God and in the power of his might, till even American slavery, the vilest that ever saw the sun, shall vanish away before it" (Tyerman, III. 650; *Journal*, VIII. 128).

Space will not permit further reference to these volumes other than to say that the high standard of scholarship and mechanical make-up of the earlier volumes has been maintained throughout the entire eight. Volume VIII. contains, besides the last two years of the journal and diaries, several important letters and an extensive general index.

WILLIAM W. SWEET.

The Skilled Labourer, 1760-1832. By J. L. HAMMOND and BARBARA HAMMOND. (London and New York: Longmans, Green, and Company. 1920. Pp. ix, 403. \$4.50.)

THIS is the third volume of a trilogy. *The Village Labourer*, *The Town Labourer*, and *The Skilled Labourer* are all written on the same general subject, on the same period (1760-1832), from the same viewpoint, and by the same authors. Together they comprise a magnificent and authoritative treatment of the Industrial Revolution in its early and mid-career.

On that account it is impossible to review adequately *The Skilled Labourer* apart from the two preceding volumes, and this is the more true, not only because this book completes the trilogy, but also because in a peculiar sense it is a supplement to the second volume, *The Town Labourer*—more, indeed, a series of detailed and voluminous foot-notes, illustrating principles laid down in the latter book, than a separate entity in itself. Whoever attempts to read *The Skilled Labourer* without an acquaintanceship with *The Town Labourer* is speedily at sea. Detail follows detail in minute and intricate profusion. Generalization is but rarely met with, and, despite the logical sequence and charm of style which is characteristic of the authors, a sense of confusion and disappointment will inevitably result when this book is taken by itself.

The documentary material so freely drawn on by the authors is devoted primarily to one thing—to illustrating how the miner, the cotton weaver, the wool worker, and the artisan in the knitting trade acted when confronted by the social complexities resulting from the introduction of machinery. The mental reaction of these workingmen has already been described by the authors in the superb chapters of their *Town Labourer* devoted to the mind, the defences, and the ambitions of the poor. In this book they analyze simply the organization of the artisans and their uphill fight in constant competition with power machinery to better, or at least to maintain, their social and economic status.

This story is not new: but the full and authoritative account of it is, and the historian may here find source-material for which he might otherwise search many weary months. And herein lies the especial value of this book; it is a source-book in which we may fully trace the disasters which befell the old handicraftsman and his ultimate nemesis at the hands of the new God of the Nineteenth Century, machine production.

The closely packed pages of this book are devoted somewhat narrowly to this one theme. Problems such as those of child and woman labor, factory laws, the new town life, etc., are treated in the earlier volume, *The Town Labourer*. Except for some preliminary pages devoted to the coal miners and some forty-odd more at the end of the book given over to the work of a government spy, this is the book's principal theme.

In these latter pages the historian will find demonstrated what he has long ago suspected. Many riots and revolutionary disturbances in the Midlands and in Yorkshire owed their origin to agents of the government who attempted to draw the poor artisans into doing overt acts against the authorities. The chiefest of these, one Oliver, owed his downfall to his own ambition. He sought for more important prey, attempted to stir up trouble among the manufacturers, was caught red-handed by the *Leeds Mercury*, exposed and then deposed through the agency of that powerful journal. And with this exposé the book ends.

The authors have done their work well. One wishes that they might have been a little less liberal, in the more technical sense of that word, in their attitude toward the ruling classes of the early nineteenth century. After all, the tory squirearchy which put through the war against Napoleon did save England, and in their defense it might be urged that the more immediate emergency justified harsh suppression of dissent and revolt. The "binding" of the miners for the work of the new year was, after all, a species of contract, and there was something to be said for its enforcement. The destruction of machinery was to a considerable extent instigated by *agents provocateurs*; but it is also true that a general spirit of lawlessness characterized the country at that period, and anyone who studies carefully the minutes of the British Convention in Howell's *State Trials* may well come to the conclusion that a real revolution confronted Britain at the end of the eighteenth century. Furthermore, miserable as was the condition of the skilled artisans, one important fact has apparently escaped the notice of the authors. The actual construction of power machines which displaced the skilled craftsman called into being a new class of mechanics who made and repaired the new tools of production. The hand-weaver descended in the economic scale, but the mechanic rose. The making of tools speedily became a great industry in itself, calling for new adaptabilities and inventiveness, so the net social loss of the working class was considerably lessened.

The Skilled Labourer is, therefore, slightly biased in its findings. Product of the new liberal school so ably led by Hobson and Hobhouse, it cannot help offering a stimulating and fresh outlook on the past; perhaps, inferentially, it cannot avoid its anti-conservative bias. To expect that would be to look for the millenium. As it is, these three books by J. L. and Barbara Hammond cover this important period of British industrial history with amazing thoroughness.

WALTER P. HALL.

The Lebanon in Turmoil, Syria and the Powers in 1860: Book of the Marvels of the Time concerning the Massacres in the Arab Country by Iskander Ibn Ya'qūb Abkārīūs. Translated and annotated and provided with an Introduction and Conclusion by J. F. SCHELTEMA, M.A., Ph.D. (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1920. Pp. 203. \$6.50.)

THE appearance of this volume is peculiarly timely. On September 1, 1920, General Gouraud proclaimed in Beyrout the creation of the new state of Greater Lebanon, including that city and other coast-towns, with autonomous administration under the French mandate. The story of Iskander Abcarius deals with one chapter in the history of the Lebanon which terminated with the French occupation of 1860-1861. In a concluding paper Dr. Scheltema brings the history of the Lebanon down to the early days of the Armistice. He describes the Charter of the Lebanon, drawn up by the International Commission in 1861 (emended in 1864) by which the Mountain was recognized as an autonomous state under Turkish suzerainty, but with a Christian governor under the protection of the Powers. He shows how this constitution was violated during the Great War by the appointment of Moslem Turks to the position of governor and how Turkish rule came to an end with the Entente occupation of Syria in October, 1918.

Iskander Abcarius, the Armenian writer of the Arabic manuscript, here translated by Dr. Scheltema, was born in Beyrout, where for some time he acted as vice-consul for the United States of America. Writing as a Christian he dwells on the undoubted atrocities of the Druzes, in their war against the Maronites, but Dr. Scheltema points out in his foreword that "whoever reads between the lines . . . will become convinced of the underlying verity that the calamity which in 1860 befell the Christians of the Lebanon, and in particular the Maronites, was largely, if not wholly, of their own making". This conclusion is amply sustained by Colonel Churchill in his book, *The Druzes and the Maronites*. He winds up his account of the first war in 1841—a war of which the conflicts of 1845 and 1860 were but the continuation—with this statement: "Thus ended a conflict, induced in the first instance by the grasping ambition and bigoted intolerance of the Maronite Patriarch, engaged in by the Druzes with all the desperation of a people struggling for their nationality, and lashed into fury by the Turks." The importance of this passage appears to have been overlooked by Dr. Scheltema, who regards Churchill as having a bias in favor of the Christians. Colonel Churchill had intimate relations with both parties. He married the daughter of a Maronite emir, and, as he told the father of the reviewer, he planned the campaign for the Druzes in which they took the Christian town of Zahleh! It was the savagery of the Druzes in the war of 1860 that naturally awoke his sympathy for their victims.

The reviewer finds a certain bias in the florid narrative of Abcarius,

notwithstanding his declaration that he had been particular in the selection of his material, "endeavoring to sift it carefully". His allusions to the treatment of women by the Druzes are not in harmony with their theory of warfare, nor, according to American residents in the Lebanon at the time of the massacres, with their practice. We may add that Dr. Scheltema in his extended introduction rightly emphasizes the baleful influence of foreign interference in the affairs of the Lebanon—the French acting as patrons of the Maronites; the British, of the Druzes.

In his foreword the editor and translator apologizes "for not utilizing some documents which the war kept out of our reach". This apology is significant of the editor's meticulous scholarship, so abundantly illustrated in a wealth of foot-notes, in which geographical, historical, and political allusions are interpreted by reference to diplomatic correspondence; to reports in the press, contemporary with the events; to periodical magazines; to accounts of travellers, etc., etc. This valuable contribution to scholarship made by Dr. Scheltema lacks nothing but an index.

FREDERICK JONES BLISS.

A Monograph on Plebiscites, with a Collection of Official Documents. By SARAH WAMBAUGH. [Publications of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of International Law.] (New York: Oxford University Press. 1920. Pp. xxxv, 1088. \$5.00.)

MISS WAMBAUGH's timely and painstaking study of certain formal expressions of self-determination involving changes of sovereignty is an exceedingly valuable addition to the stock of definitely sifted and organized historical material available for a better informed and perhaps more reasonable disposition of international problems. Her work presents a brief historical summary of the theory and practice of plebiscites, followed by a detailed examination of the plebiscites of the French Revolutionary period—Avignon and the Comtat Venaissin (1791), Savoy (1792), Nice, the Belgian communes, the Rhine valley (1793), Mülhausen and Geneva (1798), those of the period 1814–1870 in Italy (1848–1870), in Moldavia and Wallachia (1857), in the Ionian islands (1863), in the islands of St. Thomas and St. John (1868), the proposals connected with the Schleswig question from 1848, and finally those of the period from 1871 to 1914 in St. Bartholomew (West Indies, 1877), the proposals associated with the Tacna-Arica question from 1883, and in the separation of Sweden and Norway (1905). Some thousand pages of documentary evidence offer substantial justification for the conclusions presented in the text of the monograph.

A somewhat more elaborate and comprehensive consideration of the theory of self-determination might well have prefaced so considerable an undertaking. Admirable as the introductory summary is, it is too

condensed and compact to be entirely satisfying. The growth of the doctrine of the plebiscite and its place in various schools of political thought is sketched, and the difficulties of practical application are indicated, but the discussion of these interesting matters hardly more than broaches the possibilities of the subject. The reader would surely appreciate a more expansive and pertinent development of the actual problems involved, along the lines suggested by the incisive exposition of Haskins in his *Tasks and Methods of the Peace Conference*. (Haskins and Lord, *Some Problems of the Peace Conference*, pp. 13 ff.)

Each plebiscite is treated minutely and judiciously, with some attention to the historical background and the general interests concerned; the qualifications for voting, the methods of polling, and the approximate justice of the results are described adequately. Questions of fraud, undue pressure, and the quality of the supervision at the polls are examined discriminatingly and without bias. In cases where there is no proof for the establishment of a definite conclusion the author sensibly proffers a working hypothesis. The documents are reproduced in the language of origin, with English translations where the original is foreign, in parallel columns. The selection is, in some instances, rather too much confined to official records wherein are contained the more formal pronouncements, attestations, or minutes. Necessary as these may all be in the interests of precision or completeness, they cannot convey the meaning or vitality which exists in many unofficial but nevertheless responsible and representative *ex parte* statements. Factors of motive and desire as well as of form deserve documentation.

National self-determination has been opposed, in theory, by those who have maintained that it has no place in international law, who do not admit the "expediency of leaving to a vote by universal suffrage a question of such importance as sovereignty", who believe that it violates the principle of the rule of the majority—leaving the minority the right of practical secession—and that it may deprive the conqueror of the fruits of victory. It has been deprecated, in practice, on the ground that a bare and possibly evanescent majority might determine an important decision, that it is subject to undue pressure and fraud, and that, actually, plebiscites have been "merely an unnecessary ratification of a *fait accompli*". These objections the author rather effectively refutes, explaining moreover that they have generally disappeared with the development of a new political philosophy and a new international outlook. Further difficulties are, of course, to be expected; it is not easy to establish definite lines with respect to the desires and ambitions of comparatively small minorities.

With the passing of the generation of statesmen who supported it, the principle of self-determination appears to have entered a sort of "academic retirement" from which it was rescued, minus its nineteenth-century prestige, by the war. If it did not, however, accomplish all that was hoped in the last century, it must not be forgotten that inherent

in the experiences with the plebiscites lay the positive value of the introduction and development of the idea and the creation of precedent.

Such thoughts, it is not unreasonable to assume, account in part for the spirit of some of the terms of the Versailles treaty. For however inadequate the detailed provisions of that settlement respecting self-determination may be, there is indubitable evidence of sincerity of purpose in the various efforts to apply the principle of the plebiscite in a full, free, and honest adjustment of cases where the proper residence of sovereignty is doubtful. Further information about these most important experiments will be afforded, it is to be hoped, in studies similar to the excellent monograph under review.

LAURENCE BRADFORD PACKARD.

D'Une Guerre à l'Autre: Essai sur la Politique Extérieure de la Troisième République, 1871-1914. Par CHRISTIAN SCHEFER. (Paris: Félix Alcan. 1920. Pp. xi, 371. 12 fr.)

THIS remarkably interesting and valuable book by Professor Schefer, of the École des Sciences Politiques, is modestly described as an essay. The author holds that for many years to come, in the strict sense of the word, no history of the foreign affairs of the Third Republic can be written. Lack of perspective and the absence of much of the necessary evidence, he thinks, will make such an undertaking impossible.

He has written, nevertheless, as befits an historical scholar. Careful examination of the book, from the standpoint of accuracy in statement of facts, shows that the author, while giving no citations of evidence, has been as scrupulously accurate as the most exacting would require. While not concealing his own sympathies, when handling controversial topics, he is almost invariably tolerant and fair-minded. His estimates of the leading personalities, especially of Ferry, Freycinet, Hanotaux, and Delcassé, though expressed only in the form of brief comments of an incidental character, constitute a notable feature of the book. They are discriminating, sympathetic, and informing.

The ten chapters into which the book is divided depict the foreign policy of the Third Republic as falling into four well-defined periods. The first lasted from 1871 to 1879. It was for France a time of self-effacement, that policy being forced upon the country by the need for recovery from the disaster of the Franco-Prussian War, uncertainty about its form of government, and the pessimistic outlook of the monarchists who in the main directed the foreign policy. The second, 1879 to 1892, was a period of rehabilitation effected through the acquisition of a new colonial empire. This was the work of the Republicans when newly arrived at power. It was accomplished despite serious blundering in regard to Egypt, but it entailed a prolonged and unfortunate misunderstanding with England. Credit for the great result achieved belongs chiefly to Ferry. In the third period, 1892 to 1905, the balance

of power in Europe, which had been destroyed by the Franco-Prussian War, was restored by the creation of the Franco-Russian alliance and the development of the Entente Cordiale. The final period, 1905 to 1914, was a time of continued German aggression, developing through a series of crises into the catastrophe of 1914.

In only one important point do I find any ground for adverse criticism. But the one is very serious. As a Francophile of long standing I am profoundly impressed with the belief that at this critical time it is highly desirable that everybody, but Americans in particular, should get a correct conception of the real character of French diplomacy, both past and present. Such knowledge means increased respect and sympathy for France. I very much fear, however, that Professor Schefer's book, despite its admirable qualities, will impart to many of its readers, particularly to Americans, an entirely erroneous impression, one which the author certainly did not intend to convey. The impression to which I allude will come from the general tone of the book.

It would not be strictly accurate to describe the tone of the book as chauvinistic or even imperialistic. But it has that appearance. It is exactly the tone which has led many Americans, even among those who know a good deal about France and are most friendly to her, to believe that the French have been, since 1871, chauvinistic and imperialistic. The holders of this erroneous belief fail to perceive that this tone is often, as with Professor Schefer, more a form of expression than a reflection of the true thought of those who employ it.

Professor Schefer's comment upon the retirement of Delcassé in 1905 (pp. 267-271) affords an example of the tone which seems to me so unfortunate. It was well, he holds, that Delcassé was forced to retire. The reason given, however, is not because he was insisting upon a course of action which would lead to war, when, as the sequel showed, war could be avoided, but because he took that stand at a time when the army was not ready. Here, as elsewhere, it seems to me that Professor Schefer fails, in tone if not in substance, to appraise at its true worth a cardinal feature of French life under the Third Republic, one which has controlled at critical moments the foreign policy of the country. Without adopting the fallacies of the pacifists, though a good many Frenchmen went dangerously far in that direction, the French people were determined that peace should be preserved as long as possible, even if it did sometimes involve some loss of prestige and some yielding of things to which France felt that she had full right. This policy made France a unit in 1914 and won for her first the sympathy and finally the aid which enabled her to survive the terrible strain of the World War. The policy was fully justified by its results. Professor Schefer subscribes to the doctrine, but frequently fails, or seems to fail, to apply it.

FRANK MALOY ANDERSON.

A Short History of the Great War. By A. F. POLLARD, M.A., Litt.D., Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford, Professor of English History in the University of London. (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Howe. 1920. Pp. viii, 411. \$3.25.)

ALREADY a number of histories of the Great War have appeared, some of them in many volumes, others professing to be "brief" accounts. Prefaces and reviews comment on the difficulty of the task at this early date, before the great mass of official documents is available, and particularly before the facts from the enemy point of view are better known. In the meantime however it is decidedly worth while to attempt some general survey, and more than ample material for a substantially accurate picture is at hand.

Somewhere between the hastily compiled, profusely illustrated, picturesque, and anecdotal sets to be sold on the installment plan on the one hand, and the hopelessly detailed and technical military histories on the other, one looks to the professional historians for accounts of the years since 1914 which shall picture and at the same time interpret the tremendous movements which have convulsed the world. In such accounts large space must of necessity be given to campaigns and battles and purely military matters; but equally ample space should be given to the political and economic and psychological forces and developments which in large measure determined the military outcome.

In turning to Professor A. F. Pollard's *A Short History of the Great War* for such a broad and balanced picture of the events of the last six years one is somewhat disappointed. The book is almost entirely an account of military and naval movements, though there are of course incidental references to, and even brief discussions of, other topics. An introductory chapter deals with the outbreak of the war, and the last pages summarize and discuss the peace settlement. Junker precipitation of the war is ascribed to fear of socialism at home. While some of the details of the settlement are criticized, its great positive achievements are emphasized. Throughout the body of the book such topics as the economic organization of the nations for war, internal political struggles, the conflict between the military and the civil authorities—for instance, in Germany, that over the submarine campaign and the Russian peace—the diplomatic duels to secure the support of wavering neutrals, the working of the blockade, the various peace proposals and moves, and the attitude of the United States, are all given very brief treatment. One cannot criticize the author for not doing what he obviously does not set out to accomplish. But for the general reader, and particularly for a college class, a volume on the plan of Hayes's *Brief History of the Great War* seems distinctly more useful. Incidentally, the lack of bibliography and notes is somewhat against Pollard as a text-book. Some of the maps would be more useful if they contained the conventional marks indicating the position and movements of the troops engaged.

Simply as an account of military events however the volume leaves something to be desired. Rather too much space is given to details, and not quite enough to fundamental questions of topography, tactics, and strategy. There are a number of excellent summaries of events and expositions of situations and discussions of objects and criticisms of strategy; but not infrequently the attention is distracted from fundamentals by the information that "the Germans encircling Ciechanow found themselves encircled at Prasnysz", or that "a battery of Royal Horse Artillery was almost wiped out". The campaigns in Germany's African possessions are given a disproportionate amount of space. Judicious condensation would have made it possible to amplify the discussion of the original French-British plans, the numbers and advantages of the opposing forces, the theories of war of the various general staffs, the developments in tactics evolved by either side, and the like. The accounts of the war by such writers as Belloc and Simonds may perhaps be criticized by military experts, but they have the merit of making clear the general principles and primary objectives, and the average reader, in spite of his newspaper education during the war, needs this kind of information.

In spite however of what the book does not contain—and one cannot say everything in four hundred pages—the volume is well worth reading. Its tone is temperate and judicial, though there is an undercurrent of criticism of the Lloyd George coalition government. Except for the paragraphs in which one gets lost in a tangle of place-names, the account of events is clear and interesting.

ARTHUR P. SCOTT.

The Victory at Sea. By Rear-Admiral WILLIAM SOWDEN SIMS, U. S. N., Commander of the American Naval Forces operating in European Waters during the Great War, in collaboration with Burton J. Hendrick. (Garden City and New York: Doubleday, Page, and Company. 1920. Pp. xiii, 410. \$5.00.)

THIS is a very interesting book carrying with it a comprehensive and intelligent description of the submarine and anti-submarine warfare of the late war, and is by far the best yet made known to the world.

It is especially in this respect of great historical and professional value, as it treats in a continuously progressive manner, technically correct, as well as illuminating, of the wonderful development of the campaign against the submarine, in the great trade routes and waters, converging about the British Isles. It states clearly the successive steps taken to avoid and counteract the German submarine warfare which at one time seemed to be on the point of success.

The concentration of shipping and transport in the narrow seas about Great Britain and Ireland afforded the salient objective for the sub-

marine of the Germans. The importance of this objective grew with the increased necessity for food and munition supply, for raw materials, for manufacture of supplies essential to the success of the war, and above all in latter days, for the safe transport of men and material from the United States both before and after our country had entered fully into the Great War.

It was fortunate for us that we had an officer of high rank, and especial experience, like Admiral Sims, available for the duty for which he was detailed practically as the head of naval affairs of this country in London, the natural centre of naval operations in European waters. Of untiring energy, his personality and accomplishments were well known to the British Admiralty circles, and as a *persona grata* he had little difficulty in establishing relations and co-ordinating his efforts with those of the British naval officials toward the common end.

After establishing himself in London and taking over the duties of naval attaché to our embassy, he directed his efforts to securing from home the necessary vessels for the anti-submarine war. The first squadron of destroyers under Taussig soon arrived at Queenstown and the others of all classes followed at varying intervals. As they came they were distributed to the various bases in the British Isles under the British commanders-in-chief, thus preventing divided effort and loss of power. In the meantime American officers of high rank had been placed in command of various bases on the French Atlantic coast, at Gibraltar, and elsewhere in the Mediterranean. There was also a division of battle-ships under Admiral Slidell Rodgers of the convoying force which with the convoying forces in general on the European side was under Sims's directions.

Sims was however a naval administrator in his duties and not afloat as a commander-in-chief or as a fighter. Practically he was chief of operations as well as commander of the American naval forces operating in European waters. Rodman's squadron became a unit of the Grand Fleet under Admiral Beatty, though the internal matters still vested with Rodman. The position of a naval officer in a fighting command is very well differentiated from that of general by Lord Fisher when he says, "The general is somewhere behind the fighting line or ought to be. The admiral has got to be *in* the fighting line or he ought to be." Though Sims did not get afloat or in the fighting line, he served his country at his post, with remarkable fidelity and efficiency.

In his dispatch to the Navy Department dated June 19, 1917, Sims says, "As reported by cable dispatch, the British government has definitely reached the decision to put the convoy system into operation as far as it goes. . . . The British Navy is already strained beyond its capacity, and I therefore urgently recommend that we co-operate, at least to the extent of handling convoys from New York." We did co-

operate and with eminent success. This seems to be the beginning of the convoy system.

The personal narrative of Admiral Sims, his personal touch, as it were, as it occurs in various parts of the book, is spirited and interesting, but the most valuable and historical part of the volume before us is the history and description of the methods of attack by the German submarines and the various measures taken in the counter-attack and overcoming of these operations. These measures, stated more or less progressively, were, the arming of the merchantmen, zigzagging in the courses followed, the patrolling of the destroyers, the use of depth-bombs, the formation of convoys, the employment of mystery ships, which were disguised merchantmen, the use of the subchasers, and later and more successfully the employment of the allied submarines, aeroplanes, and hydroplanes.

Apparently the progress of the war developed ultimately that the most deadly enemy of the German submarine was the submarine itself. Absolutely the destroyers scored more heavily because they outnumbered any other craft, but relatively the submarine proved more successful. Of the vessels engaged, the allied destroyers, about 500 in number, sank 34 German submarines with gun-fire and depth-charges, though auxiliary patrol craft, such as trawlers, yachts, subchasers, and other light craft, numbering about 3000, sank 31 submarines; while the allied submarines, about 100 in number, sank 20 submarines.

The most striking story of the book is that of the mystery ship *Dunraven* under the command of Captain Gordon Campbell of the British Navy. The last fight and the last days of the *Dunraven* and the heroism exhibited by her commander and her crew are I believe unequalled anywhere in naval warfare. It reflects the greatest credit, not only upon those immediately concerned, but also upon the British naval service as well as the nation of which it is a part.

But the history of this submarine campaign, largely carried on by the young men of both services, British and American, of enlisted and commissioned rank, should be a cause of great pride and satisfaction to their respective countrymen and make them realize that the sea-instinct of the race only needs opportunity to show that it is as splendid as ever, exhibited as well whether they fight separately or unitedly as natural allies afloat.

Some Problems of the Peace Conference. By CHARLES HOMER HASKINS and ROBERT HOWARD LORD. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press; London: Humphrey Milford. 1920. Pp. xii, 307. \$3.00.)

IN this volume the authors present in print the lectures delivered by them at the Lowell Institute in January, 1920, on the territorial settlement of Europe determined by the Peace Conference. Professor Has-

kins contributes the first four chapters, on Tasks and Methods of the Conference, Belgium and Denmark, Alsace-Lorraine, the Rhine and the Saar; Professor Lord, in the last four chapters, treats Poland, Austria, Hungary and the Adriatic, the Balkans.

The book aims "to give a rapid survey of the principal elements" in the territorial settlement, and is, so far as my information extends, the first of its kind to appear. It will not be the last, by any means, but at this early date it sets a standard of workmanship which should discourage rivalry by authors less well prepared, and should save the public from much printing that its publication has made unnecessary. Professor Haskins was the responsible adviser and delegated representative of the American Peace Commission on the problems that he discusses. Professor Lord had a similar position in matters relating to the Polish settlement, and was in close touch with problems in other parts of the field that he covers. Both authors write, therefore, with an intimate knowledge of the facts, as these were prepared for the use of the American Commission, and as they developed in the course of the Peace Conference. It was their task to select from their abundant material the facts which appeared to them to show most clearly the nature of the problems; to discuss the various possible solutions; and to indicate what in their opinion will be the outcome of the settlement. They have accomplished their task with notable success. They make no appeal to the taste for the sensational. They present a volume packed close with information. Yet they show so clearly the relations of the facts that they hold the attention, and though their personal convictions are often apparent they treat the questions so candidly that they win the confidence of the reader. The book assumes, what we must devoutly hope to be the case, that the American public is really interested in those questions; and it offers to satisfy their demand not only with good matter but in an admirable manner. Bibliographical notes, appended to each chapter, are excellent; six maps inserted to illustrate the territorial problems are well enough designed, but technically are not well executed.

The plan of the work sets on it two important limitations. In the first place the book, having been prepared for delivery in the form of lectures to a general audience, is necessarily brief in proportion to the importance of the topics discussed. Occasionally the reader gets a glimpse of the elaborate studies on which the considerations relating to the settlement were based. As a rule the authors renounce the use of detailed arguments and present only a summary of the elements in the problem. In the second place, they do not feel free to describe the course of the negotiations, to indicate the attitude of the various powers that were party to them, and to estimate the share that each had in shaping the final result. In respect, therefore, both to extent and to content, the book leaves much to be contributed to the subject in the future, by the present authors or by other scholars. It does provide what is most

needed at this time, a well-informed and fair-minded sketch of the background and of the probable issue of the territorial settlement.

One noteworthy contribution of the book is the first chapter on Task and Methods of the Conference. There have been many misleading accounts, written by those who knew nothing about it, of the manner in which decisions were reached, and the public has thereby been seriously prejudiced against the settlement. It is high time that the facts were known, as they are set forth here. Professor Haskins's description of the way in which territorial questions were handled makes clear, at least, that they were soberly and carefully studied by commissions of specialists, that the findings of these commissions provided the basis on which decisions were reached by the heads of states, and that serious departures from the recommendations of commissions were rare. Selfishness and chicanery were found in this as in most gatherings of a humbler sort, but the dominant motive of the Conference was the demand for a peace that would satisfy the requirements of justice and would therefore stand the test of time.

Another part of this first chapter discusses the elements of boundary-making, the factors to be weighed in determining the line dividing two groups. Professor Haskins classifies these factors under two heads, geographic and ethnographic, and under the former head treats natural features (mountains, seas, rivers), and natural resources. I must confess to sharing the feeling of a delegate on one of the commissions who protested that an appeal to geography appeared to him absolutely irrational, that boundaries were made to serve human interests, and that nature could look after herself. Indirectly, of course, the natural environment has enormous influence in restricting and shaping the activities of a group, but to accept it as an immediate factor, rather than to analyze its effects and to combine with it such artificial factors as railroads, appears to me to put too high a premium on the study of contour maps, to discourage unduly the study of the technical and economic conditions on which the relations of people immediately depend. For "natural" resources, again, I should substitute "economic" resources. Coal or iron ore is always the same thing to the chemist, but it is a very different thing in economic importance, according to the stage of the arts, and its relative scarcity compared to the existing demand of a particular group. This plea, for the repression of dogmatic geography, and the analysis of geographic factors only in their directly human bearings (military, economic, and so forth), is thoroughly satisfied by the treatment accorded specific territorial questions in the course of the book.

In reading the chapters on the different boundary problems, which make up the greater part of the book, it is profitable to keep in mind this introductory discussion of the elements of boundary-making. One realizes then the endless variety of the problems presented. Against any line some sound objection could be urged. The task was not merely

to resist demands which were believed to be unjust; the hardest task was to decide between just claims in conflict. The variety and complexity of the individual territorial problems forbids any attempt here to summarize the discussion of them in the book.

There are some details to which I should take exception. While it is true as stated on page 33 that "No one could determine in advance . . . just how much of an indemnity Germany could pay", it is certain that one could determine how much Germany could *not* pay (*cf.* pp. 49, 142); and it seems to me unfortunate to base the League of Nations even in part on the particular form of the economic settlement. The book abounds in evidence of other and stronger reasons for the League. After one author has used the term "race" in its proper sense the other author can scarcely justify himself, even by a foot-note, in using the term "in its popular sense, as virtually equivalent to 'people' or 'nation'". In what period was it that Fiume's "commercial relations were mainly with Italy"? The most recent maps show not one (p. 260) but two narrow-gauge railroads from the interior to the Dalmatian coast. And from the view (p. 279) that the balance of evidence favors the claims of the Greeks to the Koritza district of Albania, I must dissent emphatically. To recount such details is, however, merely another suggestion of my conviction that the book as a whole is sound.

CLIVE DAY.

BOOKS OF AMERICAN HISTORY

The United States: an Experiment in Democracy. By CARL BECKER, Professor of Modern European History in Cornell University. (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1920. Pp. 333. \$2.50.)

THE purpose of this interesting volume is to present some of the main experiences of America as a democracy—or, more properly speaking, the experiences and strivings of a society taking more or less seriously the burdens and hopes of democratic theory and practice. Some portions are historical in the ordinary sense of the word, giving actual events and the emergence of principles or hopes and aspirations; considerable space is allotted to discussion and comment, and the value of the book must largely depend on the wisdom with which facts and tendencies are chosen and on the wisdom with which they are commented upon. The philosophic discussion—plain, simple, but by no means unlearned—is the product of reflection on American history and on American society as the author has seen and known it. These interpretations and reflective comments are well worth reading by the specialist and ought to be very helpful to the general reader. Such chapters as those on Democracy and Free Land, Democracy and Immigration, Democracy and Education, Democracy and Equality, perhaps especially the last, have distinct value.

The work is so admirable in many respects that the reviewer has a natural reluctance about calling attention to inaccuracies and careless statements. It is easy to make mistakes, indeed very difficult to avoid them entirely even in a short and rather cursory treatment; but it must be said, I fear, that the author has allowed himself more than his fair share of errors. The most serious single fault is in the treatment of the judicial system of the United States, one of those things that specially deserve to be given right. Other inaccuracies are not so important; but it is not right, for example, to speak of the United States as refusing to "indemnify the Loyalists according to the treaty of 1783", and it is doubtful if such "refusal" should be called the reason for Britain's refusing to surrender the western posts. Nor is it true that an appointment by the President is valid only when approved by a two-thirds vote of the Senate, or that Texas became a state in the Union in 1837, or that Illinois was admitted in 1819. It is not right to omit Arizona from the territory acquired from Mexico "in 1846", or to allow the printer to make 1853 into 1883. Donaldson figures that the government paid Texas in 1850 something over twenty-five cents an acre, not twenty. It is not quite accurate to declare that in all colonies save Rhode Island and Connecticut the governors were appointed by the crown, or that in 1783 "the western limits of the thirteen states did not extend beyond the Alleghany mountains, while the immense stretches of rich prairie and woodland from the Alleghanies to the Mississippi and from the Spanish province of Florida to the Great Lakes . . . became the public domain of the federal government", or that Plymouth maintained its separate government for eighty years, or that the states have all powers not "expressly" granted to the federal government, or to recount the Missouri Compromise struggle as it is here recounted. There can be no valid reason for using the word "federal" in such a statement as this: that the colonies had accepted "the federal theory of Empire—the theory that the colonies had never been subject to the Parliament, but only to the king".

People are interested just now, or ought to be interested, in just such discussions as the author has given; it is to be hoped that the inaccuracies will not seriously injure the usefulness of a readable book, which is on the whole filled with sagacious comment and treats in a telling way a number of traits and tendencies of American democracy.

A. C. McL.

The Pastor of the Pilgrims: a Biography of John Robinson. By WALTER H. BURGESS. (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Howe. 1920. Pp. xii, 426. \$5.00.)

An Answer to John Robinson of Leyden by a Puritan Friend. Now first published from a Manuscript of A. D. 1609. Edited by

CHAMPLIN BURRAGE, sometime Librarian of Manchester College, Oxford. [Harvard Theological Studies, IX.] (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1920. Pp. xiii, 94. \$2.00.)

THE main facts of John Robinson's later and more conspicuous life have long been familiar; but recent researches by English and American scholars have made evident much that was obscure or even unknown as to his early history and development. Largely through a diligent use of the Probate Registry of York, the author of this volume has discovered that Robinson was born in the village of Sturton-le-Steeple, in Nottinghamshire, about four miles south of Gainsborough and some nine miles southeast of Scrooby, in the centre, therefore, of the region which was to be the cradle of the Pilgrim movement. The family from which he sprang, like that in the same village into which he married, were respected well-to-do yeomen, and the author gives many interesting facts as to their relations, possessions, and manner of life.

The region was, the author shows, one that gravitated naturally, educationally, to Cambridge, where Robinson became a sizar in Corpus Christi College in 1592 and progressed to a fellowship in 1597, which he held till just before his marriage in 1604. He then became attached, in some ministerial capacity, probably that of assistant, to the strongly Puritan parish of St. Andrew's in Norwich. The details of his suspension are unknown, but it was the time of the enforcement of the New Canons of 1604, and Robinson was soon deprived of his ministry by episcopal authority. This action led the deprived minister to return to the region of his boyhood home and brought him into association with, and speedily into leadership of, the growing Separatism of the district.

Mr. Burgess follows Robinson through the more familiar and significant portions of his career, and traces what may be known of his descendants after his death. The author analyzes Robinson's works, makes evident the significance of the controversies in which he engaged, and his influence on his own age. The volume shows wide study of the whole literature of contemporary Separatism and of its opponents, and may be heartily commended not only as a biography of the Pilgrim pastor, but as a most readable and informing account of the Separatist movement of his day not only for the specialist but for the general reader. Mr. Burgess strongly dissents from Professor Usher's inclination to minimize the official persecution to which the Separatists were subjected.

Mr. Burgess gives reasons for believing that John Smyth (the "Se-Baptist"), so variously associated with Robinson, was also a native of Sturton. He does not claim demonstration, and the problem awaits further investigation.

To that indefatigable and deserving student of Separatism, Mr. Champlin Burrage, we owe the publication, from a manuscript in the Bodleian Library of Oxford, of a little known criticism of Robinson's

Separatist positions, in or about 1609, by "a Puritan friend". Mr. Burrage leaves the question of authorship open, and expresses his opinion "that it is doubtful whether he can ever be identified with certainty". Mr. Burgess, in the volume just noted, attributes its composition, primarily on a comparison of handwriting, to John Burgess, sometime rector of St. Peter Hungate in Norwich, and, like Robinson, silenced in 1604, but who had not followed him into Separatism. The work is of value not only for the light which it sheds on Robinson's connection with Norwich. It makes evident some difficulties of Robinson's Separatist position. He had been a minister of St. Andrew's Church. He now denied that St. Andrew's, since a part of the Church of England, was a true church, and therefore "noe man maie be a member of St. Andrewes Church or communicate therewith in the worship of God". His opponent forces the argument and presents an interesting discussion of the whole problem of Separatism.

WILLISTON WALKER.

Kino's Historical Memoir of Pimeria Alta: a Contemporary Account of the Beginnings of California, Sonora, and Arizona, 1683-1711. Edited and Annotated by HERBERT EUGENE BOLTON, Professor of American History and Curator of the Bancroft Library, University of California. In two volumes. [Spain in the West: a Series of Original Documents from Foreign Archives, vols. III. and IV.] (Cleveland: Arthur H. Clark Company. 1919. Pp. 379; 329. \$12.50.)

AGAIN has Dr. Bolton placed students of Arizona, Sonora, and California greatly in his debt by bringing to light and making accessible the invaluable treatise on the "Celestial Favors" by Fr. Eusebio Kino, covering the period of his missionary labors and explorations from 1683 to 1711.

Considered quantitatively alone [says Dr. Bolton] his work of exploration was astounding. During his twenty-four years of residence at the mission of Dolores, between 1687 and 1711, he made more than fifty journeys inland, an average of more than two per year. These journeys varied from a hundred to nearly a thousand miles in length. They were all made either on foot or on horseback, chiefly the latter. In the course of them he crossed and recrossed repeatedly and at varying angles all of the two hundred miles of country between the Magdalena and the Gila and the two hundred and fifty miles between the San Pedro and the Colorado.

Dr. Bolton's work is devoted to a translation of Kino's almost forgotten history, used by Venegas, Alegre, and Ortega, in their works published in the eighteenth century, but lost to sight of modern students until found, with the title *Favores Celestiales*, in the archives of Mexico, and now made available for the first time. This work by Kino is of the

first importance to the history of Arizona, Sonora, and California, embodying as it does a complete account of his missionary labors among the native tribes of the regions referred to.

Favores Celestiales consists of five books, divided into twenty-six parts of varying length and comprising from five to seventeen chapters each. Even a bare summary of the contents is out of the question here, but we may repeat Dr. Bolton's succinct characterization of the general nature of the work:

Part I. is a consecutive account of the spiritual affairs, the explorations, the Indian troubles and other temporal interests in Pimería Alta, with considerable attention to California, from the time of Kino's arrival in March, 1687, to November, 1699, and contains near the end a discussion of the spiritual and temporal advantages which might be derived from further conquests . . . Parts II., III., and IV. cover in a similar way the period from 1700 to 1707, with particular emphasis upon Kino's own exploring expeditions in Pimería Alta, along the Gila and Colorado rivers, and along the Gulf coast . . . Part V. was not originally written as a portion of the "Historia," but was incorporated, in Kino's last days, as a suitable conclusion. It is a report to the King, finished in 1710, the year before Kino's death, and consists of an extended argument in favor of the promotion of further conquests in California and other parts of the northern country, with a view to the establishment of a new kingdom to be called "New Navarre." In short, the *Favores Celestiales* is a history of Pimería Alta and of explorations therein and therefrom, with considerable attention to California affairs, for the twenty-three years between 1687 and 1710, written by the principal personage in the region during the period.

Dr. Bolton's introduction (pp. 27-82), characterized by the usual scholarship of the author, includes a biographical sketch of Kino, an account of his missionary explorations and observations, a discussion of the *Favores Celestiales*, its preparation and rediscovery, and a list of Kino's writings. Appended to the second volume are lists of the published works and manuscripts consulted, and an index. The volumes throughout are replete with explanatory notes, and are embellished with several plates and maps, the latter including "A later version of Kino's map of Pimería Alta", hitherto unpublished.

F. W. HODGE.

The Illinois Country, 1673-1818. By CLARENCE W. ALVORD.

[Centennial History of Illinois, volume I.] (Springfield: Illinois Centennial Commission. 1920. Pp. xx, 524.)

THIS is a notable volume, the capstone to a notable historical career. A decade and a half ago the *Illinois Historical Collections* comprised a single book of miscellaneous source-material brought together on the politician's principle of giving "the several sections of the state a fair share of representation in the volume". Professor Alvord was called to the editorship, and from his busy office has flowed year after year one

of the most prolific and fruitful streams known to American historical scholarship. More recently, as editor-in-chief of the Illinois Centennial Publications, he has planned and supervised the production of a comprehensive history of the state. The volume before us, although the last to come from the press, is the first of the *Centennial History*. Written by the editor-in-chief, a historian of note working in his own special field and with the resources of a great commonwealth at his command, the reader rightly expects the book to be of highest scholarly excellence and workmanship.

Nor, in the main, is this expectation disappointed. In twenty-one chapters and five hundred pages Professor Alvord portrays the history of the Illinois country with a breadth of outlook, an assured familiarity, and a wealth of detail unapproached hitherto in the literature of the subject. The theme of the book may be briefly summarized as the story of the planting of a French colony in the heart of the continent; the long contest with the English for supremacy in America, with the Illinois country occupying the pivotal position in the French scheme of empire; the Anglo-Saxon triumph, with the subsequent revolt of the colonies from the mother country; and the beginnings, civil and political, of American society in Illinois. The telling of this story involves a wide sweep of history, and across the pages of the volume march a varied array of characters great and small—from Marquette the missionary, yearning for martyrdom in the cause of Christ, or La Salle, the "first promoter of big business in the West", to John Dodge of infamous memory, as choice a rascal as ever scuttled a ship or throttled the liberties of a people.

To the resident of Illinois this book will constitute a never-failing source of inspiration and delight, providing him as it does with a historic past as dignified and thrilling and almost as ancient as any commonwealth along the Atlantic seaboard can boast. To the thoughtful scholar it offers much food for reflection, although he will not acquiesce, necessarily, in all the positions taken by the author. Some, we feel sure, will think that in Professor Alvord the economic interpretation of history finds a too-thoroughgoing exponent. Some will question the sweeping character of certain of his broad generalizations. For example, we note the explanation given (on pages 84-86) of the Iroquois warfare upon the tribes of the interior. To Professor Alvord a single simple factor explains these wars—the desire of the Iroquois to control as middlemen the trade of the interior tribes with the whites. No doubt this was an important cause of the wars, but the demonstration that it was the only one is yet to be made. Survivors of the New England school of historians (if any such there be) will be disposed to question the perspective of the author in evaluating these wars. "The [Iroquois] attack of 1680," he says, "marks the opening campaign of almost a hundred years of warfare for dominion over the West," and he finds that the Iroquois themselves were stirred up by the English,

who, unable to strike directly at the French for the control of the Mississippi Valley, struck at them through their allies, the Iroquois. There is a measure of truth in all this, of course; the Iroquois had not struck at the French in the West before 1680 because until La Salle came into Illinois there were none there to strike at; but are not these attacks of the Iroquois in the West more correctly to be regarded in the light of an extension of that conflict between them and the French which began with the founding of New France by Champlain?

The decrees of the paternalistic government which France established in the American wilderness produced, oftentimes, strange and unanticipated consequences. In 1673 the government, intent on curbing the *coureurs de bois*, forbade the people on pain of their lives to go into the woods for twenty-four hours without permission, and three years later all trading permits were prohibited. "The only effect was to make a large number of Frenchmen outlaws in the West, where they were supported by their friends and were able to divert the fur trade to the British at Albany" (p. 72). Again, we learn (p. 107) that the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685 entailed confusion upon the fur trade of Canada, since "many members of [the Huguenot] sect, operating hat factories in Normandy, were forced to leave France, thus impairing an industry which absorbed much of the output of Canada". Still more remarkable was the dilemma encountered by the government in its efforts at preventing the debauchery of the Indians by the trade in brandy. "If the Indians did not drink French brandy they would carry their furs to Albany and purchase English rum—equally demoralizing in this world; further, mixed with the English intoxicant, the children of the forest would imbibe Protestant heresy and endanger their souls for eternity" (p. 71). But the citizen of democratic America is humiliated to find that the lot of the French dwellers of Illinois for many years after the blessings of Democracy were forced upon them by George Rogers Clark was distinctly worse than it had been under the old autocratic régime. The story of the "Period of the City States" (pp. 358-378) is one of the strangest and most chastening in American annals. The picture drawn by Father Gibault of conditions in the Illinois (p. 366) fairly rivals the most turbulent scenes of the Middle Ages.

The physical appearance of the book is pleasing but by no means distinguished. The same may be said of its literary style, although in this respect the opening paragraphs are of a high order of excellence, and flashes of brilliant writing appear here and there throughout the volume. Bristling with details as it does, the commission of some positive errors of statement might perhaps be taken for granted. The following items in fields with which the reviewer chances to be somewhat familiar may be noted: The portrait ascribed to Marquette (frontispiece) is not known to be of him, and the year of his founding the Illinois mission is indicated correctly on page 67 but incorrectly on page 132. The battle of Fallen Timbers was fought on August 20, 1794, not

August 18 (p. 399). The builder of Fort Dearborn was Captain John Whistler, father of Colonel William Whistler (p. 414). It is incorrect to say that Harrison led "an army of militia" against Tippecanoe (p. 438); the backbone of his army was Colonel Boyd's Fourth U. S. Infantry. Hull surrendered Detroit on August 16, not the day before, and his order for the evacuation of Fort Dearborn was received at that place August 9, not August 8 (p. 440). There was no United States factory at Prairie du Chien prior to the War of 1812 (p. 451). One or two misprints have been noted (*e.g.*, "Mascoupens" on page 82, note 13, and "bankruptcy", page 113). But such errors of detail are of trivial importance and do not seriously impair the character of Professor Alvord's achievement. We are indebted to him for the first comprehensive, authoritative account of the century and a half of Illinois history which antedates the creation of the present commonwealth. That commonwealth could ill afford to dispense with his services.

M. M. QUAIPE.

Steps in the Development of American Democracy. By ANDREW CUNNINGHAM McLAUGHLIN, Professor of History, University of Chicago. (New York and Cincinnati: Abingdon Press. 1920. Pp. 210. \$1.50.)

SINCE the stirring appeal of President Wilson, addressed primarily to citizens of the United States before our entrance into the World War, "to make the world safe for democracy", and the subsequent challenge that "democracy be made safe for the world", attention has been drawn anew to these inquiries: What is democracy? What are its essential characteristics? What contributions has the United States, the most conspicuous exponent of democracy among the nations, made to the science and practice of government? It is in answer to these pertinent and timely questions that this small volume, comprising the lectures delivered by Professor McLaughlin at Wesleyan University, will be found especially valuable. This series of lectures was the first to be given on the George Slocum Bennett Foundation "for the promotion of a better understanding of national problems and of a more perfect realization of the responsibilities of citizenship".

The author tells us in the preface that his purpose "is simply to recount a few salient experiences which helped to make America what it is . . . as also to describe certain basic doctrines and beliefs, some of which may have had their day, while others have not yet reached fulfillment". The historical method is employed and it constitutes, indeed, the characteristic feature of the work. Mr. McLaughlin truly states that he has "refrained from any serious effort to describe democracy, except as certain phases or aspects of it appeared in our actual life history". Such a course seemed to him necessary in order "not to attribute to American democracy of the past all that we now find to be theoretic-

ally involved in the action and character of a thoroughly democratic people" (p. 168).

In a work of this character, the presentation of new historical facts is not to be expected, but rather a new and fresh treatment of them and of their significance. This latter task is what Mr. McLaughlin essayed in this series of lectures and this he has most successfully achieved. His treatment differs from that contained in the standard work of Professor C. E. Merriam on *The History of American Political Theories* in being more popular in form and less detailed and formal in its presentation, owing to the character of the audience for which his lectures were originally prepared. Unlike that of Professor Merriam's volume, Professor McLaughlin's aim is not to present an extended treatment of the various political theories that have been held but rather to unfold the progressive development of democracy by presenting its predominating characteristics during each of the successive periods of the country's history. This he does in a rapid but lucid and convincing way. Beginning with its germ in colonial days, the voluntary association of men by contract in religious and political organizations, he traces its development through each of the six succeeding periods into which he divides our history down to the present time.

Mr. McLaughlin's firm grasp upon the history of the country is apparent throughout his treatment, and his discussion is characterized by brilliant exposition and frequently enlivened by flashes of wit and even restrained sarcasm. In the concluding chapter, after summing up the "implications of democracy" of to-day, he closes with an exposition of the responsibilities of democracy. This is an earnest and eloquent appeal for America "to play wholeheartedly the rôle of a democratic nation". "If we would be democratic, we must act the democrat" in international affairs as well as domestic. "We cannot be outwardly autocratic and inwardly democratic."

It is fortunate that this scholarly and inspiring presentation of the progress of democracy is to reach a wider audience through the medium of the printed page. An intelligent reading of this little volume should contribute to "a more perfect realization of the responsibilities of citizenship".

HERMAN V. AMES.

Judicial Settlement of Controversies between States of the American Union: an Analysis of Cases decided in the Supreme Court of the United States. By JAMES BROWN SCOTT, A.M., J.U.D., LL.D. [Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of International Law.] (Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1919. Pp. xiii, 548. \$2.50.)

IN his review of the two volumes of cases of which this volume is an analysis, published in the April number of the *Review* (XXV. 509),

the present writer suggested the need of an index to make the material of the collection readily available. This need has been abundantly and artistically supplied by the *Analysis*. Indeed, the usefulness of the latter far outruns that of an index, which would be of service to few save lawyers, while the *Analysis* gives a history, statement, and explanation of each case sufficient for any intelligent layman, while not omitting adequate quotation from important parts of the opinions and appropriate editorial discussion of the more difficult points. The learned editor's familiarity with the historical and personal setting of the cases enables him to give an intimate flavor and dramatic interest to many of them not to be found between the covers of the reports; and his propaganda in favor of an international court of justice with a jurisdiction far in excess of any probable power of physical enforcement is frankly conducted.

His thesis appears in the following quotations:

The sphere of usefulness of a supreme tribunal, especially one of the society of nations, would be doomed to operate within bounds unduly contracted, unless questions considered political could, in the future as in the past, be rescued from the faltering hands of diplomacy and, by submission to the Court, become judicial and be decided by the consent of the parties according to the principles of law and justice, like questions of humbler origin. The hope of the future is that law shall, little by little, win upon the political domain, making that legal or justiciable which was not so before, and continuing a process long since begun but never to be ended until, in the fine phrase of Mirabeau, "Right shall one day be the monarch of the world". The opinion of Mr. Justice Baldwin¹ offers a hope, and the Supreme Court the means of its realization; it is in itself not merely a demonstration of the right of jurisdiction, since exercised by the Supreme Court in suits between states, but also a brief in behalf of a court of the society of nations which, like the Supreme Court of the United States, is to decide disputes alleged to be political, but in fact justiciable, between bodies politic, indifferently called states or nations; and again, like the Supreme Court, to stand between diplomacy, non-existent or defective, on the one hand, and war, only too effective, on the other (pp. 141-142).

What the nations have done in the past they can do in the future, and by submission make questions justiciable which were not so before, just as they have done on previous occasions, notably in the domain of prize law. What thirteen states of the New World have done, the states of the Old World can assuredly do if only they will, for where there is a will there is a way. . . . Should the leaders of opinion in a world torn and racked by war attempt to do for the society of nations what American statesmen did at the close of a war, from which a more perfect union of the American States emerged, they need only bethink themselves of the Supreme Court of the United States. They can for a few paltry dollars provide themselves with a set of the Supreme Court Reports, in which they will find reproduced the decrees of the Court settling the controversies between States according to principles of

¹ In *Rhode Island v. Massachusetts*, 12 Peters 657, 736-738 (1836).

justice, the mysteries of judicial and political power unveiled, the distinctions between them stated and the process by which political questions become justiciable revealed, and a procedure which has stood the argument of counsel, satisfied the requirements of justice, and preserved peace between the States of the American Union and the Government of the Union by assigning to each and keeping to each its appropriate sphere of action. Peace has come to the States of the American Union through justice administered in a Court of Justice. To be worth while and to be durable, peace can only come to the States of the Society of Nations through justice administered in its Court of Justice (pp. 542-543).

To impute to a single function of the Supreme Court so great a share in the success of our government is obviously extravagant. That the United States has important and wisely-chosen legislative powers, as well as judicial ones, and that all of its departments normally act upon the *individuals* who compose the states, instead of upon the states themselves, are political devices of far more importance for our peace and well-being than the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over suits between the states, useful though the latter undoubtedly is. And despite them all we had our Civil War. No society of nations can prosper as the American Union has done until it is constituted between nations sufficiently similar in culture, development, and political ideals to be willing to entrust adequate powers to a common legislative body, and to permit their enforcement by a common executive department, as well as by a common judiciary. One need not decry the desirability of a strong and able international court, with a jurisdiction not restricted by all of the conventional notions of what is "justiciable"; but to suggest that such a device alone, with any conceivable jurisdiction, could assure to Europe in the near future the peace with justice secured to America by elaborate and well-tried political machinery in the hands of an intelligent, experienced, and fairly homogeneous democracy, is but to aver a belief in miracles.

JAMES PARKER HALL.

The Right Rev. Edward Dominic Fenwick, O.P., Founder of the Dominicans in the United States, Pioneer Missionary in Kentucky, Apostle of Ohio, First Bishop of Cincinnati. By Very Rev. V. F. O'DANIEL, O.P., S.T.M. (New York and Cincinnati: Frederick Pustet Company. 1920. Pp. xiv, 473. \$3.50.)

It is fitting that the centenary of the Roman Catholic diocese of Cincinnati should be commemorated by a sympathetic and reliable biography of its first ordinary, the pioneer missionary who laid its foundations deep and strong. Descended from an old and prominent Maryland family, Edward Fenwick, like others of his class, was sent abroad at the close of the Revolution to be educated at one of the colleges founded by English Catholics in Belgium. There he was received into

the Dominican Order and there he remained until forced by the French victories in the Netherlands to take refuge with other Dominicans in England. In 1804, after an absence of twenty years, he returned to his native Maryland with the intention of founding a province of his order in the United States. Yielding to the counsel of Bishop Carroll, he decided that the first Dominican establishment should be located among the Roman Catholic immigrants in Kentucky, rather than in Maryland where there were already two colleges under the care of the Jesuits and the Sulpicians. From the date of his arrival in Kentucky in 1805 to his death from cholera during the epidemic of 1832, whether as friar preacher or as friar prelate, he adapted his life to the conditions of pioneer society, travelling usually without an attendant like any other itinerant missionary in the rapidly growing West.

In writing this biography the author has set for himself a twofold task. Primarily the book is intended to interest and to edify the general reader by presenting for his contemplation the record of a pious and saintly career; but at the same time the author has endeavored to write an accurate historical narrative drawn from original documentary sources. This twofold task was all the more difficult because many traditional errors had crept into earlier historical accounts, and because the documentary sources to be consulted were widely scattered and extremely fragmentary. Owing to the nature of its organization the Roman Catholic Church in this country has no records which correspond exactly with the minutes of conferences, assemblies, and conventions of other religious denominations, and it is these which form the backbone, so to speak, of religious historical material. In the case of Bishop Fenwick this lack was not made good by a continuous personal correspondence, for he kept neither diary nor letter-book, nor was he careful to preserve the letters which he received. Moreover, as the author states in his preface, many of the ecclesiastical documents are of a litigious character and cannot therefore be accepted at their face value.

As the copious bibliography attests, it has required enormous labor to search through family and local records as well as through scattered ecclesiastical archives both in Europe and in America. For his conscientious and painstaking efforts to establish the exact fact as well as for his correction of errors and misprints in missionary reports and in other religious publications, the author is entitled to the gratitude of those who have neither the leisure nor the opportunity to examine ecclesiastical sources. It is to be hoped that he may some day render still further service by publishing entire the collection of documents he has assembled at so great pains. A publication on the same scale as the documentary volumes of the *History of the Society of Jesus* would not only interest the student of ecclesiastical history but would be of value to the secular historian who must needs take into account the important part religious organizations have played in the development of the West.

MARTHA L. EDWARDS.

The United States in Our Own Times, 1865-1920. By PAUL L. HAWORTH, Ph.D. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1920. Pp. viii, 563. \$2.25.)

THE first characteristic of the book that impresses the reader is the number of quotation-marks; the second, that a great number of these quotations add nothing to its style or interest, and that the author could have said the same thing just as forcibly, perhaps even more so, in his own words. Phrases such as "'only hits that count'" (p. 241), "'lazy and sassy'" (p. 8), "'made to be broken'" (p. 101), and longer quotations of a similar nature, too numerous to mention, add little to the narrative.

A certain indefiniteness also characterizes the work. The statement, "By revelations concerning the 'Sanborn Contracts', Secretary of Treasury Richardson was so badly discredited he resigned" (p. 77) is not illuminating to the student who has never heard of the Sanborn Contracts. Grant's connection with Black Friday is also unsatisfactorily presented (p. 64). The apparent attempt of the author to guard against over-emphasizing a subject concerning which he is a specialist has led to a poorly balanced presentation of the disputed election of 1876, especially in the portion dealing with the manner of counting the votes in Louisiana, Florida, and South Carolina.

The author claims to have devoted a large share of space to social and industrial problems. His arrangement of material, however, is such as seriously to eclipse the important developments connected with any specific movement. We find no satisfactory connected accounts of the evolution of agrarianism, labor, social legislation, constitutional law, imperialism, and other such matters as should properly be the concern of the student of this period of our history. Though no one doubts that the proportions of a book are largely a matter of opinion, the reviewer cannot refrain from pointing out that a book which devotes nine pages to a description of Indian battles and buffaloes (pp. 103-112) and but five lines to the Dawes Act, is hardly well balanced; that a book which has space to devote to poetic ornamentation and omits some of the most important development of our constitutional law is hardly well rounded. Not only has the author failed to show the interaction between the social and industrial problems of the country and the evolution of our law, but also he has failed to indicate the relation of these problems to our political life. Because of this he lacks a sympathetic understanding of the thinking of those who from time to time have joined the forces of dissent.

In his treatment of the two most conspicuous contemporary American statesmen, Roosevelt and Wilson, the author leaves no doubt in the minds of his readers that the former was by far the greater. It is hardly necessary to point out that a text-book is no place in which to give way to partizan zeal, or to suggest that sufficient time has not as

yet elapsed to permit sufficient perspective for a true historical judgment of either.

Two attributes, however, of this work stand out so strikingly as to make its reading well worth the while of the student of recent American history. In the first place the "Suggestions for Further Readings", giving as they do page references to selected portions of various works, are excellent; secondly, and more important, Mr. Haworth has produced a work which is so readable as to justify the claim of the publishers that it is as "fascinating as a story".

B. B. KENDRICK.

The Canadian Dominion: a Chronicle of our Northern Neighbor.

By OSCAR D. SKELTON. [Chronicles of America series, vol. XLIX.] (New Haven: Yale University Press; London: Humphrey Milford. 1919. Pp. xi, 296.)

CANADA has reason to congratulate herself on the appearance of this excellent little volume in the *Chronicles of America* series. She has not only been accorded a distinctive place in the development of the new world, but has also been fortunate in finding a sympathetic interpreter of her evolution from a colonial to a national status.

Professor Skelton has been most skillful in combining the dual rôles of historian and political scientist. On the historical side he has little to present that is new or striking, but he does succeed in breathing the breath of life into the dry bones of the past and giving them vitality. To the gift of historical imagination, he has added the quality of insight. He is perhaps more interested in the significance of events than in the events themselves. The reader will not soon forget his keen analysis of the political tendencies of his country, nor his critical judgments of the statesmen of the time.

The author's point of view is that of a staunch nationalist. He is proud of the part that his country has played in resisting Tory imperialism on the one hand and American intervention on the other, but there is, fortunately, an entire absence of national self-complacency or chauvinism throughout the study. In his treatment of domestic affairs, he maintains a strict judicial impartiality, although he occasionally reveals his liberal fiscal sympathies in his discussion of recent tariff policies. On imperial matters, he looks forward to the day when Canada shall attain to full nationality, not as an independent state, but as an equal and full-fledged member of the Britannic Union and of the League of Nations.

His treatment of Anglo-American relations will doubtless prove of particular interest to American readers. Although somewhat critical at times of the occasional high-handed attitude of American diplomats towards a weaker neighbor, he does not fail to do full justice to the general policy and particular contentions of the United States. His

handling of the reaction of American policy upon Canadian affairs is especially effective. Few Americans, it is safe to assert, are aware of the extent to which the policy of this country has unwittingly contributed to the development of Canadian nationalism.

Although the general outlines of this study are excellent, there are certain minor features which are open to criticism. The Maritime Provinces have received but scant attention, and the great Northwest is almost entirely neglected. The author has given due consideration to the economic expansion of the country, but, strange to say, has largely overlooked the political phases of this growth in the form of the farmers' party organizations and the labor movements. Even more surprising is his neglect of the constitutional development of the country during the past fifty years. Canada has made some interesting experiments in federalism which have an important bearing upon the evolution of federal principles in the modern state. The bibliography, moreover, is sadly inadequate. There is scarcely a reference to any of the leading authorities on constitutional history and law: for example, the valuable studies of Bourinot are not even mentioned. The most authoritative record of the proceedings of the federal constitutional convention is likewise overlooked, and Mr. Porritt's marked contributions to recent Canadian history suffer the same fate. These are only a few of the many surprising omissions. It is sincerely to be hoped that the author may find occasion to revise the general bibliography in future editions of his work.

These limitations, however, are insignificant in comparison with the high intrinsic merit of the whole book. Its delightful literary form, together with its accuracy and suggestiveness, make it both the most readable and the most valuable of the general histories of the Canadian Dominion. The volume, in short, is a credit to Canadian scholarship.

C. D. ALLIN.

The United States and Latin America. By JOHN HOLLADAY LATANÉ, Ph.D., LL.D., Professor of American History in the Johns Hopkins University. (New York: Doubleday, Page, and Company. 1920. Pp. 346. \$2.50.)

TWENTY years ago Professor Latané published a series of lectures on the diplomatic relations of the United States and Spanish America. His present work is based on the earlier one. Into it a number of changes have been introduced. These include a new general title, a revision of the contents of four chapters, and the addition of two new ones, dealing with the advance of the United States in the Caribbean and with Pan-Americanism. From the original volume material of special interest at the time has been omitted and its place taken by an account of later events, even if, in the cases of Cuba and Colombia for example, the record of them is not always "brought down to date".

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Unfortunately for the manifold promise held out by the general title, the work does not present anything like a complete picture of the relations between the United States and Latin America. It does not cover even the diplomatic relations alone. The method of treatment instead is selective and episodical. While illustrating some of the general principles that have governed the policy of this country toward its southern neighbors, it hardly furnishes the comprehensive survey that the reader is led to expect. Of the twenty nations in Latin America five are not mentioned at all, and seven of them merely in connection with their establishment as republics and their participation in the events of the last fifteen years, especially as concerned with the Great War.

Throughout, the book appears to have been conceived in terms of the United States alone. What has been written about Latin America, which might serve to indicate its reaction to the influence, diplomatic and otherwise, exercised by this country is quite ignored. Works in Spanish and Portuguese seemingly have not been consulted. Recent treatises in English on Latin America are rarely cited; and when a reference is given the text reveals little, if any, use of the material. This is conspicuously true of the first two chapters. Standing substantially as printed in the earlier edition, they contain errors and misconceptions that might readily have been corrected by a resort to works that have been published since 1900. Such a procedure would have helped to assign to the United States a more important place in the recognition of Spanish-American independence than the author accords it.

Why three pages devoted to Texas and Mexico from 1803 to 1848 should constitute a suitable prelude to a study of the advance of the United States in the Caribbean is not clear to the reviewer. Neither does he perceive the reason for including recent dealings with Mexico in the account of Pan-Americanism. He is even more at a loss to understand the dismissal of the Central American arrangements of 1907 in a dozen lines, and the total disregard of the share of the United States in the negotiations attending the War of the Pacific over the nitrate deposits of "northern Chile" (p. 299).

Without convincing documentary evidence numerous positive assertions of the author lack an appropriate foundation. Among them are his declarations about the rôle of Germany in the Venezuelan imbroglio (p. 249), the result of the conference at Niagara Falls (p. 309), President Wilson's refusal to enter upon war with Mexico (p. 311), the Haitian situation (*ibid.*), and the effects of the President's co-operation with certain of the Latin American republics (*ibid.*). In the same category belong the statements about the reasons for the neutrality of South American countries during the war (p. 316), the virtual changelessness of the Monroe Doctrine (p. 323), and the motive for the formation of the "A B C Alliance" (p. 329).

WILLIAM R. SHEPHERD.

MINOR NOTICES

The Teaching of History. By Eugene L. Hasluck, M.A. [Cambridge Handbooks for Teachers.] (Cambridge, University Press, 1920, pp. 119, \$3.20.) This slender volume is of interest to American teachers for two reasons: first, for the information it gives directly or by implication upon the state of history-teaching in England, and, secondly, for the practical quality of its criticisms and suggestions, so wholly unaffected by the airs and attitudes of the professional pedagogue. Mr. Hasluck speaks of a "concentric" programme, according to which the full course of English history should be gone over each year, "political conflicts one year, wars and foreign policy another year, constitutional developments another year". He remarks that a continuous, chronological treatment, with the different threads interwoven, still finds greater favor. He inclines to use the concentric method within the limits of a single period, for example, 1603-1689, which would be the work of one term. It is not a little curious that he feels obliged to argue that English boys should study something besides English history. His own plan calls for about a dozen lessons in general on European history each term during three years, for the older pupils, boys of from fourteen to sixteen years of age. The United States since the Revolutionary War receives a modest assignment. Our national development, glanced at from the eastern shores of the Atlantic, does not take on the proportions we ordinarily ascribe to it. His words are worth quoting. "It seems", he says, "that we should have omitted something of importance if we neglected to give two or three lessons to the subject of the United States and their problems." As regards selection of material, Mr. Hasluck does not believe in making the lessons too entertaining. He thinks the "reaction against the grinding methods of our fathers" has been excessive. This does not imply an old-fashioned text-book treatment. He advocates the use of exercises in the sources, although in his opinion the source-book enthusiasts have gone too far. He emphasizes one characteristic of efficient work of this kind, which is too often forgotten, the presence in the hands of each student, not only before the class exercises, but during the class hour, of a copy of the particular document or group of documents. His suggestions also for the utilization of local history are valuable.

H. E. B.

Archaic England: an Essay in Deciphering Prehistory from Megalithic Monuments, Earthworks, Customs, Coins, Place-Names, and Faerie Superstitions. By Harold Bayley. (London, Chapman and Hall Ltd.; Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott Company, 1920, pp. viii, 894, \$7.50.) If one could believe that Mr. Bayley intended his book on *Archaic England* as a satire on the writings of a certain class of histortians and philolo-

gists, who seem able to reach important conclusions without much regard to the evidence, his work would be comprehensible. But a satirist rarely finds it necessary to extend his purpose over more than eight hundred large pages; moreover, the reading of a very few pages brings out the fact that the author intends that his account shall be taken as serious history.

Mr. Bayley's work is primarily a study in folklore. It is a discussion of such topics as Gog and Magog, Puck, Oberon, the Man in the Moon, the White Horse, and a host of others of the same kinship. The author seems to believe strongly in the essential unity of the human race and human culture, and that traces of this original unity can be found in folklore, in place-names, and in popular customs, rites, and ceremonies. In this belief there is doubtless a great deal of important truth; but in his effort to discover and present this truth Mr. Bayley employs a method that makes the sifting process an impossible one. He seems to have framed a principle that if any two words sound alike they are the same word, no matter what may be the accident of origin. If this principle is once accepted, the rest is easy.

To begin with, Mr. Bayley believes that the English race, speech, and culture are fundamentally British and not Anglo-Saxon. He rejoices in the Norman conquest, through which "the temporary ascendancy of German kultur was finally and irrevocably destroyed" (p. 24). The English language, he holds, "has descended in direct ancestry from the Welsh or Kymbric" (p. 79); Mr. Bayley is, therefore, largely occupied with Celtic lore, terms, and place-names. He finds an evident connection between Janus, the Roman divinity, and "the innumerable Jones of Wales" (p. 92); between the Greek hero Achilles and Achill in County Mayo (p. 82); between the Balkan Albania and the Scotch Albany (p. 84); and finally between Yankee and jonnock, an English dialect adjective meaning true, straightforward, and the like (p. 97). The term Kymry he explains as meaning the followers of King Bri (p. 310). Gretchen "resolves into Great *Chun* or Great *Mighty Chief*" (p. 302). Mr. Bayley is not so sure of the identification of Elgin with "the Irish Hooligans" (p. 290), or of Jehu with "the exclamation Gehoh! Gehoh! which carmen use to their horses" (p. 282); but he is quite clear that Yule was originally *ye all* (p. 132). It is scarcely necessary to illustrate the author's method further. Examples might be presented in great numbers; but enough have been given to prove that the publishers are correct in advertising *Archaic England* as a "remarkable book".

L. M. L.

Feudal Cambridgeshire. By William Farrer, D.Litt. (Cambridge, University Press, 1920, pp. xi, 354, \$12.00.) The purpose of Dr. Farrer in compiling the information contained in this calendar is to aid the student in the determination of the "baronial, honorial, and manorial history" of Cambridgeshire. The calendar arranges the villis of the county con-

veniently in their respective hundreds, and gives for each vill a number of references from various printed sources sufficient to indicate, in general, its descent through various fees in the period from Domesday Book through the thirteenth century, or its permanence as part of one fee. It was probably necessary that the references should be summaries in English and not quotations from the original, but there is a somewhat disquieting warning in the introduction that not all references to a given vill from the source chosen are included. The speedy identification of fees will be undoubtedly facilitated by a careful work of this character, which has entailed much labor, and the pedigrees of baronial houses, of which a number are given, will prove very useful. The calendar will contribute to the important studies of baronies and honors which are yet to be written. In his extremely brief introduction Dr. Farrer makes no attempt, unfortunately for the student of history, to draw his own conclusions from the material he has so patiently collected with regard to the difficult definition of "honor" or "barony".

It is obvious that in a work of this kind there must be some definite limitations of the number of authorities included. The student may reasonably desire to know the exact considerations determining the compiler's choice of material within the wide field open to him and the exact works consulted. The division between printed and unprinted is not logical, although it may be convenient, or even necessary. Even within the restricted field of printed material, however, Dr. Farrer's choice is insufficiently designated. The statement regarding sources in the introduction is surprisingly brief and general, especially for thirteenth-century material, and there is no bibliography. The student can never be sure what authorities, other than those cited, have been consulted for any particular vill. This defect might be easily remedied, to the greater usefulness of the work in the similar compilations which are, we are told, projected for several other counties. There is occasionally, moreover, an indefiniteness with regard to authorities, especially for statements made in the foot-notes. The inclusion of Norfolk vills in Wisbeach, and the failure to indicate which of the multiform possibilities of Wisbeach as hundred, vill, manor, castle, or barton, is meant, is a case in point. Surely, Elena la Zuche held "sokelond", and not "fokelond" (equated in the index with folkland) in Swavesey (see *Rot. Hund.*, II. 370). The full index of persons and places will prove of great service.

N. NELSON.

Belgium: the Making of a Nation. By H. Vander Linden, Professor of History in the University of Liège. Translated by Sybil Jane. (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1920, pp. 356, \$3.25.) It was natural enough that Belgian scholars, forced into foreign environment by the German invasion, should turn their attention to their own history as a whole, no matter what their special field had been. Others, less well equipped, also plunged headlong into the Belgian story, and large has been the crop of

minor works, works possessing, as a rule, but little significance as contributions to Belgic history. Monographs are valuable if their scope be limited, but any small volume covering centuries has the defects of its qualities. In this instance the reader might have gained had the author limited himself to a consideration of modern Belgium, even though his outline of the past has been sketched simply with a view to the dominating influences. One would have liked him to treat the later periods with the delightful intimacy of men and times which he displays in his discussion of the bull of demarcation of Alexander VI. That article, published in the October number of this review, 1916, is a wonderful example of a power to be as familiar with a past phase as one might be with current events. It is an inspiring exposition of a justly original point of view—a vivid sidelight turned on an important transaction, a light kindled by the writer's researches into colonial expansion.

As regards this volume, it really seems as though M. Vander Linden might have omitted the first 152 pages of his historic review, giving a reference to the *Belgian Democracy* of Pirenne, with whom he is in substantial agreement as to the theory that internationalism is the essential keynote of Belgian nationality. The chronological narrative is too condensed to be vital. The later chapters are richer in individuality and indicate what the author can do in character-sketches. The intensive provincialism that persisted throughout the Austrian régime, the Catholic influence in political situations, the difference between French and Belgic definitions of liberty during the Revolution, are acutely outlined, as well as the good intentions of the Congress of Vienna and their failure in regard to the kingdom of the Netherlands. The most readable chapters are, however, those dealing with the years 1831–1914, giving the evolution of the present realm from an agricultural to an industrial state, a state burdened with capitalist, proletarian, and linguistic problems. The differentiation of these problems from similar ones existing in other lands is particularly well put, as is also the peculiar character of Belgian “Liberalism”. In spite of all the incongruous elements seething in a small space, there is a confidence in the existence of a peculiar Belgic national strength. May that prove to be the case!

Het Voorspel van den Eersten Engelschen Oorlog. Door Johan E. Elias. In two volumes. (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1920, pp. viii, 185, vi, 235, and 5 maps, 10 fl.) A complete history of Dutch commercial hegemony in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries would be entitled to fill many volumes and would comprehend much of the economic history of Europe in that period. It is to be hoped that the folios will some day be written, but in the meantime students will be grateful for this synthesized and condensed survey of what the author has called, not very descriptively, *Preliminaries to the First English War*. Mr. Elias fixes upon the English War as the crisis when Dutch mercantile imperialism, unbearably strained in the effort to maintain its monopolies

and supremacies in all parts of the world, first gave ground—not so much before its English rival as before the new conditions of a new age. From this point of view the entire economic development of the provinces is a preface to the war, as the history of France is a preface to the Revolution. Mr. Elias has shorn away, in so far as it was possible, religious, political, and diplomatic ramifications, and in another work he has dealt with the Dutch navy, but even thus limited, his task was extensive and intricate. In its accomplishment he was greatly served by the numerous careful monographs on all aspects of the Republic's Golden Age, which stand to the credit of Dutch scholarship. The book is then not the product of original investigations but of exhaustive reading and correlation of the masses of material available in print. Although the author has been most scrupulous in furnishing references, the absence of a bibliography is regrettable.

The first volume tells the story of the origin, growth, and integration of Dutch economic supremacy in Europe. There is a chapter on commerce and the fisheries, one—an omnivorous but highly interesting chapter—on shipbuilding, the carrying trade, industry, labor and finance, one on English commercial development, and one expounding the rival Dutch and English theories of *mare liberum* and *mare clausum*. The second volume describes Dutch expansion in Asia, Africa, and the Americas. Although the English rivalry is emphasized throughout, the writer's concern is primarily with the history of his own land, and his treatment of English affairs is designedly summary and incidental.

In reading the book one is strongly impressed by the fact that "peaceful penetration" has not changed its methods greatly since the seventeenth century. It meant then, as it means now, energy, initiative, ruthlessness, long views, large profits, capital piling up, credit unfolding, industrial organization and combination, labor sweated, here restriction of output for the sake of holding prices, there large-scale production to undersell competitors, monopolies and special privileges, spheres of influence, barbarous cruelties to yellow, black, and red peoples, dollar diplomacy, and "incomparably the greatest navy of the world".

VIOLET BARBOUR.

The Rise of South Africa: a History of the Origin of South African Colonization and of its Development towards the East from the Earliest Times to 1857. By G. E. Cory, Professor in Rhodes University College, Grahamstown, South Africa. Vol. III. (New York and London, Longmans, Green, and Company, 1919, pp. xiv, 474, \$9.00.) The publication of this volume marks the third stage in an undertaking which the author began in 1893, two years after his arrival from England to assume a professorship in Rhodes University College, Grahamstown, South Africa. The two preceding volumes, appearing successively in 1910 and 1913, have already been noticed in this review. However, it is perhaps worth while to point out once more that the main title—*The Rise*

of *South Africa*—is misleading, though the subtitle, “A History of the Origin of South African Colonization and of its Development towards the East from the earliest Times to 1857”, indicates more correctly the very special character of the work. As a matter of fact, the third volume, purporting to cover the period from 1834 to 1840, is, with the exception of an excellent chapter on slavery and its suppression in South Africa, devoted exclusively to the Kaffir War of 1835, its origin, course, and aftermath.

Allowing for the restricted scope of the treatment, both in time and area, the author has made a valuable contribution of far more general interest than the particular incidents he actually describes. Following his previous practice he supplements a careful study of the records by material drawn from interviews with early settlers and their descendants, thus reproducing most vividly the frontier life of a by-gone age with all its adventurousness and hardship.

More important still, while aiming to be unbiassed, he presents a vigorous brief for the colonists as against “Mr. Mother Country”, the London Missionary Society, and the policy for which they stood in dealing with the natives—the policy of lenient drifting and amiable persuasion as contrasted with the more drastic and aggressive methods advocated by the frontiersmen. This sharp conflict of policy, together with acute differences of opinion regarding the respective responsibility of white and colored folk for the dreary succession of border wars, is one of the most persistent problems of the greater part of South African history, to say nothing of a not inconsiderable portion of British colonial history in many other parts of the far-flung empire. Professor Cory leaves the reader in no doubt as to where he stands. “It is always an easy matter”, he remarks, “for those at a safe distance to say what should have been done in the time of danger, and not having suffered loss themselves, to counsel mercy, forbearance, and forgiveness in those who have.” This is all very true; indeed one may go further and admit that “indiscriminate and mistaken zeal on the part of benevolent people in Great Britain” contributed to many subsequent disorders and disasters; and certainly little or nothing can be said for somnolent and vacillating secretaries like Lord Glenelg, who was ultimately removed for incompetence. On the other hand, fear of criticism from the humanitarian element among the British public has always been a wholesome check on savage and irresponsible administration, happily limiting the number of Governor Eyres and General Dyers. But Governor Durban and Colonel (later Sir) Harry G. Smith were apparently not of the brutal sort, and were undoubtedly the victims of hysterical and inept meddling.

ARTHUR LYON CROSS.

Johann Peter Friedrich Ancillon und Kronprinz Friedrich Wilhelm IV. von Preussen. Von Paul Haake. [Historische Bibliothek, herausgegeben von der Redaktion der *Historischen Zeitschrift*, 42. Band.]

(Munich and Berlin, Oldenbourg, 1920, pp. 180, M. 20.) The author of this book seeks to rescue Ancillon from the unfriendly interment in the *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie*, to which he was consigned by an anonymous hand. He gives an excellent analysis of the ideas of this once famous preacher, philosopher, writer, tutor, and statesman, and of the strong anti-liberal influence which he exerted upon Frederick William III. and upon the crown prince, whose guide he became in 1810. His work is largely based on hitherto unused letters between Ancillon and the crown prince and he wisely lets the letters largely speak for themselves.

Ancillon, born in 1766, of a Prussian French Huguenot family, was a child of the Age of Enlightenment. His admiration for Frederick the Great and the system of government which he represented was unlimited. He happened to be at Versailles during the Tennis Court Oath, and the events which he witnessed in France turned him violently against all written constitutions and popular sovereignty. On his return to Berlin, he attracted so much attention by his eloquent sermons to the French community there that he was appointed, in 1810, as tutor to the crown prince, who became king in 1840. He was more than a mere tutor. He speedily became to the crown prince a beloved guide, philosopher, and friend—an intimate relationship, which lasted for more than a quarter of a century and was broken only by his death in 1837. But the clay in the potter's hand was not of the best. Even as a youth, Frederick William IV. often betrayed signs of that unbalanced ecstasy and fantasy which became more marked with age. "Nein! u. Ach! u. O! Dieses Rheingau ! ! ! ! !", he exclaimed in a letter to Ancillon in 1815 at the age of twenty; and the next sentence, stating that the weather was divine and that the church bells were ringing, is followed by twenty-eight exclamation points. Haake seems to think that Ancillon was at fault in not correcting earlier this ecstatic lack of self-control; but it is doubtful whether it would have been possible to do this. There is a curious family resemblance—slight but unmistakable—between the hysterical outbursts of this medieval romantic Hohenzollern and the ex-Kaiser's private notes as recently published by Kautsky.

Most interesting to the general student of German history is the author's account of the way in which Ancillon opposed the adoption of constitutional government in Prussia. Under the inspiration of the War of Liberation and of Hardenberg, Frederick William III. had signed on May 22, 1815, a project for a Prussian parliament and constitution. But Ancillon persuaded him to keep it locked up in his desk for some weeks. After Waterloo, Ancillon again secured the postponement of the execution of the project, then its displacement by the *Staatsrat* of 1817, and finally its abortion by a definite return to the old system of medieval estates.

SIDNEY B. FAY.

Memoirs of the Empress Eugénie. By Comte Fleury. In two volumes. (New York and London, D. Appleton and Company, 1920, pp. 473, 561, \$7.50.) The life of the Empress Eugénie afforded a rare opportunity for memoirs. For the entire period of the Second Empire she played an important part. No spectator had a better place from which to see and hear the play. Then, after the curtain fell, there came to her a long period for deep and quiet reflection. Her complex and elusive personality supplied an additional element of interest and significance. All who are interested in history may well rejoice that the memoirs which were to be expected have appeared so soon after the death of the empress.

With these, as with all memoirs, historians will first ask when and by whom they were written. The books themselves give no direct statement as to the date of writing. But the internal evidence shows almost conclusively that the memoirs were completed, except possibly for unimportant details, about ten years ago. The title-pages announce that the memoirs are by Comte Fleury. There is, however, a report in circulation that the empress dictated the memoirs to him. The internal evidence, in my judgment, indicates very clearly that in the main the empress was the real author.¹

The two volumes are of quite different character. In the first, the empress and her personal interests, especially the prince imperial and the court life, occupy a large place. Her whole career is covered, but there are only a few pages upon her youth and upon her later life in England after the fall of the Empire. The second volume consists of fifteen chapters, each dealing with some important feature of the history of the Second Empire, mainly with its foreign affairs. Nine of the fifteen chapters are devoted to the Franco-Prussian War. Probably the first volume will interest the greater number of readers, but historians will value the memoirs more for the second.

In both volumes, but especially the second, the recollection of the empress is supplemented by numerous contemporaneous documents, many of them hitherto unpublished. Among these are a good many reports of conversations and memoranda by Napoleon III. The remainder come from members of the imperial court, especially from General Fleury. It is unfortunate that for many of these documents exact information as to time of writing and authorship is lacking.

The memoirs contain no surprises. There is nothing in them that will compel any very considerable re-writing of the history of the Second Empire. They are interesting and clever Bonapartist propaganda, pleading for a more lenient judgment upon the Second Empire than has hitherto prevailed. Almost everything in the life of France which went well is ascribed to the wisdom and benevolence of Napoleon III. The

¹ An article by the reviewer in the *New York Evening Post*, Literary Review, Oct. 30, 1920, p. 14, gives the argument as to date of writing and authorship.

evils which his régime brought upon the country are, by implication at least, attributed chiefly to the malevolent opposition of his opponents in France.

Probably the most distinctive feature of the memoirs is the portrait they draw of the empress. It is, I think, much too favorable, inaccurate because incomplete. But it is done with sincerity, modesty, and good taste. It is a revelation of the empress as she would like to be seen.

FRANK MALOY ANDERSON.

International Labor Legislation. By Iwao Frederick Ayusawa, Ph.D. [Columbia University Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law, vol. XCI, no. 2.] (New York, Longmans, 1920, pp. 258, \$2.00.) Mr. Ayusawa describes his essay as a study of the history and progress of treaties, conventions, and congresses which have resulted in labor legislation of international validity. Two-thirds of the report is given to a description of the attempts to secure such legislation, from the early nineteenth century through the Great War. The account begins with Robert Owen's address before members of the Holy Alliance in 1818, in which he contended that "the prime task of the governments of Europe was the international fixation of the legal limits of normal industrial conditions". The development is traced through the rise of the international socialist organizations (the Internationales), the formation of international trade-unions, the various treaties and agreements which European governments have entered into, and the several non-official organizations which have worked to secure these agreements, the most important of which has been the International Association for Labor Legislation. The sources from which the account is drawn are scattered, and the assembled material will be useful to the student in the field of labor, even though he may be puzzled by several indefinite references (such as that to "an international labor conference", first mentioned on page 33) and by some errors (possibly typographical, as in the case of the year 1800 on page 30).

The remainder of the report is devoted mainly to the first Labor Conference under the League of Nations, held in Washington in the autumn of 1919, to which were appointed members from different countries as provided for in the Treaty of Peace, and which the author himself attended. He describes its organization; the adoption of the conventions on the eight-hour day, unemployment, the employment of women and children; and the recommendations on unhealthy processes, which are to become the basis of legislation in different countries. The account is given with a vividness which shows the writer to have been an interested observer, particularly with regard to the provisions which were so significant for Japan. Unfortunately the story stops short of the congress in Genoa and the activities of the International Labor Office.

AMY HEWES.

Literature in a Changing Age. By Ashley H. Thorndike, Professor of English in Columbia University. (New York, Macmillan Company, 1920, pp. 318, \$3.00.) The "Changing Age" is the Victorian era; and the purpose of the book is to set forth the changes wrought in the content and manner of Victorian literature by the political, economic, religious, and other developments of the period. The points of contact between the life and the literature are the more numerous and varied because the author's conception of literature is broad, not to say loose, including much that is confessedly ephemeral and of small artistic value, such as newspapers and magazines, although he lays chief emphasis upon writing that "moves our imagination and sympathy". Introductory chapters discuss the permanent and the changing in literature, and the "literary inheritance" from the generation of Wordsworth, Byron, and Keats, which formed a point of departure for Victorian literature. The Reading Public is the title of a chapter on changes in the numbers and taste of readers during the course of the century, with special insistence on the "Gargantuan appetite" of the modern public. Carlyle, as a powerful and pioneer figure, is then considered at some length in relation to his environment, much being made of his shift of interest from the mystical romanticism of *Sartor Resartus* to the economic and political ills diagnosed in *Past and Present* and later works. Subsequent chapters deal with the reflection, in poetry, novels, and essays, of the labor agitation, the growth in England of the ideas of democracy and empire, the transformation of theology under the influence of science, the feminist movement, and the effect of science, invention, and machinery upon modern life. The last two chapters, Beauty and Art and the Future, affirm that Victorian conceptions of beauty widened to embrace a greater variety of subjects, literature thereby becoming a more comprehensive and valuable transcript of the age, and prophesy that this widening process will continue.

One always takes up with respect a work by Professor Thorndike, but this book is below his reputation. It is solid and sensible, and presents truly the main facts about the period and its literature. But the ground covered is so wide that little not already known to the student of history or of literature can be told within the small compass of the volume; and the book lacks the unity, lucidity, and brilliancy which could alone make memorable so brief a treatment of so large and complex a subject.

WALTER C. BRONSON.

Direct and Indirect Costs of the Great World War. By Ernest L. Bogart, Professor of Economics, University of Illinois. (Washington, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1919, pp. vi, 330, \$1.00.) Behind Professor Bogart's ambitious attempt to estimate and summarize the total cost of the war lies a mass of laboriously collected material, presented in so usable a form that many a harassed student of the finan-

cial policies of nations will turn to it gratefully. The major part of the volume is concerned with the direct outlays of the belligerent countries. Great Britain and her dominions, the principal allied and associated powers, and Germany and her allies are considered in turn. In each case the author's procedure is to note important changes in the currency and to follow with numerical and descriptive statements of expenditures, loans, and taxation during the successive years of the war. The indirect costs of the war, which include casualties, the death toll in civilian life, property losses, and the loss in production, are treated briefly. In the conclusion the costs of the war are combined and the final figure set at \$337,946,179,657.

As an analysis of the financial history of each of the great countries during the war period Professor Bogart's contribution is not only important but unique. In the case of the larger countries the information is authentic and the gaps are few. The brief sections are in effect significant outlines of histories which are as yet largely unwritten. But for Rumania, Greece, and Serbia the direct costs are almost wholly estimated, and for thirteen other entente allies a blanket estimate of \$500,000,000 in direct outlays is given.

The attempt to estimate the indirect costs of the war is correctly described in the author's foreword as "attended with a considerable amount of conjecture and . . . [to] be regarded merely as the best guess which is possible at the present time". The loss of human life is now to a considerable extent a matter of record; but the capitalized value of that life is a matter in which one man's guess is as good as another's, and possibly as good as the French actuary's estimates used by the author. The figures for property losses, on land and by sea, are almost equally elusive. The cost of war relief and the outlays of neutrals can perhaps be approximated. Insuperable difficulties lie in the way of calculating the loss of production, but the figure is placed at \$45,000,000,000—the largest single item in the list of indirect costs, which total \$151,612,542,560.

It is an axiom of statistical method that a numerical total is no more accurate than its weakest member. In view of the estimate of \$45,000,000,000 for loss in production, the grand total of \$337,946,179,657 as the price which the world has paid for the war loses much of its meaning. It is not as an accurate summary of the costs of the war, but as an outline of the financial history of the great powers, that the book will prove permanently useful.

ALZADA COMSTOCK.

Le Guet-apens Prussien en Belgique. Par Godefroid Kurth, Professeur Émérite à l'Université de Liège. Avec une Préface de S. E. le Cardinal D. J. Mercier, Archevêque de Malines. Avant-propos de M. Georges Goyau. (Paris, Honoré Champion; Brussels, Albert Dewit, 1919, pp. xiii, 226, 4.40 fr.) This little book, published three years

after the death of its author, contains the finished portion of what was to have been a summary history of Germany's crime against Belgium. Of eleven chapters indicated in his notes but five were completed at his death. These survey Belgian neutrality since 1831 (ch. I.), Belgian responsibility to protect its neutrality (ch. II.), the German ultimatum and Belgian response (ch. III.), the Prussian efforts to justify their conduct (ch. IV.), and the resistance of Belgium to the aggression (ch. V.). A brief conclusion and three appendixes, dealing more specifically with the atrocities, complete the work. The book proper repeats what is now a well-known story. The appendixes, especially the account of the tragedy at Aerschot, contribute testimony which cannot be ignored. The work is very clear in style and remarkably restrained in tone.

The author, who is well known not only for his numerous and remarkable contributions in the field of early European history but also for his great work as a teacher of scientific method in history, seems to have been rather unjustly regarded as pro-German in his intellectual sympathies. He had frankly admired German historical scholarship and had sought to establish the history seminar in Belgium. On the other hand he had equally admired the lucidity of French exposition and fully succeeded in making it his own. The possibility of appropriating the excellent qualities of both without incurring intellectual vassallage to either would probably be admitted without argument by dispassionate students. Certainly the present work reveals the author as a true patriot—without prejudice to his reputation as a critical scholar. Perhaps this is the chief motive of his literary executors in presenting this work to the world so late.

A. C. K.

The Russian Peasant and the Revolution. By Maurice G. Hindus. (New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1920, pp. xii, 327, \$2.00.) The problem of the Russian peasant is one of the most important and most trying problems of the Russian past and present. It is sufficient to state that the peasants form 85 per cent. of the Russian population and are steadily increasing much more than the city-population. The problem presents itself, broadly speaking, as follows: What is the Russian peasant and what is the part he will play in Russia in the future? The book of Hindus tries to solve this problem. Hindus seems to be personally acquainted with the life of the Russian peasant and has completed his personal impressions through wide reading of different Russian books. The result of both is a book written with good knowledge of the subject, with great sympathy for the Russian peasant, and in a good style. The best chapters are the first eight, which depict the economic and the social life of the peasants. My only objections to this vivid picture are: (1) the author treats Russia as a whole, for him the Russian peasant and the conditions of his life are the same everywhere; this is misleading; one type of the Russian peasant and one type of his economic life

do not exist; they are utterly different in different parts of Russia; (2) the author describes almost exclusively the economic life of the peasants; I expected to find a larger amount of information on the religious habits and on the morals of the peasant; (3) he gives a very rosy idealized picture of the character of the Russian peasant, a picture usually given by the so-called Russian popularists (*narodniki*).¹

In dealing with the political side of the problem (chs. IX.-XVII.) Hindus is very keen in criticizing the different solutions of the agrarian problem proposed by the different political parties in Russia, both liberal and socialistic. He seems to advocate the thesis that the peasants were right in using the régime of the Bolsheviki for taking the land from the landowners without waiting for a general and fair solution of the agrarian problem by the Constituent Assembly. I completely disagree with Hindus in this respect. The tumultuous way of seizing the land and the elementary way of dividing it among the neighbors of the seized estates are unfair and seem to me a great regression, both from the point of view of morals and of economics. They bring Russia back to the conditions of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and their economic results would make her an easy prey for her more advanced neighbors. I am convinced that the solution of the agrarian problem in Russia is not yet found, and that every new government of Russia, even a peasants' government, will be obliged to start afresh with this tremendous problem and to find a fair and just way of its solution.

M. ROSTOVTSSEV.

Handbooks prepared under the Direction of the Historical Section of the Foreign Office. Vols. XII., XVI., XVII., XXIII.-XXV., nos. 67-73, 96-109, 148-162. (London, H. M. Stationery Office, 1920, pp. from 24 to 174, prices from 6d to 4 sh.) This fresh batch of Dr. Prothero's *Handbooks* includes several interesting numbers. In some of them the name of the author is now given. The excellent one on the Congress of Vienna (no. 153) by Professor Charles K. Webster has already appeared in public print (Oxford University Press). The one on the Congress of Berlin (no. 154) is also well done. We note particularly, as containing accurate and useful information not easily accessible elsewhere, the *Handbooks* on Syria and Palestine (no. 60), the Islands of the Northern and Eastern Aegean (no. 64), Mongolia (no. 68), Manchuria (no. 69), and the Plebiscite and Referendum (no. 159). The last pamphlet in the series (no. 162) deals with Zionism and may be recommended. The preceding one (no. 161), entitled "President Wilson's Policy", is made up of extracts from the messages and speeches of the President. They are put in without comment.

¹ I regret that Hindus is not acquainted with the striking picture of the life of the Russian peasant given by Miss Semenova-Tianshansky (*The Life of Ivan*, published by the Russian Geographical Society), who spent her whole life among the peasants.

Nos. 96 to 109 are (with the exception of one on French Morocco, no. 101) devoted to English, French, and Belgian tropical Africa. They contain, like the other handbooks in the series, carefully gathered and useful information, well selected and succinctly put, and supported by bibliographies of varying value. In the appendixes several of them have treaties and other documents.

Nos. 148 to 152 deal with broader international topics, namely, the Freedom of the Seas, by Sir Francis T. Piggett, International Rivers, by Georges Kaeckenbeeck, International Canals, by Edward A. Whit-tuck, International Congresses, by Rt. Hon. Sir Ernest Satow, and European Coalitions, Alliances, and Ententes since 1792, by F. J. C. Hearnshaw.

Las Órdenes Religiosas de España y la Colonización de América en la Segunda Parte del Siglo XVIII. Estadísticas y Otros Documentos. Publicados por el P. Otto Maas, O. F. M. (Barcelona, Fidel Giró, 1918, pp. 217.) This volume is an extract from the *Estudios Franciscanos* for 1917 and 1918. Father Maas, a German, sets forth in his preface the outburst of missionary zeal among German Catholics before the Great War, citing as an example the formation of the International Institute for the Scientific Study of Missions, under whose auspices he is working in the archives of Spain.

The volume is a welcome addition to printed documentary sources. It reproduces twenty-one documents from the Archivo General de Indias, at Seville. We are grateful for a good analytical index, which Continental publications of this character usually lack. Documents I. and II. are of interest for a comparative study of missions in North and South America, for they give a general view of the work of the various orders in all Spanish America during the twenty years, 1759-1779. Numbers III. and IV. deal with Chile and Peru, V. with Quito, VI., VII., and VIII. with New Granada, IX.-XII. with Venezuela, XIII. with Guiana, XIV., XV., XVI. with Bolivia, and XVII.-XXI. with Argentina and Paraguay.

HERBERT E. BOLTON.

The Fitch Papers: Correspondence and Documents during Thomas Fitch's Governorship of the Colony of Connecticut, 1754-1766. Vol. II., January, 1759-May, 1766. [Collections of the Connecticut Historical Society, vol. XVIII.] (Hartford, the Society, 1920, pp. xxiii, 457, \$3.00.) With the issue of the second volume of the Fitch Papers, the editor, Mr. Bates, emerges from the confines of strictly Connecticut history and enters the broader field of imperial relations. Some of the problems of the previous volume concerned, it is true, other colonies than Connecticut and brought us at times into touch with Great Britain, but none of them rose to the dignity of major issues in the same sense as do those here presented, connected as the latter are with the closing years of

the Seven Years' War, the peace of Paris, the renewal of the Molasses Act, and the passing of the Stamp Act. Even the Susquehannah question, which in its later phases, as here depicted, becomes Anglo-American in importance, was at first but a comparatively small matter; and the Mohegan question, though carried eventually up to the King in Council, never became of more than local interest. But from 1759 to 1766 Connecticut steps out into the limelight and her leading problems are, to an extent greater than ever before, those of all the colonies. Anyone dealing with this period must reckon with the documents here printed, for they throw light often in unexpected places. From them we not only learn much about Connecticut's contribution to the war and her relations with General Amherst but obtain also such interesting incidental facts as that Connecticut men served with the British regulars and in the regiments of other colonies; we acquire important information regarding the colonial agencies in London of Jackson, Ingersoll, Johnson, and Life; we understand better than before Connecticut's financial dealings with England and her manner of handling the money received from Parliament; we find here the text of the lost "State of the Trade", drawn up by the Boston merchants in 1763, and in close connection with it Connecticut's own protest against the renewal of the Molasses Act; and above all else we get valuable additions to our knowledge of the conferences and debates preceding the passage of the Stamp Act. Some of this material has been printed before, and some of it has been used by Professor Gipson in his account of Jared Ingersoll and by Miss Bailey in her paper on the Susquehannah controversy, but it can all be used again with profit. Mr. Bates does not often nod, but we cannot understand why he should twice refer to the "State Paper Office" as if it were a place where documents can still be found, and we wonder a little that he should have passed by "Samuel Marten" (to whom Ingersoll wrote a long letter in 1761, pp. 131-134), as if he were a person easy to identify. We are glad to be able to state that another volume of the series, containing the papers and correspondence of Governor Pitkin, is already in preparation and will probably be issued in the spring. The Pitkin volume will be the last of a remarkably useful publication, of which the Connecticut Historical Society may well be proud.

C. M. A.

Maine in the Northeastern Boundary Controversy. By Henry S. Burrage, State Historian. (State Librarian, 1919, pp. xiv, 398, \$3.50.) This work is of the "local history" type, relating with extreme particularity and in great detail incidents of interest, primarily, only to residents of the district or community where the incidents occurred. Nevertheless the Maine boundary question was, and is, of great importance in American diplomatic history, and the author has made some contributions of fact, and some corrections of error in his extremely painstaking, though rather dreary, presentation. He gives excellent summaries of the argu-

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ments advanced by Maine, New Brunswick, the United States, and Great Britain, all through the controversy, of which Webster said the arguments were as difficult to follow as the boundary itself. An interesting fact stated by Mr. Burrage is that, whatever the truth of the accusation that Preble, the American minister to the Netherlands, sent advance information of the Netherlands award to Maine, a month before he sent it to Washington, there is at least no proof of this to be found in the Maine archives. The author comments on a previous "local history" on the boundary controversy, written by the Hon. Israel Washburn, that it is in error in naming two British and one American as members of the St. Croix Commission of 1796 and then attacking the decision of the Commission as necessarily "British". Mr. Burrage says that in fact there were two Americans and one British commissioner, and defends the decision of the commission. The archives of Maine evidently have been very thoroughly studied by the author, but he gives little evidence of acquaintance with the many monographs, both British and American, that have been written on various aspects of the Maine boundary controversy. The work is better organized in the earlier than in the later chapters. As a whole it constitutes an addition to knowledge which must be used by the general historian of the controversy.

E. D. A.

Autobiography of Andrew Carnegie. (Boston and New York, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1920, pp. xii, 385, \$5.00.) The group of admirable biographies of the captains of industry, which already includes important works on Jay Cooke, Henry Villard, James J. Hill, and Lord Strathcona, is noticeably enlarged by this self-drawn portrait of the steel-master. Although the book has been touched up here and there by the friendly pen of Professor John C. Van Dyke, it is essentially and convincingly the work of Carnegie himself. The historian will regret that it confines itself more to portraiture than to documentation, that it throws little new light upon partly known facts, and that it has none of the elaborate accuracy likely to be found in the biography of a man who seeks to justify himself.

Andrew Carnegie was satisfied with himself and the rest of the Scotsmen, from his earliest years. With the simplicity of the great prestidigitator he transforms the humble errand boy into the associate of emperors and the benefactor of society. He conceals the steps by which he rose, if indeed he ever knew them. The searcher for the principles upon which success is founded will find here little to illustrate any rule. He will find maxims enough, for Carnegie was only less fertile than Poor Richard in wise apothegms; but he may end by wishing for fewer maxims and more abundant proof.

It is highly improbable that Carnegie became leader in the develop-

ment of the use of steel by following his own motto, "never to go in where you couldn't wade". Here and there he gives a glimpse of the cautious plunger. When as a boy, or little more than one, he stepped beyond his orders and ran Tom Scott's division of the Pennsylvania Railroad, he was giving an evidence of cool willingness to take risks. He knew as well how to advertise. His practice as a messenger boy in Pittsburgh to learn the faces of his customers and flatter them by delivering messages to them on the street, is worthy of Franklin. His advice to the office-boy to do something outside the line of duty, in order to catch the attention of the boss, comes close to being his recipe for success.

The reader of the book retains a friendly feeling towards a simple yet astute personality. Carnegie had a persistent enthusiasm for the permanent values in life, and a genuine devotion to the task of spreading these values among his fellows. The amiable delight that he received from academic robes and festive orations was a slight price to pay for the facilities of education that he spread throughout the world. He patronized the Kaiser as unconsciously as he did the humblest laborer in his mills. But he could stir up movements that show him as a keen weigher of political forces.

Occasionally the volume gives fragments of testimony or fact. Collis P. Huntington reveals himself as he confesses that "My ledger is the only book I have gone through for five years". "I'll never drink a drop of liquor again", is ascribed to Grant at the time of Rawlins's remonstrance; and, says Carnegie, "He never did". Simon Cameron is given credit, upon his own admission, for securing the renomination of both Jackson and Lincoln. But, as Carnegie himself adds, "'There's figuring in all them things.'"

FREDERIC L. PAXSON.

Organized Labor in American History. By Frank Tracy Carlton, Ph.D., Professor of Economics in DePauw University. (New York, D. Appleton and Company, 1920, pp. 313.) As its title implies, Professor Carlton's book is not a history of labor, but of labor's influence on American social and political development. There is, it is true, a chapter of about thirty pages on the rise and growth of the labor movement; but that is only by way of introduction. It is followed by chapters on labor's relation to the adoption of the Constitution, to the public school system, land reform, labor legislation, minor reform movements, and political action. The volume is therefore unique in that it attempts to bring economic, social, and political history together and for that reason should be welcomed by both economists and historians. It might very well supplement a text-book in either political or economic history. The author's purpose however is not coldly scientific. He shows a lively sympathy for the humane aspects of the labor movement. Writing when

the zeal for reconstruction was abroad in the land, he hoped for a new age of services, co-operation, and mutual aid to take the place of the old epoch of strife, profits, and international rivalry. Indeed some passages were evidently written while the American utopia seemed within his grasp. Still, with a scholar's caution, he warns us that the vision may fade, nay, is now fading and that industrial chaos lies just ahead. Leaving advocacy and prophecy aside, we may say that the author has accomplished his modest purpose of helping to bring American history into a truer perspective by showing the influence of the wage-earner on the course of events. As he remarks, a great deal has been written on the influence of the frontier—a thing of the past—and the time has come to emphasize a power that has been and is increasing. Surely no one can quarrel with that.

MARY BEARD.

The New Frontier: a Study of the American Liberal Spirit, its Frontier Origin, and its Application to Modern Problems. By Guy Emerson. (New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1920, pp. xii, 314, \$2.00.) If the prospective reader picks up this book with the expectation of finding a discussion of the frontier in its later manifestations, he is doomed to disappointment, for, as the secondary title indicates, it is a spiritual and not a physical frontier which Mr. Emerson discusses. As he states it, "the main purpose of this book is to point out how this great heritage [the spirit of the frontiersman] may invigorate our work and keep fresh our inherent idealism". After a preface by Professor Hazen and a brief introduction, the author attempts, in a chapter on the Frontier of American Character, to state the significance of the constantly advancing line of civilization; in this he testifies to the influence of the works of Professor Turner, to whose writings he owes in large part his inspiration to put pen to paper. The frontier, he maintains, is still with us, but "it is a frontier industrial, financial, commercial, political, social, educational, artistic, diplomatic, religious". The remaining chapters have indeed a slight thread, in occasional reference to this frontier spirit, which may be said to tie them into some sort of a unified whole; but all might well have been printed separately as essays on such topics as the Leadership that made America, What is a Liberal? Human Resources, or the American Spirit in World Affairs. The last chapter, entitled the New Frontier, is an attempt to synthesize America's problems and to state the attitude in which they should be faced.

Mr. Emerson belongs to that somewhat neglected though numerous group of liberals as distinguished from radicals on the one hand and reactionaries on the other. And it is to this inchoate and as yet largely inarticulate body that this country has to look for guidance if the tasks of the present are met as the pioneer faced the unsubdued wilderness:

with an Americanism which "is a basic love of the square deal, of fair play . . . a love sometimes submerged in the show and bustle of twentieth-century achievement, of rugged simplicity both of living and character".

Written by a layman for laymen, with a limited and somewhat uneven bibliography appended for the use of readers not especially familiar with the development of the United States, the book is interesting and valuable as an illustration of one type of thought which has to be taken into consideration by the student of forces making American history to-day.

L. B. SHIPPEE.

The "Corsair" in the War Zone. By Ralph D. Paine. (Boston and New York, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1920, pp. xiii, 303, \$4.00.) This well-written and attractively got up volume, though primarily a more or less personal record of an armed yacht and her ship's company, nevertheless possesses undoubted historical value as the chronicle of a typical vessel of her class, the mission of which was to make good the serious lack of destroyers and scouting craft in our navy in 1917. The name *Corsair* has long held an honorable place in our naval annals, for its former bearer, rechristened the *Gloucester*, made a dashing name for herself off Santiago in 1898 under the heroic Wainwright.

It is unfortunate that the United States has never followed the example of Great Britain and enrolled in her naval reserve the best of her merchant steamers, and it is therefore the more to the credit of American owners that they immediately placed their vessels at Uncle Sam's disposition for a nominal rental. The strenuous and varied career of the *Corsair* under Commander Kittinger, and afterwards under Lieut.-Commander Porter, her original yachting skipper, is replete with interest, and is told by Mr. Paine with simplicity and spirit. It is well to have so detailed a record, and so typical a one, of the astonishing manner in which a lot of landsmen, most of them innocent of salt water, were turned in a marvellously short time into accomplished seamen and naval mechanics.

The book is a welcome and valuable minor contribution to the history of the World War. The numerous and excellent illustrations greatly add to its attractiveness.

EDWARD BRECK.

Russian-American Relations, March, 1917-March, 1920: Documents and Papers. Compiled and edited by C. K. Cumming and Walter W. Pettit. (New York, Harcourt, Brace, and Howe, 1920, pp. xxviii, 375, \$3.50.) The executive committee of the League of Free Nations Association, having resolved to undertake an inquiry into the relations between the United States and Russia since the revolution of March,

1917, entrusted the inquiry to a committee of three, Dr. John A. Ryan, Mr. J. Henry Scattergood, and Mr. William Allen White, who caused this volume to be prepared by Mr. C. K. Cumming, and by Captain Walter W. Pettit, who as a member of the Military Intelligence Division of the United States Army had accompanied Mr. William C. Bullitt in his brief mission to Petrograd in March, 1919. The result is the present collection of documents and papers, some 270 in number, dated from March 16, 1917, to February 24, 1920, and furnishing an extraordinary and welcome affluence of material illustrating the diplomatic and quasi-diplomatic relations maintained by our government with that of Russia. It is much to be wished that we might have many more of such books, illustrative of our foreign relations, especially in view of the sparing manner in which, on the whole, our Department of State gives forth documentary evidence respecting those relations. Gratitude for the publication, however, should not impose silence as to its faults, which are of such a character as to impair greatly its usefulness. First of all, the selection of documents, besides being very slight for the period of the provisional and Kerensky governments, has also somewhat of an *ex parte* character. Out of 270 documents, 137 have apparently been contributed by Mr. Raymond Robins, whose attitude toward the administration is sufficiently well known; a third of the rest are from the *Izvestia*, the official organ of the Soviet government, while other Russian authorities have almost no representation; most of the rest are from the *New York Times* and its *Current History*. The reader will not fail to be struck with the entire absence of papers derived directly from the State Department, except for five that are taken from one of its publications. A more serious effort should surely have been made to procure authoritative material from that source, and, to the reviewer's knowledge, would not have been unsuccessful. Such a recourse would have given greater completeness and fairness to the book's exhibit. We should like, besides knowing what Colonel Robins and others cabled to Washington, to know more of what was cabled in reply. Such a recourse might also have improved the texts in some cases; *e. g.*, one of the most important documents is known to have had an important additional paragraph of which no trace is here given. On the paper jacket of the book the publishers assert that "all the available documents and papers which seemed important" have been included; but the editorial committee do not claim so much. If however this partial publication shall cause the State Department to print more frankly, it will have done additional good.

Publications of the American Jewish Historical Society. No. 27. The Lyons Collection, vol. II. (The Society, 1920, pp. xx, 618.) This second volume of the Lyons collection contains a great mass of notes on American Jewish history which the Rev. J. J. Lyons, with indefatigable industry, collected during a long period of labor in that field. Many of

his data have been discovered independently by other workers in the same field, and published, during the long period between the time of his death and the date when, by the generous gift of his children, this volume has been placed within the reach of scholars. His references and notes as to material already thus published are here calendared. The rest of the book is a rich mine of material, but consisting so largely of items as rather to defy reviewing. Many of these items, from manuscripts and from books of local history, are of great interest, and the sum total of what they contribute to American Hebrew history is extraordinary. The items are systematically arranged and admirably indexed.

Stevenson's Germany: the Case Against Germany in the Pacific. By C. Brunson Fletcher. (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1920, pp. xv, 230, \$3.50.) The purpose of this book is to show why the former German colonies in the Pacific should never be returned to her. Robert Louis Stevenson is cited as the strongest witness against the late empire, and his *A Footnote to History* is accepted as a strong and accurate indictment. But beyond the repetition of charges the volume contains very little of a positive nature. This is naïvely explained by the oft-repeated statement that there was almost a conspiracy of silence to withhold the facts concerning the treatment of the natives in the German possessions. "No one cared to speak or to write against Germany, and we are forced to argue from suggestion instead of being able to recite the facts of the case." "It would be easy", we are told, "for Germany to draw a terrible indictment against Great Britain and her Colonies in the Pacific from the attacks of English writers and publicists, and it would be difficult for critics of Germany to retaliate on similar grounds, if voluminous documents were essential." However, the author is convinced that "first in Samoa and then right through the ocean German ways with the natives have been full of treachery, deceit, and devilishness", and "the feeling throughout Australasia is that Germany can never be trusted again".

Mr. Fletcher is an Australian journalist who has already given us two books on the Pacific. The present volume has little to commend it. The organization is very faulty, the materials used are slight and even they have not been presented as well as they deserved, and there are certain obvious errors, such as the reference to "eight hundred millions" of Chinese. It would not be difficult for a more careful investigator to write a more useful study of the career of Germany in the Pacific.

P. J. T.

HISTORICAL NEWS

AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION

While this number of the *Review* is being printed, the Association holds, in Washington, its thirty-fifth annual meeting. The *Annual Report* for 1917 will be distributed, it is hoped, not long after the meeting. It is also hoped that it will be followed soon by vol. II. of the *Annual Report* for 1918, containing the autobiography of Martin Van Buren. As the Yale University Press has discontinued the publication of the annual bibliography, *Writings on American History*, which it has hitherto, with much liberality, maintained as an independent volume, that bibliography will hereafter be printed as a part of the *Annual Report*, as it was in 1909, 1910, and 1911. This practice will begin with vol. I. of 1918, which will also contain the proposed handbook, or directory of members. Both *Writings, 1918*, and the handbook will probably be obtainable in separate form somewhat in advance of the completion of vol. I. for 1918 at the Government Printing Office. (P. S. For additional data respecting the annual meeting, see p. 411.)

PERSONAL

Professor Arley B. Show, who held the chair of medieval history in Stanford University, died on October 27. A graduate of Doane College and of Andover Theological Seminary, he came to Stanford University as assistant professor of European history in 1892, and in 1901 he was made professor. In addition to his regular work of instruction he was especially active in teachers' courses, and his relations with the high school teachers of the state were very intimate. He published much in the field of historical pedagogy, and was a man of great worth of character.

Dr. Julius Klein has left the government service in the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce and has resumed his university duties as an associate professor at Harvard.

Professor Rayner W. Kelsey returns in January to Haverford College from a leave of absence spent mostly in London, with a view to a work on the history of agriculture in colonial Pennsylvania.

Dr. W. F. Dunaway has been appointed assistant professor of history in the Pennsylvania State College.

Mr. I. R. Hudson, instructor in history and political science in Vanderbilt University, has been advanced to the grade of assistant pro-

fessor, and Professor Frank L. Owsley, of Birmingham College, has been appointed assistant professor of history in Vanderbilt University.

Professor Charles H. Cunningham of the University of Texas is on leave of absence as economic adviser attached to the American embassy at Madrid.

Mr. Charles F. Coan, formerly of the University of California, has accepted a position in the department of history and political science in the State University of New Mexico.

Dr. William H. Ellison, dean of the Santa Barbara Junior College, has been elected associate professor of history in the Oregon Agricultural College.

Dr. Waldemar C. Westergaard of Pomona College has been promoted to a full professorship in history on the Warren F. Day Foundation.

GENERAL

The principal articles in the October number of the *Historical Outlook* are a study of the problems of Devolution and Imperial Federation (in the British Empire), by Professor Edith E. Ware of Chattanooga University; a discussion of the Territorial Problems of the Peace Conference, by Professor Douglas Johnson, chief of the division of boundary geography in the American commission to negotiate peace; and a contribution by Professor Desdèvises du Dezert, entitled *Along the Highways of French History*. The latter paper is continued in the November number, in which is also found an article by Anna L. Holbrook on the Cult of the Dead in Ancient Egypt. In the December number the most important historical article is a study of the American Position on the Revolution of 1848 in Germany, by Professor R. C. McGrane.

When the Germans burned Louvain the whole edition of the *Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique* for July, 1914, was destroyed. It has now been reproduced, and published in October, 1920, as no. 3 of vol. XV. On account of the costs of printing ("quintuplés", says the editor) vol. XV. will be concluded with this third number, instead of having the usual four. We are glad to be assured that Professor Cauchie's admirable journal is now to resume publication. From January, 1921, on, there will be three numbers issued each year. The price of subscription, in other countries than Belgium, will be 30 francs. Before long a special *fascicule* will be issued devoted to the *Bibliographie de l'Histoire Ecclésiastique* from 1914 to the end of 1919; also a general index to the first fifteen volumes (1900-1914). As the 500th anniversary of the University of Louvain approaches it is intended to issue a supplementary *Collection d'Études sur l'Histoire Externe et Interne de l'Ancienne Université de Louvain, 1425-1797*. The principal contents of the number now published are an article on the theological writings of Robert

of Melun, by Father R. M. Martin, O. P., a completing installment of the series of articles by Father A. Debil, S. J., on Gratian *De Paenitentia*, and of that of Father M. Dubreul, S. J., on Pope Alexander VIII. and French affairs, this present article relating to the conclave of 1689.

Dr. Woodson's *Journal of Negro History* contains in its October number valuable papers by two of his pupils, Arnet G. Lindsay, who treats of Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Great Britain bearing on the Return of Negro Slaves, 1783-1828, and Norman P. Andrews, who treats of the Negro in Politics since emancipation. There are also biographical accounts of Henry Bibb, negro colonizer in Canada, by Fred Landon, and of Myrtila Minor, founder of the normal school for colored girls in Washington, by G. S. Wormley.

Die Materialistische Geschichtsauffassung, ihr Wesen und ihre Wandlungen (Leipzig, Quelle and Meyer, 1920, pp. 66) by Professor E. Brandenburg; *Probleme der Wirtschaftsgeschichte, eine Einführung* (Tübingen, Mohr, 1920, pp. xiii, 711) by Professor G. von Below; Vicomte G. d'Avenel's *Découvertes d'Histoire Sociale* (Paris, Flammarion, 1920); and *Zur Rassenfrage, eine Stammes- und Kulturgeschichtliche Untersuchung* (Vienna, Braumüller, 1919, pp. 181) by M. Mises, are recent contributions to the discussion of the problems of historical study.

Problems of history teaching are discussed in *Der Neue Geschichtsunterricht* (Berlin, Union Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft, 1920, pp. 70) by Professor A. Meister and others.

The Oxford University Press has just published volume I. of Sir Paul Vinogradoff's *Outlines of Historical Jurisprudence*, and a second volume of the *Studies in the History and Method of Science*, edited by Dr. Charles Singer.

A History of Sea Power, by William O. Stevens and Allan Westcott, professors in the United States Naval Academy, comes from the press of George H. Doran Company.

Messrs. Macmillan and Company of London expect to bring out in January Lord Bryce's *Modern Democracies*, in two volumes.

Democracy and Assimilation, by Professor Julius Drachsler of Smith College (Macmillan), is, on the historical side, a study of the facts of intermarriage among ethnic groups in the United States as well as of the community life and organization of immigrants.

A History of Political Theories from Rousseau to Spencer (Macmillan, pp. ix, 446), by Professor William A. Dunning of Columbia University, completing his remarkable series of volumes on the history of political theories, has just been published.

The Fitzpatrick and other Lectures on the History of Medicine, by Sir T. Clifford Allbutt, professor of medicine in Cambridge University

and president of the British Medical Association, will be published by Macmillan.

Members of the department of history in the University of Chicago have prepared a small *Study Manual for European History* (University of Chicago Press) which may be commended to college teachers elsewhere.

Nicholas L. Brown, 123 Lexington Avenue, New York, is beginning the publication of a series of *Historical Miniatures*, edited by Dr. F. L. Glaser, each volume of which will consist of an account, by an eyewitness, of one of the most impressive or crucial periods of history. The first volumes in the series will be *Scenes from the Court of Peter the Great*, based on the Latin diary of Korb, secretary of the Austrian legation at Peter's court, and *Pope Alexander VI. and his Court*, based on Burchard's diary.

In the series *Helps for Students of History*, no. 30 is a tract of 59 pages on *Seals*, by H. S. Kingsförd, assistant secretary of the Society of Antiquaries.

Noteworthy articles in periodicals: S. C. Gilfillan, *The Coldward Course of Progress* (Political Science Quarterly, September); Moeller van den Bruck, *Der Untergang des Abendlandes: für und wider Spengler* (Deutsche Rundschau, July); R. Picard, *Le Développement de l'Historiographie Moderne d'après un Ouvrage Récent [Fueter]* (Revue d'Histoire Économique, VIII. 1).

ANCIENT HISTORY

General review: N. H. Baynes, *Some Recent Books on Roman History* (History, October).

The Cambridge University Press announces a work on *The Origin of Man and of his Superstitions*, by Carveth Read, lecturer on comparative psychology in University College, London.

Sallust and a first volume of Herodotus have appeared in the *Loeb Classical Library*.

L. Pareti deals with the period prior to the conquest of Messenia in the first volume of his *Storia di Sparta Arcaica* (Florence, Le Monnier, 1920, pp. vii, 276).

Professor Ettore Pais has issued the fourth volume of his *Storia Critica di Roma durante i Primi Cinque Secoli* (Rome, Maglione and Strini, 1920, pp. x, 494).

Virgile et les Origines d'Ostie, by J. Carcopino (Paris, Boccard), fasc. 116 of the *Bibliothèque des Écoles Françaises d'Athènes et de Rome*, consists of a brilliant dissertation on the "pre-history" of Ostia and of an authoritative treatise on the topography of the last six books of the Aeneid.

In a brief dissertation published by the Accademia dei Lincei, *Il Liber Coloniarum*, Professor Ettore Pais essays to prove, against Mommsen and others, that that portion of the *Gromatici Latini* has a substantial value for the history of the Roman colonies in Italy.

Noteworthy articles in periodicals: J. H. Breasted, *The Origins of Civilization*, I.-VI. (Scientific Monthly, October, 1919-March, 1920); M. Rostovtsev, *L'Age du Cuivre dans le Caucase Septentrional et les Civilisations de Soumer et de l'Égypte Protodynastique* (Revue Archéologique, July); J. H. Breasted, *The Earliest Internationalism* (Semi-centenary Celebration of the University of California); G. Poisson, *Les Influences Ethniques dans la Religion Grecque, Essai d'Application de la Méthode Ethnologique à l'Histoire Religieuse*, I. (Revue de Synthèse Historique, February); J. Simon, *Hellenism and the Jews in the Three Centuries preceding Christianity* (American Catholic Quarterly Review, April); E. Meyer, *Die Gemeinde des Neuen Bundes im Lande Damascus: eine Jüdische Schrift aus der Seleukidenzeit* (Abhandlungen der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1919, 9); K. Kohler, *The Essenes and the Apocalyptic Literature* (Jewish Quarterly Review, October); B. W. Wells, *Business and Politics at Carthage* (Sewanee Review, October); M. Gelzer, *Römische Gesellschaft zur Zeit Ciceros* (Neue Jahrbücher, XLV. 1); E. G. Hardy, *Augustus and his Legionaries* (Classical Quarterly, July-October); W. E. Heitland, *A Great Agricultural Emigration from Italy* (Journal of Roman Studies, VIII. 1); R. K. McElderry, *Vespasian's Reconstruction of Spain* (ibid.); E. Hohl, *Über den Ursprung der Historia Augusta* (Hermes, LV. 3); J. Geffcken, *Religionsgeschichtliches in der Historia Augusta* (ibid.); Sir W. M. Ramsay, *Studies in the Roman Province of Galatia* (Journal of Roman Studies, VIII. 2).

EARLY CHURCH HISTORY

General review: C. Guignebert, *Antiquités Chrétiennes* (Revue Historique, May).

In *Les Mystères Païens et le Mystère Chrétien* (Paris, Nourry, 1920, pp. 368), Alfred Loisy has deduced from a study of the Greek mysteries and of the Oriental cults arguments to show that the ideas involved in them were foreign to the teachings of Jesus but appear in the writings of Paul, whose acceptance of them assured the successful spread of Christianity in the first centuries.

F. R. M. Hitchcock has studied the life and work of *Irenaeus of Lugdunum* (Cambridge, University Press, 1920, pp. vi, 367), and Dean J. Armitage Robinson has translated and edited St. Irenaeus's *Demonstration of the Apostolic Preaching* (London, S. P. C. K., 1920, pp. 154), the text of which was first printed in 1907 from a manuscript found at Erivan in Armenia.

F. Haase has published a translation of *Die Koptischen Quellen zum Konzil von Nicäa* (Paderborn, Schöningh, 1920, pp. 124) with editorial commentary; E. W. Brooks has edited for the series *Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium* the *Historia Ecclesiastica Zachariae Rhetori vulgo adscripta* (Paris, Gabalda, 1919, pp. ix, 238).

Part II. of *Testimonies: or Quotations against the Jews* in the early Christian Church, with a survey of the whole subject, by Dr. J. Rendel Harris and Vacher Burch, is soon to be issued by the Cambridge University Press; part I. appeared in 1916.

In commemoration of the fifteen-hundredth anniversary of the death of St. Jerome, the Hieronymite friars have published an edition of the *Lettere di San Girolamo* (Rome, Desclée, 1920, pp. xlvi, 648).

MEDIEVAL HISTORY

Dom Cuthbert Butler, abbot of Downside, has issued *Benedictine Monachism, Studies in Benedictine Life and Rule* (London, Longmans, 1920).

A. Fliche has gathered three articles published last year in the *Moyen Age* into a volume on *Hildebrand* (Paris, Champion, 1920). He is also the author of the volume *Saint Grégoire VII.* (Paris, Gabalda, 1920) in the series *Les Saints*.

The Latin Orient (S. P. C. K., pp. 61), by Dr. William Miller, in the series of *Helps for Students of History*, deals with the crusading states in Palestine, the kingdom of Cyprus, the Frankish states in Greece, the Venetian colonies in Greece and Albania, the Genoese colonies, and the Knights of Rhodes.

A. von Ruville is the author of a new volume on *Die Kreuzzüge* (Bonn, Schroeder, 1920, pp. vii, 370).

Extracts from the *Itinerarium Regis Ricardi* (pp. 61), a contemporary account of the Third Crusade, are edited by M. T. Stead in the series of *Texts for Students*, published by the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge.

Professor Camille Enlart has published an amply illustrated and interesting volume on the *Villes Mortes du Moyen Age* (Paris, Boccard, 1920). Among the towns described are Têrouanne, Porto, Paphos, Famagusta, Wisby, and three Corsican towns.

Noteworthy articles in periodicals: L. Halphen, *Études Critiques sur l'Histoire de Charlemagne*, VI. *Le Couronnement Impérial de l'An 800* (*Revue Historique*, May); H. F. Brown, *The Venetians and the Venetian Quarter in Constantinople to the Close of the Twelfth Century* (*Journal of Hellenic Studies*, XL. 1); G. E. Le Boyar, *Bartholomaeus Anglicus and his Encyclopaedia* (*Journal of English and Germanic Philology*, April); E. Sthamer, *Studien über die Sizilischen Register*

Friedrichs II. (Sitzungsberichte der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1920, 32); A. de Salvio, *Dante and Medieval Heresy* (Romanic Review, July).

MODERN EUROPEAN HISTORY

The subjects of Sir Geoffrey Butler's *Studies in Statecraft* (Cambridge University Press) include Bishop Roderick and Renaissance Pacifism, the French "Civilians", William Postel, Sully and his Grand Design, and the Grand Design of Éméric Crucé.

A contribution of first-rate importance has been made by A. Büchi in his edition of the *Korrespondenzen und Akten zur Geschichte des Kardinals Matth. Schinner* (vol. I., 1489-1515, Basel, Geering, 1920, pp. xx, 592). Cardinal Schinner is known to most readers as the Cardinal of Sion (Switzerland). His friendship with Erasmus, his visit to England, his part in the wars of the Renaissance, and other facts indicate the significance of this work. Of scarcely less significance for events a few years later is *La Política Española en Italia, Correspondencia de D. Fernando Marín, Abad de Najera, con Carlos I.* (vol. I., 1521-1524, Madrid, Tip. de la Revista de Archivos, 1919, pp. xlviii, 544), edited by E. Pacheco y de Leyva.

The second volume of L. Serrano's *La Liga de Lepanto entre España, Venecia, y la Santa Sede, 1570-1573, Ensayo Histórico a Base de Documentos Diplomáticos* (Madrid, Tip. de la Revista de Archivos, 1919, pp. 442) has appeared.

Karl Müller has completed his *Kirchengeschichte* with a volume (Tübingen, Mohr, 1919) dealing with the period since the seventeenth century. The work as a whole furnishes a good survey.

Doubleday, Page, and Company have brought out *Europe, 1789-1920*, by Professor Edward R. Turner of the University of Michigan. The work is designed for college classes in European history.

B. Bareilles in a little volume entitled *Un Turc à Paris, 1806-1811, Relation de Voyage et de Mission de Mouhib Effendi, Ambassadeur Extraordinaire du Sultan Sélim III.* (Paris, Bossard, 1920, pp. 108) has presented material of novel importance for the history of the Eastern Question in the Napoleonic period, since it is one of the earliest publications to reveal the Turkish side of the case.

John Murray of London is issuing the third edition of Percy Ashley's *Modern Tariff History*, in which the accounts of tariffs in Germany, France, and the United States are brought up to the outbreak of the war in 1914.

Some useful additions to the literature of international affairs in the two decades preceding the Great War are *Ein Vierteljahrhundert Weltgeschichte, 1894-1919* (Charlottenburg, Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft,

1920, pp. 152), by H. F. Helmolt; *Das Europäische Verhängnis, die Politik der Grossmächte, ihr Wesen und ihre Folgen* (Berlin, Paetel, 1919, pp. xi, 324), by P. Hiltebrandt, which includes a second part relating to the war period; *Les Relations Franco-Espagnoles et l'Affaire du Maroc, la France et l'Espagne au Maroc* (Paris, Albigny, 1920, pp. 252), by J. Alengry, and *Die Bedeutung der Algeciras-Konferenz unter Berücksichtigung der Europäischen Marokko-Politik bis zur endgültigen Lösung der Marokkofrage* (Munich, Duncker and Humblot, 1920, pp. vi, 188), by G. von Rüdiger.

Contrary to the belief expressed by one of our reviewers in the October issue, page 136, British War Office maps of Europe, Asia, and Africa, bearing upon the treaty of Versailles, are available, together with numerous special maps; a catalogue of all maps published by the Geographical Section of the General Staff can be obtained for 6 d.

Mr. Arthur Sweetser, who has been attached to the American Peace Commission and the provisional secretariat of the League of Nations, is the author of *The League of Nations at Work* (New York, Macmillan, 1920, pp. ix, 215) in which is presented an account of the actual doings of the League in its first months, *i. e.*, to July, 1920.

Noteworthy articles in periodicals: P. Silva, *L'Expansion Européenne et ses Phases* (Scientia, August); P. Boissonnade, *Le Mouvement Commercial entre la France et les Iles Britanniques au XVI^e Siècle* (Revue Historique, July-August); G. N. Clark, *The Dutch Missions to England in 1689* (English Historical Review, October); C. H. Stockton, *The Declaration of Paris* (American Journal of International Law, July); F. Rachfahl, *Der Rückversicherungsvertrag, der "Balkandreibund", und das angebliche Bündnisangebot Bismarcks an England vom Jahre 1887* (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, July); "Spectator", *Austrian Policy, 1906-1914* (New Europe, October 7); P. Nothomb, *Le Traité Hollando-Belge et l'Alliance France-Belgique* (Revue Hebdomadaire, July 10); E. du Vivier de Streel, *La Situation Économique de l'Europe et la Conférence de Bruxelles* (Revue de Paris, July 15); R. W. Seton-Watson, *The Little Entente* (New Europe, October 14).

THE GREAT WAR

General review: R. Grosse, *Die Geschichte des Weltkrieges* (Deutsche Literaturzeitung, August 7, 14).

A. Lombroso has published the first volume of a *Bibliografia Ragionata della Guerra delle Nazioni* (Florence, Ariani, 1920, pp. xxxii, 259).

Die Geographischen Ursachen des Weltkrieges, ein Beitrag zur Schuldfrage (Berlin, Siegmund, 1920, pp. 144), by G. Wegener, is a contribution of unusual character and special interest.

Marshal Joffre's *La Préparation de la Guerre et la Conduite des Opérations, 1914-1915* (Paris, Chantenay, 1920, pp. 149) covers events from the beginning of mobilization to the battle of the Marne and presents his reply to the discussion which has been waged upon his conduct of these operations. *La Bataille de la Marne, le Rôle du Gouvernement Militaire de Paris, du 1^{er} au 12 Septembre 1914* (Paris, Berger-Levrault, 1920, pp. iv, 138), by General Clergerie and Captain Delahaye d'Anglemont, is another contribution to the same discussion. "Mermeix" has issued the second part of his *Le Commandement Unique* (Paris, Ollendorff, 1920, pp. 378), which deals with the work of Sarraill and the forces in the Balkans.

Constable has published the second volume, for 1916 and 1917, of the *Chronology of the War issued under the Auspices of the Ministry of Information* (pp. 330). Surveys of the war which are of some special significance are *Le Chemin de la Victoire, 1914-1918* (Paris, Plon, 1920, pp. 368) by L. Madelin; *Comment Finit la Guerre* (*ibid.*) by General Mangin; *L'Armée Allemande pendant la Guerre de 1914-1918, Grandeur et Décadence, Manoeuvres en Lignes Intérieures* (Paris, Chapelot, 1920, pp. 70) by General Buat, chief of the French General Staff; *Die Ursachen unserer Niederlage, Erinnerungen und Urteile aus dem Weltkrieg* (Munich, Lehmann, 1920, pp. 326) by A. Krauss; and *Der Weltkrieg, Vorläufige Orientierung von einem Schweizerischen Standpunkt aus* (Zurich, Orell Füssli, 1919, vol. III., pp. 128) by S. Zurlinden.

A large mass of fact, of crucial importance in relation to the operations of the French army during the first three weeks of the war, was contained in the report of the commission of inquiry as to the rôle and situation of metallurgy in France and the accompanying five volumes of evidence. M. Fernand Engerand, who was the *rapporteur* of the commission, has now published the substance of the report and evidence, together with other materials respecting war plans, etc., in an important book entitled *La Bataille de la Frontière, Août, 1914, Briey* (Paris, Bossard).

Prices and Price Control in Great Britain and the United States during the World War (pp. 331), by Simon Litman, professor of economics in the University of Illinois (no. 19 of the *Preliminary Economic Studies of the War* brought out by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), contains much material that is of interest to the layman as well as to the historian and economist.

The Press and the General Staff (London, Collins), by the Hon. Neville Lytton, who organized the work of the newspaper correspondents at the British General Headquarters, contains anecdotes of nearly all the great men of the war.

Some time ago the Norwegian government published a report, in five volumes, containing the sworn evidence of witnesses concerning

the losses sustained by the Norwegian mercantile marine through acts of war. A new edition in French has now appeared, *Rapports de Mer sur les Pertes de Guerre subies par la Marine de Commerce Norvégienne* (Christiania, Inspector General of Navigation). The losses of this neutral government, through submarine warfare, included 1162 Norwegian seamen, 829 ships, of 1,239,833 registered tons, with a value of certainly \$300,000,000.

War Posters issued by Belligerent and Neutral Nations, 1914-1919, edited by Martin Hardie and Arthur K. Sabin, contains not only reproductions of important war posters but also stories connected with them. There is an index to the names of the artists (Macmillan).

The second volume of the co-operative *History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, edited by Captain Temperley (London, Frowde, pp. xvii, 488), is occupied with the Settlement with Germany; the third (pp. vii, 457), with a chronology, notes, and documents.

Noteworthy articles in periodicals: R. Fester, *Verantwortlichkeiten*, IV. *Politische Sicherungen* (Deutsche Rundschau, August); P. L. Rivière, *Souvenirs du G. Q. G., Août-Septembre 1914* (Revue Hebdomadaire, September 25); Capt. A. Hilliard-Atteridge, *The Siege of Maubeuge* (Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, August); H. Carré, *La Bataille de la Marne vue du Côté Allemand* (Revue de Paris, September 1); G. Lacour-Gayet, *S. Ém. le Cardinal Mercier, Primat de Belgique, et le Gouverneur-Général Allemand von Bissing* (Comptes Rendus de l'Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques, February); R. J. Kerner, *Austrian Plans for a Balkan Settlement, 1915-1916* (New Europe, September 30); General Regnault, *L'Échec du Plan XVII*. (Revue de Paris, July 15); Gen. L. Capello, *Caporetto, la Decisione della Ritirata* (Nuova Antologia, August 1); L. Weller, *La Guerre aurait-elle pu être Terminée plus tôt? [Sixte de Bourbon]* (Revue de Paris, August 15); R. Worms, *Les Prises Maritimes et la Cinquième Année de la Guerre* (Comptes Rendus de l'Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques, February).

GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND

In a British series of manuals of medical history, Major G. Parker, M. D., has a small volume on *The Early History of Surgery in Great Britain* (Macmillan, pp. lx, 204).

The Story of Cambridgeshire as told by itself (Cambridge University Press, pp. viii, 64), six lectures to teachers by the late Dr. William Cunningham, shows how history may be made vivid and real by studying the traces that remain.

The Venerable Bede, his Life and Writings (London, S. P. C. K.), by Dr. George T. Browne, formerly bishop of Bristol, is a recent addition to the *Studies in Church History* series.

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A revised and enlarged edition of M. Jusserand's *English Wayfaring Life in the Middle Ages*, with new illustrations, has been published by Fisher Unwin.

La Tapisserie de la Reine Mathilde dite la Tapisserie de Bayeux (Paris, Laurens, 1919, pp. 220), by A. Levé, includes a complete photographic reproduction of the tapestry.

The Selden Society has issued as its eighteenth volume the *Year Book of 8 Edward II.* (1315), edited by William C. Bolland and published by Quaritch.

The Captivity and Death of Edward of Carnarvon, by Professor T. F. Tout (Longmans, pp. 51) is reprinted from the *Bulletin* of the John Rylands Library.

Messrs. Longman have in the press a volume by Miss Kathleen Lambey on *The Teaching and Cultivation of the French Language in England during Tudor and Stuart Times*, with an introductory chapter on the preceding period.

In a series of *Empire Builders*, edited by Professor A. P. Newton and Mr. W. Basil Worsfold, Professor Walter J. Harte of University College, Exeter, brings out a good little book of 60 pages on *Sir Francis Drake* (S. P. C. K.). Another excellent little book by the same publishers, *Birmingham*, by Canon J. H. D. Masterman (pp. 106), is a new addition to the series called *The Story of the English Towns*.

The life of John Chamberlain (1553-1627), the friend of diplomats and other eminent men, is the subject of a book entitled *A Jacobean Letter Writer* (Kegan Paul, pp. xvi, 248), by Edward P. Statham.

The Southampton Record Society has published vol. II., 1609-1610, of *The Assembly Books of Southampton* (Southampton, Cox and Sharland), edited by J. W. Horrocks.

The beginning of English journalism in December, 1620, has been commemorated by the publication of a *Tercentenary Hand-List of English and Welsh Newspapers, Magazines, and Reviews* (London, Hodder and Stoughton), a bibliographical guide of very great importance to historical inquirers.

The Navy Records Society has issued, for 1920, volume I. of the *Life and Works of Sir Henry Mainwaring*, probably the foremost English sea-captain of the period of the first two Stuarts.

The Life, Correspondence, and Collections of Thomas Howard, Earl of Arundel (Cambridge University Press), is a work nearly completed by the late Miss Mary Hervev, and edited by Miss C. M. Phillimore and Dr. G. C. Williamson.

The Cambridge University Press will shortly publish *The Household Account Book of Sarah Fell of Swarthmoor Hall*, edited by Norman

Penney, librarian of the Friends Library at Devonshire House. Sarah Fell was the daughter of the widow Margaret Fell who married George Fox. Her account-book furnishes an important picture of life in a country house in the latter part of the seventeenth century.

The American Antiquarian Society has lately secured a remarkable file of the *London Gazette*, extending from vol. I., no. 1 (1665), through the year 1796, and more complete than any other file in the United States.

An extraordinarily thorough account of *The Navy in the War of 1739-48* (Cambridge University Press) is given by Rear-Admiral H. W. Richardson in three illustrated volumes.

In his book on *England in Transition, 1789-1832, a Study of Movements* (Longmans, pp. xiv, 285), Dr. William L. Mathieson aims at tracing the economic, and especially the spiritual and intellectual forces, that wrought the great political and social changes of the period.

The ninth and tenth volumes of Hon. J. W. Fortescue's *History of the British Army* (Macmillan) cover the important years 1813-1815.

Mr. C. E. Raven's careful and excellent book on *Christian Socialism, 1848-1854*, is naturally occupied chiefly with Morris, Ludlow, and Kingsley.

In his account of *The English Reform Bill of 1867* (Columbia University Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law, vol. XCIII., no. 1, pp. 285), Dr. Joseph H. Park discusses the relation between economic stress and political agitation, the popular and official attitude of the period toward reform, and Disraeli's success with reform in 1867.

The Life of Queen Alexandra, by W. R. H. Trowbridge, is announced for publication this spring by Fisher Unwin.

A useful guide in modern English biography is the volume *Who Was Who, 1897-1916* (London, A. and C. Black), containing the biographies, taken from *Who's Who*, of those people who have died during the twenty years indicated.

J. R. Raynes's *The Pageant of England, 1900-1920* (Swarthmore Press, pp. xii, 275), is a work after the manner of Justin McCarthy's *History of Our Own Times*.

A History of Scotland from the Roman Evacuation to the Disruption, 1843 (Cambridge University Press), by Professor C. Sanford Terry, is a volume of some 650 pages, with thirty-two pedigree tables of the Scottish reigning houses and famous families.

A recent issue in the series of *Translations of Christian Literature* put forth by the Society for the Promotion of Christian Knowledge is a version, by Dr. H. J. Lawlor, of St. Bernard of Clairvaux's *Life of St. Malachy of Armagh* (pp. xxvi, 183), important for the history of the reformation of Irish church life in the twelfth century.

Materials for the History of the Franciscan Province of Ireland, A. D. 1230-1450, collected and edited by the late Father E. B. Fitzmaurice, O. F. M., and A. G. Little, forms the ninth volume issued by the British Society of Franciscan Studies through the Manchester University Press.

The S. P. C. K. series of *Helps for Students of History* includes three small volumes on Ireland, 1494-1603; 1603-1714; 1714-1829, all by R. H. Murray.

A history of *Modern Ireland in the European System*, by James Hogan, is announced by Messrs. Longman. The first volume, which will shortly be published, covers the period from 1500 to 1557.

The Occupation of Land in Ireland in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century (Dublin and London, Maunsell, pp. 150), by Patrick G. Dardis, is a conscientious thesis for a degree in the National University of Ireland.

Noteworthy articles in periodicals: F. M. Stenton, *The Danes in England* [Historical Revisions, XVI.] (History, October); J. H. Round, *The Early Sheriffs of Norfolk* (English Historical Review, October); H. N. Hillebrand, *The Early History of the Chapel Royal* (Modern Philology, September); G. Callender, *The Evolution of Sea-Power under the First Two Tudors* (History, October); E. R. Adair, *English Galleys in the Sixteenth Century* (English Historical Review, October); F. M. G. Evans, *Emoluments of the Principal Secretaries of State in the Seventeenth Century* (*ibid.*); J. Aynard, *Les Dernières Années de Lord Kitchener* (Revue Hebdomadaire, August 14); Sir Erle Richards, *The British Prize Courts and the War* (British Year Book of International Law, 1920-1921); Sir Herbert Maxwell, *Tour of Mary, Queen of Scots, through Southwestern Scotland* (Scottish Historical Review, October); J. M. Dickie, *The Economic Position of Scotland in 1760* (*ibid.*).

FRANCE

General review: M. Handelsman, *Bulletin des Ouvrages Napoléoniens parus en Pologne de 1901 à 1918* (Revue des Études Napoléoniennes, August).

P. Marichal and L. Mirot, two former pupils of the late Professor Auguste Longnon, have undertaken to edit from notes on his lectures a work which shall present the results of his lifelong researches with regard to *Les Noms de Lieu de la France, leur Origine, leur Signification, leurs Transformations*. The first volume has appeared, incorporating materials on *Noms de Lieu d'Origine Phénicienne, Grecque, Ligure, Gauloise, et Romaine* (Paris, Champion, 1920).

The seventh volume of *Gallia Christiana Novissima* (Paris, Ficker, 1920) has appeared under the editorship of Abbé Ulysse Chevalier.

A monographic *Étude sur les Esclaves et les Serfs d'Église en France du VI^e au XIII^e Siècle* (Paris, Tenin, 1919, pp. 320) has been written by P. Bernard.

A group of books has recently appeared relating to the history of Provence which are worthy of citation: *La Provence à travers les Siècles*, II. *Invasions Barbares; au Pouvoir des Rois Francs; les Rois de Provence; l'Église du VI^e au XII^e Siècle* (Paris, Lechevalier, 1920, pp. xii, 481) by E. Camau; *Recueil des Actes des Rois de Provence, 855-928* (Paris, Imp. Nationale, 1920, pp. lviii, 163) edited by R. Poupardin; *La Chasse en Provence, XIII^e-XVIII^e Siècle, Étude Historique et Juridique* (Aix, Dragon, 1920) by P. Moulin; *Le Parlment de Provence au Dix-huitième Siècle* (*ibid.*, pp. xvi, 534) by L. Wolff; and *Le Parlement d'Aix, Défenseur des Droits et des Traditions de la Provence* (*ibid.*) by J. Cabassol.

The attention of students of economic history should be called to Professor Henri Hauser's excellent volume on *Travailleurs et Marchands dans l'Ancienne France* (Paris, Alcan, 1920, pp. 232).

Henri Bremond has published two more volumes of his work on the *Histoire Littéraire du Sentiment Religieux en France depuis la Fin des Guerres de Religion jusqu'à nos Jours* (Paris, Bloud and Gay, 1920, pp. iii, 604; 413). In the fourth volume he deals with the Port Royal group, and in the fifth with the Jesuits.

In 1907 R. Lavallée began the publication of the *Mémoires du Cardinal de Richelieu* from the original manuscripts with the most painstaking care and had issued three volumes prior to the war. He has now resumed the task and issued the fourth volume (Paris, Société de l'Histoire de France, 1920, pp. 311) which covers only the important year 1624.

Professor H. Carré of Poitiers has published a volume on *La Noblesse de France et l'Opinion Publique au XVIII^e Siècle* (Paris, Champion, 1920, pp. 650).

In the series of *Helps for Students of History* (S. P. C. K.), Mr. G. P. Gooch's *The French Revolution* is a model of statement as to writers, tendencies, and lines of approach.

Several monographs dealing with topics in the history of the French Revolution deserve to be enumerated: J. Durieux, *La Dordogne Militaire, Généraux et Soldats de la Révolution et de l'Empire* (Bergerac, Castanet, 1920, pp. xx, 544); E. Chapuisat, *Figures et Choses d'Autrefois* (Paris, Crès, 1920, pp. 309), which is especially important for a thorough, critical study of the career of Clavière; E. H. Carrier, *Correspondence of Jean Baptiste Carrier during his Mission in Brittany, 1793-1794* (London, Lane, 1920, pp. xvi, 283) which is mainly a translation of letters from Aulard's *Recueil* with an apologia; A. Lemasson, *Les Actes*

des Prêtres Insermentés du Diocèse de Saint-Brieuc guillotisés en 1794 ou déportés (vol. II., Saint-Brieuc, 1920, pp. viii, 340); M. Dussarp, *Roger Ducos et sa Mission à Landrecies en l'An III.* (Largentière, Mazel and Plancher, pp. 238); G. Lenotre, *Le Roi Louis XVII. et l'Énigme du Temple, d'après des Documents Inédits* (Paris, Perrin, 1920); and P. L. Roussel, *Le Système des Mandats Territoriaux, 1796-1797* (Paris, Tenin, 1920, pp. 145).

An important work on the *Histoire de la Liberté d'Association en France depuis 1789* (2 vols., Paris, Tenin, 1920) has been written by P. Nourrisson. P. Quentin-Bauchart has presented another phase of the industrial history of France in *La Crise Sociale de 1848, les Origines et la Révolution de Février* (Paris, Hachette, 1920, pp. xiv, 328).

In the eighth volume of his *Études Historiques* (Paris, Boccard, 1920, pp. 344) Professor Arthur Chuquet has assembled in characteristic manner interesting and sometimes significant information on a wide range of topics mainly from the period of the French Revolution and Empire. He has also completed with a fourth volume his presentation of materials on *Quatre Généraux de la Révolution, Hoche et Desaix, Kléber et Marceau* (*ibid.*, pp. 427).

Adventures in Wars of the Republic and Consulate, by A. Moreau de Jonnés, has been translated from the edition of 1893 by Brig.-Gen. A. J. Abdy and published by Murray.

A new *Histoire de la Négociation du Concordat de 1801* (Tours, Mame, 1920, pp. viii, 516) comes from the competent pen of Comte Boulay de la Meurthe.

After long intervals since the publication of the first and second volumes, Professor J. Basdevant has brought out the third volume of *Traités et Conventions en Vigueur entre la France et les Puissances Étrangères* (Paris, Imp. Nationale, 1920, pp. 774) which includes the treaties between 1814 and 1868 to which several other nations were parties, and those with Japan and Venezuela.

A new volume in the series entitled *Makers of the Nineteenth Century* (London, Constable) is a biography of *Victor Hugo* by Madame Mary Duclaux, soon to appear.

Noteworthy articles in periodicals: A. Blanchet, *Le Monnayage Anglais en France du XII^e and XV^e Siècle* (Journal des Savants, July); F. de Mély, *Nos Vieilles Cathédrales et leurs Maîtres-d'Oeuvre*, I. (Revue Archéologique, January); E. Blum, *Les Assurances Terrestres en France sous l'Ancien Régime* (Revue d'Histoire Économique et Sociale, VIII. 1); L. Lévy-Schneider, *Quelques Réflexions sur la Méthode à adopter pour étudier l'Histoire du XVIII^e Siècle en France* (Revue de Synthèse Historique, February); G. Michon, *Robespierre et la Guerre, 1791-1792* (Annales Révolutionnaires, July); P. de la Gorce, *Deux*

Années de l'Histoire Religieuse de la Révolution, 1796-1797, I. (Revue des Deux Mondes, October 15); E. Driault, *L'Oeuvre Extérieure de Napoléon* (Revue des Études Napoléoniennes, August); P. Robiquet, *La Disgrâce de Fouché en Septembre 1815*, I. (Révolution Française, July); A. Lebon, *Cinquante Ans de Politique Extérieure* (Revue des Deux Mondes, September 1); P. Meuriot, *La Constitution de 1875 et ses Parrains: Prévost-Paradol et Victor de Broglie* (Comptes Rendus de l'Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques, February); G. Hano-taux and Lt.-Col. Fabry, *Nos Grands Chefs*, I. *Le Maréchal Joffre* (Revue des Deux Mondes, September 1); E. Seillière, *Le Président Deschanel* (Revue Hebdomadaire, October 2).

ITALY, SPAIN, AND PORTUGAL

General review: G. Bourgin, *Histoire d'Italie: Période du Risorgimento* (Revue Historique, July-August).

R. Cessi has published the first volume of *Regnum et Imperium, Contributo alla Storia della Costituzione Politica d'Italia dalla Caduta alla Ricostituzione dell' Impero Romano d'Occidente* (Bologna, Zanichelli, 1920), and V. Epifanio, *L'Idea Italiana e i Re d'Italia nei Secoli* (Padua, Draghi, 1920, pp. vii, 257).

A useful bibliography for Neapolitan history has been published anonymously under the title *Libri e Opuscoli su Napoli e l'Antico Reame delle Due Sicilie* (Naples, L. Lubrano, 1919, pp. 190).

In the series of *Texts for Students* (London, S. P. C. K.), nos. 19 and 20, edited by Esther G. Roper, contain select extracts illustrating Florentine life in the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries (pp. viii, 59; viii, 64).

A book on *The Art of War in Italy, 1494-1529*, by F. L. Taylor, is published by the Cambridge University Press.

Miss Cecily M. Booth's study of *Cosimo I., Duke of Florence*, which is based on contemporary documents, will be brought out by the Cambridge University Press.

The most important work yet undertaken by E. Rodocanachi is *La Réforme en Italie* (Paris, Picard, 1920) of which the first volume treats of the character of the Reformation movement in Italy, its development and spread, and the causes which favored it. Adequate bibliography is furnished.

A new *Storia del Risorgimento Politico d'Italia* (Bologna, Zanichelli, 1920, pp. 500) is by Italo Raulich, who has covered the years 1815-1830 in the first volume.

G. Balsamo-Crivelli has edited Gioberti's *Del Primato Morale e Civile degli Italiani* (2 vols., Turin, Utet, 1919), and also the Gioberti-Massari *Carteggio, 1838-1852* (Turin, Bocca, 1920, pp. xi, 611). A first

volume of D'Azeglio's *Carteggi e Documenti Diplomatici Inediti* (Turin, Palatina, 1920, pp. clxxv, 496), covering the years 1831-1854, has been edited by A. Colombo. Materials for the year 1846 appear in the fourth volume of the *Protocollo della Giovine Italia* (Imola, Galeati, 1919, pp. xviii, 270).

A. Angiolini and E. Ciacchi are the authors of *Socialismo e Socialisti in Italia, Storia Completa del Movimento Socialista Italiano dal 1850 al 1919* (Florence, Nerbini, 1919, pp. 256).

G. M. Trevelyan's well-known works, *Garibaldi's Defence of the Roman Republic*, *Garibaldi and the Thousand*, and *Garibaldi and the Making of Italy*, are now published by Nelson at the low price of 2 sh. 6 d. each.

A valuable collection of documentary material is presented in *Raccolta di Concordati su Materie Ecclesiastiche tra la Santa Sede e le Autorità Civili* (Rome, Tip. Poliglotta Vaticana, 1919, pp. xx, 1140), but without names of the editors.

Dr. Thomas Nelson Page, who was American ambassador to Italy from 1913 to 1919, has written a volume on *Italy and the World War*, which Scribner has published.

The Hakluyt Society has just published volume I. (pp. xc, 370) of *The Chronicle of Ramon Muntaner*, important for the history of Aragon in the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, now translated for the first time from Catalan into English by Lady Goodenough (Countess Anna Kinsky).

In the collection *Spanish Ballads* (Cambridge University Press, pp. xvi, 218), by Guy Le Strange, the ballads are divided into four groups, miscellaneous, historical (Christian and Moslem), and Moorish, and are edited with historical introduction and notes.

The Benedictines of Stanbrook have undertaken to produce, in four volumes, a complete edition of the 460 *Letters of Saint Teresa*, translated from the Spanish and annotated. The first volume, with an introduction by Cardinal Gasquet, has already appeared (London, Thomas Baker, 1919, pp. xix, 308).

Noteworthy articles in periodicals: A. Luzio, *Il Carteggio Nigra-Cavour* (Nuova Antologia, July 1); P. de Quirielle, *De Giolitti à Giolitti: La Politique Italienne* (Revue Hebdomadaire, July 10); L. Barrau-Dihigo, *Remarques sur la Chronique dite d'Alphonse III.* (Revue Hispanique, August, 1919); A. Garcia Rives, *Clases Sociales en Leon y Castilla, Siglos X.-XIII.*, I. (Revista de Archivos, Bibliotecas, y Museos, April).

GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND SWITZERLAND

Dr. Eduard Norden's *Die Germanische Urgeschichte in Tacitus' Germania* (Leipzig, Teubner, 1920, pp. x, 505) is an interesting attempt

to combine data of the *Germania* with all others that can be obtained from classical writers and from archaeological investigations, to illustrate the early ethnography of Germany, the relations of Germans and Kelts, and related topics.

The subtitle *Die Verbrechen und ihre Folgen im Allgemeinen* indicates the contents of the first part of *Das Strafrecht des Deutschen Mittelalters* (Leipzig, Weicher, 1920, pp. xvi, 671) by R. His.

The late Albert Hauck died on the eve of printing the second half of the fifth volume of his *Kirchengeschichte Deutschlands* (Leipzig, Hinrichs, 1920, pp. viii, 583-1212) and the publication was supervised by H. Boehmer, who, it is announced, will prepare the necessary supplementary volumes to complete the work to the treaty of Augsburg, 1555, which was the terminus Professor Hauck had planned for his work. The present volume covers the period of the Great Schism and of the Council of Constance.

Die Busslehre des Johannes Eck (Münster, Aschendorff, 1919, pp. xx, 250) is by H. Schauerte. J. M. Reu is editing an extended collection of *Quellen zur Geschichte des Kirchlichen Unterrichts in der Evangelischen Kirche Deutschlands zwischen 1530 und 1600* (Gütersloh, Bertelsmann), of which the latest volume is made up of materials relating to instruction in the catechism.

Fürstenschulen in Germany after the Reformation (pp. 46), a little book by Thomas Woody, assistant professor of education in the University of Pennsylvania, is chiefly an account of the origins and early character of the Saxon schools at Pforta, Grumma, and Meissen.

G. Du Bosq de Beaumont and M. Bernos have edited the *Correspondance de Sophie Dorothée, Princesse Électorale de Hanovre, avec le Comte de Königsmarck* (Paris, Ambert, 1920).

Volksstaat und Einherrschaft (Constance, Reuss and Itta, 1920, pp. 598) is a volume of documents on the Baden revolution of 1848-1849, edited by F. Lautenschlager. The *Erinnerungen eines Revolutionärs, Skizzen aus dem Jahre 1848* (Leipzig, Haberland, 1920, 2 vols.) of Paul Boerner have been published.

Die Politischen Berichte des Fürsten Bismarck aus Petersburg und Paris, 1859-1862 (Berlin, Hobbing, 1920, 2 vols.) have been edited by L. Raschdau.

Max Cornicelius has issued the concluding volume of his edition of *Heinrich von Treitschkes Briefe* (Leipzig, Hirzel, 1920, pp. viii, 305-670), which contains the materials for the years 1871-1896.

E. Dörzbacher has studied the socialist attitude on imperial issues in *Die Deutsche Sozialdemokratie und die Nationale Machtpolitik bis 1914* (Gotha, Perthes, 1920, pp. viii, 271).

E. Drahn has prepared a *Marx-Bibliographie* (Charlottenburg, Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft, 1920, pp. 59).

The recent German revolution is illustrated by two valuable books by important participants, *Die Deutsche Revolution: ihr Unglück und ihre Rettung* (Berlin, Der Firm), by Heinrich Ströbel, formerly a Socialist representative in the Prussian Landtag, who, when the revolution took place, became one of the Socialist ministers in the Prussian government, and who represents the right wing of the Independent Socialists; and *Die Deutsche Revolution: von Kiel bis Kapp* (Berlin, Verlag für Politik und Wirtschaft), by Gustav Noske, who gives his personal reminiscences during the eighteen months in which he was perhaps the most important man in Germany. Other new accounts of the revolution of 1918 and succeeding events are W. E. Oeftering's *Der Umsturz 1918 in Baden* (Constance, Reuss and Itta, 1920, pp. 304); and Percy Brown's *Germany in Dissolution* (London, Melrose, 1920, pp. x, 304).

The Gesellschaft für Rheinische Geschichtskunde has published, as its thirty-seventh volume, the first volume of an important bibliography of Rhenish Prussia, *Bücherkunde zur Geschichte der Rheinlande*. This first volume (Bonn, Hanstein, 1920, pp. lx, 716) lists more than 16,000 articles in periodicals and general collections. The second volume will be devoted to books.

An account of *Der Untergang der Oesterreichisch-Ungarischen Monarchie* (Leipzig, Koehler, 1920, pp. vii, 331) is by F. Kleinwächter.

Noteworthy articles in periodicals: H. Grisar, *Lutheranalekten* (Historisches Jahrbuch, XXXIX. 3); F. Meinecke, *Wilhelm von Humboldt und der Deutsche Staat* (Neue Rundschau, August); Capt. Koeltz, *Le Plan de Campagne Allemand de 1871 à 1914* (Revue de Paris, August 15); J. Rovère, *Le Particularisme Bavarois de 1871 à 1914* (Revue des Deux Mondes, September 1, 15); E. Vermeil, *L'Allemagne Politique*, I. *Le Nouveau Pangermanisme*; II. *Les Origines du Coup d'État Kapp-Luttwitz, Octobre 1919* (*ibid.*, July 15, August 15); J. Bainville, *Le Règne et les Idées de Charles I^{er} Empereur d'Autriche* (Revue Universelle, October 15).

NETHERLANDS AND BELGIUM

Belgium, from the Roman Invasion to the Present Day, by Émile Cammaerts, the distinguished Belgian writer, will be added this spring to the series called *The Story of the Nations* (London, Unwin; New York, Putnam).

An *Histoire Économique de la Belgique à la Fin de l'Ancien Régime* (Ghent, Van Rysselberghe and Romband, 1920, pp. 588) is by Professor H. Van Houtte of the University of Ghent.

The Belgian Commission Royale d'Histoire has lately published volume II. (1445-1455) of the *Actes ou Procès-verbaux des Séances tenues par le Conseil de l'Université de Louvain* (pp. xxxiv, 416), edited by Canon A. van Hove, professor in the University of Louvain. The commission has entrusted M. Joseph Cuvelier, archivist-general of the kingdom, with the editing of the *Correspondance de la Cour d'Espagne sur les Affaires des Pays-Bas au XVII^e Siècle*, in succession to the late Professor Henri Lonchay.

Noteworthy articles in periodicals: H. Davignon, *La Correspondance du Roi Léopold II. d'après une Publication Récente* (Revue Hebdomadaire, October 2); Lieut.-General F. de Bas, *Another Version of the Scheldt History* (History, October).

NORTHERN AND EASTERN EUROPE

Dr. Bertha S. Phillpotts, principal of Westfield College (University of London), has published through the Cambridge University Press a work on *The Elder Edda and Ancient Scandinavian Drama* (pp. xii, 216), which emphasizes the significance of the older Eddic poems as a source for Scandinavian history.

Vol. IX., part I., of the *Saga Book* of the Viking Society (University of London, pp. 252) is an account of *Harald Fairhair and his Ancestors*, by Sir Henry H. Howorth.

The Copenhagen publisher Gad has begun the issue of volume I. of a new edition of the *Annales Danici Medii Aevi*, formerly published in Langebek's *Scriptores*, and for the most part also in the German *Monumenta*, but now newly edited by Ellen Joergensen.

H. Schüch has edited *Gustaf III:s och Lovisa Ulrikas Brevväxling* (2 vols., Stockholm, Norstedt).

The Finnish ministry of foreign affairs has published *Finnland im Anfang des XX. Jahrhunderts* (Helsingfors, Finnische Literaturgesellschaft, 1919, pp. xv, 672).

General Count Rüdiger von der Goltz, commander of the German forces in Finland and later in the Baltic provinces, gives an important and interesting narrative of his management in *Meine Sendung in Finnland und im Baltikum* (Leipzig, Koehler).

The Red Insurrection in Finland, 1918 (London, Harrison) is an intelligent study based on documentary evidence by Mr. Henning Söderhjelm, with some preliminary study of the preceding period, from 1905 on.

E. Duchesne has translated and edited *Le Stoglav ou les Cent Chapitres, Recueil des Décisions de l'Assemblée Ecclésiastique de Moscou, 1551* (Paris, Champion, 1920, pp. xlv, 292).

Messrs. Longman are about to publish *Russia in the 'Eighties: Sport and Politics*, by John F. Baddeley, a record by a special newspaper correspondent; on the political side, the importance of the book lies largely in the opinions and reminiscences of Count Peter Shuvalov, with whom the author was on terms of intimate friendship, and in some similar material respecting Lord Dufferin and others.

A volume on Alexander III. by E. Daudet bears the title *L'Avant-dernier Romanoff* (Paris, Hachette, 1920).

What appears to be a trustworthy account of the murder of the Tsar and his family, based upon investigations skilfully conducted, is now brought out under the title *The Last Days of the Romanovs* (London, Thornton Butterworth). The first part is a narrative composed from the documents by Mr. Robert Wilton, formerly correspondent of the *Times* in Russia; the second part is a transcript of the depositions collected for the Minister of Justice at Omsk by Nicholas Sokolov and brought out of Siberia by Admiral Smirnov.

The Freiherr von Freytag-Loringhoven has prepared a volume on *Die Gesetzgebung der Russischen Revolution* (Halle, Niemeyer, 1920, pp. iv, 261); L. Martin, on *De Tolstoï à Lénine, Contribution à l'Étude Historique de l'Évolution Agricole en Russie* (Montpellier, Imp. de la Charité, 1920, pp. 147); and M. Hoschiller, on *Le Mirage du Soviétisme* (Paris, Payot, 1920, pp. 256).

Professor Michael Hrushevsky (Grushevski) of Lemberg, when the war opened, had brought down to 1650, in eight large octavo volumes, his *History of the Ukraine*. Abridgments in Ukrainian and in Russian exist and one in German was reviewed in this journal (XXIV. 666). We have now received a French abridgment, *Abrégé de l'Histoire de l'Ukraine* (Paris, Giard and Brière, 1920, pp. vii, 256) extending to the present time. Like the German volume referred to, it is put forth under the auspices of a nationalistic organization—in this case, the Institut Sociologique Ukrainien.

Noteworthy articles in periodicals: M. Rostovtsev, *L'Exploration Archéologique de la Russie Méridionale de 1912 à 1917* (*Journal des Savants*, March, May); M. Pernot, *L'Épreuve de la Pologne* (*Revue des Deux Mondes*, October 1, 15); H. Bidou, *La Bataille de Varsovie et la Pologne* (*Revue de Paris*, October 15).

SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE

A new edition of Lord Eversley's *The Turkish Empire from 1288 to 1914* has just been published by Fisher Unwin (London), with additional chapters by Sir Valentine Chirol covering the years from 1914 to 1920.

Under the Turk in Constantinople (Macmillan), by G. F. Abbott, is a record of Sir John Finch's embassy in the latter part of the seventeenth century.

Prince Alexander's papers and other unpublished documents have been utilized by E. C. Corti in writing *Alexander von Battenberg, sein Kampf mit den Zaren und Bismarck* (Vienna, Seidel, 1920, pp. 351).

ASIA, MEDIEVAL AND MODERN

The first volume of Jacob Mann's work on *The Jews in Egypt and in Palestine under the Fatimid Caliphs* (Milford, pp. 280), is a contribution to their political and communal history, based chiefly on Genizah sources which will be printed, for the first time, in the second volume.

The Jews of Asia, especially in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (New York, Dutton, 1920, pp. xiii, 242), is a compilation of materials rather than a narrative, by Sidney Mendelssohn, who died in 1917.

The Oxford University Press announces a tenth volume of Mr. William Foster's calendar entitled *The English Factories in India*, carrying the story from 1655 to 1660, and part 2 of Mr. P. E. Roberts's *Historical Geography of India*.

The Cambridge University Press announces a work concerning *William Bolts*, by N. L. Hallward, which throws new light on the relations of the East India Company with the natives of India and rival European traders towards the end of the eighteenth century.

The account of the battle of Mukden is continued in the fifth volume of *Guerre Russo-Japonaise, 1904-1905* (Paris, Chapelot, 1920, pp. 519), the French translation of the history of the war by the Russian General Staff.

AFRICA, MEDIEVAL AND MODERN

The Jews of Africa, especially in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (New York, Dutton, 1920, pp. xiii, 200), is a companion volume to the book on Asia, mentioned under the preceding heading, by Sidney Mendelssohn.

The Bantu Past and Present, an Ethnographical and Historical Study of the Native Races of South Africa (Edinburgh, Green, 1920, pp. xix, 398), by S. M. Molema, recounts much of South African history from a new point of view.

The ninth volume of the *Collection des Ouvrages Anciens concernant Madagascar* (Paris, Union Coloniale, 1920, pp. 652) contains the second part of Flacourt's *Histoire de la Grande Ile de Madagascar*, written in the seventeenth century, and François Martin's *Mémoires sur l'Ile de Madagascar*, 1665-1668.

AMERICA

GENERAL ITEMS

The Department of Historical Research in the Carnegie Institution of Washington has for some weeks past had the advantage of the aid in Washington of Professor M. W. Jernegan of the University of Chicago, assisting Dr. Paullin in the preparation of that part of the proposed atlas of the historical geography of the United States which will exhibit data in religious history. Miss Shirley Farr, of the same university, joins the staff in January, to assist in the conduct of this journal.

Among the recent accessions of the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress are: George Washington's memorandum book, 1756-1757 (photostat of original in the New York Public Library); diary and account-book of James Monroe, 1795-1802 (one volume); letter- and order-book of Commodore John Rodgers, 1812-1815 (one volume); log-book of voyages of the ship *Oglethorpe* between Savannah and Liverpool, 1817-1824; letters to Edward J. Mallett, 1827-1860 (46 pieces); receipt books of mileage and pay of United States senators, 14th, 17th, and 18th Congresses; seven letters from Andrew Johnson to William M. Lowery, 1841-1870, and one letter from Robert Johnson to Lowery, January 15, 1861; letter-book of Major-General J. G. Foster while in command of the department of Florida, 1865-1866 (one volume); and papers of Admiral Charles S. Sperry, U. S. N., 1895-1911.

Recent issues of the *Old South Leaflets*, nos. 218-221, of which Dr. Samuel E. Morison is now general editor, embrace extracts from letters and speeches of John Bright during the Civil War and from the British debates of 1863 on the Southern Confederacy; from William Sturgis's lectures and diary on the Northwest Fur Trade and the Indians of the Oregon Country; from Walter Coulton's journal, *California in 1846-1848*; and from Charles S. Stuart's *Private Journal of a Voyage to the Pacific Islands in the Years 1822-25* (his description of Hawaii).

In the October number of the *Catholic Historical Review* Rev. William Henry Kent, O. S. C., discourses broadly upon the topic "Catholic Truth and Historical Truth", taking his text from a recent magazine article; Rev. Patrick A. Collis examines the preface of the *Acta Sanctorum*, as a remarkable presentation of historical method; and Mr. J. Lloyd Mecham presents an article upon the Martyrdom of Father Juan de Santa Maria. In the department of Miscellany are found a convenient list of titular sees of the American hierarchy and a contribution by the Rev. Robert Lechat, S. J., Bollandist, *Les Acta Sanctorum des Bollandistes*. In the section of Documents the *Review* reprints from the rare volume, *The Laity's Directory to the Church Service* (1822), "A Brief Account of the Establishment of Episcopacy in the United States", and "The Present State of Religion in the Respective Dioceses".

The principal paper in the March number of the *Records of the American Catholic Historical Society* is a Sketch of the Life of Mother Cornelia Connelly, Foundress of the Sisters of the Holy Child Jesus, 1809-1879. Articles in the June number are: Notes on a few Old Catholic Hymn Books, by Jane Campbell; and Knights of Columbus War Activities in Philadelphia, by Edward J. Galbally. The September number contains a body of thirty-seven letters, 1849-1853, of Francis Patrick Kenrick, afterward archbishop of Philadelphia, to a Catholic family, that of George D. Allen; and an interesting body of extracts from the diplomatic correspondence of Gérard, French minister, 1778-1779, found in the Archives des Affaires Étrangères, Paris, by Miss Elizabeth S. Kite.

Dr. David Jayne Hill's *American World Policies* is chiefly an argument against entrance into the League of Nations, but contains excellent and useful historical matter relating to American constitutional history.

A two-volume *Histoire du Protestantisme Français au Canada et aux États-Unis* (Paris, Fischbacher, 1919, pp. 394, 338) is by Father Duclos.

The *Journal* of the Presbyterian Historical Society for June and September-December contains a history of the Philadelphia North Presbytery, by Rev. Dr. William P. White, and the records of the Middle Association of Congregational Churches of the state of New York, 1804-1808, edited by Rev. Dr. J. Q. Adams.

Bulletin no. 71 of the Bureau of American Ethnology, by David I. Bushnell, jr., performs a useful service by bringing together a great variety of details on *Native Cemeteries and Forms of Burial East of the Mississippi* (Washington, Government Printing Office, pp. 160, and 17 plates). The data are arranged in order of the ethnological groups, and under them by tribes.

George B. Grinnell's *When Buffalo Ran* (Yale University Press, 1920, pp. 114) has the value attaching to the recollections of an Indian of his boyhood and youth up to the time of his marriage.

The Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel, and Tin Workers, by Professor Jesse S. Robinson of Carleton College (*John Hopkins Studies*, XXXVIII. 2, pp. 166), opens with a section on the origin and history of that union.

F. Fairchild Sherman of New York, editor and publisher of *Art in America*, expects to publish, in this month, *Early American Portrait Painters in Miniature*, by Theodore Bolton.

ITEMS ARRANGED IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER

The Macmillan Company has brought out *The Colonization of North America, 1492-1783*, by Professors Herbert E. Bolton and Thomas M. Marshall. The work is designed as a text-book.

The title, *Bradford's History of the Plymouth Settlement, rendered in Modern English*, by Harold Paget, sufficiently indicates the character of the book, published in 1909, but again brought out in 1920 (New York, E. P. Dutton and Company). Such efforts are perhaps useful, for the editor may be right in thinking that to many persons the reading of what he calls "the medieval English of the original" would be so laborious as to preclude them from making its acquaintance. Anyone who can understand the Bible can understand Bradford, and Mr. Paget has not always understood him rightly or translated him correctly; but his text is easier to read.

New Light on the Pilgrim Story, by Rev. Thomas M. Mason and Rev. Dr. B. Nightingale (London, Congregational Union of England and Wales) makes useful additions on the side of personal and biographical details.

The Manchester University Press (Longmans) issues *Captain Myles Standish: His Lost Lands and Lancashire Connections: a New Investigation*, by Rev. Thomas C. Porteus, vicar of Coppull, Lancashire.

In order to lighten the *Calendar of State Papers, Colonial*, and so accelerate its progress, the Public Record Office undertook some time ago to print the *Journal of the Commissioners for Trade and Plantations*, commonly known as the Board of Trade Journals. Up to April, 1704, the entries in the journal have been included in the *Calendar*, distributed under their respective dates. The continuous printing now begun is much more convenient, and the arrangement is such as to indicate by marginal notes the place of deposit of all letters received by the commissioners, read, and noted in the journal. The first volume, now published by the Stationery Office (pp. 641), runs from April 3, 1704, to January 28, 1709. It is hoped that the publication of the journal to 1782 may be accomplished in a reasonable time, many years before the calendar can be brought to that date. The volume almost defies review, but is of course crowded with useful material for colonial history.

The National Genealogical Society of Washington has published, as a volume of 122 pages, *Lists of Swiss Emigrants in the Eighteenth Century to the American Colonies*, vol. I., being Zurich lists of 1734-1744, obtained from Swiss archives by Professor A. B. Faust, accompanied by facsimiles and preceded by a reprint of his article on Swiss Emigration to the American Colonies in the Eighteenth Century, from vol. XXII. of this journal.

Professor Herbert A. Smith of McGill University, in a small book called *The American Supreme Court as an International Tribunal* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1920, pp. viii, 120), summarizes and presents in expository form the material on interstate cases published by Dr. James Brown Scott in his *Judicial Settlements of Controversies between States of the Union*.

The attention of historical scholars should be called to *The Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 which framed the Constitution of the United States, reported by James Madison* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1920, pp. xcvi, 731), "International Edition", edited, at the instance of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, by Dr. Gaillard Hunt and Dr. James Brown Scott. Here will be found the text of Madison's debates prepared with extreme care from Madison's original manuscript and preceded by useful documentary and other matter (Annapolis proceedings, credentials, and the like) relative to the antecedents of the Federal Convention.

In a pamphlet entitled *A Review of "Isaac Shelby and the Genet Mission"* by Dr. Archibald Henderson (Lexington, Kentucky, 1920, pp. 52), Mr. Samuel M. Wilson examines at some length Dr. Henderson's treatment of the subject in two chapters of his work, *The Star of Empire*, and in an article in the March (1920) number of the *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*.

Lincoln the World Emancipator, by John Drinkwater (Houghton Mifflin Company), is not so much a treatment of the historical Lincoln as it is an interpretation of Lincoln as a symbol, a type, a universal figure, an exemplification of the best characteristics and the ideals of the Anglo-Saxon race, constituting a bond of union between England and America and a reconciler of their differences.

The *Magazine of History* for November-December, 1917 (a double though meagre number), which has but recently come from the press, contains a letter written by President Lincoln to the mayor of New York, Dec. 2, 1863, principally concerning a proposed celebration of the victories in the West.

The Naval History Society has ready for immediate publication the second volume of the confidential correspondence of Gustavus V. Fox. Rear-Admiral Fiske has retired from the secretaryship of the Society and Mr. W. H. Gardiner has been chosen secretary in his place.

Mrs. Sophie Radford de Meissner has written a life of her father, Rear-Admiral William Radford (1808-1890), which Henry Holt and Company have published with the title *Old Naval Days: the Career of Rear-Admiral Radford*. It is understood that Mrs. de Meissner has made extensive use of the naval archives in the preparation of the volume.

A Life of Alphonso Taft, by Lewis A. Leonard, with a preface by Henry Clews, is brought out in New York by the Hawke Publishing Company.

In one of their little books called *Macmillan's Pocket Classics*, the Macmillan Company have issued, for school use, *Roosevelt's Writings*,

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a selection from his autobiography, his historical and outdoor books, and his addresses on matters of citizenship.

Doubleday, Page, and Company announce for early publication the *Reminiscences* of Melville E. Stone, who for the past twenty years has been general manager of the Associated Press.

The Americanization of Edward Bok: the Autobiography of a Dutch Boy Fifty Years after, will probably have an interest for many students of American history other than readers of the *Ladies' Home Journal*, of which Mr. Bok was long time editor. Mr. Bok has counted among his friends and intimates many notable Americans of his time.

Rose W. Lane is the author of a volume entitled *The Making of Herbert Hoover*, which the Century Company has published.

Students interested in the development and progress of American negroes of the best sort will find much to interest them in the autobiography of Bishop L. J. Coppin, *Unwritten History* (Philadelphia, A. M. E. Book Concern, pp. 375), giving interesting glimpses of life on the Eastern Shore of Maryland, before, during, and after the Civil War, of ministerial labors, and of service as Methodist bishop in South Africa.

Herbert E. Gaston's *The Nonpartisan League* (New York, Harcourt, Brace, and Howe, 1920, pp. vii, 325) is a history, and a good one, by one who for three years was connected with the publicity work of the League.

THE UNITED STATES IN THE GREAT WAR

Little, Brown, and Company have brought out *A Guide to the Military History of the World War, 1914-1918*, by Thomas C. Frothingham. The data are arranged with a view to quick references. There are maps, diagrams, bibliography, index, etc.

The Yale University Press announces its forthcoming publication of a new series, *How America Went to War*, in six volumes, of which the first two, just brought out, are *The Road to France*, by Benedict Crowell, assistant secretary of war, and Robert F. Wilson.

The office of historian of the United States Air Service has been filled by the appointment of Dr. Wayne E. Stevens, recently director of the War Records Section of the Illinois State Historical Library, who will supervise the preparation of a history of the organization and operations of the air service in the American Expeditionary Forces. All original documents pertaining in any way to the overseas activities of the service are being collected, and will constitute the basis of the proposed history. These records consist of operation orders and reports, intelligence summaries, maps, "unit histories", etc. The project will be carried out in co-operation with the Historical Branch of the General Staff and in accordance with its plans.

An Explorer in the Air Service, by Professor Hiram Bingham of Yale University, who had an important part in organizing instruction in aviation and in other service at aviation headquarters in Washington, is an unofficial, personal record of those two years of service.

Three contributions to war history published by the Houghton Mifflin Company are *The Lafayette Flying Corps*, authorized history, by Captain James N. Hall and Lieutenant Charles B. Nordhoff (two volumes); a *History of the American Field Service in France: Friends of France, 1914-1917*, told by its members (three volumes); and *New England in France, 1917-1919*, a history of the Twenty-Sixth ("Yankee") Division, by Major Emerson G. Taylor. *The History of the A. E. F.*, by Shipley Thomas, is published by the George H. Doran Company. Another work covering comprehensively the history of the A. E. F. is *America in Battle: with Guide to the American Battlefields in France and Belgium*, by James A. Moss and Harry S. Howland (Menasha, Wisconsin, G. Banta Publishing Company).

A little known aspect of the Great War is dealt with in the monograph of Alfred H. Brooks, *Use of Geology on the Western Front*, with a list of publications relating to the war work of American geologists (Washington, Government Printing Office).

Robert R. McCormick, who was a member of General Pershing's staff, has produced a volume to which is given the title *The Army in 1918*, being an account of America's contribution to the World War (New York, Harcourt).

The Knights of Columbus in Peace and War, in two volumes, is the product of Maurice Francis Egan and John J. B. Kennedy (New Haven, Knights of Columbus).

The Macmillan Company has brought out *The American Colleges and Universities in the Great War, 1914-1919: a History*, by President Charles F. Thwing.

LOCAL ITEMS ARRANGED IN GEOGRAPHICAL ORDER

NEW ENGLAND

The *New England Historical and Genealogical Register* for October contains a series of letters pertaining to Colonel John Brown's expedition against Ticonderoga and Diamond Island in 1777. The letters are principally from Colonel Brown to General Lincoln, September 13 to October 4.

The contents of the October number of the *Essex Institute Historical Collections* include a continuation of Old Norfolk County Records which were printed serially for several years in the *Essex Antiquarian*, which came to an end in 1909. There is also a continuation of Francis B. C. Bradley's *History of the Boston and Maine Railroad*.

The *Proceedings* of the American Antiquarian Society at its meeting of October, 1919, includes an important study of Greater New England in the Middle of the Nineteenth Century, by Professor F. J. Turner, an elaborate account of an eighteenth-century gentlewoman of Boston, Catherine Wendell, by Professor Barrett Wendell, and a paper by Professor George H. Haynes on the Conciliatory Proposition in the Massachusetts Convention of 1788.

Smith College Studies in History, vol. V., no. 3, is an account of the Development of History and Government (*i.e.*, of the study of political science) in Smith College from 1875 to 1920, with a list of publications of faculty and alumni, prepared by Professor Mary B. Fuller. Vol. V., no. 4, is an excellent paper on Influences toward Radicalism in Connecticut, 1754-1775, largely concerned with the Susquehanna Company, by Miss Edith A. Bailey.

The American Historical Society, a commercial publishing concern, not to be confused with the American Historical Association, has put forth a *History of the State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations*, in three volumes, by Thomas W. Bicknell and others.

MIDDLE COLONIES AND STATES

The July number of the *Quarterly Journal* of the New York Historical Association contains a biographical study, by G. D. B. Hasbrouck, of Governor George Clinton, an article on Rochester by Harriet E. Brown Dow, and a continuation of the Minutes of the Presbytery of New York, edited by Professor Dixon R. Fox. The number for October contains chiefly an article on Jedediah Peck, father of the public school system of the state of New York, by Sherman Williams.

The New York Historical Society has been presented with six volumes of manuscript journals written by Major-Gen. Abner Doubleday, and with fourteen scrap-books of newspaper clippings gathered by him, all relating to the campaigns in which he was engaged during the Mexican War and Civil War.

The September *Bulletin* of the New York Public Library opens with a historical memorial on John Holt, Printer and Postmaster, by Mr. Victor H. Paltsits. The November number gives a history of the Harlem Library, and concludes the list of New York almanacs prior to 1850.

Mr. Eugene L. Armbruster, who has produced a number of monographs on subjects of Brooklyn and Long Island history, has brought out a study of *The Wallabout Prison Ships, 1776-1783*, which, he avers, "will considerably upset current opinion" about the prison ships. The work is largely a compilation from original sources (the author, 263 Eldert Street, Brooklyn).

Where to Find It: Bibliography of Syracuse History (Syracuse, Onondaga Historical Association, pp. 219) by Franklin B. Chase, city historian, embraces not only books and essays but newspaper material.

The contents of the October number of the *Proceedings of the New Jersey Historical Society* include Early Newark as a Puritan Theocracy, by Walter S. Nichols; the Dutch Trading Post at Trenton, by Dr. Carlos E. Godfrey; Address on Governor William Paterson, by the late Hon. Cortlandt Parker; and Washington's March from Princeton to Morristown, by Joshua Doughty, jr.

The History of Valley Forge, by Henry Woodman, together with a biography of the author and of the author's father, a soldier at Valley Forge, by Mary S. Woodman, has been published in Oaks, Pennsylvania, by J. U. Francis, sr.

Papers Read before the Lancaster County Historical Society May 7 and June 4 are: Early Architecture of Lancaster County (illustrated), by A. L. Kocher, and Fords and Bridges across the Conestoga, from Morgantown to Hinkletown, by M. G. Weaver.

The October number of the *Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine* contains a paper, by Charles W. Dahlinger, on Abraham Lincoln in Pittsburgh and the Birth of the Republican Party.

Students of the history of the Swedish colony on the Delaware will find an interest in G. Wittrock's *Svenska Handelskompaniet och Kopparhandeln under Gustaf II. Adolf* (Upsala, 1919, pp. 162), with texts of many documents.

The history of a great business enterprise, and one of our oldest, established in 1793, is related by Mrs. B. G. du Pont in a volume entitled *E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company* (Houghton Mifflin).

SOUTHERN COLONIES AND STATES

Mr. Bunford Samuel, librarian of the Ridgeway Branch of the Library Company of Philadelphia, is the author of a work in two volumes, of which the principal title is *Secession and Constitutional Liberty* (New York, Neale).

The Southern Historical Society Papers, no. V. (September, 1920), designated a "Jackson Number", contains two studies of the career of General T. J. Jackson. Part I., "With Stonewall Jackson in the Army of Northern Virginia", by Capt. James B. Smith, is principally the experiences and impressions of an aide. Part II. is a reprint of Col. William Allan's *History of the Campaign of Gen. T. J. (Stonewall) Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley of Virginia* (Philadelphia, 1880).

The state of Maryland and the Maryland Historical Society have lately published vol. XXXIX. of the *Archives of Maryland*. It contains the acts and proceedings of the general assembly of the province during the sessions held from 1732/3 to 1736, five sessions in all, marked by a considerable amount of interesting legislation.

Apart from continued articles, the September number of the *Maryland Historical Magazine* contains a paper, the first of a series, on Seven Pioneers of the Colonial Eastern Shore, by Percy G. Skirven.

It is expected that the new archive building of the Virginia State Library will be ready for occupancy in early February. Among the recent accessions are: twenty-three certified copies of Confederate rosters; a muster-roll of the city of Richmond; and Andrew Dunscomb's letter-book, 1784-1787.

The principal item in the January (1920) number of the *Virginia Magazine of History and Biography*, besides the continued series, is a minute of a General Meeting of the Freeholders of the County of Mecklenburg, July 29, 1774, contributed, with an introduction, by Dr. Archibald Henderson.

The principal paper in the April number of *Tyler's Quarterly Historical and Genealogical Magazine* (formerly the *William and Mary College Historical Quarterly*) is a History of York County in the Seventeenth Century.

The North Carolina Historical Commission has recently received the public letters and executive papers (1917-1920, about 10,000 pieces) of Governor Thomas W. Bickett, the records of the state comptroller, and a body of records (1780-1878) from the office of the state treasurer. A few valuable letters of the Revolutionary period have also been acquired.

Race Elements in the White Population of North Carolina, by R. D. W. Connor, secretary of the state Historical Commission, and relating to the English, Highland Scotch, Scotch-Irish, and German elements, has recently been printed by the North Carolina State Normal and Industrial College (pp. 115).

In the April number of the *South Carolina Historical and Genealogical Magazine* appear some letters from Peter Manigault to his mother, and two letters concerning him from Henry Laurens to Gabriel Manigault, all written from England in the year 1773. There is also a letter from Joseph Lord to James Petiver, written from Carolina in 1705. In the July number are some Swiss Notes on South Carolina (1737), contributed by Gilbert P. Voigt.

As a result of the amalgamation of the Georgia Historical Society and the Georgia Historical Association, the *Georgia Historical Quarterly* and all other publications of the united society have been placed under the control of an editorial board consisting of Professors R. P. Brooks and E. M. Coulter of the University of Georgia, P. S. Flippin of Mercer University and T. H. Jack of Emory University, Mr. Lawton B. Evans, superintendent of schools in Augusta, and Miss Cleo Hearon, professor in the Agnes Scott Institute. Professor Flippin has been

named managing editor. The united society takes occasion of the union to issue as the eighty-first annual report of the Georgia Historical Society, and as nos. 2 and 3 of vol. IV. of the *Georgia Historical Quarterly*, a handbook containing all the documents and explanations necessary toward understanding the history, achievements, publications, and possessions of both societies.

The *Louisiana Historical Quarterly* for January has papers on the Louisiana Territory, by Professor Cardinal Goodwin, and on the History of Natchitoches, by Milton Dunn, but will be chiefly valued for the specimen documents from the archives of the Cabildo of New Orleans, 1725-1770, printed, with translations, by the care of Mr. Henry P. Dart, who has with great energy promoted the preservation of that remarkable body of material.

WESTERN STATES

The July number of the *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* is a record of the proceedings of the twelfth annual meeting of the Mississippi Valley Historical Association, held in St. Louis in May, 1919. A summary account of the proceedings is given by Charles W. Hackett. The papers printed in the *Review* are: Following the Westward Star, by Chancellor L. Jenks; the Commerce of the Lower Mississippi in the Period 1830-1860, by R. B. Way; the Mexican Problem: a Possible Peaceful Solution, by I. J. Cox; the Attitude of Swedish Americans toward the World War, by George M. Stephenson; Texas and the Preservation of War History Material, by Milton R. Gutsch; Louisiana State War Activities, by William Beer; Constitution Making in Missouri, by C. H. McClure; Banking and Finance in Missouri in the Thirties, by F. F. Stephens; the Jesuit in the Mississippi Valley, by Laurence J. Kenny; and a group of four papers on the effect of the war on historical instruction in schools and colleges. The September number contains an article by Walter R. Sharp on Henry S. Lane and the Formation of the Republican Party in Indiana; one by Professor W. H. Siebert on Kentucky's Struggle with its Loyalist Proprietors; and a survey of recent historical activities in the Old Northwest, by Professor A. C. Cole. Professor Raymond G. Taylor describes some sources for the agricultural history of the Mississippi Valley, and Professor W. L. Fleming presents some documents relating to Jefferson Davis at West Point.

The Rise of Methodism in the West: being the Journal of the Western Conference, 1800-1811, with notes and introduction by William W. Sweet, is from the press of the Methodist Book Concern.

The Ohio Valley Historical Association held its thirteenth session at Columbus, October 15 and 16, in conjunction with a meeting of the Ohio History Teachers' Association. The address of the president, Professor W. H. Siebert of the Ohio State University, was on the Future of the

Ohio Valley Historical Association. There were also papers on the Extinction of the Indian Title in Ohio beyond the Greenville Line, by Professor Homer C. Hockett, on New England Influences on the Ohio Public School System, by Professor E. A. Miller of Oberlin, and on Educational Beginnings in West Virginia, by Professor J. M. Callahan.

The principal content of the July number of the *Ohio Archaeological and Historical Quarterly* is an account by C. B. Galbreath, of Lafayette's Visit to Ohio Valley States. The story of Lafayette's journey, which occupies somewhat more than 100 pages of the *Quarterly*, contains letters, addresses, and much contemporary narrative.

The *Quarterly Publication of the Historical and Philosophical Society of Ohio* prints in the July-September number a second installment of Selections from the Gano Papers. The letters (1812) are principally from General Gano, some of them to Governor R. J. Meigs. There is one letter from General Lewis Cass.

No. 11 of the *Bulletins* of the Indiana Historical Commission is a report of the proceedings of the State History Conference held at Indianapolis in December, 1919. It contains many useful essays in Indiana history.

The March number of the *Indiana Magazine of History* contains an initial article by Charles E. Canup on the Temperance Movement in Indiana, and a continuation of R. C. Buley's study of Indiana in the Mexican War. In the June number are: a sketch, by Martha Tucker Morris, of Christopher Harrison, lieutenant-governor of Indiana, 1816-1818, a continuation of Mr. Canup's paper, and an article, by Elmore Barce, on the Savage Allies of the Northwest. The latter study will be continued. The September number is a monograph, by Carl Painter, on the Progressive Party in Indiana.

The *Annual Report* of the Chicago Historical Society for 1919, in addition to the usual records of progress, contains a striking series of pictures and brief biographical sketches of young men who were killed in the war and were sons of members of the society.

Laurence J. Kenny, S. J., contributes to the October number of the *Illinois Catholic Historical Review* an article entitled Some First Ladies of Illinois, and Joseph J. Thompson one on Catholic Statesmen of Illinois. Other articles are continuations hitherto mentioned.

The April number of the *Tennessee Historical Magazine* has for its principal content the concluding installment of the Journal of Governor John Sevier, which comes to an end a few days before his death in September, 1815. There are also six letters from Sevier to his son, George Washington Sevier, 1812, 1813, and 1815. Hon. Park Marshall contributes some facts concerning John A. Murrell and Daniel Crenshaw, noted criminals (about 1825), and Miss Kate White a body of marriage

records of Knox County, 1792-1811, culled from a mass of loose papers in the county archives.

Mr. J. Tyree Fain has completed the *Index to Ramsey's Annals of Tennessee* (Nashville, Paul Hunter).

The National Book Company of Chicago has brought out *A School History of Tennessee*, by Gustavus W. Dyer.

Michigan Military Records, Bulletin no. 12 (pp. 244), issued by the Michigan Historical Commission, comprises three compilations of the Daughters of the American Revolution of Michigan, namely, Records of the Revolutionary Soldiers Buried in Michigan, the Pensioners of Territorial Michigan, and the Soldiers of Michigan awarded the Medal of Honor. There are several portraits in the volume. The editor is Sue I. Silliman, state historian of the Daughters of the American Revolution.

In the September number of the *Wisconsin Magazine of History* Major-Gen. William G. Haan describes the Division as a Fighting Machine, having reference primarily to his own division, the thirty-second, and describing very effectively some of its operations. There is an article by Dr. Joseph Schafer on Muscoda, 1763-1856, one by Professor Julius E. Olsen on Lincoln in Wisconsin, and a continuation of the papers of W. A. Titus on Historic Spots in Wisconsin. Dr. Schafer also discusses the proposed Wisconsin Domesday Book. In the section of documents is an installment of letters (1862) of Chauncey H. Cooke, a boy soldier, and in the Survey of Historical Activities is a descriptive account, by Louise P. Kellogg, of the papers of Charles M. Baker (1804-1872), recently acquired by the State Historical Society. The December number has articles on the Trails of Northern Wisconsin, by James H. McManus; on Col. Hans Christian Heg, colonel of a Scandinavian regiment in the Civil War, the Fifteenth Wisconsin (but killed at Chickamauga), by Dr. Theodore C. Blegen; and on the Panic of 1862 in Wisconsin, by Dr. M. M. Quaife. The later pages give interesting accounts of manuscript materials lately received by the State Historical Society: papers of Capt. William Charleton, of Col. Simeon D. Clough, and of the Wood family of Vermont, an autobiography of President Josiah L. Pickard, diaries and papers of John H. Knapp, and letters received by Louis Perrault from the Canadian revolutionaries of 1837, especially E. B. O'Callaghan.

Dr. Joseph Schafer, superintendent of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin, is engaged in the preparation of a biographical sketch of William Stephen Hamilton, participant in the early Indian wars, president of the first council of Wisconsin Territory, and member of the assembly, 1842-1843, as well as a pioneer in the lead region of Wisconsin. He was a son of Alexander Hamilton.

The August number of the *Minnesota History Bulletin*, which is designated "Dedication Number", is principally devoted to a record of the exercises at the dedication of the Minnesota Historical Society Building in May, 1918. Foremost in this record is the address of Professor Frederick J. Turner, Middle Western Pioneer Democracy.

In the *Iowa Journal of History and Politics* Mr. Jacob Van der Zee reviews the work of the Iowa code commission, and in a separate article discusses the problem of indexing the compiled code, a task which Mr. Van der Zee himself has performed.

The July number of the *Annals of Iowa* prints the Minutes of the Sac and Fox Indian Councils of 1841 and 1842, recorded by James W. Grimes and John Beach, respectively, secretaries to the commissioners for the United States. In the editorial department is printed the text of the treaty of 1842. There are also an autobiographical sketch of John A. Kasson (1822-1910), and an interesting Letter from a Citizen of the Southern Confederacy (J. W. Thatcher), written from Berkeley County, Virginia, May 12, 1861, to his brother in Ohio.

The "Missouri Centennial Number" (October) of the *Missouri Historical Review* contains an interesting and valuable group of papers treating different phases of the state's history. These are: the Travail of Missouri for Statehood, by Walter B. Stevens; Missouri in 1820, by Jonas Viles; a Century of Journalism in Missouri, by W. V. Byars; a Century of Missouri Literature, by Alexander N. DeMenil; a Century of Transportation in Missouri, by Edward J. White; Labor and Industry in Missouri during the Last Century, by Lee Meriwether; Social Customs and Usages in Missouri during the last Century, by Mary Alicia Owen; and Social Reform in Missouri during the last Century, by George B. Mangold. There is also some account of the centennial celebrations. Other centennial articles will appear in the January number.

Mr. Waddy Thompson of Atlanta, grandson of the United States minister to Mexico from 1842 to 1844, recently presented to the Texas State Historical Association sixteen letters to or from Waddy Thompson, 1842 to 1848. Among the writers are Jackson, Tyler, Webster, Calhoun, Reverdy Johnson, Hugh McLeod, José Maria Tornel, and Santa Anna.

The larger part of the October number of the *Southwestern Historical Quarterly* is occupied with chapters of A. K. Christian's *Mirabeau Buonaparte Lamar*, which will be concluded in the next number of the *Quarterly*. There is also an article, by William R. Lewis, on the Hayes Administration and Mexico. The Minutes of the Ayuntamiento of San Felipe de Austin, 1828-1832, edited by Eugene C. Barker, are concluded in this number.

Professor Thomas M. Marshall has edited, and the University of Colorado has published, as the second volume of its *Historical Collections* (Boulder, 1920, pp. xvi, 313) *The Early Records of Gilpin County*,

Colorado, 1859-1861, containing material described in his article on "The Miners' Laws of Colorado" in the preceding volume of this journal (XXV. 426-439).

The October number of the *Washington Historical Quarterly* contains an account, by William S. Lewis, of the First Militia Companies in Eastern Washington Territory, a sketch, by James E. Babb, of Judge E. P. Oliphant, who held the first court within the present limits of Idaho (then, 1862, a part of the territory of Washington), a bibliography of the anthropology of Puget Sound Indians, by J. D. Leechman, and continuations heretofore mentioned.

The contents of the June number of the *Quarterly of the Oregon Historical Society* are: David Thompson and Beginnings in Idaho, by T. C. Elliott; Educational Plans and Efforts by Methodists in Oregon to 1860, by Read Bain; and History of Oregon Normal Schools, by John C. Almack.

Thomas C. Russell of San Francisco has brought out a reprint, "line for line and page for page", from Barrington's *Miscellanies* (London, 1781), of the *Voyage of the Sonora in the Second Bucareli Expedition*, to which he has added "many other interesting notes as well as an index to both text and notes", a reproduction of Bodega's Carta General, and a portrait of Daines Barrington.

A Journal of a Trip to California: Across the Continent, from Weston, Missouri, to Weber Creek, California, in the Summer of 1850, by C. W. Smith, edited by R. W. G. Vail, librarian of the Minnesota Historical Society, has been brought out by the Cadmus Book Shop, 312 34th street, New York.

CANADA

The Public Archives of Canada have of late been greatly enriched by addition of volumes of transcripts from London and Paris. Those from the Public Record Office cover 13 volumes of C. O. 1, 23 volumes of C. O. 5, 43 Admiralty volumes, and 9 volumes from the Chatham manuscripts; there are also transcripts of 25 volumes of the American manuscripts at the Royal Institute. From England also have come 24 volumes of Simcoe papers. From Paris the chief accessions represent the first 109 volumes of series B² and the first 111 volumes of series B³ in the Archives de la Marine; Correspondance Politique, Angleterre, vols. 83-235, and États Unis, vols. 23-25, from the Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; 310 numbers from the Bibliothèque Nationale, and 26 (Bastille) from the Bibliothèque de l'Arsenal. Of the Jugements et Délibérations du Conseil Supérieur, the transcripts, from Quebec, have now reached 1735.

For the Board of Historical Publication, connected with the Public Archives of Canada, Dr. Adam Shortt is preparing a large collection of documents exhibiting the history of paper and other currency in French and English Canada and in the colony of Nova Scotia. Later, he in-

tends to prepare a series of documents illustrating the history of land-grants and thereby the progress of settlement in Canada.

The third number of the *Canadian Historical Review*, that for September, maintains the character for varied and excellent material established by its predecessors. There are papers on Captains of Militia in the French period, by Benjamin Sulte, on the Vérendrye question, by A. H. de Trémaudan, on Canadian Opinion of Southern Secession in the United States, by Fred Landon, and on the Imperial Ideas of Benjamin Disraeli, by Professor J. L. Morison. The documents consist of two letters found by Miss Irene A. Wright in the Archives of the Indies at Seville, casting light on Canada in 1608, and an autobiographical memorial (1818) of J. M. Caldwell illustrative of political affairs in Canada between 1810 and 1818.

The Champlain Society has issued to its members the first of three volumes of *Select British Documents of the Canadian War of 1812*, edited by Col. William Wood.

Professor Oscar D. Skelton of Queen's University, Kingston, is about to publish *The Life and Times of Sir Alexander Tilloch Galt* (Oxford University Press), based on the private papers of Sir Alexander Galt and on papers in the Public Archives of Canada relating to the period just before and after Confederation.

A volume that should prove of interest to several classes of readers is *The Life of Sir William Van Horne*, builder of the Canadian Pacific Railroad, by Walter Vaughan (Century).

The Canadians in France, 1915-1918, by Captain Harwood Steele, is a detailed history of the Canadian army corps in the World War (New York, Dutton).

AMERICA, SOUTH OF THE UNITED STATES

The August number of the *Hispanic American Historical Review* has three main articles: one by Señor José M. O. Capseguí on "Don Manuel Josef de Ayala y la Historia de Nuestra Legislación de Indias"; one by Miss Irene A. Wright on Rescates (illicit trade) with special reference to Cuba, 1599-1610; and one by Professor W. W. Pierson, jr., on Alberdi's Views on the Monroe Doctrine.

M. Rodríguez Codola has written an *Historia de España y de las Pueblos Hispanoamericanos hasta su Independencia* (Barcelona, 1919, vol. I., pp. 544); and E. Restrepo-Tirado, *Descubrimiento y Conquista de Colombia* (Bogotá, Imp. Nacional, 1919, vol. II., pp. 431).

Los Estados Unidos de América y las Repúblicas Hispanoamericanas de 1810-1830 (Bogotá, Imp. Nacional, 1918), by F. J. Urrutia, will interest students of the Monroe doctrine.

Noteworthy articles in periodicals: Sir W. Ashley, *The Pilgrim Fathers and their Place in History* (Quarterly Review, October); R. H.

Murray, *The Pilgrim Fathers* (Edinburgh Review, October); C. F. Thwing, *The Pilgrims' Motive and Contribution* (Hibbert Journal, October); H. H. Scullard, *The Theology of John Robinson and of the Pilgrim Fathers* (*ibid.*); C. Burrage, *The Earliest Minor Accounts of Plymouth Plantation* (Harvard Theological Review, October); L. N. Kinnicutt, *Plymouth's Debt to the Indians* (*ibid.*); Archibald Henderson, *Daniel Boone and the American Pioneer* (Century, September); R. B. Anderson, *Kleng Peerson, the Father of Norwegian Immigration to America* (American Scandinavian Review, July); W. M. Persons, P. M. Tuttle, and E. Frickey, *Business and Financial Conditions following the Civil War in the United States* (Review of Economic Statistics, Supplement, July); G. Bradford, *American Portraits, 1875-1890: James Gillespie Blaine* (Atlantic Monthly, October); Grover Cleveland (*ibid.*, November); E. S. Martin, *Mr. Choate in England: his Letters showing his Activities while Ambassador* (Scribner's Magazine, October); J. W. Pratt, *The British Blockade and American Precedent* (U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November); C. G. Fenwick, *Democracy and Efficient Government: Lessons of the War* (American Political Science Review, November); Hon. Justice Longley, *Reminiscences Political and Otherwise* (Canadian Magazine, October, November, December); A. González Palencia, *Extracto del Catálogo de los Documentos del Consejo de Indias conservados en la Sección de Consejos del Archivo Historico Nacional* (Revista de Archivos, Bibliotecas, y Museos, July); C. Viñas Mey, *La Legislación Social en la Recopilación de Indias* (*ibid.*); G. N. Tricoche, *Batailles Oubliées: les Anglais à Buenos-Ayres, 8-9 Juillet 1807* (Revue Historique, July-August); Beltran Mathieu, *The Neutrality of Chile during the European War* (American Journal of International Law, July).

(P. S. to p. 374.) ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION. A brief delay in the printing of this number of the *Review* makes it possible to give members early notice of some of the chief transactions of the annual meeting. A fuller account will, as usual, be printed in the April number.

The registration numbered 360. The secretary's report showed a membership of 2524, a gain of 79 since the preceding year. The treasurer's report showed receipts of \$10,483, expenditures of \$9,786; but so extraordinarily has the cost of printing the *American Historical Review* increased, especially in the latter months of the year, that instead of paying to the Macmillan Company fifty cents per copy supplied to members of the Association, it becomes necessary to pay hereafter seventy cents, or, per annum, \$2.80, nearly the total sum paid by each member as annual dues. Therefore the Association voted to submit to the next annual meeting an amendment to the constitution increasing the annual dues from three dollars to five dollars (and the life-membership fee from fifty dollars to one hundred), and in the mean time to authorize

the treasurer, when sending out the bills in September, to invite voluntary contributions of from two to five dollars additional to the dues. Provision was also made for a committee on increase of the endowment.

The special Committee on Policy submitted an elaborate report. Such of its recommendations as could be carried into effect under existing conditions were adopted; among them, an arrangement securing somewhat greater permanence to the Committee on the Programme. It was voted that the next meeting should be held in St. Louis, at the end of December, 1921; Professor Evarts B. Greene was made chairman of the Committee on the Programme. The special Committee on History in the Schools was, at its request, discharged, and the completion of its work was intrusted to a new committee having a similar designation. The prize for the best essay in military history, which, it was voted, should be called the Robert M. Johnston Prize, was awarded to Mr. Thomas R. Hay, for an essay on Hood's Tennessee Campaign. The Committee on the Justin Winsor Prize having been unable to agree upon an award, the decision was referred to the new committee, that for 1921-1922.

His Excellency the French ambassador, Mr. Jusserand, was chosen president for the ensuing year, Professor Charles H. Haskins first vice-president, Professor Edward P. Cheyney second vice-president. Professor Bassett and Mr. Moore were re-elected secretary and treasurer respectively. The elections to the Executive Council followed precisely the list presented by the Committee on Nominations, except that Professor Becker withdrew his name, preferring to continue as a member of the Board of Editors of this journal, whereupon the committee substituted the name of Professor Sioussat. The councillors elected were: Miss Ruth Putnam, Professors Arthur L. Cross, Sidney B. Fay, Carl R. Fish, Carlton J. H. Hayes, Frederic L. Paxson, James T. Shotwell, and St. George L. Sioussat. The Council elected Professor Guy S. Ford a member of the Board of Editors of this journal, in the place of Professor J. H. Robinson, whose term had expired, and Professor Archibald C. Coolidge in the place of Professor Cheyney, who resigned after being elected a vice-president.

In view of the small number of the ballots which had been received in the autumnal "primary", and by which the Committee on Nominations had been guided, the outgoing chairman of that committee, Mr. Paltsits, proposed for consideration next year an amendment to by-law no. 2 which would abolish the provision for this formal balloting, and would leave it to the committee to nominate, with only such indications from other members as letters received from them, or their conversation, might supply. Meantime it was voted that the preliminary ballot should be omitted in 1921. The writer of these lines, however (who believes the ballot to be useful), is convinced that the Association never intended that any nominating committee should think itself bound to follow rigidly, without discretion, the numerical results of the balloting.